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		The Wealth of Networks - How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom
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		Yochai Benkler
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		Copyright (C) 2006 Yochai Benkler.;<br /> License: All rights reserved. Subject to the exception immediately following, this book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/ The author has made an online version of the book available under a Creative Commons Noncommercial Sharealike license; it can be accessed through the author's website at http://www.benkler.org.
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	<text class="h1">
		The Wealth of Networks - How Social Production Transforms Markets and
Freedom,<br />Yochai Benkler
	</text>
</object>
<object id="2">
	<ocn>2</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Acknowledgments
	</text>
</object>
<object id="3">
	<ocn>3</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Reading this manuscript was an act of heroic generosity. I owe my
gratitude to those who did and who therefore helped me to avoid at
least some of the errors that I would have made without their
assistance. Bruce Ackerman spent countless hours listening, and reading
and challenging both this book and its precursor bits and pieces since
2001. I owe much of its present conception and form to his friendship.
Jack Balkin not only read the manuscript, but in an act of great
generosity taught it to his seminar, imposed it on the fellows of
Yale's Information Society Project, and then spent hours with me
working through the limitations and pitfalls they found. Marvin Ammori,
Ady Barkan, Elazar Barkan, Becky Bolin, Eszter Hargittai, Niva Elkin
Koren, Amy Kapczynski, Eddan Katz, Zac Katz, Nimrod Koslovski, Orly
Lobel, Katherine McDaniel, and Siva Vaidhyanathan all read the
manuscript and provided valuable thoughts and insights. Michael
O'Malley from Yale University Press deserves special thanks for helping
me decide to write the book that I really wanted to write, not
something else, and then stay the course. <sub>[pg 10]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="4">
	<ocn>4</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This book has been more than a decade in the making. Its roots go back
to 1993-1994: long nights of conversations, as only graduate students
can have, with Niva Elkin Koren about democracy in cyberspace; a series
of formative conversations with Mitch Kapor; a couple of madly
imaginative sessions with Charlie Nesson; and a moment of true
understanding with Eben Moglen. Equally central from around that time,
but at an angle, were a paper under Terry Fisher's guidance on
nineteenth-century homesteading and the radical republicans, and a
series of classes and papers with Frank Michelman, Duncan Kennedy, Mort
Horwitz, Roberto Unger, and the late David Charny, which led me to
think quite fundamentally about the role of property and economic
organization in the construction of human freedom. It was Frank
Michelman who taught me that the hard trick was to do so as a liberal.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="5">
	<ocn>5</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Since then, I have been fortunate in many and diverse intellectual
friendships and encounters, from people in different fields and foci,
who shed light on various aspects of this project. I met Larry Lessig
for (almost) the first time in 1998. By the end of a two-hour
conversation, we had formed a friendship and intellectual conversation
that has been central to my work ever since. He has, over the past few
years, played a pivotal role in changing the public understanding of
control, freedom, and creativity in the digital environment. Over the
course of these years, I spent many hours learning from Jamie Boyle,
Terry Fisher, and Eben Moglen. In different ways and styles, each of
them has had significant influence on my work. There was a moment,
sometime between the conference Boyle organized at Yale in 1999 and the
one he organized at Duke in 2001, when a range of people who had been
doing similar things, pushing against the wind with varying degrees of
interconnection, seemed to cohere into a single intellectual movement,
centered on the importance of the commons to information production and
creativity generally, and to the digitally networked environment in
particular. In various contexts, both before this period and since, I
have learned much from Julie Cohen, Becky Eisenberg, Bernt Hugenholtz,
David Johnson, David Lange, Jessica Litman, Neil Netanel, Helen
Nissenbaum, Peggy Radin, Arti Rai, David Post, Jerry Reichman, Pam
Samuelson, Jon Zittrain, and Diane Zimmerman. One of the great
pleasures of this field is the time I have been able to spend with
technologists, economists, sociologists, and others who don't quite fit
into any of these categories. Many have been very patient with me and
taught me much. In particular, I owe thanks to Sam Bowles, Dave Clark,
Dewayne Hendricks, Richard Jefferson, Natalie Jeremijenko, Tara Lemmey,
Josh Lerner, Andy Lippman, David Reed, Chuck Sabel, Jerry Saltzer, Tim
Shepard, Clay Shirky, and Eric von Hippel. In constitutional law and
political theory, I benefited early and consistently from the insights
of Ed Baker, with whom I spent many hours puzzling through practically
every problem of political theory that I tackle in this book; Chris
Eisgruber, Dick Fallon, Larry Kramer, Burt Neuborne, Larry Sager, and
Kathleen Sullivan all helped in constructing various components of the
argument.
	</text>
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<object id="6">
	<ocn>6</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Much of the early work in this project was done at New York University,
whose law school offered me an intellectually engaging and
institutionally safe environment to explore some quite unorthodox
views. A friend, visiting when I gave a brown-bag workshop there in
1998, pointed out that at very few law schools could I have presented
"The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy" as an
untenured member of the faculty, to a room full of law and economics
scholars, without jeopardizing my career. Mark Geistfeld, in
particular, helped me work though the economics of sharing--as we
shared many a pleasant afternoon on the beach, watching our boys
playing in the waves. I benefited from the generosity of Al Engelberg,
who funded the Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy and
through it students and fellows, from whose work I learned so much; and
Arthur Penn, who funded the Information Law Institute and through it
that amazing intellectual moment, the 2000 conference on "A Free
Information Ecology in the Digital Environment," and the series of
workshops that became the Open Spectrum Project. During that period, I
was fortunate enough to have had wonderful students and fellows with
whom I worked in various ways that later informed this book, in
particular Gaia Bernstein, Mike Burstein, John Kuzin, Greg Pomerantz,
Steve Snyder, and Alan Toner.
	</text>
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<object id="7">
	<ocn>7</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Since 2001, first as a visitor and now as a member, I have had the
remarkable pleasure of being part of the intellectual community that is
Yale Law School. The book in its present form, structure, and emphasis
is a direct reflection of my immersion in this wonderful community.
Practically every single one of my colleagues has read articles I have
written over this period, attended workshops where I presented my work,
provided comments that helped to improve the articles--and through
them, this book, as well. I owe each and every one of them thanks, not
least to Tony Kronman, who made me see that it would be so. To list
them all would be redundant. To list some would inevitably
underrepresent the various contributions they have made. Still, I will
try to say a few of the special thanks, owing much yet to <sub>[pg
xii]</sub> those I will not name. Working out the economics was a
precondition of being able to make the core political claims. Bob
Ellickson, Dan Kahan, and Carol Rose all engaged deeply with questions
of reciprocity and commonsbased production, while Jim Whitman kept my
feet to the fire on the relationship to the anthropology of the gift.
Ian Ayres, Ron Daniels during his visit, Al Klevorick, George Priest,
Susan Rose-Ackerman, and Alan Schwartz provided much-needed mixtures of
skepticism and help in constructing the arguments that would allay it.
Akhil Amar, Owen Fiss, Jerry Mashaw, Robert Post, Jed Rubenfeld, Reva
Siegal, and Kenji Yoshino helped me work on the normative and
constitutional questions. The turn I took to focusing on global
development as the core aspect of the implications for justice, as it
is in chapter 9, resulted from an invitation from Harold Koh and Oona
Hathaway to speak at their seminar on globalization, and their
thoughtful comments to my paper. The greatest influence on that turn
has been Amy Kapczynski's work as a fellow at Yale, and with her, the
students who invited me to work with them on university licensing
policy, in particular, Sam Chaifetz.
	</text>
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<object id="8">
	<ocn>8</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Oddly enough, I have <b>never had the proper context</b> in which to
give two more basic thanks. My father, who was swept up in the
resistance to British colonialism and later in Israel's War of
Independence, dropped out of high school. He was left with a passionate
intellectual hunger and a voracious appetite for reading. He died too
young to even imagine sitting, as I do today with my own sons, with the
greatest library in human history right there, at the dinner table,
with us. But he would have loved it. Another great debt is to David
Grais, who spent many hours mentoring me in my first law job, bought me
my first copy of Strunk and White, and, for all practical purposes,
taught me how to write in English; as he reads these words, he will be
mortified, I fear, to be associated with a work of authorship as
undisciplined as this, with so many excessively long sentences, replete
with dependent clauses and unnecessarily complex formulations of quite
simple ideas.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="9">
	<ocn>9</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Finally, to my best friend and tag-team partner in this tussle we call
life, Deborah Schrag, with whom I have shared nicely more or less
everything since we were barely adults. <sub>[pg 1]</sub>
	</text>
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<object id="10">
	<ocn>10</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Chapter 1 - Introduction: A Moment of Opportunity and Challenge
	</text>
</object>
<object id="11">
	<ocn>11</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Information, knowledge, and culture are central to human freedom and
human development. How they are produced and exchanged in our society
critically affects the way we see the state of the world as it is and
might be; who decides these questions; and how we, as societies and
polities, come to understand what can and ought to be done. For more
than 150 years, modern complex democracies have depended in large
measure on an industrial information economy for these basic functions.
In the past decade and a half, we have begun to see a radical change in
the organization of information production. Enabled by technological
change, we are beginning to see a series of economic, social, and
cultural adaptations that make possible a radical transformation of how
we make the information environment we occupy as autonomous
individuals, citizens, and members of cultural and social groups. It
seems passe today to speak of "the Internet revolution." In some
academic circles, it is positively na&#239;ve. But it should not be.
The change brought about by the networked information environment is
deep. It is structural. It goes to the very foundations of how liberal
markets and liberal democracies have coevolved for almost two
centuries. <sub>[pg 2]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="12">
	<ocn>12</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A series of changes in the technologies, economic organization, and
social practices of production in this environment has created new
opportunities for how we make and exchange information, knowledge, and
culture. These changes have increased the role of nonmarket and
nonproprietary production, both by individuals alone and by cooperative
efforts in a wide range of loosely or tightly woven collaborations.
These newly emerging practices have seen remarkable success in areas as
diverse as software development and investigative reporting,
avant-garde video and multiplayer online games. Together, they hint at
the emergence of a new information environment, one in which
individuals are free to take a more active role than was possible in
the industrial information economy of the twentieth century. This new
freedom holds great practical promise: as a dimension of individual
freedom; as a platform for better democratic participation; as a medium
to foster a more critical and self-reflective culture; and, in an
increasingly information dependent global economy, as a mechanism to
achieve improvements in human development everywhere.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="13">
	<ocn>13</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The rise of greater scope for individual and cooperative nonmarket
production of information and culture, however, threatens the
incumbents of the industrial information economy. At the beginning of
the twenty-first century, we find ourselves in the midst of a battle
over the institutional ecology of the digital environment. A wide range
of laws and institutions-- from broad areas like telecommunications,
copyright, or international trade regulation, to minutiae like the
rules for registering domain names or whether digital television
receivers will be required by law to recognize a particular code--are
being tugged and warped in efforts to tilt the playing field toward one
way of doing things or the other. How these battles turn out over the
next decade or so will likely have a significant effect on how we come
to know what is going on in the world we occupy, and to what extent and
in what forms we will be able--as autonomous individuals, as citizens,
and as participants in cultures and communities--to affect how we and
others see the world as it is and as it might be.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="14">
	<ocn>14</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		THE EMERGENCE OF THE NETWORKED INFORMATION ECONOMY
	</text>
</object>
<object id="15">
	<ocn>15</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The most advanced economies in the world today have made two parallel
shifts that, paradoxically, make possible a significant attenuation of
the limitations that market-based production places on the pursuit of
the political <sub>[pg 3]</sub> values central to liberal societies.
The first move, in the making for more than a century, is to an economy
centered on information (financial services, accounting, software,
science) and cultural (films, music) production, and the manipulation
of symbols (from making sneakers to branding them and manufacturing the
cultural significance of the Swoosh). The second is the move to a
communications environment built on cheap processors with high
computation capabilities, interconnected in a pervasive network--the
phenomenon we associate with the Internet. It is this second shift that
allows for an increasing role for nonmarket production in the
information and cultural production sector, organized in a radically
more decentralized pattern than was true of this sector in the
twentieth century. The first shift means that these new patterns of
production--nonmarket and radically decentralized--will emerge, if
permitted, at the core, rather than the periphery of the most advanced
economies. It promises to enable social production and exchange to play
a much larger role, alongside property- and marketbased production,
than they ever have in modern democracies.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="16">
	<ocn>16</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The first part of this book is dedicated to establishing a number of
basic economic observations. Its overarching claim is that we are
seeing the emergence of a new stage in the information economy, which I
call the "networked information economy." It is displacing the
industrial information economy that typified information production
from about the second half of the nineteenth century and throughout the
twentieth century. What characterizes the networked information economy
is that decentralized individual action--specifically, new and
important cooperative and coordinate action carried out through
radically distributed, nonmarket mechanisms that do not depend on
proprietary strategies--plays a much greater role than it did, or could
have, in the industrial information economy. The catalyst for this
change is the happenstance of the fabrication technology of
computation, and its ripple effects throughout the technologies of
communication and storage. The declining price of computation,
communication, and storage have, as a practical matter, placed the
material means of information and cultural production in the hands of a
significant fraction of the world's population--on the order of a
billion people around the globe. The core distinguishing feature of
communications, information, and cultural production since the
mid-nineteenth century was that effective communication spanning the
ever-larger societies and geographies that came to make up the relevant
political and economic units of the day required ever-larger
investments of physical capital. Large-circulation mechanical presses,
the telegraph <sub>[pg 4]</sub> system, powerful radio and later
television transmitters, cable and satellite, and the mainframe
computer became necessary to make information and communicate it on
scales that went beyond the very local. Wanting to communicate with
others was not a sufficient condition to being able to do so. As a
result, information and cultural production took on, over the course of
this period, a more industrial model than the economics of information
itself would have required. The rise of the networked,
computer-mediated communications environment has changed this basic
fact. The material requirements for effective information production
and communication are now owned by numbers of individuals several
orders of magnitude larger than the number of owners of the basic means
of information production and exchange a mere two decades ago.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="17">
	<ocn>17</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The removal of the physical constraints on effective information
production has made human creativity and the economics of information
itself the core structuring facts in the new networked information
economy. These have quite different characteristics than coal, steel,
and manual human labor, which characterized the industrial economy and
structured our basic thinking about economic production for the past
century. They lead to three observations about the emerging information
production system. First, nonproprietary strategies have always been
more important in information production than they were in the
production of steel or automobiles, even when the economics of
communication weighed in favor of industrial models. Education, arts
and sciences, political debate, and theological disputation have always
been much more importantly infused with nonmarket motivations and
actors than, say, the automobile industry. As the material barrier that
ultimately nonetheless drove much of our information environment to be
funneled through the proprietary, market-based strategies is removed,
these basic nonmarket, nonproprietary, motivations and organizational
forms should in principle become even more important to the information
production system.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="18">
	<ocn>18</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Second, we have in fact seen the rise of nonmarket production to much
greater importance. Individuals can reach and inform or edify millions
around the world. Such a reach was simply unavailable to diversely
motivated individuals before, unless they funneled their efforts
through either market organizations or philanthropically or
state-funded efforts. The fact that every such effort is available to
anyone connected to the network, from anywhere, has led to the
emergence of coordinate effects, where the aggregate effect of
individual action, even when it is not self-consciously cooperative,
produces <sub>[pg 5]</sub> the coordinate effect of a new and rich
information environment. One needs only to run a Google search on any
subject of interest to see how the "information good" that is the
response to one's query is produced by the coordinate effects of the
uncoordinated actions of a wide and diverse range of individuals and
organizations acting on a wide range of motivations-- both market and
nonmarket, state-based and nonstate.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="19">
	<ocn>19</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Third, and likely most radical, new, and difficult for observers to
believe, is the rise of effective, large-scale cooperative
efforts--peer production of information, knowledge, and culture. These
are typified by the emergence of free and open-source software. We are
beginning to see the expansion of this model not only to our core
software platforms, but beyond them into every domain of information
and cultural production--and this book visits these in many different
domains--from peer production of encyclopedias, to news and commentary,
to immersive entertainment.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="20">
	<ocn>20</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		It is easy to miss these changes. They run against the grain of some of
our most basic Economics 101 intuitions, intuitions honed in the
industrial economy at a time when the only serious alternative seen was
state Communism--an alternative almost universally considered
unattractive today. The undeniable economic success of free software
has prompted some leading-edge economists to try to understand why many
thousands of loosely networked free software developers can compete
with Microsoft at its own game and produce a massive operating
system--GNU/Linux. That growing literature, consistent with its own
goals, has focused on software and the particulars of the free and
open-source software development communities, although Eric von
Hippel's notion of "user-driven innovation" has begun to expand that
focus to thinking about how individual need and creativity drive
innovation at the individual level, and its diffusion through networks
of likeminded individuals. The political implications of free software
have been central to the free software movement and its founder,
Richard Stallman, and were developed provocatively and with great
insight by Eben Moglen. Free software is but one salient example of a
much broader phenomenon. Why can fifty thousand volunteers successfully
coauthor <i>Wikipedia</i>, the most serious online alternative to the
Encyclopedia Britannica, and then turn around and give it away for
free? Why do 4.5 million volunteers contribute their leftover computer
cycles to create the most powerful supercomputer on Earth, SETI@Home?
Without a broadly accepted analytic model to explain these phenomena,
we tend to treat them as curiosities, perhaps transient fads, possibly
of significance in one market segment or another. We <sub>[pg 6]</sub>
should try instead to see them for what they are: a new mode of
production emerging in the middle of the most advanced economies in the
world-- those that are the most fully computer networked and for which
information goods and services have come to occupy the highest-valued
roles.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="21">
	<ocn>21</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Human beings are, and always have been, diversely motivated beings. We
act instrumentally, but also noninstrumentally. We act for material
gain, but also for psychological well-being and gratification, and for
social connectedness. There is nothing new or earth-shattering about
this, except perhaps to some economists. In the industrial economy in
general, and the industrial information economy as well, most
opportunities to make things that were valuable and important to many
people were constrained by the physical capital requirements of making
them. From the steam engine to the assembly line, from the
double-rotary printing press to the communications satellite, the
capital constraints on action were such that simply wanting to do
something was rarely a sufficient condition to enable one to do it.
Financing the necessary physical capital, in turn, oriented the
necessarily capital-intensive projects toward a production and
organizational strategy that could justify the investments. In market
economies, that meant orienting toward market production. In state-run
economies, that meant orienting production toward the goals of the
state bureaucracy. In either case, the practical individual freedom to
cooperate with others in making things of value was limited by the
extent of the capital requirements of production.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="22">
	<ocn>22</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In the networked information economy, the physical capital required for
production is broadly distributed throughout society. Personal
computers and network connections are ubiquitous. This does not mean
that they cannot be used for markets, or that individuals cease to seek
market opportunities. It does mean, however, that whenever someone,
somewhere, among the billion connected human beings, and ultimately
among all those who will be connected, wants to make something that
requires human creativity, a computer, and a network connection, he or
she can do so--alone, or in cooperation with others. He or she already
has the capital capacity necessary to do so; if not alone, then at
least in cooperation with other individuals acting for complementary
reasons. The result is that a good deal more that human beings value
can now be done by individuals, who interact with each other socially,
as human beings and as social beings, rather than as market actors
through the price system. Sometimes, under conditions I specify in some
detail, these nonmarket collaborations can be better at motivating
effort and can allow creative people to work on information projects
more <sub>[pg 7]</sub> efficiently than would traditional market
mechanisms and corporations. The result is a flourishing nonmarket
sector of information, knowledge, and cultural production, based in the
networked environment, and applied to anything that the many
individuals connected to it can imagine. Its outputs, in turn, are not
treated as exclusive property. They are instead subject to an
increasingly robust ethic of open sharing, open for all others to build
on, extend, and make their own.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="23">
	<ocn>23</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Because the presence and importance of nonmarket production has become
so counterintuitive to people living in market-based economies at the
end of the twentieth century, part I of this volume is fairly detailed
and technical; overcoming what we intuitively "know" requires
disciplined analysis. Readers who are not inclined toward economic
analysis should at least read the introduction to part I, the segments
entitled "When Information Production Meets the Computer Network" and
"Diversity of Strategies in our Current Production System" in chapter
2, and the case studies in chapter 3. These should provide enough of an
intuitive feel for what I mean by the diversity of production
strategies for information and the emergence of nonmarket individual
and cooperative production, to serve as the basis for the more
normatively oriented parts of the book. Readers who are genuinely
skeptical of the possibility that nonmarket production is sustainable
and effective, and in many cases is an efficient strategy for
information, knowledge, and cultural production, should take the time
to read part I in its entirety. The emergence of precisely this
possibility and practice lies at the very heart of my claims about the
ways in which liberal commitments are translated into lived experiences
in the networked environment, and forms the factual foundation of the
political-theoretical and the institutional-legal discussion that
occupies the remainder of the book.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="24">
	<ocn>24</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		NETWORKED INFORMATION ECONOMY AND LIBERAL, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES
	</text>
</object>
<object id="25">
	<ocn>25</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		How we make information, how we get it, how we speak to others, and how
others speak to us are core components of the shape of freedom in any
society. Part II of this book provides a detailed look at how the
changes in the technological, economic, and social affordances of the
networked information environment affect a series of core commitments
of a wide range of liberal democracies. The basic claim is that the
diversity of ways of organizing information production and use opens a
range of possibilities for pursuing % <sub>[pg 8]</sub> the core
political values of liberal societies--individual freedom, a more
genuinely participatory political system, a critical culture, and
social justice. These values provide the vectors of political morality
along which the shape and dimensions of any liberal society can be
plotted. Because their practical policy implications are often
contradictory, rather than complementary, the pursuit of each places
certain limits on how we pursue the others, leading different liberal
societies to respect them in different patterns. How much a society
constrains the democratic decision-making powers of the majority in
favor of individual freedom, or to what extent it pursues social
justice, have always been attributes that define the political contours
and nature of that society. But the economics of industrial production,
and our pursuit of productivity and growth, have imposed a limit on how
we can pursue any mix of arrangements to implement our commitments to
freedom and justice. Singapore is commonly trotted out as an extreme
example of the trade-off of freedom for welfare, but all democracies
with advanced capitalist economies have made some such trade-off.
Predictions of how well we will be able to feed ourselves are always an
important consideration in thinking about whether, for example, to
democratize wheat production or make it more egalitarian. Efforts to
push workplace democracy have also often foundered on the shoals--real
or imagined--of these limits, as have many plans for redistribution in
the name of social justice. Market-based, proprietary production has
often seemed simply too productive to tinker with. The emergence of the
networked information economy promises to expand the horizons of the
feasible in political imagination. Different liberal polities can
pursue different mixtures of respect for different liberal commitments.
However, the overarching constraint represented by the seeming
necessity of the industrial model of information and cultural
production has significantly shifted as an effective constraint on the
pursuit of liberal commitments.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="26">
	<ocn>26</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Enhanced Autonomy
	</text>
</object>
<object id="27">
	<ocn>27</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The networked information economy improves the practical capacities of
individuals along three dimensions: (1) it improves their capacity to
do more for and by themselves; (2) it enhances their capacity to do
more in loose commonality with others, without being constrained to
organize their relationship through a price system or in traditional
hierarchical models of social and economic organization; and (3) it
improves the capacity of individuals to do more in formal organizations
that operate outside the market sphere. This enhanced autonomy is at
the core of all the other improvements I <sub>[pg 9]</sub> describe.
Individuals are using their newly expanded practical freedom to act and
cooperate with others in ways that improve the practiced experience of
democracy, justice and development, a critical culture, and community.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="28">
	<ocn>28</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		I begin, therefore, with an analysis of the effects of networked
information economy on individual autonomy. First, individuals can do
more for themselves independently of the permission or cooperation of
others. They can create their own expressions, and they can seek out
the information they need, with substantially less dependence on the
commercial mass media of the twentieth century. Second, and no less
importantly, individuals can do more in loose affiliation with others,
rather than requiring stable, long-term relations, like coworker
relations or participation in formal organizations, to underwrite
effective cooperation. Very few individuals living in the industrial
information economy could, in any realistic sense, decide to build a
new Library of Alexandria of global reach, or to start an encyclopedia.
As collaboration among far-flung individuals becomes more common, the
idea of doing things that require cooperation with others becomes much
more attainable, and the range of projects individuals can choose as
their own therefore qualitatively increases. The very fluidity and low
commitment required of any given cooperative relationship increases the
range and diversity of cooperative relations people can enter, and
therefore of collaborative projects they can conceive of as open to
them.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="29">
	<ocn>29</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		These ways in which autonomy is enhanced require a fairly substantive
and rich conception of autonomy as a practical lived experience, rather
than the formal conception preferred by many who think of autonomy as a
philosophical concept. But even from a narrower perspective, which
spans a broader range of conceptions of autonomy, at a minimum we can
say that individuals are less susceptible to manipulation by a legally
defined class of others--the owners of communications infrastructure
and media. The networked information economy provides varied
alternative platforms for communication, so that it moderates the power
of the traditional mass-media model, where ownership of the means of
communication enables an owner to select what others view, and thereby
to affect their perceptions of what they can and cannot do. Moreover,
the diversity of perspectives on the way the world is and the way it
could be for any given individual is qualitatively increased. This
gives individuals a significantly greater role in authoring their own
lives, by enabling them to perceive a broader range of possibilities,
and by providing them a richer baseline against which to measure the
choices they in fact make.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="30">
	<ocn>30</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Democracy: The Networked Public Sphere
	</text>
</object>
<object id="31">
	<ocn>31</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The second major implication of the networked information economy is
the shift it enables from the mass-mediated public sphere to a
networked public sphere. This shift is also based on the increasing
freedom individuals enjoy to participate in creating information and
knowledge, and the possibilities it presents for a new public sphere to
emerge alongside the commercial, mass-media markets. The idea that the
Internet democratizes is hardly new. It has been a staple of writing
about the Internet since the early 1990s. The relatively simple
first-generation claims about the liberating effects of the Internet,
summarized in the U.S. Supreme Court's celebration of its potential to
make everyone a pamphleteer, came under a variety of criticisms and
attacks over the course of the past half decade or so. Here, I offer a
detailed analysis of how the emergence of a networked information
economy in particular, as an alternative to mass media, improves the
political public sphere. The first-generation critique of the
democratizing effect of the Internet was based on various implications
of the problem of information overload, or the Babel objection.
According to the Babel objection, when everyone can speak, no one can
be heard, and we devolve either to a cacophony or to the reemergence of
money as the distinguishing factor between statements that are heard
and those that wallow in obscurity. The second-generation critique was
that the Internet is not as decentralized as we thought in the 1990s.
The emerging patterns of Internet use show that very few sites capture
an exceedingly large amount of attention, and millions of sites go
unnoticed. In this world, the Babel objection is perhaps avoided, but
only at the expense of the very promise of the Internet as a democratic
medium.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="32">
	<ocn>32</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In chapters 6 and 7, I offer a detailed and updated analysis of this,
perhaps the best-known and most contentious claim about the Internet's
liberalizing effects. First, it is important to understand that any
consideration of the democratizing effects of the Internet must measure
its effects as compared to the commercial, mass-media-based public
sphere, not as compared to an idealized utopia that we embraced a
decade ago of how the Internet might be. Commercial mass media that
have dominated the public spheres of all modern democracies have been
studied extensively. They have been shown in extensive literature to
exhibit a series of failures as platforms for public discourse. First,
they provide a relatively limited intake basin--that is, too many
observations and concerns of too many people in complex modern <sub>[pg
11]</sub> societies are left unobserved and unattended to by the small
cadre of commercial journalists charged with perceiving the range of
issues of public concern in any given society. Second, particularly
where the market is concentrated, they give their owners inordinate
power to shape opinion and information. This power they can either use
themselves or sell to the highest bidder. And third, whenever the
owners of commercial media choose not to exercise their power in this
way, they then tend to program toward the inane and soothing, rather
than toward that which will be politically engaging, and they tend to
oversimplify complex public discussions. On the background of these
limitations of the mass media, I suggest that the networked public
sphere enables many more individuals to communicate their observations
and their viewpoints to many others, and to do so in a way that cannot
be controlled by media owners and is not as easily corruptible by money
as were the mass media.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="33">
	<ocn>33</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The empirical and theoretical literature about network topology and use
provides answers to all the major critiques of the claim that the
Internet improves the structure of the public sphere. In particular, I
show how a wide range of mechanisms--starting from the simple mailing
list, through static Web pages, the emergence of writable Web
capabilities, and mobility--are being embedded in a social system for
the collection of politically salient information, observations, and
comments, and provide a platform for discourse. These platforms solve
some of the basic limitations of the commercial, concentrated mass
media as the core platform of the public sphere in contemporary complex
democracies. They enable anyone, anywhere, to go through his or her
practical life, observing the social environment through new eyes--the
eyes of someone who could actually inject a thought, a criticism, or a
concern into the public debate. Individuals become less passive, and
thus more engaged observers of social spaces that could potentially
become subjects for political conversation; they become more engaged
participants in the debates about their observations. The various
formats of the networked public sphere provide anyone with an outlet to
speak, to inquire, to investigate, without need to access the resources
of a major media organization. We are seeing the emergence of new,
decentralized approaches to fulfilling the watchdog function and to
engaging in political debate and organization. These are being
undertaken in a distinctly nonmarket form, in ways that would have been
much more difficult to pursue effectively, as a standard part of the
construction of the public sphere, before the networked information
environment. Working through detailed examples, I try <sub>[pg
12]</sub> to render the optimism about the democratic advantages of the
networked public sphere a fully specified argument.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="34">
	<ocn>34</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The networked public sphere has also begun to respond to the
information overload problem, but without re-creating the power of mass
media at the points of filtering and accreditation. There are two core
elements to these developments: First, we are beginning to see the
emergence of nonmarket, peer-produced alternative sources of filtration
and accreditation in place of the market-based alternatives. Relevance
and accreditation are themselves information goods, just like software
or an encyclopedia. What we are seeing on the network is that filtering
for both relevance and accreditation has become the object of
widespread practices of mutual pointing, of peer review, of pointing to
original sources of claims, and its complement, the social practice
that those who have some ability to evaluate the claims in fact do
comment on them. The second element is a contingent but empirically
confirmed observation of how users actually use the network. As a
descriptive matter, information flow in the network is much more
ordered than a simple random walk in the cacophony of information flow
would suggest, and significantly less centralized than the mass media
environment was. Some sites are much more visible and widely read than
others. This is true both when one looks at the Web as a whole, and
when one looks at smaller clusters of similar sites or users who tend
to cluster. Most commentators who have looked at this pattern have
interpreted it as a reemergence of mass media--the dominance of the few
visible sites. But a full consideration of the various elements of the
network topology literature supports a very different interpretation,
in which order emerges in the networked environment without re-creating
the failures of the mass-media-dominated public sphere. Sites cluster
around communities of interest: Australian fire brigades tend to link
to other Australian fire brigades, conservative political blogs (Web
logs or online journals) in the United States to other conservative
political blogs in the United States, and to a lesser but still
significant extent, to liberal political blogs. In each of these
clusters, the pattern of some high visibility nodes continues, but as
the clusters become small enough, many more of the sites are moderately
linked to each other in the cluster. Through this pattern, the network
seems to be forming into an attention backbone. "Local"
clusters--communities of interest--can provide initial vetting and
"peer-review-like" qualities to individual contributions made within an
interest cluster. Observations that are seen as significant within a
community <sub>[pg 13]</sub> of interest make their way to the
relatively visible sites in that cluster, from where they become
visible to people in larger ("regional") clusters. This continues until
an observation makes its way to the "superstar" sites that hundreds of
thousands of people might read and use. This path is complemented by
the practice of relatively easy commenting and posting directly to many
of the superstar sites, which creates shortcuts to wide attention. It
is fairly simple to grasp intuitively why these patterns might emerge.
Users tend to treat other people's choices about what to link to and to
read as good indicators of what is worthwhile for them. They are not
slavish in this, though; they apply some judgment of their own as to
whether certain types of users--say, political junkies of a particular
stripe, or fans of a specific television program--are the best
predictors of what will be interesting for them. The result is that
attention in the networked environment is more dependent on being
interesting to an engaged group of people than it is in the mass-media
environment, where moderate interest to large numbers of weakly engaged
viewers is preferable. Because of the redundancy of clusters and links,
and because many clusters are based on mutual interest, not on capital
investment, it is more difficult to buy attention on the Internet than
it is in mass media outlets, and harder still to use money to squelch
an opposing view. These characteristics save the networked environment
from the Babel objection without reintroducing excessive power in any
single party or small cluster of them, and without causing a resurgence
in the role of money as a precondition to the ability to speak
publicly.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="35">
	<ocn>35</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Justice and Human Development
	</text>
</object>
<object id="36">
	<ocn>36</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Information, knowledge, and information-rich goods and tools play a
significant role in economic opportunity and human development. While
the networked information economy cannot solve global hunger and
disease, its emergence does open reasonably well-defined new avenues
for addressing and constructing some of the basic requirements of
justice and human development. Because the outputs of the networked
information economy are usually nonproprietary, it provides free access
to a set of the basic instrumentalities of economic opportunity and the
basic outputs of the information economy. From a liberal perspective
concerned with justice, at a minimum, these outputs become more readily
available as "finished goods" to those who are least well off. More
importantly, the availability of free information resources makes
participating in the economy less dependent on <sub>[pg 14]</sub>
surmounting access barriers to financing and social-transactional
networks that made working out of poverty difficult in industrial
economies. These resources and tools thus improve equality of
opportunity.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="37">
	<ocn>37</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		From a more substantive and global perspective focused on human
development, the freedom to use basic resources and capabilities allows
improved participation in the production of information and
information-dependent components of human development. First, and
currently most advanced, the emergence of a broad range of free
software utilities makes it easier for poor and middle-income countries
to obtain core software capabilities. More importantly, free software
enables the emergence of local capabilities to provide software
services, both for national uses and as a basis for participating in a
global software services industry, without need to rely on permission
from multinational software companies. Scientific publication is
beginning to use commons-based strategies to publish important sources
of information in a way that makes the outputs freely available in
poorer countries. More ambitiously, we begin to see in agricultural
research a combined effort of public, nonprofit, and open-source-like
efforts being developed and applied to problems of agricultural
innovation. The ultimate purpose is to develop a set of basic
capabilities that would allow collaboration among farmers and
scientists, in both poor countries and around the globe, to develop
better, more nutritious crops to improve food security throughout the
poorer regions of the world. Equally ambitious, but less operationally
advanced, we are beginning to see early efforts to translate this
system of innovation to health-related products.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="38">
	<ocn>38</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		All these efforts are aimed at solving one of the most glaring problems
of poverty and poor human development in the global information
economy: Even as opulence increases in the wealthier economies--as
information and innovation offer longer and healthier lives that are
enriched by better access to information, knowledge, and culture--in
many places, life expectancy is decreasing, morbidity is increasing,
and illiteracy remains rampant. Some, although by no means all, of this
global injustice is due to the fact that we have come to rely ever-more
exclusively on proprietary business models of the industrial economy to
provide some of the most basic information components of human
development. As the networked information economy develops new ways of
producing information, whose outputs are not treated as proprietary and
exclusive but can be made available freely to everyone, it offers
modest but meaningful opportunities for improving human development
everywhere. We are seeing early signs of the emergence of an innovation
<sub>[pg 15]</sub> ecosystem made of public funding, traditional
nonprofits, and the newly emerging sector of peer production that is
making it possible to advance human development through cooperative
efforts in both rich countries and poor.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="39">
	<ocn>39</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		A Critical Culture and Networked Social Relations
	</text>
</object>
<object id="40">
	<ocn>40</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The networked information economy also allows for the emergence of a
more critical and self-reflective culture. In the past decade, a number
of legal scholars--Niva Elkin Koren, Terry Fisher, Larry Lessig, and
Jack Balkin-- have begun to examine how the Internet democratizes
culture. Following this work and rooted in the deliberative strand of
democratic theory, I suggest that the networked information environment
offers us a more attractive cultural production system in two distinct
ways: (1) it makes culture more transparent, and (2) it makes culture
more malleable. Together, these mean that we are seeing the emergence
of a new folk culture--a practice that has been largely suppressed in
the industrial era of cultural production--where many more of us
participate actively in making cultural moves and finding meaning in
the world around us. These practices make their practitioners better
"readers" of their own culture and more self-reflective and critical of
the culture they occupy, thereby enabling them to become more
self-reflective participants in conversations within that culture. This
also allows individuals much greater freedom to participate in tugging
and pulling at the cultural creations of others, "glomming on" to them,
as Balkin puts it, and making the culture they occupy more their own
than was possible with mass-media culture. In these senses, we can say
that culture is becoming more democratic: self-reflective and
participatory.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="41">
	<ocn>41</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Throughout much of this book, I underscore the increased capabilities
of individuals as the core driving social force behind the networked
information economy. This heightened individual capacity has raised
concerns by many that the Internet further fragments community,
continuing the long trend of industrialization. A substantial body of
empirical literature suggests, however, that we are in fact using the
Internet largely at the expense of television, and that this exchange
is a good one from the perspective of social ties. We use the Internet
to keep in touch with family and intimate friends, both geographically
proximate and distant. To the extent we do see a shift in social ties,
it is because, in addition to strengthening our strong bonds, we are
also increasing the range and diversity of weaker connections.
Following <sub>[pg 16]</sub> Manuel Castells and Barry Wellman, I
suggest that we have become more adept at filling some of the same
emotional and context-generating functions that have traditionally been
associated with the importance of community with a network of
overlapping social ties that are limited in duration or intensity.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="42">
	<ocn>42</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		FOUR METHODOLOGICAL COMMENTS
	</text>
</object>
<object id="43">
	<ocn>43</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		There are four methodological choices represented by the thesis that I
have outlined up to this point, and therefore in this book as a whole,
which require explication and defense. The first is that I assign a
very significant role to technology. The second is that I offer an
explanation centered on social relations, but operating in the domain
of economics, rather than sociology. The third and fourth are more
internal to liberal political theory. The third is that I am offering a
liberal political theory, but taking a path that has usually been
resisted in that literature--considering economic structure and the
limits of the market and its supporting institutions from the
perspective of freedom, rather than accepting the market as it is, and
defending or criticizing adjustments through the lens of distributive
justice. Fourth, my approach heavily emphasizes individual action in
nonmarket relations. Much of the discussion revolves around the choice
between markets and nonmarket social behavior. In much of it, the state
plays no role, or is perceived as playing a primarily negative role, in
a way that is alien to the progressive branches of liberal political
thought. In this, it seems more of a libertarian or an anarchistic
thesis than a liberal one. I do not completely discount the state, as I
will explain. But I do suggest that what is special about our moment is
the rising efficacy of individuals and loose, nonmarket affiliations as
agents of political economy. Just like the market, the state will have
to adjust to this new emerging modality of human action. Liberal
political theory must first recognize and understand it before it can
begin to renegotiate its agenda for the liberal state, progressive or
otherwise.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="44">
	<ocn>44</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		The Role of Technology in Human Affairs
	</text>
</object>
<object id="45">
	<ocn>45</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The first methodological choice concerns how one should treat the role
of technology in the development of human affairs. The kind of
technological determinism that typified Lewis Mumford, or, specifically
in the area of communications, Marshall McLuhan, is widely perceived in
academia today <sub>[pg 17]</sub> as being too deterministic, though
perhaps not so in popular culture. The contemporary effort to offer
more nuanced, institution-based, and politicalchoice-based explanations
is perhaps best typified by Paul Starr's recent and excellent work on
the creation of the media. While these contemporary efforts are indeed
powerful, one should not confuse a work like Elizabeth Eisenstein's
carefully argued and detailed The Printing Press as an Agent of Change,
with McLuhan's determinism. Assuming that technologies are just tools
that happen, more or less, to be there, and are employed in any given
society in a pattern that depends only on what that society and culture
makes of them is too constrained. A society that has no wheel and no
writing has certain limits on what it can do. Barry Wellman has
imported into sociology a term borrowed from
engineering--affordances.<en>1</en> Langdon Winner called these the
"political properties" of technologies.<en>2</en> An earlier version of
this idea is Harold Innis's concept of "the bias of
communications."<en>3</en> In Internet law and policy debates this
approach has become widely adopted through the influential work of
Lawrence Lessig, who characterized it as "code is law."<en>4</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="1">
		<number>1</number>
		<note>
			Barry Wellman et al., "The Social Affordances of the Internet for
Networked Individualism," JCMC 8, no. 3 (April 2003).
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="2">
		<number>2</number>
		<note>
			Langdon Winner, ed., "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" in The Whale and
The Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 19-39.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="3">
		<number>3</number>
		<note>
			Harold Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1951). Innis too is often lumped with McLuhan and Walter
Ong as a technological determinist. His work was, however, one of a
political economist, and he emphasized the relationship between
technology and economic and social organization, much more than the
deterministic operation of technology on human cognition and
capability.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="4">
		<number>4</number>
		<note>
			Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic
Books, 1999).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="46">
	<ocn>46</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The idea is simple to explain, and distinct from a na&#239;ve
determinism. Different technologies make different kinds of human
action and interaction easier or harder to perform. All other things
being equal, things that are easier to do are more likely to be done,
and things that are harder to do are less likely to be done. All other
things are never equal. That is why technological determinism in the
strict sense--if you have technology "t," you should expect social
structure or relation "s" to emerge--is false. Ocean navigation had a
different adoption and use when introduced in states whose land empire
ambitions were effectively countered by strong neighbors--like Spain
and Portugal--than in nations that were focused on building a vast
inland empire, like China. Print had different effects on literacy in
countries where religion encouraged individual reading--like Prussia,
Scotland, England, and New England--than where religion discouraged
individual, unmediated interaction with texts, like France and Spain.
This form of understanding the role of technology is adopted here.
Neither deterministic nor wholly malleable, technology sets some
parameters of individual and social action. It can make some actions,
relationships, organizations, and institutions easier to pursue, and
others harder. In a challenging environment--be the challenges natural
or human--it can make some behaviors obsolete by increasing the
efficacy of directly competitive strategies. However, within the realm
of the feasible--uses not rendered impossible by the adoption or
rejection of a technology--different patterns of adoption and use
<sub>[pg 18]</sub> can result in very different social relations that
emerge around a technology. Unless these patterns are in competition,
or unless even in competition they are not catastrophically less
effective at meeting the challenges, different societies can persist
with different patterns of use over long periods. It is the feasibility
of long-term sustainability of different patterns of use that makes
this book relevant to policy, not purely to theory. The same
technologies of networked computers can be adopted in very different
patterns. There is no guarantee that networked information technology
will lead to the improvements in innovation, freedom, and justice that
I suggest are possible. That is a choice we face as a society. The way
we develop will, in significant measure, depend on choices we make in
the next decade or so.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="47">
	<ocn>47</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		The Role of Economic Analysis and Methodological Individualism
	</text>
</object>
<object id="48">
	<ocn>48</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		It should be emphasized, as the second point, that this book has a
descriptive methodology that is distinctly individualist and economic
in orientation, which is hardly the only way to approach this problem.
Manuel Castells's magisterial treatment of the networked
society<en>5</en> locates its central characteristic in the shift from
groups and hierarchies to networks as social and organizational
models--looser, flexible arrangements of human affairs. Castells
develops this theory as he describes a wide range of changes, from
transportation networks to globalization and industrialization. In his
work, the Internet fits into this trend, enabling better coordination
and cooperation in these sorts of loosely affiliated networks. My own
emphasis is on the specific relative roles of market and nonmarket
sectors, and how that change anchors the radical decentralization that
he too observes, as a matter of sociological observation. I place at
the core of the shift the technical and economic characteristics of
computer networks and information. These provide the pivot for the
shift toward radical decentralization of production. They underlie the
shift from an information environment dominated by proprietary,
market-oriented action, to a world in which nonproprietary, nonmarket
transactional frameworks play a large role alongside market production.
This newly emerging, nonproprietary sector affects to a substantial
degree the entire information environment in which individuals and
societies live their lives. If there is one lesson we can learn from
globalization and the ever-increasing reach of the market, it is that
the logic of the market exerts enormous pressure on existing social
structures. If we are indeed seeing the emergence of a substantial
component of nonmarket production at the very <sub>[pg 19]</sub> core
of our economic engine--the production and exchange of information, and
through it of information-based goods, tools, services, and
capabilities-- then this change suggests a genuine limit on the extent
of the market. Such a limit, growing from within the very market that
it limits, in its most advanced loci, would represent a genuine shift
in direction for what appeared to be the ever-increasing global reach
of the market economy and society in the past half century.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="5">
		<number>5</number>
		<note>
			Manuel Castells, The Rise of Networked Society (Cambridge, MA, and
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="49">
	<ocn>49</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Economic Structure in Liberal Political Theory
	</text>
</object>
<object id="50">
	<ocn>50</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The third point has to do with the role of economic structure in
liberal political theory. My analysis in this regard is practical and
human centric. By this, I mean to say two things: First, I am concerned
with human beings, with individuals as the bearers of moral claims
regarding the structure of the political and economic systems they
inhabit. Within the liberal tradition, the position I take is
humanistic and general, as opposed to political and particular. It is
concerned first and foremost with the claims of human beings as human
beings, rather than with the requirements of democracy or the
entitlements of citizenship or membership in a legitimate or
meaningfully self-governed political community. There are diverse ways
of respecting the basic claims of human freedom, dignity, and
well-being. Different liberal polities do so with different mixes of
constitutional and policy practices. The rise of global information
economic structures and relationships affects human beings everywhere.
In some places, it complements democratic traditions. In others, it
destabilizes constraints on liberty. An understanding of how we can
think of this moment in terms of human freedom and development must
transcend the particular traditions, both liberal and illiberal, of any
single nation. The actual practice of freedom that we see emerging from
the networked environment allows people to reach across national or
social boundaries, across space and political division. It allows
people to solve problems together in new associations that are outside
the boundaries of formal, legal-political association. In this fluid
social economic environment, the individual's claims provide a moral
anchor for considering the structures of power and opportunity, of
freedom and well-being. Furthermore, while it is often convenient and
widely accepted to treat organizations or communities as legal
entities, as "persons," they are not moral agents. Their role in an
analysis of freedom and justice is derivative from their role--both
enabling and constraining--as structuring context in which human
beings, <sub>[pg 20]</sub> the actual moral agents of political
economy, find themselves. In this regard, my positions here are
decidedly "liberal," as opposed to either communitarian or critical.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="51">
	<ocn>51</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Second, I am concerned with actual human beings in actual historical
settings, not with representations of human beings abstracted from
their settings. These commitments mean that freedom and justice for
historically situated individuals are measured from a first-person,
practical perspective. No constraints on individual freedom and no
sources of inequality are categorically exempt from review, nor are any
considered privileged under this view. Neither economy nor cultural
heritage is given independent moral weight. A person whose life and
relations are fully regimented by external forces is unfree, no matter
whether the source of regimentation can be understood as market-based,
authoritarian, or traditional community values. This does not entail a
radical anarchism or libertarianism. Organizations, communities, and
other external structures are pervasively necessary for human beings to
flourish and to act freely and effectively. This does mean, however,
that I think of these structures only from the perspective of their
effects on human beings. Their value is purely derivative from their
importance to the actual human beings that inhabit them and are
structured--for better or worse--by them. As a practical matter, this
places concern with market structure and economic organization much
closer to the core of questions of freedom than liberal theory usually
is willing to do. Liberals have tended to leave the basic structure of
property and markets either to libertarians--who, like Friedrich Hayek,
accepted its present contours as "natural," and a core constituent
element of freedom--or to Marxists and neo-Marxists. I treat property
and markets as just one domain of human action, with affordances and
limitations. Their presence enhances freedom along some dimensions, but
their institutional requirements can become sources of constraint when
they squelch freedom of action in nonmarket contexts. Calibrating the
reach of the market, then, becomes central not only to the shape of
justice or welfare in a society, but also to freedom.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="52">
	<ocn>52</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Whither the State?
	</text>
</object>
<object id="53">
	<ocn>53</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The fourth and last point emerges in various places throughout this
book, but deserves explicit note here. What I find new and interesting
about the networked information economy is the rise of individual
practical capabilities, and the role that these new capabilities play
in increasing the relative salience of nonproprietary, often nonmarket
individual and social behavior. <sub>[pg 21]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="54">
	<ocn>54</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In my discussion of autonomy and democracy, of justice and a critical
culture, I emphasize the rise of individual and cooperative private
action and the relative decrease in the dominance of market-based and
proprietary action. Where in all this is the state? For the most part,
as you will see particularly in chapter 11, the state in both the
United States and Europe has played a role in supporting the
market-based industrial incumbents of the twentieth-century information
production system at the expense of the individuals who make up the
emerging networked information economy. Most state interventions have
been in the form of either captured legislation catering to incumbents,
or, at best, well-intentioned but wrongheaded efforts to optimize the
institutional ecology for outdated modes of information and cultural
production. In the traditional mapping of political theory, a position
such as the one I present here--that freedom and justice can and should
best be achieved by a combination of market action and private,
voluntary (not to say charitable) nonmarket action, and that the state
is a relatively suspect actor--is libertarian. Perhaps, given that I
subject to similar criticism rules styled by their proponents as
"property"--like "intellectual property" or "spectrum property
rights"--it is anarchist, focused on the role of mutual aid and highly
skeptical of the state. (It is quite fashionable nowadays to be
libertarian, as it has been for a few decades, and more fashionable to
be anarchist than it has been in a century.)
	</text>
</object>
<object id="55">
	<ocn>55</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The more modest truth is that my position is not rooted in a
theoretical skepticism about the state, but in a practical diagnosis of
opportunities, barriers, and strategies for achieving improvements in
human freedom and development given the actual conditions of
technology, economy, and politics. I have no objection in principle to
an effective, liberal state pursuing one of a range of liberal projects
and commitments. Here and there throughout this book you will encounter
instances where I suggest that the state could play constructive roles,
if it stopped listening to incumbents for long enough to realize this.
These include, for example, municipal funding of neutral broadband
networks, state funding of basic research, and possible strategic
regulatory interventions to negate monopoly control over essential
resources in the digital environment. However, the necessity for the
state's affirmative role is muted because of my diagnosis of the
particular trajectory of markets, on the one hand, and individual and
social action, on the other hand, in the digitally networked
information environment. The particular economics of computation and
communications; the particular economics of information, knowledge, and
cultural production; and the relative role of <sub>[pg 22]</sub>
information in contemporary, advanced economies have coalesced to make
nonmarket individual and social action the most important domain of
action in the furtherance of the core liberal commitments. Given these
particular characteristics, there is more freedom to be found through
opening up institutional spaces for voluntary individual and
cooperative action than there is in intentional public action through
the state. Nevertheless, I offer no particular reasons to resist many
of the roles traditionally played by the liberal state. I offer no
reason to think that, for example, education should stop being
primarily a state-funded, public activity and a core responsibility of
the liberal state, or that public health should not be so. I have every
reason to think that the rise of nonmarket production enhances, rather
than decreases, the justifiability of state funding for basic science
and research, as the spillover effects of publicly funded information
production can now be much greater and more effectively disseminated
and used to enhance the general welfare.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="56">
	<ocn>56</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The important new fact about the networked environment, however, is the
efficacy and centrality of individual and collective social action. In
most domains, freedom of action for individuals, alone and in loose
cooperation with others, can achieve much of the liberal desiderata I
consider throughout this book. From a global perspective, enabling
individuals to act in this way also extends the benefits of
liberalization across borders, increasing the capacities of individuals
in nonliberal states to grab greater freedom than those who control
their political systems would like. By contrast, as long as states in
the most advanced market-based economies continue to try to optimize
their institutional frameworks to support the incumbents of the
industrial information economy, they tend to threaten rather than
support liberal commitments. Once the networked information economy has
stabilized and we come to understand the relative importance of
voluntary private action outside of markets, the state can begin to
adjust its policies to facilitate nonmarket action and to take
advantage of its outputs to improve its own support for core liberal
commitments.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="57">
	<ocn>57</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		THE STAKES OF IT ALL: THE BATTLE OVER THE INSTITUTIONAL ECOLOGY OF THE
DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
	</text>
</object>
<object id="58">
	<ocn>58</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		No benevolent historical force will inexorably lead this
technologicaleconomic moment to develop toward an open, diverse,
liberal equilibrium. <sub>[pg 23]</sub> If the transformation I
describe as possible occurs, it will lead to substantial redistribution
of power and money from the twentieth-century industrial producers of
information, culture, and communications--like Hollywood, the recording
industry, and perhaps the broadcasters and some of the
telecommunications services giants--to a combination of widely diffuse
populations around the globe, and the market actors that will build the
tools that make this population better able to produce its own
information environment rather than buying it ready-made. None of the
industrial giants of yore are taking this reallocation lying down. The
technology will not overcome their resistance through an insurmountable
progressive impulse. The reorganization of production and the advances
it can bring in freedom and justice will emerge, therefore, only as a
result of social and political action aimed at protecting the new
social patterns from the incumbents' assaults. It is precisely to
develop an understanding of what is at stake and why it is worth
fighting for that I write this book. I offer no reassurances, however,
that any of this will in fact come to pass.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="59">
	<ocn>59</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The battle over the relative salience of the proprietary, industrial
models of information production and exchange and the emerging
networked information economy is being carried out in the domain of the
institutional ecology of the digital environment. In a wide range of
contexts, a similar set of institutional questions is being contested:
To what extent will resources necessary for information production and
exchange be governed as a commons, free for all to use and biased in
their availability in favor of none? To what extent will these
resources be entirely proprietary, and available only to those
functioning within the market or within traditional forms of wellfunded
nonmarket action like the state and organized philanthropy? We see this
battle played out at all layers of the information environment: the
physical devices and network channels necessary to communicate; the
existing information and cultural resources out of which new statements
must be made; and the logical resources--the software and
standards--necessary to translate what human beings want to say to each
other into signals that machines can process and transmit. Its central
question is whether there will, or will not, be a core common
infrastructure that is governed as a commons and therefore available to
anyone who wishes to participate in the networked information
environment outside of the market-based, proprietary framework.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="60">
	<ocn>60</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This is not to say that property is in some sense inherently bad.
Property, together with contract, is the core institutional component
of markets, and <sub>[pg 24]</sub> a core institutional element of
liberal societies. It is what enables sellers to extract prices from
buyers, and buyers to know that when they pay, they will be secure in
their ability to use what they bought. It underlies our capacity to
plan actions that require use of resources that, without exclusivity,
would be unavailable for us to use. But property also constrains
action. The rules of property are circumscribed and intended to elicit
a particular datum--willingness and ability to pay for exclusive
control over a resource. They constrain what one person or another can
do with regard to a resource; that is, use it in some ways but not
others, reveal or hide information with regard to it, and so forth.
These constraints are necessary so that people must transact with each
other through markets, rather than through force or social networks,
but they do so at the expense of constraining action outside of the
market to the extent that it depends on access to these resources.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="61">
	<ocn>61</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Commons are another core institutional component of freedom of action
in free societies, but they are structured to enable action that is not
based on exclusive control over the resources necessary for action. For
example, I can plan an outdoor party with some degree of certainty by
renting a private garden or beach, through the property system.
Alternatively, I can plan to meet my friends on a public beach or at
Sheep's Meadow in Central Park. I can buy an easement from my neighbor
to reach a nearby river, or I can walk around her property using the
public road that makes up our transportation commons. Each
institutional framework--property and commons--allows for a certain
freedom of action and a certain degree of predictability of access to
resources. Their complementary coexistence and relative salience as
institutional frameworks for action determine the relative reach of the
market and the domain of nonmarket action, both individual and social,
in the resources they govern and the activities that depend on access
to those resources. Now that material conditions have enabled the
emergence of greater scope for nonmarket action, the scope and
existence of a core common infrastructure that includes the basic
resources necessary to produce and exchange information will shape the
degree to which individuals will be able to act in all the ways that I
describe as central to the emergence of a networked information economy
and the freedoms it makes possible.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="62">
	<ocn>62</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		At the physical layer, the transition to broadband has been accompanied
by a more concentrated market structure for physical wires and
connections, and less regulation of the degree to which owners can
control the flow of <sub>[pg 25]</sub> information on their networks.
The emergence of open wireless networks, based on "spectrum commons,"
counteracts this trend to some extent, as does the current apparent
business practice of broadband owners not to use their ownership to
control the flow of information over their networks. Efforts to
overcome the broadband market concentration through the development of
municipal broadband networks are currently highly contested in
legislation and courts. The single most threatening development at the
physical layer has been an effort driven primarily by Hollywood, over
the past few years, to require the manufacturers of computation devices
to design their systems so as to enforce the copyright claims and
permissions imposed by the owners of digital copyrighted works. Should
this effort succeed, the core characteristic of computers--that they
are general-purpose devices whose abilities can be configured and
changed over time by their owners as uses and preferences change--will
be abandoned in favor of machines that can be trusted to perform
according to factory specifications, irrespective of what their owners
wish. The primary reason that these laws have not yet passed, and are
unlikely to pass, is that the computer hardware and software, and
electronics and telecommunications industries all understand that such
a law would undermine their innovation and creativity. At the logical
layer, we are seeing a concerted effort, again headed primarily by
Hollywood and the recording industry, to shape the software and
standards to make sure that digitally encoded cultural products can
continue to be sold as packaged goods. The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act and the assault on peer-to-peer technologies are the most obvious
in this regard.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="63">
	<ocn>63</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		More generally information, knowledge, and culture are being subjected
to a second enclosure movement, as James Boyle has recently explored in
depth. The freedom of action for individuals who wish to produce
information, knowledge, and culture is being systematically curtailed
in order to secure the economic returns demanded by the manufacturers
of the industrial information economy. A rich literature in law has
developed in response to this increasing enclosure over the past twenty
years. It started with David Lange's evocative exploration of the
public domain and Pamela Samuelson's prescient critique of the
application of copyright to computer programs and digital materials,
and continued through Jessica Litman's work on the public domain and
digital copyright and Boyle's exploration of the basic romantic
assumptions underlying our emerging "intellectual property" construct
and the need for an environmentalist framework for preserving the
public domain. It reached its most eloquent expression in Lawrence
Lessig's arguments <sub>[pg 26]</sub> for the centrality of free
exchange of ideas and information to our most creative endeavors, and
his diagnoses of the destructive effects of the present enclosure
movement. This growing skepticism among legal academics has been
matched by a long-standing skepticism among economists (to which I
devote much discussion in chapter 2). The lack of either analytic or
empirical foundation for the regulatory drive toward ever-stronger
proprietary rights has not, however, resulted in a transformed politics
of the regulation of intellectual production. Only recently have we
begun to see a politics of information policy and "intellectual
property" emerge from a combination of popular politics among computer
engineers, college students, and activists concerned with the global
poor; a reorientation of traditional media advocates; and a very
gradual realization by high-technology firms that rules pushed by
Hollywood can impede the growth of computer-based businesses. This
political countermovement is tied to quite basic characteristics of the
technology of computer communications, and to the persistent and
growing social practices of sharing--some, like p2p (peer-to-peer) file
sharing, in direct opposition to proprietary claims; others,
increasingly, are instances of the emerging practices of making
information on nonproprietary models and of individuals sharing what
they themselves made in social, rather than market patterns. These
economic and social forces are pushing at each other in opposite
directions, and each is trying to mold the legal environment to better
accommodate its requirements. We still stand at a point where
information production could be regulated so that, for most users, it
will be forced back into the industrial model, squelching the emerging
model of individual, radically decentralized, and nonmarket production
and its attendant improvements in freedom and justice.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="64">
	<ocn>64</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Social and economic organization is not infinitely malleable. Neither
is it always equally open to affirmative design. The actual practices
of human interaction with information, knowledge, and culture and with
production and consumption are the consequence of a feedback effect
between social practices, economic organization, technological
affordances, and formal constraints on behavior through law and similar
institutional forms. These components of the constraints and
affordances of human behavior tend to adapt dynamically to each other,
so that the tension between the technological affordances, the social
and economic practices, and the law are often not too great. During
periods of stability, these components of the structure within which
human beings live are mostly aligned and mutually reinforce <sub>[pg
27]</sub> each other, but the stability is subject to shock at any one
of these dimensions. Sometimes shock can come in the form of economic
crisis, as it did in the United States during the Great Depression.
Often it can come from an external physical threat to social
institutions, like a war. Sometimes, though probably rarely, it can
come from law, as, some would argue, it came from the desegregation
decision in <i>Brown v. Board of Education</i>. Sometimes it can come
from technology; the introduction of print was such a perturbation, as
was, surely, the steam engine. The introduction of the highcapacity
mechanical presses and telegraph ushered in the era of mass media. The
introduction of radio created a similar perturbation, which for a brief
moment destabilized the mass-media model, but quickly converged to it.
In each case, the period of perturbation offered more opportunities and
greater risks than the periods of relative stability. During periods of
perturbation, more of the ways in which society organizes itself are up
for grabs; more can be renegotiated, as the various other components of
human stability adjust to the changes. To borrow Stephen Jay Gould's
term from evolutionary theory, human societies exist in a series of
punctuated equilibria. The periods of disequilibrium are not
necessarily long. A mere twenty-five years passed between the invention
of radio and its adaptation to the mass-media model. A similar period
passed between the introduction of telephony and its adoption of the
monopoly utility form that enabled only one-to-one limited
communications. In each of these periods, various paths could have been
taken. Radio showed us even within the past century how, in some
societies, different paths were in fact taken and then sustained over
decades. After a period of instability, however, the various elements
of human behavioral constraint and affordances settled on a new stable
alignment. During periods of stability, we can probably hope for little
more than tinkering at the edges of the human condition.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="65">
	<ocn>65</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This book is offered, then, as a challenge to contemporary liberal
democracies. We are in the midst of a technological, economic, and
organizational transformation that allows us to renegotiate the terms
of freedom, justice, and productivity in the information society. How
we shall live in this new environment will in some significant measure
depend on policy choices that we make over the next decade or so. To be
able to understand these choices, to be able to make them well, we must
recognize that they are part of what is fundamentally a social and
political choice--a choice about how to be free, equal, productive
human beings under a new set of technological and <sub>[pg 28]</sub>
economic conditions. As economic policy, allowing yesterday's winners
to dictate the terms of tomorrow's economic competition would be
disastrous. As social policy, missing an opportunity to enrich
democracy, freedom, and justice in our society while maintaining or
even enhancing our productivity would be unforgivable. <sub>[pg
29]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="66">
	<ocn>66</ocn>
	<text class="h2">
		Part One - The Networked Information Economy
	</text>
</object>
<object id="67">
	<ocn>67</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Introduction
	</text>
</object>
<object id="68">
	<ocn>68</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		For more than 150 years, new communications technologies have tended to
concentrate and commercialize the production and exchange of
information, while extending the geographic and social reach of
information distribution networks. High-volume mechanical presses and
the telegraph combined with new business practices to change newspapers
from small-circulation local efforts into mass media. Newspapers became
means of communications intended to reach ever-larger and more
dispersed audiences, and their management required substantial capital
investment. As the size of the audience and its geographic and social
dispersion increased, public discourse developed an increasingly
one-way model. Information and opinion that was widely known and formed
the shared basis for political conversation and broad social relations
flowed from ever more capital-intensive commercial and professional
producers to passive, undifferentiated consumers. It was a model easily
adopted and amplified by radio, television, and later cable and
satellite communications. This trend did not cover all forms of
communication and culture. Telephones and personal interactions, most
importantly, <sub>[pg 30]</sub> and small-scale distributions, like
mimeographed handbills, were obvious alternatives. Yet the growth of
efficient transportation and effective large-scale managerial and
administrative structures meant that the sources of effective political
and economic power extended over larger geographic areas and required
reaching a larger and more geographically dispersed population. The
economics of long-distance mass distribution systems necessary to reach
this constantly increasing and more dispersed relevant population were
typified by high up-front costs and low marginal costs of distribution.
These cost characteristics drove cultural production toward delivery to
everwider audiences of increasingly high production-value goods, whose
fixed costs could be spread over ever-larger audiences--like television
series, recorded music, and movies. Because of these economic
characteristics, the mass-media model of information and cultural
production and transmission became the dominant form of public
communication in the twentieth century.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="69">
	<ocn>69</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The Internet presents the possibility of a radical reversal of this
long trend. It is the first modern communications medium that expands
its reach by decentralizing the capital structure of production and
distribution of information, culture, and knowledge. Much of the
physical capital that embeds most of the intelligence in the network is
widely diffused and owned by end users. Network routers and servers are
not qualitatively different from the computers that end users own,
unlike broadcast stations or cable systems, which are radically
different in economic and technical terms from the televisions that
receive their signals. This basic change in the material conditions of
information and cultural production and distribution have substantial
effects on how we come to know the world we occupy and the alternative
courses of action open to us as individuals and as social actors.
Through these effects, the emerging networked environment structures
how we perceive and pursue core values in modern liberal societies.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="70">
	<ocn>70</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Technology alone does not, however, determine social structure. The
introduction of print in China and Korea did not induce the kind of
profound religious and political reformation that followed the printed
Bible and disputations in Europe. But technology is not irrelevant,
either. Luther's were not the first disputations nailed to a church
door. Print, however, made it practically feasible for more than
300,000 copies of Luther's publications to be circulated between 1517
and 1520 in a way that earlier disputations could not have
been.<en>6</en> Vernacular reading of the Bible became a feasible form
of religious self-direction only when printing these Bibles and making
them <sub>[pg 31]</sub> available to individual households became
economically feasible, and not when all copyists were either monks or
otherwise dependent on the church. Technology creates feasibility
spaces for social practice. Some things become easier and cheaper,
others harder and more expensive to do or to prevent under different
technological conditions. The interaction between these
technological-economic feasibility spaces, and the social responses to
these changes--both in terms of institutional changes, like law and
regulation, and in terms of changing social practices--define the
qualities of a period. The way life is actually lived by people within
a given set of interlocking technological, economic, institutional, and
social practices is what makes a society attractive or unattractive,
what renders its practices laudable or lamentable.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="6">
		<number>6</number>
		<note>
			Elizabeth Eisenstein, Printing Press as an Agent of Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="71">
	<ocn>71</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A particular confluence of technical and economic changes is now
altering the way we produce and exchange information, knowledge, and
culture in ways that could redefine basic practices, first in the most
advanced economies, and eventually around the globe. The potential
break from the past 150 years is masked by the somewhat liberal use of
the term "information economy" in various permutations since the 1970s.
The term has been used widely to signify the dramatic increase in the
importance of usable information as a means of controlling production
and the flow of inputs, outputs, and services. While often evoked as
parallel to the "postindustrial" stage, in fact, the information
economy was tightly linked throughout the twentieth century with
controlling the processes of the industrial economy. This is clearest
in the case of accounting firms and financial markets, but is true of
the industrial modalities of organizing cultural production as well.
Hollywood, the broadcast networks, and the recording industry were
built around a physical production model. Once the cultural utterances,
the songs or movies, were initially produced and fixed in some means of
storage and transmission, the economics of production and distribution
of these physical goods took over. Making the initial utterances and
the physical goods that embodied them required high capital investment
up front. Making many copies was not much more expensive than making
few copies, and very much cheaper on a per-copy basis. These industries
therefore organized themselves to invest large sums in making a small
number of high production-value cultural "artifacts," which were then
either replicated and stamped onto many low-cost copies of each
artifact, or broadcast or distributed through high-cost systems for low
marginal cost ephemeral consumption on screens and with receivers. This
required an effort to manage demand for those <sub>[pg 32]</sub>
products that were in fact recorded and replicated or distributed, so
as to make sure that the producers could sell many units of a small
number of cultural utterances at a low per-unit cost, rather than few
units each of many cultural utterances at higher per-unit costs.
Because of its focus around capital-intensive production and
distribution techniques, this first stage might best be thought of as
the "industrial information economy."
	</text>
</object>
<object id="72">
	<ocn>72</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Radical decentralization of intelligence in our communications network
and the centrality of information, knowledge, culture, and ideas to
advanced economic activity are leading to a new stage of the
information economy-- the networked information economy. In this new
stage, we can harness many more of the diverse paths and mechanisms for
cultural transmission that were muted by the economies of scale that
led to the rise of the concentrated, controlled form of mass media,
whether commercial or state-run. The most important aspect of the
networked information economy is the possibility it opens for reversing
the control focus of the industrial information economy. In particular,
it holds out the possibility of reversing two trends in cultural
production central to the project of control: concentration and
commercialization.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="73">
	<ocn>73</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Two fundamental facts have changed in the economic ecology in which the
industrial information enterprises have arisen. First, the basic output
that has become dominant in the most advanced economies is human
meaning and communication. Second, the basic physical capital necessary
to express and communicate human meaning is the connected personal
computer. The core functionalities of processing, storage, and
communications are widely owned throughout the population of users.
Together, these changes destabilize the industrial stage of the
information economy. Both the capacity to make meaning--to encode and
decode humanly meaningful statements-- and the capacity to communicate
one's meaning around the world, are held by, or readily available to,
at least many hundreds of millions of users around the globe. Any
person who has information can connect with any other person who wants
it, and anyone who wants to make it mean something in some context, can
do so. The high capital costs that were a prerequisite to gathering,
working, and communicating information, knowledge, and culture, have
now been widely distributed in the society. The entry barrier they
posed no longer offers a condensation point for the large organizations
that once dominated the information environment. Instead, emerging
models of information and cultural production, radically decentralized
and based on <sub>[pg 33]</sub> emergent patterns of cooperation and
sharing, but also of simple coordinate coexistence, are beginning to
take on an ever-larger role in how we produce meaning--information,
knowledge, and culture--in the networked information economy.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="74">
	<ocn>74</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A Google response to a query, which returns dozens or more sites with
answers to an information question you may have, is an example of
coordinate coexistence producing information. As Jessica Litman
demonstrated in Sharing and Stealing, hundreds of independent producers
of information, acting for reasons ranging from hobby and fun to work
and sales, produce information, independently and at widely varying
costs, related to what you were looking for. They all coexist without
knowing of each other, most of them without thinking or planning on
serving you in particular, or even a class of user like you. Yet the
sheer volume and diversity of interests and sources allows their
distributed, unrelated efforts to be coordinated-- through the Google
algorithm in this case, but also through many others-- into a picture
that has meaning and provides the answer to your question. Other, more
deeply engaged and cooperative enterprises are also emerging on the
Internet. <i>Wikipedia</i>, a multilingual encyclopedia coauthored by
fifty thousand volunteers, is one particularly effective example of
many such enterprises.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="75">
	<ocn>75</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The technical conditions of communication and information processing
are enabling the emergence of new social and economic practices of
information and knowledge production. Eisenstein carefully documented
how print loosened the power of the church over information and
knowledge production in Europe, and enabled, particularly in the
Protestant North, the emergence of early modern capitalist enterprises
in the form of print shops. These printers were able to use their
market revenues to become independent of the church or the princes, as
copyists never were, and to form the economic and social basis of a
liberal, market-based freedom of thought and communication. Over the
past century and a half, these early printers turned into the
commercial mass media: A particular type of market-based
production--concentrated, largely homogenous, and highly
commercialized--that came to dominate our information environment by
the end of the twentieth century. On the background of that dominant
role, the possibility that a radically different form of information
production will emerge--decentralized; socially, no less than
commercially, driven; and as diverse as human thought itself--offers
the promise of a deep change in how we see the world <sub>[pg 34]</sub>
around us, how we come to know about it and evaluate it, and how we are
capable of communicating with others about what we know, believe, and
plan.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="76">
	<ocn>76</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This part of the book is dedicated to explaining the
technological-economic transformation that is making these practices
possible. Not because economics drives all; not because technology
determines the way society or communication go; but because it is the
technological shock, combined with the economic sustainability of the
emerging social practices, that creates the new set of social and
political opportunities that are the subject of this book. By working
out the economics of these practices, we can understand the economic
parameters within which practical political imagination and fulfillment
can operate in the digitally networked environment. I describe
sustained productive enterprises that take the form of decentralized
and nonmarket-based production, and explain why productivity and growth
are consistent with a shift toward such modes of production. What I
describe is not an exercise in pastoral utopianism. It is not a vision
of a return to production in a preindustrial world. It is a practical
possibility that directly results from our economic understanding of
information and culture as objects of production. It flows from fairly
standard economic analysis applied to a very nonstandard economic
reality: one in which all the means of producing and exchanging
information and culture are placed in the hands of hundreds of
millions, and eventually billions, of people around the world,
available for them to work with not only when they are functioning in
the market to keep body and soul together, but also, and with equal
efficacy, when they are functioning in society and alone, trying to
give meaning to their lives as individuals and as social beings.
<sub>[pg 35]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="77">
	<ocn>77</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Chapter 2 - Some Basic Economics of Information Production and
Innovation
	</text>
</object>
<object id="78">
	<ocn>78</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		There are no noncommercial automobile manufacturers. There are no
volunteer steel foundries. You would never choose to have your primary
source of bread depend on voluntary contributions from others.
Nevertheless, scientists working at noncommercial research institutes
funded by nonprofit educational institutions and government grants
produce most of our basic science. Widespread cooperative networks of
volunteers write the software and standards that run most of the
Internet and enable what we do with it. Many people turn to National
Public Radio or the BBC as a reliable source of news. What is it about
information that explains this difference? Why do we rely almost
exclusively on markets and commercial firms to produce cars, steel, and
wheat, but much less so for the most critical information our advanced
societies depend on? Is this a historical contingency, or is there
something about information as an object of production that makes
nonmarket production attractive?
	</text>
</object>
<object id="79">
	<ocn>79</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The technical economic answer is that certain characteristics of
information and culture lead us to understand them as "public <sub>[pg
36]</sub> goods," rather than as "pure private goods" or standard
"economic goods." When economists speak of information, they usually
say that it is "nonrival." We consider a good to be nonrival when its
consumption by one person does not make it any less available for
consumption by another. Once such a good is produced, no more social
resources need be invested in creating more of it to satisfy the next
consumer. Apples are rival. If I eat this apple, you cannot eat it. If
you nonetheless want to eat an apple, more resources (trees, labor)
need to be diverted from, say, building chairs, to growing apples, to
satisfy you. The social cost of your consuming the second apple is the
cost of not using the resources needed to grow the second apple (the
wood from the tree) in their next best use. In other words, it is the
cost to society of not having the additional chairs that could have
been made from the tree. Information is nonrival. Once a scientist has
established a fact, or once Tolstoy has written War and Peace, neither
the scientist nor Tolstoy need spend a single second on producing
additional War and Peace manuscripts or studies for the one-hundredth,
one-thousandth, or one-millionth user of what they wrote. The physical
paper for the book or journal costs something, but the information
itself need only be created once. Economists call such goods "public"
because a market will not produce them if priced at their marginal
cost--zero. In order to provide Tolstoy or the scientist with income,
we regulate publishing: We pass laws that enable their publishers to
prevent competitors from entering the market. Because no competitors
are permitted into the market for copies of War and Peace, the
publishers can price the contents of the book or journal at above their
actual marginal cost of zero. They can then turn some of that excess
revenue over to Tolstoy. Even if these laws are therefore necessary to
create the incentives for publication, the market that develops based
on them will, from the technical economic perspective, systematically
be inefficient. As Kenneth Arrow put it in 1962, "precisely to the
extent that [property] is effective, there is underutilization of the
information."<en>7</en> Because welfare economics defines a market as
producing a good efficiently only when it is pricing the good at its
marginal cost, a good like information (and culture and knowledge are,
for purposes of economics, forms of information), which can never be
sold both at a positive (greater than zero) price and at its marginal
cost, is fundamentally a candidate for substantial nonmarket
production.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="7">
		<number>7</number>
		<note>
			The full statement was: "[A]ny information obtained, say a new method
of production, should, from the welfare point of view, be available
free of charge (apart from the costs of transmitting information). This
insures optimal utilization of the information but of course provides
no incentive for investment in research. In a free enterprise economy,
inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create
property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there
is an underutilization of information." Kenneth Arrow, "Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," in Rate and
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, ed.
Richard R. Nelson (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962),
616-617.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="80">
	<ocn>80</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This widely held explanation of the economics of information production
has led to an understanding that markets based on patents or copyrights
involve a trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency. That is,
looking <sub>[pg 37]</sub> at the state of the world on any given day,
it is inefficient that people and firms sell the information they
possess. From the perspective of a society's overall welfare, the most
efficient thing would be for those who possess information to give it
away for free--or rather, for the cost of communicating it and no more.
On any given day, enforcing copyright law leads to inefficient
underutilization of copyrighted information. However, looking at the
problem of information production over time, the standard defense of
exclusive rights like copyright expects firms and people not to produce
if they know that their products will be available for anyone to take
for free. In order to harness the efforts of individuals and firms that
want to make money, we are willing to trade off some static
inefficiency to achieve dynamic efficiency. That is, we are willing to
have some inefficient lack of access to information every day, in
exchange for getting more people involved in information production
over time. Authors and inventors or, more commonly, companies that
contract with musicians and filmmakers, scientists, and engineers, will
invest in research and create cultural goods because they expect to
sell their information products. Over time, this incentive effect will
give us more innovation and creativity, which will outweigh the
inefficiency at any given moment caused by selling the information at
above its marginal cost. This defense of exclusive rights is limited by
the extent to which it correctly describes the motivations of
information producers and the business models open to them to
appropriate the benefits of their investments. If some information
producers do not need to capture the economic benefits of their
particular information outputs, or if some businesses can capture the
economic value of their information production by means other than
exclusive control over their products, then the justification for
regulating access by granting copyrights or patents is weakened. As I
will discuss in detail, both of these limits on the standard defense
are in fact the case.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="81">
	<ocn>81</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Nonrivalry, moreover, is not the only quirky characteristic of
information production as an economic phenomenon. The other crucial
quirkiness is that information is both input and output of its own
production process. In order to write today's academic or news article,
I need access to yesterday's articles and reports. In order to write
today's novel, movie, or song, I need to use and rework existing
cultural forms, such as story lines and twists. This characteristic is
known to economists as the "on the shoulders of giants" effect,
recalling a statement attributed to Isaac Newton: "If I have seen
farther it is because I stand on the shoulders of giants."<en>8</en>
This second quirkiness <sub>[pg 38]</sub> of information as a
production good makes property-like exclusive rights less appealing as
the dominant institutional arrangement for information and cultural
production than it would have been had the sole quirky characteristic
of information been its nonrivalry. The reason is that if any new
information good or innovation builds on existing information, then
strengthening intellectual property rights increases the prices that
those who invest in producing information today must pay to those who
did so yesterday, in addition to increasing the rewards an information
producer can get tomorrow. Given the nonrivalry, those payments made
today for yesterday's information are all inefficiently too high, from
today's perspective. They are all above the marginal cost--zero.
Today's users of information are not only today's readers and
consumers. They are also today's producers and tomorrow's innovators.
Their net benefit from a strengthened patent or copyright regime, given
not only increased potential revenues but also the increased costs, may
be negative. If we pass a law that regulates information production too
strictly, allowing its beneficiaries to impose prices that are too high
on today's innovators, then we will have not only too little
consumption of information today, but also too little production of new
information for tomorrow.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="8">
		<number>8</number>
		<note>
			Suzanne Scotchmer, "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives 5
(1991): 29-41.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="82">
	<ocn>82</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Perhaps the most amazing document of the consensus among economists
today that, because of the combination of nonrivalry and the "on the
shoulders of giants" effect, excessive expansion of "intellectual
property" protection is economically detrimental, was the economists'
brief filed in the Supreme Court case of <i>Eldred v.
Ashcroft</i>.<en>9</en> The case challenged a law that extended the
term of copyright protection from lasting for the life of the author
plus fifty years, to life of the author plus seventy years, or from
seventy-five years to ninety-five years for copyrights owned by
corporations. If information were like land or iron, the ideal length
of property rights would be infinite from the economists' perspective.
In this case, however, where the "property right" was copyright, more
than two dozen leading economists volunteered to sign a brief opposing
the law, counting among their number five Nobel laureates, including
that well-known market skeptic, Milton Friedman.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="9">
		<number>9</number>
		<note>
			Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="83">
	<ocn>83</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The efficiency of regulating information, knowledge, and cultural
production through strong copyright and patent is not only
theoretically ambiguous, it also lacks empirical basis. The empirical
work trying to assess the impact of intellectual property on innovation
has focused to date on patents. The evidence provides little basis to
support stronger and increasing exclusive <sub>[pg 39]</sub> rights of
the type we saw in the last two and a half decades of the twentieth
century. Practically no studies show a clear-cut benefit to stronger or
longer patents.<en>10</en> In perhaps one of the most startling papers
on the economics of innovation published in the past few years, Josh
Lerner looked at changes in intellectual property law in sixty
countries over a period of 150 years. He studied close to three hundred
policy changes, and found that, both in developing countries and in
economically advanced countries that already have patent law, patenting
both at home and abroad by domestic firms of the country that made the
policy change, a proxy for their investment in research and
development, decreases slightly when patent law is
strengthened!<en>11</en> The implication is that when a country--either
one that already has a significant patent system, or a developing
nation--increases its patent protection, it slightly decreases the
level of investment in innovation by local firms. Going on intuitions
alone, without understanding the background theory, this seems
implausible--why would inventors or companies innovate less when they
get more protection? Once you understand the interaction of nonrivalry
and the "on the shoulders of giants" effect, the findings are entirely
consistent with theory. Increasing patent protection, both in
developing nations that are net importers of existing technology and
science, and in developed nations that already have a degree of patent
protection, and therefore some nontrivial protection for inventors,
increases the costs that current innovators have to pay on existing
knowledge more than it increases their ability to appropriate the value
of their own contributions. When one cuts through the rent-seeking
politics of intellectual property lobbies like the pharmaceutical
companies or Hollywood and the recording industry; when one overcomes
the honestly erroneous, but nonetheless conscience-soothing beliefs of
lawyers who defend the copyright and patent-dependent industries and
the judges they later become, the reality of both theory and empirics
in the economics of intellectual property is that both in theory and as
far as empirical evidence shows, there is remarkably little support in
economics for regulating information, knowledge, and cultural
production through the tools of intellectual property law.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="10">
		<number>10</number>
		<note>
			Adam Jaffe, "The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation
and the Innovation Process," Research Policy 29 (2000): 531.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="11">
		<number>11</number>
		<note>
			Josh Lerner, "Patent Protection and Innovation Over 150 Years"
(working paper no. 8977, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, MA, 2002).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="84">
	<ocn>84</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Where does innovation and information production come from, then, if it
does not come as much from intellectual-property-based market actors,
as many generally believe? The answer is that it comes mostly from a
mixture of (1) nonmarket sources--both state and nonstate--and (2)
market actors whose business models do not depend on the regulatory
framework of intellectual property. The former type of producer is the
expected answer, <sub>[pg 40]</sub> within mainstream economics, for a
public goods problem like information production. The National
Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and the Defense
Department are major sources of funding for research in the United
States, as are government agencies in Europe, at the national and
European level, Japan, and other major industrialized nations. The
latter type--that is, the presence and importance of market-based
producers whose business models do not require and do not depend on
intellectual property protection--is not theoretically predicted by
that model, but is entirely obvious once you begin to think about it.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="85">
	<ocn>85</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Consider a daily newspaper. Normally, we think of newspapers as
dependent on copyrights. In fact, however, that would be a mistake. No
daily newspaper would survive if it depended for its business on
waiting until a competitor came out with an edition, then copied the
stories, and reproduced them in a competing edition. Daily newspapers
earn their revenue from a combination of low-priced newsstand sales or
subscriptions together with advertising revenues. Neither of those is
copyright dependent once we understand that consumers will not wait
half a day until the competitor's paper comes out to save a nickel or a
quarter on the price of the newspaper. If all copyright on newspapers
were abolished, the revenues of newspapers would be little
affected.<en>12</en> Take, for example, the 2003 annual reports of a
few of the leading newspaper companies in the United States. The New
York Times Company receives a little more than $3 billion a year from
advertising and circulation revenues, and a little more than $200
million a year in revenues from all other sources. Even if the entire
amount of "other sources" were from syndication of stories and
photos--which likely overstates the role of these copyright-dependent
sources--it would account for little more than 6 percent of total
revenues. The net operating revenues for the Gannett Company were more
than $5.6 billion in newspaper advertising and circulation revenue,
relative to about $380 million in all other revenues. As with the New
York Times, at most a little more than 6 percent of revenues could be
attributed to copyright-dependent activities. For Knight Ridder, the
2003 numbers were $2.8 billion and $100 million, respectively, or a
maximum of about 3.5 percent from copyrights. Given these numbers, it
is safe to say that daily newspapers are not a copyright-dependent
industry, although they are clearly a market-based information
production industry.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="12">
		<number>12</number>
		<note>
			At most, a "hot news" exception on the model of <i>International
News Service v. Associated Press</i>, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), might be
required. Even that, however, would only be applicable to online
editions that are for pay. In paper, habits of reading, accreditation
of the original paper, and first-to-market advantages of even a few
hours would be enough. Online, where the first-to-market advantage
could shrink to seconds, "hot news" protection may be worthwhile.
However, almost all papers are available for free and rely solely on
advertising. The benefits of reading a copied version are, at that
point, practically insignificant to the reader.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="86">
	<ocn>86</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As it turns out, repeated survey studies since 1981 have shown that in
all industrial sectors except for very few--most notably
pharmaceuticals--firm managers do not see patents as the most important
way they capture the <sub>[pg 41]</sub> benefits of their research and
developments.<en>13</en> They rank the advantages that strong research
and development gives them in lowering the cost or improving the
quality of manufacture, being the first in the market, or developing
strong marketing relationships as more important than patents. The term
"intellectual property" has high cultural visibility today. Hollywood,
the recording industry, and pharmaceuticals occupy center stage on the
national and international policy agenda for information policy.
However, in the overall mix of our information, knowledge, and cultural
production system, the total weight of these exclusivity-based market
actors is surprisingly small relative to the combination of nonmarket
sectors, government and nonprofit, and market-based actors whose
business models do not depend on proprietary exclusion from their
information outputs.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="13">
		<number>13</number>
		<note>
			Wesley Cohen, R. Nelson, and J. Walsh, "Protecting Their
Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)" (working paper no. 7552, National
Bureau Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, 2000); Richard Levin et al.,
"Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and
Development"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3 (1987): 783;
Mansfield et al., "Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study,"
The Economic Journal 91 (1981): 907.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="87">
	<ocn>87</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The upshot of the mainstream economic analysis of information
production today is that the widely held intuition that markets are
more or less the best way to produce goods, that property rights and
contracts are efficient ways of organizing production decisions, and
that subsidies distort production decisions, is only very ambiguously
applicable to information. While exclusive rights-based production can
partially solve the problem of how information will be produced in our
society, a comprehensive regulatory system that tries to mimic property
in this area--such as both the United States and the European Union
have tried to implement internally and through international
agreements--simply cannot work perfectly, even in an ideal market
posited by the most abstract economics models. Instead, we find the
majority of businesses in most sectors reporting that they do not rely
on intellectual property as a primary mechanism for appropriating the
benefits of their research and development investments. In addition, we
find mainstream economists believing that there is a substantial role
for government funding; that nonprofit research can be more efficient
than for-profit research; and, otherwise, that nonproprietary
production can play an important role in our information production
system.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="88">
	<ocn>88</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		THE DIVERSITY OF STRATEGIES IN OUR CURRENT INFORMATION PRODUCTION
SYSTEM
	</text>
</object>
<object id="89">
	<ocn>89</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The actual universe of information production in the economy then, is
not as dependent on property rights and markets in information goods as
the last quarter century's increasing obsession with "intellectual
property" might <sub>[pg 42]</sub> suggest. Instead, what we see both
from empirical work and theoretical work is that individuals and firms
in the economy produce information using a wide range of strategies.
Some of these strategies indeed rely on exclusive rights like patents
or copyrights, and aim at selling information as a good into an
information market. Many, however, do not. In order to provide some
texture to what these models look like, we can outline a series of
ideal-type "business" strategies for producing information. The point
here is not to provide an exhaustive map of the empirical business
literature. It is, instead, to offer a simple analytic framework within
which to understand the mix of strategies available for firms and
individuals to appropriate the benefits of their investments--of time,
money, or both, in activities that result in the production of
information, knowledge, and culture. The differentiating parameters are
simple: cost minimization and benefit maximization. Any of these
strategies could use inputs that are already owned--such as existing
lyrics for a song or a patented invention to improve on--by buying a
license from the owner of the exclusive rights for the existing
information. Cost minimization here refers purely to ideal-type
strategies for obtaining as many of the information inputs as possible
at their marginal cost of zero, instead of buying licenses to inputs at
a positive market price. It can be pursued by using materials from the
public domain, by using materials the producer itself owns, or by
sharing/bartering for information inputs owned by others in exchange
for one's own information inputs. Benefits can be obtained either in
reliance on asserting one's exclusive rights, or by following a
non-exclusive strategy, using some other mechanism that improves the
position of the information producer because they invested in producing
the information. Nonexclusive strategies for benefit maximization can
be pursued both by market actors and by nonmarket actors. Table 2.1
maps nine ideal-type strategies characterized by these components.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="90">
	<ocn>90</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The ideal-type strategy that underlies patents and copyrights can be
thought of as the "Romantic Maximizer." It conceives of the information
producer as a single author or inventor laboring creatively--hence
romantic--but in expectation of royalties, rather than immortality,
beauty, or truth. An individual or small start-up firm that sells
software it developed to a larger firm, or an author selling rights to
a book or a film typify this model. The second ideal type that arises
within exclusive-rights based industries, "Mickey," is a larger firm
that already owns an inventory of exclusive rights, some through
in-house development, some by buying from Romantic Maximizers. <sub>[pg
43]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="91">
	<ocn>91</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		<b>Table 2.1: Ideal-Type Information Production Strategies</b>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="92">
	<ocn>92</ocn>
	<text class="table">	
		<table summary="normal text css" width="100%" border="0" bgcolor="white" cellpadding="2" align="center">
      <tr><th width="25%">Cost Minimization/ Benefit Acquisition</th><th width="25%">Public Domain</th><th width="25%">Intrafirm</th><th width="25%">Barter/Sharing</th></tr>
      <tr><td width="25%">Rights based exclusion (make money by exercising exclusive rights - licensing or blocking competition)</td><td width="25%">Romantic Maximizers (authors, composers; sell to publishers; sometimes sell to Mickeys)</td><td width="25%">Mikey (Disney reuses inventory for derivative works; buy outputs of Romantic Maximizers)</td><td width="25%">RCA (small number of companies hold blocking patents; they create patent pools to build valuable goods)</td></tr>
      <tr><td width="25%">Nonexclusion - Market (make money from information production but not by exercising the exclusive rights)</td><td width="25%">Scholarly Lawyers (write articles to get clients; other examples include bands that give music out for free as advertisements for touring and charge money for performance; software developers who develop software and make money from customizing it to a particular client, on-site management, advice and training, not from licensing)</td><td width="25%">Know-How (firms that have cheaper or better production processes because of their research, lower their costs or improve the quality of other goods or services; lawyer offices that build on existing forms)</td><td width="25%">Learning Networks (share information with similar organizations - make money from early access to information. For example, newspapers join together to create a wire service; firms where engineers and scientists from different firms attend professional societies to diffuse knowledge)</td></tr>
      <tr><td width="25%">Nonexclusion - Nonmarket</td><td width="25%">Joe Einstein (give away information for free in return for status, benefits to reputation, value for the innovation to themselves; wide range of motivations. Includes members of amateur choirs who perform for free, academics who write articles for fame, people who write opeds, contribute to mailing lists; many free software developers and free software generally for most uses)</td><td width="25%">Los Alamos (share in-house information, rely on in-house inputs to produce valuable public goods used to secure additional government funding and status)</td><td width="25%">Limited sharing networks (release paper to small number of colleagues to get comments so you can improve it before publication. Make use of time delay to gain relative advantage later on using Joe Einstein strategy. Share one's information on formal condition of reciprocity: like "copyleft" conditions on derivative works for distribution)</td></tr>
    </table>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="93">
	<ocn>93</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		- A defining cost-reduction mechanism for Mickey is that it applies
creative people to work on its own inventory, for which it need not pay
above marginal cost prices in the market. This strategy is the most
advantageous in an environment of very strong exclusive rights
protection for a number of reasons. First, the ability to extract
higher rents from the existing inventory of information goods is
greatest for firms that (a) have an inventory and (b) rely on asserting
exclusive rights as their mode of extracting value. Second, the
increased costs of production associated with strong exclusive rights
are cushioned by the ability of such firms to rework their existing
inventory, rather than trying to work with materials from an
evershrinking public domain or paying for every source of inspiration
and element of a new composition. The coarsest version of this strategy
might be found if Disney were to produce a "winter sports"
thirty-minute television program by tying together scenes from existing
cartoons, say, one in which Goofy plays hockey followed by a snippet of
Donald Duck ice skating, and so on. More subtle, and representative of
the type of reuse relevant to the analysis here, would be the case
where Disney buys the rights to Winniethe-Pooh, and, after producing an
animated version of stories from the original books, then continues to
work with the same characters and relationships to create a new film,
say, Winnie-the-Pooh--Frankenpooh (or Beauty and the Beast--Enchanted
Christmas; or The Little Mermaid--Stormy the Wild Seahorse). The third
exclusive-rights-based strategy, which I call "RCA," is barter among
the owners of inventories. Patent pools, cross-licensing, and
market-sharing agreements among the radio patents holders in 1920-1921,
which I describe in chapter 6, are a perfect example. RCA, GE,
AT&amp;T, and Westinghouse held blocking patents that prevented each
other and anyone else from manufacturing the best radios possible given
technology at that time. The four companies entered an agreement to
combine their patents and divide the radio equipment and services
markets, which they used throughout the 1920s to exclude competitors
and to capture precisely the postinnovation monopoly rents sought to be
created by patents.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="94">
	<ocn>94</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Exclusive-rights-based business models, however, represent only a
fraction of our information production system. There are both
market-based and nonmarket models to sustain and organize information
production. Together, these account for a substantial portion of our
information output. Indeed, industry surveys concerned with patents
have shown that the vast majority of industrial R&amp;D is pursued with
strategies that do not rely primarily on patents. This does not mean
that most or any of the firms that <sub>[pg 45]</sub> pursue these
strategies possess or seek no exclusive rights in their information
products. It simply means that their production strategy does not
depend on asserting these rights through exclusion. One such cluster of
strategies, which I call "Scholarly Lawyers," relies on demand-side
effects of access to the information the producer distributes. It
relies on the fact that sometimes using an information good that one
has produced makes its users seek out a relationship with the author.
The author then charges for the relationship, not for the information.
Doctors or lawyers who publish in trade journals, become known, and get
business as a result are an instance of this strategy. An enormously
creative industry, much of which operates on this model, is software.
About two-thirds of industry revenues in software development come from
activities that the Economic Census describes as: (1) writing,
modifying, testing, and supporting software to meet the needs of a
particular customer; (2) planning and designing computer systems that
integrate computer hardware, software, and communication technologies;
(3) on-site management and operation of clients' computer systems
and/or data processing facilities; and (4) other professional and
technical computer-related advice and services, systems consultants,
and computer training. "Software publishing," by contrast, the business
model that relies on sales based on copyright, accounts for a little
more than one-third of the industry's revenues.<en>14</en>
Interestingly, this is the model of appropriation that more than a
decade ago, Esther Dyson and John Perry Barlow heralded as the future
of music and musicians. They argued in the early 1990s for more or less
free access to copies of recordings distributed online, which would
lead to greater attendance at live gigs. Revenue from performances,
rather than recording, would pay artists.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="14">
		<number>14</number>
		<note>
			In the 2002 Economic Census, compare NAICS categories 5415 (computer
systems and related services) to NAICS 5112 (software publishing).
Between the 1997 Economic Census and the 2002 census, this ratio
remained stable, at about 36 percent in 1997 and 37 percent in 2002.
See 2002 Economic Census, "Industry Series, Information, Software
Publishers, and Computer Systems, Design and Related Services"
(Washington, DC: U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="95">
	<ocn>95</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The most common models of industrial R&amp;D outside of
pharmaceuticals, however, depend on supply-side effects of information
production. One central reason to pursue research is its effects on
firm-specific advantages, like production know-how, which permit the
firm to produce more efficiently than competitors and sell better or
cheaper competing products. Daily newspapers collectively fund news
agencies, and individually fund reporters, because their ability to
find information and report it is a necessary input into their
product--timely news. As I have already suggested, they do not need
copyright to protect their revenues. Those are protected by the short
half-life of dailies. The investments come in order to be able to play
in the market for daily newspapers. Similarly, the learning curve and
knowhow effects in semiconductors are such that early entry into the
market for <sub>[pg 46]</sub> a new chip will give the first mover
significant advantages over competitors. Investment is then made to
capture that position, and the investment is captured by the
quasi-rents available from the first-mover advantage. In some cases,
innovation is necessary in order to be able to produce at the state of
the art. Firms participate in "Learning Networks" to gain the benefits
of being at the state of the art, and sharing their respective
improvements. However, they can only participate if they innovate. If
they do not innovate, they lack the in-house capacity to understand the
state of the art and play at it. Their investments are then recouped
not from asserting their exclusive rights, but from the fact that they
sell into one of a set of markets, access into which is protected by
the relatively small number of firms with such absorption capacity, or
the ability to function at the edge of the state of the art. Firms of
this sort might barter their information for access, or simply be part
of a small group of organizations with enough knowledge to exploit the
information generated and informally shared by all participants in
these learning networks. They obtain rents from the concentrated market
structure, not from assertion of property rights.<en>15</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="15">
		<number>15</number>
		<note>
			Levin et al., "Appropriating the Returns," 794-796 (secrecy, lead
time, and learningcurve advantages regarded as more effective than
patents by most firms). See also F. M. Scherer, "Learning by Doing and
International Trade in Semiconductors" (faculty research working paper
series R94-13, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University, Cambridge, MA, 1994), an empirical study of semiconductor
industry suggesting that for industries with steep learning curves,
investment in information production is driven by advantages of being
first down the learning curve rather than the expectation of legal
rights of exclusion. The absorption effect is described in Wesley M.
Cohen and Daniel A. Leventhal, "Innovation and Learning: The Two Faces
of R&amp;D," The Economic Journal 99 (1989): 569-596. The collaboration
effect was initially described in Richard R. Nelson, "The Simple
Economics of Basic Scientific Research," Journal of Political Economy
67 (June 1959): 297-306. The most extensive work over the past fifteen
years, and the source of the term of learning networks, has been from
Woody Powell on knowledge and learning networks. Identifying the role
of markets made concentrated by the limited ability to use information,
rather than through exclusive rights, was made in F. M. Scherer,
"Nordhaus's Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric
Reinterpretation," American Economic Review 62 (1972): 422-427.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="96">
	<ocn>96</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		An excellent example of a business strategy based on nonexclusivity is
IBM's. The firm has obtained the largest number of patents every year
from 1993 to 2004, amassing in total more than 29,000 patents. IBM has
also, however, been one of the firms most aggressively engaged in
adapting its business model to the emergence of free software. Figure
2.1 shows what happened to the relative weight of patent royalties,
licenses, and sales in IBM's revenues and revenues that the firm
described as coming from "Linuxrelated services." Within a span of four
years, the Linux-related services category moved from accounting for
practically no revenues, to providing double the revenues from all
patent-related sources, of the firm that has been the most
patent-productive in the United States. IBM has described itself as
investing more than a billion dollars in free software developers,
hired programmers to help develop the Linux kernel and other free
software; and donated patents to the Free Software Foundation. What
this does for the firm is provide it with a better operating system for
its server business-- making the servers better, faster, more reliable,
and therefore more valuable to consumers. Participating in free
software development has also allowed IBM to develop service
relationships with its customers, building on free software to offer
customer-specific solutions. In other words, IBM has combined both
supply-side and demand-side strategies to adopt a nonproprietary
business model that has generated more than $2 billion yearly of
business <sub>[pg 47]</sub> for the firm. Its strategy is, if not
symbiotic, certainly complementary to free software.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="97">
	<ocn>97</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		<image xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:actuate="onLoad" xlink:show="embed"
xlink:href="../_sisu/image/won_benkler_2_1.png" width="420"
height="342" />[won_benkler_2_1.png] "Figure 2.1: Selected IBM
Revenues, 2000-2003"
	</text>
</object>
<object id="98">
	<ocn>98</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		I began this chapter with a puzzle--advanced economies rely on
nonmarket organizations for information production much more than they
do in other sectors. The puzzle reflects the fact that alongside the
diversity of market-oriented business models for information production
there is a wide diversity of nonmarket models as well. At a broad level
of abstraction, I designate this diversity of motivations and
organizational forms as "Joe Einstein"--to underscore the breadth of
the range of social practices and practitioners of nonmarket
production. These include universities and other research institutes;
government research labs that publicize their work, or government
information agencies like the Census Bureau. They also include
individuals, like academics; authors and artists who play to
"immortality" rather than seek to maximize the revenue from their
creation. Eric von Hippel has for many years documented user innovation
in areas ranging from surfboard design to new mechanisms for pushing
electric wiring through insulation tiles.<en>16</en> The Oratorio
Society of New York, whose chorus <sub>[pg 48]</sub> members are all
volunteers, has filled Carnegie Hall every December with a performance
of Handel's Messiah since the theatre's first season in 1891. Political
parties, advocacy groups, and churches are but few of the stable social
organizations that fill our information environment with news and
views. For symmetry purposes in table 2.1, we also see reliance on
internal inventories by some nonmarket organizations, like secret
government labs that do not release their information outputs, but use
it to continue to obtain public funding. This is what I call "Los
Alamos." Sharing in limited networks also occurs in nonmarket
relationships, as when academic colleagues circulate a draft to get
comments. In the nonmarket, nonproprietary domain, however, these
strategies were in the past relatively smaller in scope and
significance than the simple act of taking from the public domain and
contributing back to it that typifies most Joe Einstein behaviors. Only
since the mid-1980s have we begun to see a shift from releasing into
the public domain to adoption of commons-binding licensing, like the
"copyleft" strategies I describe in chapter 3. What makes these
strategies distinct from Joe Einstein is that they formalize the
requirement of reciprocity, at least for some set of rights shared.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="16">
		<number>16</number>
		<note>
			Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
2005).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="99">
	<ocn>99</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		My point is not to provide an exhaustive list of all the ways we
produce information. It is simply to offer some texture to the
statement that information, knowledge, and culture are produced in
diverse ways in contemporary society. Doing so allows us to understand
the comparatively limited role that production based purely on
exclusive rights--like patents, copyrights, and similar regulatory
constraints on the use and exchange of information--has played in our
information production system to this day. It is not new or mysterious
to suggest that nonmarket production is important to information
production. It is not new or mysterious to suggest that efficiency
increases whenever it is possible to produce information in a way that
allows the producer--whether market actor or not--to appropriate the
benefits of production without actually charging a price for use of the
information itself. Such strategies are legion among both market and
nonmarket actors. Recognizing this raises two distinct questions:
First, how does the cluster of mechanisms that make up intellectual
property law affect this mix? Second, how do we account for the mix of
strategies at any given time? Why, for example, did proprietary,
market-based production become so salient in music and movies in the
twentieth century, and what is it about the digitally networked
environment that could change this mix? <sub>[pg 49]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="100">
	<ocn>100</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		THE EFFECTS OF EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
	</text>
</object>
<object id="101">
	<ocn>101</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Once we recognize that there are diverse strategies of appropriation
for information production, we come to see a new source of inefficiency
caused by strong "intellectual property"-type rights. Recall that in
the mainstream analysis, exclusive rights always cause static
inefficiency--that is, they allow producers to charge positive prices
for products (information) that have a zero marginal cost. Exclusive
rights have a more ambiguous effect dynamically. They raise the
expected returns from information production, and thereby are thought
to induce investment in information production and innovation. However,
they also increase the costs of information inputs. If existing
innovations are more likely covered by patent, then current producers
will more likely have to pay for innovations or uses that in the past
would have been available freely from the public domain. Whether,
overall, any given regulatory change that increases the scope of
exclusive rights improves or undermines new innovation therefore
depends on whether, given the level of appropriability that preceded
it, it increased input costs more or less than it increased the
prospect of being paid for one's outputs.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="102">
	<ocn>102</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The diversity of appropriation strategies adds one more kink to this
story. Consider the following very simple hypothetical. Imagine an
industry that produces "infowidgets." There are ten firms in the
business. Two of them are infowidget publishers on the Romantic
Maximizer model. They produce infowidgets as finished goods, and sell
them based on patent. Six firms produce infowidgets on supply-side
(Know-How) or demand-side (Scholarly Lawyer) effects: they make their
Realwidgets or Servicewidgets more efficient or desirable to consumers,
respectively. Two firms are nonprofit infowidget producers that exist
on a fixed, philanthropically endowed income. Each firm produces five
infowidgets, for a total market supply of fifty. Now imagine a change
in law that increases exclusivity. Assume that this is a change in law
that, absent diversity of appropriation, would be considered efficient.
Say it increases input costs by 10 percent and appropriability by 20
percent, for a net expected gain of 10 percent. The two infowidget
publishers would each see a 10 percent net gain, and let us assume that
this would cause each to increase its efforts by 10 percent and produce
10 percent more infowidgets. Looking at these two firms alone, the
change in law caused an increase from ten infowidgets to eleven--a gain
for the policy change. Looking at the market as a whole, however, eight
firms see an increase of 10 percent in costs, and no gain in
appropriability. This is because none of these firms <sub>[pg 50]</sub>
actually relies on exclusive rights to appropriate its product's value.
If, commensurate with our assumption for the publishers, we assume that
this results in a decline in effort and productivity of 10 percent for
the eight firms, we would see these firms decline from forty
infowidgets to thirty-six, and total market production would decline
from fifty infowidgets to forty-seven.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="103">
	<ocn>103</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Another kind of effect for the change in law may be to persuade some of
the firms to shift strategies or to consolidate. Imagine, for example,
that most of the inputs required by the two publishers were owned by
the other infowidget publisher. If the two firms merged into one
Mickey, each could use the outputs of the other at its marginal
cost--zero--instead of at its exclusive-rights market price. The
increase in exclusive rights would then not affect the merged firm's
costs, only the costs of outside firms that would have to buy the
merged firm's outputs from the market. Given this dynamic, strong
exclusive rights drive concentration of inventory owners. We see this
very clearly in the increasing sizes of inventory-based firms like
Disney. Moreover, the increased appropriability in the exclusive-rights
market will likely shift some firms at the margin of the nonproprietary
business models to adopt proprietary business models. This, in turn,
will increase the amount of information available only from proprietary
sources. The feedback effect will further accelerate the rise in
information input costs, increasing the gains from shifting to a
proprietary strategy and to consolidating larger inventories with new
production.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="104">
	<ocn>104</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Given diverse strategies, the primary unambiguous effect of increasing
the scope and force of exclusive rights is to shape the population of
business strategies. Strong exclusive rights increase the
attractiveness of exclusiverights-based strategies at the expense of
nonproprietary strategies, whether market-based or nonmarket based.
They also increase the value and attraction of consolidation of large
inventories of existing information with new production.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="105">
	<ocn>105</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		WHEN INFORMATION PRODUCTION MEETS THE COMPUTER NETWORK
	</text>
</object>
<object id="106">
	<ocn>106</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Music in the nineteenth century was largely a relational good. It was
something people did in the physical presence of each other: in the
folk way through hearing, repeating, and improvising; in the
middle-class way of buying sheet music and playing for guests or
attending public performances; or in the upper-class way of hiring
musicians. Capital was widely distributed <sub>[pg 51]</sub> among
musicians in the form of instruments, or geographically dispersed in
the hands of performance hall (and drawing room) owners. Market-based
production depended on performance through presence. It provided
opportunities for artists to live and perform locally, or to reach
stardom in cultural centers, but without displacing the local
performers. With the introduction of the phonograph, a new, more
passive relationship to played music was made possible in reliance on
the high-capital requirements of recording, copying, and distributing
specific instantiations of recorded music--records. What developed was
a concentrated, commercial industry, based on massive financial
investments in advertising, or preference formation, aimed at getting
ever-larger crowds to want those recordings that the recording
executives had chosen. In other words, the music industry took on a
more industrial model of production, and many of the local venues--from
the living room to the local dance hall--came to be occupied by
mechanical recordings rather than amateur and professional local
performances. This model crowded out some, but not all, of the
live-performance-based markets (for example, jazz clubs, piano bars, or
weddings), and created new live-performance markets--the megastar
concert tour. The music industry shifted from a reliance on Scholarly
Lawyer and Joe Einstein models to reliance on Romantic Maximizer and
Mickey models. As computers became more music-capable and digital
networks became a ubiquitously available distribution medium, we saw
the emergence of the present conflict over the regulation of cultural
production--the law of copyright--between the twentieth-century,
industrial model recording industry and the emerging amateur
distribution systems coupled, at least according to its supporters, to
a reemergence of decentralized, relation-based markets for professional
performance artists.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="107">
	<ocn>107</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This stylized story of the music industry typifies the mass media more
generally. Since the introduction of the mechanical press and the
telegraph, followed by the phonograph, film, the high-powered radio
transmitter, and through to the cable plant or satellite, the capital
costs of fixing information and cultural goods in a transmission
medium--a high-circulation newspaper, a record or movie, a radio or
television program--have been high and increasing. The high physical
and financial capital costs involved in making a widely accessible
information good and distributing it to the increasingly larger
communities (brought together by better transportation systems and more
interlinked economic and political systems) muted the relative role of
nonmarket production, and emphasized the role of those firms that could
<sub>[pg 52]</sub> muster the financial and physical capital necessary
to communicate on a mass scale. Just as these large, industrial-age
machine requirements increased the capital costs involved in
information and cultural production, thereby triggering
commercialization and concentration of much of this sector, so too
ubiquitously available cheap processors have dramatically reduced the
capital input costs required to fix information and cultural
expressions and communicate them globally. By doing so, they have
rendered feasible a radical reorganization of our information and
cultural production system, away from heavy reliance on commercial,
concentrated business models and toward greater reliance on
nonproprietary appropriation strategies, in particular nonmarket
strategies whose efficacy was dampened throughout the industrial period
by the high capital costs of effective communication.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="108">
	<ocn>108</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Information and cultural production have three primary categories of
inputs. The first is existing information and culture. We already know
that existing information is a nonrival good--that is, its real
marginal cost at any given moment is zero. The second major cost is
that of the mechanical means of sensing our environment, processing it,
and communicating new information goods. This is the high cost that
typified the industrial model, and which has drastically declined in
computer networks. The third factor is human communicative
capacity--the creativity, experience, and cultural awareness necessary
to take from the universe of existing information and cultural
resources and turn them into new insights, symbols, or representations
meaningful to others with whom we converse. Given the zero cost of
existing information and the declining cost of communication and
processing, human capacity becomes the primary scarce resource in the
networked information economy.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="109">
	<ocn>109</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Human communicative capacity, however, is an input with radically
different characteristics than those of, say, printing presses or
satellites. It is held by each individual, and cannot be "transferred"
from one person to another or aggregated like so many machines. It is
something each of us innately has, though in divergent quanta and
qualities. Individual human capacities, rather than the capacity to
aggregate financial capital, become the economic core of our
information and cultural production. Some of that human capacity is
currently, and will continue to be, traded through markets in creative
labor. However, its liberation from the constraints of physical capital
leaves creative human beings much freer to engage in a wide range of
information and cultural production practices than those they could
afford to participate in when, in addition to creativity, experience,
cultural awareness <sub>[pg 53]</sub> and time, one needed a few
million dollars to engage in information production. From our
friendships to our communities we live life and exchange ideas,
insights, and expressions in many more diverse relations than those
mediated by the market. In the physical economy, these relationships
were largely relegated to spaces outside of our economic production
system. The promise of the networked information economy is to bring
this rich diversity of social life smack into the middle of our economy
and our productive lives.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="110">
	<ocn>110</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Let's do a little experiment. Imagine that you were performing a Web
search with me. Imagine that we were using Google as our search engine,
and that what we wanted to do was answer the questions of an
inquisitive six-year-old about Viking ships. What would we get, sitting
in front of our computers and plugging in a search request for "Viking
Ships"? The first site is Canadian, and includes a collection of
resources, essays, and worksheets. An enterprising elementary school
teacher at the Gander Academy in Newfoundland seems to have put these
together. He has essays on different questions, and links to sites
hosted by a wide range of individuals and organizations, such as a
Swedish museum, individual sites hosted on geocities, and even to a
specific picture of a replica Viking ship, hosted on a commercial site
dedicated to selling nautical replicas. In other words, it is a Joe
Einstein site that points to other sites, which in turn use either Joe
Einstein or Scholarly Lawyer strategies. This multiplicity of sources
of information that show up on the very first site is then replicated
as one continues to explore the remaining links. The second link is to
a Norwegian site called "the Viking Network," a Web ring dedicated to
preparing and hosting short essays on Vikings. It includes brief
essays, maps, and external links, such as one to an article in
Scientific American. "To become a member you must produce an
Information Sheet on the Vikings in your local area and send it in
electronic format to Viking Network. Your info-sheet will then be
included in the Viking Network web." The third site is maintained by a
Danish commercial photographer, and hosted in Copenhagen, in a portion
dedicated to photographs of archeological finds and replicas of Danish
Viking ships. A retired professor from the University of Pittsburgh
runs the fourth. The fifth is somewhere between a hobby and a showcase
for the services of an individual, independent Web publisher offering
publishing-related services. The sixth and seventh are museums, in
Norway and Virginia, respectively. The eighth is the Web site of a
hobbyists' group dedicated to building Viking Ship replicas. The ninth
includes classroom materials and <sub>[pg 54]</sub> teaching guides
made freely available on the Internet by PBS, the American Public
Broadcasting Service. Certainly, if you perform this search now, as you
read this book, the rankings will change from those I saw when I ran
it; but I venture that the mix, the range and diversity of producers,
and the relative salience of nonmarket producers will not change
significantly.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="111">
	<ocn>111</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The difference that the digitally networked environment makes is its
capacity to increase the efficacy, and therefore the importance, of
many more, and more diverse, nonmarket producers falling within the
general category of Joe Einstein. It makes nonmarket strategies--from
individual hobbyists to formal, well-funded nonprofits--vastly more
effective than they could be in the mass-media environment. The
economics of this phenomenon are neither mysterious nor complex.
Imagine the grade-school teacher who wishes to put together ten to
twenty pages of materials on Viking ships for schoolchildren.
Pre-Internet, he would need to go to one or more libraries and museums,
find books with pictures, maps, and text, or take his own photographs
(assuming he was permitted by the museums) and write his own texts,
combining this research. He would then need to select portions, clear
the copyrights to reprint them, find a printing house that would set
his text and pictures in a press, pay to print a number of copies, and
then distribute them to all children who wanted them. Clearly, research
today is simpler and cheaper. Cutting and pasting pictures and texts
that are digital is cheaper. Depending on where the teacher is located,
it is possible that these initial steps would have been insurmountable,
particularly for a teacher in a poorly endowed community without easy
access to books on the subject, where research would have required
substantial travel. Even once these barriers were surmounted, in the
precomputer, pre-Internet days, turning out materials that looked and
felt like a high quality product, with highresolution pictures and
maps, and legible print required access to capitalintensive facilities.
The cost of creating even one copy of such a product would likely
dissuade the teacher from producing the booklet. At most, he might have
produced a mimeographed bibliography, and perhaps some text reproduced
on a photocopier. Now, place the teacher with a computer and a
high-speed Internet connection, at home or in the school library. The
cost of production and distribution of the products of his effort are
trivial. A Web site can be maintained for a few dollars a month. The
computer itself is widely accessible throughout the developed world. It
becomes trivial for a teacher to produce the "booklet"--with more
information, available to anyone in the world, anywhere, at any time,
as long as he is willing to spend <sub>[pg 55]</sub> some of his free
time putting together the booklet rather than watching television or
reading a book.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="112">
	<ocn>112</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		When you multiply these very simple stylized facts by the roughly
billion people who live in societies sufficiently wealthy to allow
cheap ubiquitous Internet access, the breadth and depth of the
transformation we are undergoing begins to become clear. A billion
people in advanced economies may have between two billion and six
billion spare hours among them, every day. In order to harness these
billions of hours, it would take the whole workforce of almost 340,000
workers employed by the entire motion picture and recording industries
in the United States put together, assuming each worker worked
forty-hour weeks without taking a single vacation, for between three
and eight and a half years! Beyond the sheer potential quantitative
capacity, however one wishes to discount it to account for different
levels of talent, knowledge, and motivation, a billion volunteers have
qualities that make them more likely to produce what others want to
read, see, listen to, or experience. They have diverse interests--as
diverse as human culture itself. Some care about Viking ships, others
about the integrity of voting machines. Some care about obscure music
bands, others share a passion for baking. As Eben Moglen put it, "if
you wrap the Internet around every person on the planet and spin the
planet, software flows in the network. It's an emergent property of
connected human minds that they create things for one another's
pleasure and to conquer their uneasy sense of being too
alone."<en>17</en> It is this combination of a will to create and to
communicate with others, and a shared cultural experience that makes it
likely that each of us wants to talk about something that we believe
others will also want to talk about, that makes the billion potential
participants in today's online conversation, and the six billion in
tomorrow's conversation, affirmatively better than the commercial
industrial model. When the economics of industrial production require
high up-front costs and low marginal costs, the producers must focus on
creating a few superstars and making sure that everyone tunes in to
listen or watch them. This requires that they focus on averaging out
what consumers are most likely to buy. This works reasonably well as
long as there is no better substitute. As long as it is expensive to
produce music or the evening news, there are indeed few competitors for
top billing, and the star system can function. Once every person on the
planet, or even only every person living in a wealthy economy and 10-20
percent of those living in poorer countries, can easily talk to their
friends and compatriots, the competition becomes tougher. It does not
mean that there is no continued role <sub>[pg 56]</sub> for the
mass-produced and mass-marketed cultural products--be they Britney
Spears or the broadcast news. It does, however, mean that many more
"niche markets"--if markets, rather than conversations, are what they
should be called--begin to play an ever-increasing role in the total
mix of our cultural production system. The economics of production in a
digital environment should lead us to expect an increase in the
relative salience of nonmarket production models in the overall mix of
our information production system, and it is efficient for this to
happen--more information will be produced, and much of it will be
available for its users at its marginal cost.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="17">
		<number>17</number>
		<note>
			Eben Moglen, "Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of
Copyright," First Monday (1999), &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/">http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue4_8/moglen/</link>&gt;.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="113">
	<ocn>113</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The known quirky characteristics of information and knowledge as
production goods have always given nonmarket production a much greater
role in this production system than was common in capitalist economies
for tangible goods. The dramatic decline in the cost of the material
means of producing and exchanging information, knowledge, and culture
has substantially decreased the costs of information expression and
exchange, and thereby increased the relative efficacy of nonmarket
production. When these facts are layered over the fact that
information, knowledge, and culture have become the central
high-value-added economic activities of the most advanced economies, we
find ourselves in a new and unfamiliar social and economic condition.
Social behavior that traditionally was relegated to the peripheries of
the economy has become central to the most advanced economies.
Nonmarket behavior is becoming central to producing our information and
cultural environment. Sources of knowledge and cultural edification,
through which we come to know and comprehend the world, to form our
opinions about it, and to express ourselves in communication with
others about what we see and believe have shifted from heavy reliance
on commercial, concentrated media, to being produced on a much more
widely distributed model, by many actors who are not driven by the
imperatives of advertising or the sale of entertainment goods.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="114">
	<ocn>114</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		STRONG EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
	</text>
</object>
<object id="115">
	<ocn>115</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		We now have the basic elements of a clash between incumbent
institutions and emerging social practice. Technologies of information
and cultural production initially led to the increasing salience of
commercial, industrialmodel production in these areas. Over the course
of the twentieth century, <sub>[pg 57]</sub> in some of the most
culturally visible industries like movies and music, copyright law
coevolved with the industrial model. By the end of the twentieth
century, copyright was longer, broader, and vastly more encompassing
than it had been at the beginning of that century. Other exclusive
rights in information, culture, and the fruits of innovation expanded
following a similar logic. Strong, broad, exclusive rights like these
have predictable effects. They preferentially improve the returns to
business models that rely on exclusive rights, like copyrights and
patents, at the expense of information and cultural production outside
the market or in market relationships that do not depend on exclusive
appropriation. They make it more lucrative to consolidate inventories
of existing materials. The businesses that developed around the
material capital required for production fed back into the political
system, which responded by serially optimizing the institutional
ecology to fit the needs of the industrial information economy firms at
the expense of other information producers.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="116">
	<ocn>116</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The networked information economy has upset the apple cart on the
technical, material cost side of information production and exchange.
The institutional ecology, the political framework (the lobbyists, the
habits of legislatures), and the legal culture (the beliefs of judges,
the practices of lawyers) have not changed. They are as they developed
over the course of the twentieth century--centered on optimizing the
conditions of those commercial firms that thrive in the presence of
strong exclusive rights in information and culture. The outcome of the
conflict between the industrial information economy and its emerging
networked alternative will determine whether we evolve into a
permission culture, as Lessig warns and projects, or into a society
marked by social practice of nonmarket production and cooperative
sharing of information, knowledge, and culture of the type I describe
throughout this book, and which I argue will improve freedom and
justice in liberal societies. Chapter 11 chronicles many of the arenas
in which this basic conflict is played out. However, for the remainder
of this part and part II, the basic economic understanding I offer here
is all that is necessary.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="117">
	<ocn>117</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		There are diverse motivations and strategies for organizing information
production. Their relative attractiveness is to some extent dependent
on technology, to some extent on institutional arrangements. The rise
that we see today in the efficacy and scope of nonmarket production,
and of the peer production that I describe and analyze in the following
two chapters, are well within the predictable, given our understanding
of the economics of information production. The social practices of
information production <sub>[pg 58]</sub> that form the basis of much
of the normative analysis I offer in part II are internally sustainable
given the material conditions of information production and exchange in
the digitally networked environment. These patterns are unfamiliar to
us. They grate on our intuitions about how production happens. They
grate on the institutional arrangements we developed over the course of
the twentieth century to regulate information and cultural production.
But that is because they arise from a quite basically different set of
material conditions. We must understand these new modes of production.
We must learn to evaluate them and compare their advantages and
disadvantages to those of the industrial information producers. And
then we must adjust our institutional environment to make way for the
new social practices made possible by the networked environment.
<sub>[pg 59]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="118">
	<ocn>118</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Chapter 3 - Peer Production and Sharing
	</text>
</object>
<object id="119">
	<ocn>119</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		At the heart of the economic engine, of the world's most advanced
economies, we are beginning to notice a persistent and quite amazing
phenomenon. A new model of production has taken root; one that should
not be there, at least according to our most widely held beliefs about
economic behavior. It should not, the intuitions of the
late-twentieth-century American would say, be the case that thousands
of volunteers will come together to collaborate on a complex economic
project. It certainly should not be that these volunteers will beat the
largest and best-financed business enterprises in the world at their
own game. And yet, this is precisely what is happening in the software
world.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="120">
	<ocn>120</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Industrial organization literature provides a prominent place for the
transaction costs view of markets and firms, based on insights of
Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. On this view, people use markets
when the gains from doing so, net of transaction costs, exceed the
gains from doing the same thing in a managed firm, net of the costs of
organizing and managing a firm. Firms emerge when the opposite is true,
and transaction costs can best be reduced by <sub>[pg 60]</sub>
bringing an activity into a managed context that requires no individual
transactions to allocate this resource or that effort. The emergence of
free and open-source software, and the phenomenal success of its
flagships, the GNU/ Linux operating system, the Apache Web server,
Perl, and many others, should cause us to take a second look at this
dominant paradigm.<en>18</en> Free software projects do not rely on
markets or on managerial hierarchies to organize production.
Programmers do not generally participate in a project because someone
who is their boss told them to, though some do. They do not generally
participate in a project because someone offers them a price to do so,
though some participants do focus on long-term appropriation through
money-oriented activities, like consulting or service contracts.
However, the critical mass of participation in projects cannot be
explained by the direct presence of a price or even a future monetary
return. This is particularly true of the all-important, microlevel
decisions: who will work, with what software, on what project. In other
words, programmers participate in free software projects without
following the signals generated by marketbased, firm-based, or hybrid
models. In chapter 2 I focused on how the networked information economy
departs from the industrial information economy by improving the
efficacy of nonmarket production generally. Free software offers a
glimpse at a more basic and radical challenge. It suggests that the
networked environment makes possible a new modality of organizing
production: radically decentralized, collaborative, and nonproprietary;
based on sharing resources and outputs among widely distributed,
loosely connected individuals who cooperate with each other without
relying on either market signals or managerial commands. This is what I
call "commons-based peer production."
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="18">
		<number>18</number>
		<note>
			For an excellent history of the free software movement and of
open-source development, see Glyn Moody, Rebel Code: Inside Linux and
the Open Source Revolution (New York: Perseus Publishing, 2001).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="121">
	<ocn>121</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		"Commons" refers to a particular institutional form of structuring the
rights to access, use, and control resources. It is the opposite of
"property" in the following sense: With property, law determines one
particular person who has the authority to decide how the resource will
be used. That person may sell it, or give it away, more or less as he
or she pleases. "More or less" because property doesn't mean anything
goes. We cannot, for example, decide that we will give our property
away to one branch of our family, as long as that branch has boys, and
then if that branch has no boys, decree that the property will revert
to some other branch of the family. That type of provision, once common
in English property law, is now legally void for public policy reasons.
There are many other things we cannot do with our property--like build
on wetlands. However, the core characteristic of property <sub>[pg
61]</sub> as the institutional foundation of markets is that the
allocation of power to decide how a resource will be used is
systematically and drastically asymmetric. That asymmetry permits the
existence of "an owner" who can decide what to do, and with whom. We
know that transactions must be made-- rent, purchase, and so forth--if
we want the resource to be put to some other use. The salient
characteristic of commons, as opposed to property, is that no single
person has exclusive control over the use and disposition of any
particular resource in the commons. Instead, resources governed by
commons may be used or disposed of by anyone among some (more or less
well-defined) number of persons, under rules that may range from
"anything goes" to quite crisply articulated formal rules that are
effectively enforced.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="122">
	<ocn>122</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Commons can be divided into four types based on two parameters. The
first parameter is whether they are open to anyone or only to a defined
group. The oceans, the air, and highway systems are clear examples of
open commons. Various traditional pasture arrangements in Swiss
villages or irrigation regions in Spain are now classic examples,
described by Eleanor Ostrom, of limited-access common resources--where
access is limited only to members of the village or association that
collectively "owns" some defined pasturelands or irrigation
system.<en>19</en> As Carol Rose noted, these are better thought of as
limited common property regimes, rather than commons, because they
behave as property vis-a-vis the entire world except members ` of the
group who together hold them in common. The second parameter is whether
a commons system is regulated or unregulated. Practically all
well-studied, limited common property regimes are regulated by more or
less elaborate rules--some formal, some social-conventional--governing
the use of the resources. Open commons, on the other hand, vary widely.
Some commons, called open access, are governed by no rule. Anyone can
use resources within these types of commons at will and without
payment. Air is such a resource, with respect to air intake (breathing,
feeding a turbine). However, air is a regulated commons with regard to
outtake. For individual human beings, breathing out is mildly regulated
by social convention--you do not breath too heavily on another human
being's face unless forced to. Air is a more extensively regulated
commons for industrial exhalation--in the shape of pollution controls.
The most successful and obvious regulated commons in contemporary
landscapes are the sidewalks, streets, roads, and highways that cover
our land and regulate the material foundation of our ability to move
from one place to the other. In all these cases, however, the
characteristic of commons is that the constraints, if any, are
symmetric <sub>[pg 62]</sub> among all users, and cannot be
unilaterally controlled by any single individual. The term
"commons-based" is intended to underscore that what is characteristic
of the cooperative enterprises I describe in this chapter is that they
are not built around the asymmetric exclusion typical of property.
Rather, the inputs and outputs of the process are shared, freely or
conditionally, in an institutional form that leaves them equally
available for all to use as they choose at their individual discretion.
This latter characteristic-- that commons leave individuals free to
make their own choices with regard to resources managed as a
commons--is at the foundation of the freedom they make possible. This
is a freedom I return to in the discussion of autonomy. Not all
commons-based production efforts qualify as peer production. Any
production strategy that manages its inputs and outputs as commons
locates that production modality outside the proprietary system, in a
framework of social relations. It is the freedom to interact with
resources and projects without seeking anyone's permission that marks
commons-based production generally, and it is also that freedom that
underlies the particular efficiencies of peer production, which I
explore in chapter 4.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="19">
		<number>19</number>
		<note>
			Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions
for Collective Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="123">
	<ocn>123</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The term "peer production" characterizes a subset of commons-based
production practices. It refers to production systems that depend on
individual action that is self-selected and decentralized, rather than
hierarchically assigned. "Centralization" is a particular response to
the problem of how to make the behavior of many individual agents
cohere into an effective pattern or achieve an effective result. Its
primary attribute is the separation of the locus of opportunities for
action from the authority to choose the action that the agent will
undertake. Government authorities, firm managers, teachers in a
classroom, all occupy a context in which potentially many individual
wills could lead to action, and reduce the number of people whose will
is permitted to affect the actual behavior patterns that the agents
will adopt. "Decentralization" describes conditions under which the
actions of many agents cohere and are effective despite the fact that
they do not rely on reducing the number of people whose will counts to
direct effective action. A substantial literature in the past twenty
years, typified, for example, by Charles Sabel's work, has focused on
the ways in which firms have tried to overcome the rigidities of
managerial pyramids by decentralizing learning, planning, and execution
of the firm's functions in the hands of employees or teams. The most
pervasive mode of "decentralization," however, is the ideal market.
Each individual agent acts according to his or her will. Coherence and
efficacy emerge because individuals signal their wishes, and plan
<sub>[pg 63]</sub> their behavior not in cooperation with others, but
by coordinating, understanding the will of others and expressing their
own through the price system.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="124">
	<ocn>124</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		What we are seeing now is the emergence of more effective collective
action practices that are decentralized but do not rely on either the
price system or a managerial structure for coordination. In this, they
complement the increasing salience of uncoordinated nonmarket behavior
that we saw in chapter 2. The networked environment not only provides a
more effective platform for action to nonprofit organizations that
organize action like firms or to hobbyists who merely coexist
coordinately. It also provides a platform for new mechanisms for widely
dispersed agents to adopt radically decentralized cooperation
strategies other than by using proprietary and contractual claims to
elicit prices or impose managerial commands. This kind of information
production by agents operating on a decentralized, nonproprietary model
is not completely new. Science is built by many people contributing
incrementally--not operating on market signals, not being handed their
research marching orders by a boss--independently deciding what to
research, bringing their collaboration together, and creating science.
What we see in the networked information economy is a dramatic increase
in the importance and the centrality of information produced in this
way.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="125">
	<ocn>125</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		FREE/OPEN-SOURCE SOFTWARE
	</text>
</object>
<object id="126">
	<ocn>126</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The quintessential instance of commons-based peer production has been
free software. Free software, or open source, is an approach to
software development that is based on shared effort on a nonproprietary
model. It depends on many individuals contributing to a common project,
with a variety of motivations, and sharing their respective
contributions without any single person or entity asserting rights to
exclude either from the contributed components or from the resulting
whole. In order to avoid having the joint product appropriated by any
single party, participants usually retain copyrights in their
contribution, but license them to anyone--participant or stranger--on a
model that combines a universal license to use the materials with
licensing constraints that make it difficult, if not impossible, for
any single contributor or third party to appropriate the project. This
model of licensing is the most important institutional innovation of
the free software movement. Its central instance is the GNU General
Public License, or GPL. <sub>[pg 64]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="127">
	<ocn>127</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This requires anyone who modifies software and distributes the modified
version to license it under the same free terms as the original
software. While there have been many arguments about how widely the
provisions that prevent downstream appropriation should be used, the
practical adoption patterns have been dominated by forms of licensing
that prevent anyone from exclusively appropriating the contributions or
the joint product. More than 85 percent of active free software
projects include some version of the GPL or similarly structured
license.<en>20</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="20">
		<number>20</number>
		<note>
			Josh Lerner and Jean Tirole, "The Scope of Open Source Licensing"
(Harvard NOM working paper no. 02-42, table 1, Cambridge, MA, 2002).
The figure is computed out of the data reported in this paper for the
number of free software development projects that Lerner and Tirole
identify as having "restrictive" or "very restrictive" licenses.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="128">
	<ocn>128</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Free software has played a critical role in the recognition of peer
production, because software is a functional good with measurable
qualities. It can be more or less authoritatively tested against its
market-based competitors. And, in many instances, free software has
prevailed. About 70 percent of Web server software, in particular for
critical e-commerce sites, runs on the Apache Web server--free
software.<en>21</en> More than half of all back-office e-mail functions
are run by one free software program or another. Google, Amazon, and
CNN.com, for example, run their Web servers on the GNU/Linux operating
system. They do this, presumably, because they believe this
peerproduced operating system is more reliable than the alternatives,
not because the system is "free." It would be absurd to risk a higher
rate of failure in their core business activities in order to save a
few hundred thousand dollars on licensing fees. Companies like IBM and
Hewlett Packard, consumer electronics manufacturers, as well as
military and other mission-critical government agencies around the
world have begun to adopt business and service strategies that rely and
extend free software. They do this because it allows them to build
better equipment, sell better services, or better fulfill their public
role, even though they do not control the software development process
and cannot claim proprietary rights of exclusion in the products of
their contributions.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="21">
		<number>21</number>
		<note>
			Netcraft, April 2004 Web Server Survey, &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_">http://news.netcraft.com/archives/web_</link>&gt;
server_survey.html.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="129">
	<ocn>129</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The story of free software begins in 1984, when Richard Stallman
started working on a project of building a nonproprietary operating
system he called GNU (GNU's Not Unix). Stallman, then at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), operated from political
conviction. He wanted a world in which software enabled people to use
information freely, where no one would have to ask permission to change
the software they use to fit their needs or to share it with a friend
for whom it would be helpful. These freedoms to share and to make your
own software were fundamentally incompatible with a model of production
that relies on property rights and markets, he thought, because in
order for there to be a market in uses of <sub>[pg 65]</sub> software,
owners must be able to make the software unavailable to people who need
it. These people would then pay the provider in exchange for access to
the software or modification they need. If anyone can make software or
share software they possess with friends, it becomes very difficult to
write software on a business model that relies on excluding people from
software they need unless they pay. As a practical matter, Stallman
started writing software himself, and wrote a good bit of it. More
fundamentally, he adopted a legal technique that started a snowball
rolling. He could not write a whole operating system by himself.
Instead, he released pieces of his code under a license that allowed
anyone to copy, distribute, and modify the software in whatever way
they pleased. He required only that, if the person who modified the
software then distributed it to others, he or she do so under the exact
same conditions that he had distributed his software. In this way, he
invited all other programmers to collaborate with him on this
development program, if they wanted to, on the condition that they be
as generous with making their contributions available to others as he
had been with his. Because he retained the copyright to the software he
distributed, he could write this condition into the license that he
attached to the software. This meant that anyone using or distributing
the software as is, without modifying it, would not violate Stallman's
license. They could also modify the software for their own use, and
this would not violate the license. However, if they chose to
distribute the modified software, they would violate Stallman's
copyright unless they included a license identical to his with the
software they distributed. This license became the GNU General Public
License, or GPL. The legal jujitsu Stallman used--asserting his own
copyright claims, but only to force all downstream users who wanted to
rely on his contributions to make their own contributions available to
everyone else--came to be known as "copyleft," an ironic twist on
copyright. This legal artifice allowed anyone to contribute to the GNU
project without worrying that one day they would wake up and find that
someone had locked them out of the system they had helped to build.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="130">
	<ocn>130</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The next major step came when a person with a more practical, rather
than prophetic, approach to his work began developing one central
component of the operating system--the kernel. Linus Torvalds began to
share the early implementations of his kernel, called Linux, with
others, under the GPL. These others then modified, added, contributed,
and shared among themselves these pieces of the operating system.
Building on top of Stallman's foundation, Torvalds crystallized a model
of production that was fundamentally <sub>[pg 66]</sub> different from
those that preceded it. His model was based on voluntary contributions
and ubiquitous, recursive sharing; on small incremental improvements to
a project by widely dispersed people, some of whom contributed a lot,
others a little. Based on our usual assumptions about volunteer
projects and decentralized production processes that have no managers,
this was a model that could not succeed. But it did.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="131">
	<ocn>131</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		It took almost a decade for the mainstream technology industry to
recognize the value of free or open-source software development and its
collaborative production methodology. As the process expanded and came
to encompass more participants, and produce more of the basic tools of
Internet connectivity--Web server, e-mail server, scripting--more of
those who participated sought to "normalize" it, or, more specifically,
to render it apolitical. Free software is about freedom ("free as in
free speech, not free beer" is Stallman's epitaph for it). "Open-source
software" was chosen as a term that would not carry the political
connotations. It was simply a mode of organizing software production
that may be more effective than market-based production. This move to
depoliticize peer production of software led to something of a schism
between the free software movement and the communities of open source
software developers. It is important to understand, however, that from
the perspective of society at large and the historical trajectory of
information production generally the abandonment of political
motivation and the importation of free software into the mainstream
have not made it less politically interesting, but more so. Open source
and its wide adoption in the business and bureaucratic mainstream
allowed free software to emerge from the fringes of the software world
and move to the center of the public debate about practical
alternatives to the current way of doing things.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="132">
	<ocn>132</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		So what is open-source software development? The best source for a
phenomenology of open-source development continues to be Eric Raymond's
<i>Cathedral and Bazaar</i>, written in 1998. Imagine that one person,
or a small group of friends, wants a utility. It could be a text
editor, photo-retouching software, or an operating system. The person
or small group starts by developing a part of this project, up to a
point where the whole utility--if it is simple enough--or some
important part of it, is functional, though it might have much room for
improvement. At this point, the person makes the program freely
available to others, with its source code--instructions in a
human-readable language that explain how the software does whatever it
does when compiled into a machine-readable language. When others begin
<sub>[pg 67]</sub> to use it, they may find bugs, or related utilities
that they want to add (e.g., the photo-retouching software only
increases size and sharpness, and one of its users wants it to allow
changing colors as well). The person who has found the bug or is
interested in how to add functions to the software may or may not be
the best person in the world to actually write the software fix.
Nevertheless, he reports the bug or the new need in an Internet forum
of users of the software. That person, or someone else, then thinks
that they have a way of tweaking the software to fix the bug or add the
new utility. They then do so, just as the first person did, and release
a new version of the software with the fix or the added utility. The
result is a collaboration between three people--the first author, who
wrote the initial software; the second person, who identified a problem
or shortcoming; and the third person, who fixed it. This collaboration
is not managed by anyone who organizes the three, but is instead the
outcome of them all reading the same Internet-based forum and using the
same software, which is released under an open, rather than
proprietary, license. This enables some of its users to identify
problems and others to fix these problems without asking anyone's
permission and without engaging in any transactions.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="133">
	<ocn>133</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The most surprising thing that the open source movement has shown, in
real life, is that this simple model can operate on very different
scales, from the small, three-person model I described for simple
projects, up to the many thousands of people involved in writing the
Linux kernel and the GNU/ Linux operating system--an immensely
difficult production task. SourceForge, the most popular
hosting-meeting place of such projects, has close to 100,000 registered
projects, and nearly a million registered users. The economics of this
phenomenon are complex. In the larger-scale models, actual organization
form is more diverse than the simple, three-person model. In
particular, in some of the larger projects, most prominently the Linux
kernel development process, a certain kind of meritocratic hierarchy is
clearly present. However, it is a hierarchy that is very different in
style, practical implementation, and organizational role than that of
the manager in the firm. I explain this in chapter 4, as part of the
analysis of the organizational forms of peer production. For now, all
we need is a broad outline of how peer-production projects look, as we
turn to observe case studies of kindred production models in areas
outside of software. <sub>[pg 68]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="134">
	<ocn>134</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		PEER PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION, KNOWLEDGE, AND CULTURE GENERALLY
	</text>
</object>
<object id="135">
	<ocn>135</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Free software is, without a doubt, the most visible instance of peer
production at the turn of the twenty-first century. It is by no means,
however, the only instance. Ubiquitous computer communications networks
are bringing about a dramatic change in the scope, scale, and efficacy
of peer production throughout the information and cultural production
system. As computers become cheaper and as network connections become
faster, cheaper, and ubiquitous, we are seeing the phenomenon of peer
production of information scale to much larger sizes, performing more
complex tasks than were possible in the past for nonprofessional
production. To make this phenomenon more tangible, I describe a number
of such enterprises, organized to demonstrate the feasibility of this
approach throughout the information production and exchange chain.
While it is possible to break an act of communication into
finer-grained subcomponents, largely we see three distinct functions
involved in the process. First, there is an initial utterance of a
humanly meaningful statement. Writing an article or drawing a picture,
whether done by a professional or an amateur, whether high quality or
low, is such an action. Second, there is a separate function of mapping
the initial utterances on a knowledge map. In particular, an utterance
must be understood as "relevant" in some sense, and "credible."
Relevance is a subjective question of mapping an utterance on the
conceptual map of a given user seeking information for a particular
purpose defined by that individual. Credibility is a question of
quality by some objective measure that the individual adopts as
appropriate for purposes of evaluating a given utterance. The
distinction between the two is somewhat artificial, however, because
very often the utility of a piece of information will depend on a
combined valuation of its credibility and relevance. I therefore refer
to "relevance/accreditation" as a single function for purposes of this
discussion, keeping in mind that the two are complementary and not
entirely separable functions that an individual requires as part of
being able to use utterances that others have uttered in putting
together the user's understanding of the world. Finally, there is the
function of distribution, or how one takes an utterance produced by one
person and distributes it to other people who find it credible and
relevant. In the mass-media world, these functions were often, though
by no means always, integrated. NBC news produced the utterances, gave
them credibility by clearing them on the evening news, and distributed
<sub>[pg 69]</sub> them simultaneously. What the Internet is permitting
is much greater disaggregation of these functions.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="136">
	<ocn>136</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Uttering Content
	</text>
</object>
<object id="137">
	<ocn>137</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		NASA Clickworkers was "an experiment to see if public volunteers, each
working for a few minutes here and there can do some routine science
analysis that would normally be done by a scientist or graduate student
working for months on end." Users could mark craters on maps of Mars,
classify craters that have already been marked, or search the Mars
landscape for "honeycomb" terrain. The project was "a pilot study with
limited funding, run part-time by one software engineer, with
occasional input from two scientists." In its first six months of
operation, more than 85,000 users visited the site, with many
contributing to the effort, making more than 1.9 million entries
(including redundant entries of the same craters, used to average out
errors). An analysis of the quality of markings showed "that the
automaticallycomputed consensus of a large number of clickworkers is
virtually indistinguishable from the inputs of a geologist with years
of experience in identifying Mars craters."<en>22</en> The tasks
performed by clickworkers (like marking craters) were discrete, each
easily performed in a matter of minutes. As a result, users could
choose to work for a few minutes doing a single iteration or for hours
by doing many. An early study of the project suggested that some
clickworkers indeed worked on the project for weeks, but that 37
percent of the work was done by one-time contributors.<en>23</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="22">
		<number>22</number>
		<note>
			Clickworkers Results: Crater Marking Activity, July 3, 2001,
&lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://clickworkers.arc">http://clickworkers.arc</link>&gt;
.nasa.gov/documents/crater-marking.pdf.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="23">
		<number>23</number>
		<note>
			<i>B. Kanefsky, N. G. Barlow, and V. C. Gulick</i>, Can Distributed
Volunteers Accomplish Massive Data Analysis Tasks? &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.clickworkers.arc.nasa.gov/documents">http://www.clickworkers.arc.nasa.gov/documents</link>&gt;
/abstract.pdf.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="138">
	<ocn>138</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The clickworkers project was a particularly clear example of how a
complex professional task that requires a number of highly trained
individuals on full-time salaries can be reorganized so as to be
performed by tens of thousands of volunteers in increments so minute
that the tasks could be performed on a much lower budget. The low
budget would be devoted to coordinating the volunteer effort. However,
the raw human capital needed would be contributed for the fun of it.
The professionalism of the original scientists was replaced by a
combination of high modularization of the task. The organizers broke a
large, complex task into small, independent modules. They built in
redundancy and automated averaging out of both errors and purposeful
erroneous markings--like those of an errant art student who thought it
amusing to mark concentric circles on the map. What the NASA scientists
running this experiment had tapped into was a vast pool of fiveminute
increments of human judgment, applied with motivation to participate in
a task unrelated to "making a living." <sub>[pg 70]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="139">
	<ocn>139</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		While clickworkers was a distinct, self-conscious experiment, it
suggests characteristics of distributed production that are, in fact,
quite widely observable. We have already seen in chapter 2, in our
little search for Viking ships, how the Internet can produce
encyclopedic or almanac-type information. The power of the Web to
answer such an encyclopedic question comes not from the fact that one
particular site has all the great answers. It is not an Encyclopedia
Britannica. The power comes from the fact that it allows a user looking
for specific information at a given time to collect answers from a
sufficiently large number of contributions. The task of sifting and
accrediting falls to the user, motivated by the need to find an answer
to the question posed. As long as there are tools to lower the cost of
that task to a level acceptable to the user, the Web shall have
"produced" the information content the user was looking for. These are
not trivial considerations, but they are also not intractable. As we
shall see, some of the solutions can themselves be peer produced, and
some solutions are emerging as a function of the speed of computation
and communication, which enables more efficient technological
solutions.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="140">
	<ocn>140</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Encyclopedic and almanac-type information emerges on the Web out of the
coordinate but entirely independent action of millions of users. This
type of information also provides the focus on one of the most
successful collaborative enterprises that has developed in the first
five years of the twenty-first century, <i>Wikipedia</i>.
<i>Wikipedia</i> was founded by an Internet entrepreneur, Jimmy Wales.
Wales had earlier tried to organize an encyclopedia named Nupedia,
which was built on a traditional production model, but whose outputs
were to be released freely: its contributors were to be PhDs, using a
formal, peer-reviewed process. That project appears to have failed to
generate a sufficient number of high-quality contributions, but its
outputs were used in <i>Wikipedia</i> as the seeds for a radically new
form of encyclopedia writing. Founded in January 2001, <i>Wikipedia</i>
combines three core characteristics: First, it uses a collaborative
authorship tool, Wiki. This platform enables anyone, including
anonymous passersby, to edit almost any page in the entire project. It
stores all versions, makes changes easily visible, and enables anyone
to revert a document to any prior version as well as to add changes,
small and large. All contributions and changes are rendered transparent
by the software and database. Second, it is a self-conscious effort at
creating an encyclopedia--governed first and foremost by a collective
informal undertaking to strive for a neutral point of view, within the
limits of substantial self-awareness as to the difficulties of such an
enterprise. An effort <sub>[pg 71]</sub> to represent sympathetically
all views on a subject, rather than to achieve objectivity, is the core
operative characteristic of this effort. Third, all the content
generated by this collaboration is released under the GNU Free
Documentation License, an adaptation of the GNU GPL to texts. The shift
in strategy toward an open, peer-produced model proved enormously
successful. The site saw tremendous growth both in the number of
contributors, including the number of active and very active
contributors, and in the number of articles included in the
encyclopedia (table 3.1). Most of the early growth was in English, but
more recently there has been an increase in the number of articles in
many other languages: most notably in German (more than 200,000
articles), Japanese (more than 120,000 articles), and French (about
100,000), but also in another five languages that have between 40,000
and 70,000 articles each, another eleven languages with 10,000 to
40,000 articles each, and thirty-five languages with between 1,000 and
10,000 articles each.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="141">
	<ocn>141</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The first systematic study of the quality of <i>Wikipedia</i> articles
was published as this book was going to press. The journal Nature
compared 42 science articles from <i>Wikipedia</i> to the gold standard
of the Encyclopedia Britannica, and concluded that "the difference in
accuracy was not particularly great."<en>24</en> On November 15, 2004,
Robert McHenry, a former editor in chief of the Encyclopedia
Britannica, published an article criticizing <i>Wikipedia</i> as "The
Faith-Based Encyclopedia."<en>25</en> As an example, McHenry mocked the
<i>Wikipedia</i> article on Alexander Hamilton. He noted that Hamilton
biographers have a problem fixing his birth year--whether it is 1755 or
1757. <i>Wikipedia</i> glossed over this error, fixing the date at
1755. McHenry then went on to criticize the way the dates were treated
throughout the article, using it as an anchor to his general claim:
<i>Wikipedia</i> is unreliable because it is not professionally
produced. What McHenry did not note was that the other major online
encyclopedias--like Columbia or Encarta--similarly failed to deal with
the ambiguity surrounding Hamilton's birth date. Only the Britannica
did. However, McHenry's critique triggered the <i>Wikipedia</i>
distributed correction mechanism. Within hours of the publication of
McHenry's Web article, the reference was corrected. The following few
days saw intensive cleanup efforts to conform all references in the
biography to the newly corrected version. Within a week or so,
<i>Wikipedia</i> had a correct, reasonably clean version. It now stood
alone with the Encyclopedia Britannica as a source of accurate basic
encyclopedic information. In coming to curse it, McHenry found himself
blessing <i>Wikipedia</i>. He had demonstrated <sub>[pg 72]</sub>
precisely the correction mechanism that makes <i>Wikipedia</i>, in the
long term, a robust model of reasonably reliable information.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="24">
		<number>24</number>
		<note>
			J. Giles, "Special Report: Internet Encyclopedias Go Head to Head,"
Nature, December 14, 2005, available at &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.nature.com/news/2005/051212/full/438900a.html">http://www.nature.com/news/2005/051212/full/438900a.html</link>&gt;.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="25">
		<number>25</number>
		<note>
			&lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.techcentralstation.com/111504A.html">http://www.techcentralstation.com/111504A.html</link>&gt;.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="142">
	<ocn>142</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		<b>Table 3.1: Contributors to Wikipedia, January 2001 - June 2005</b>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="143">
	<ocn>143</ocn>
	<text class="table">	
		<table summary="normal text css" width="100%" border="0" bgcolor="white" cellpadding="2" align="center">
      <tr><th width="24%"></th><th width="12%">Jan. 2001</th><th width="12%">Jan. 2002</th><th width="12%">Jan. 2003</th><th width="12%">Jan. 2004</th><th width="12%">July 2004</th><th width="12%">June 2006</th></tr>
      <tr><td width="24%">Contributors*</td><td width="12%">10</td><td width="12%">472</td><td width="12%">2,188</td><td width="12%">9,653</td><td width="12%">25,011</td><td width="12%">48,721</td></tr>
      <tr><td width="24%">Active contributors**</td><td width="12%">9</td><td width="12%">212</td><td width="12%">846</td><td width="12%">3,228</td><td width="12%">8,442</td><td width="12%">16,945</td></tr>
      <tr><td width="24%">Very active contributors***</td><td width="12%">0</td><td width="12%">31</td><td width="12%">190</td><td width="12%">692</td><td width="12%">1,639</td><td width="12%">3,016</td></tr>
      <tr><td width="24%">No. of English language articles</td><td width="12%">25</td><td width="12%">16,000</td><td width="12%">101,000</td><td width="12%">190,000</td><td width="12%">320,000</td><td width="12%">630,000</td></tr>
      <tr><td width="24%">No. of articles, all languages</td><td width="12%">25</td><td width="12%">19,000</td><td width="12%">138,000</td><td width="12%">490,000</td><td width="12%">862,000</td><td width="12%">1,600,000</td></tr>
    </table>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="144">
	<ocn>144</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		&#042; Contributed at least ten times; &#042;* at least 5 times in last
month; &#042;&#042;* more than 100 times in last month.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="145">
	<ocn>145</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		- Perhaps the most interesting characteristic about <i>Wikipedia</i> is
the selfconscious social-norms-based dedication to objective writing.
Unlike some of the other projects that I describe in this chapter,
<i>Wikipedia</i> does not include elaborate software-controlled access
and editing capabilities. It is generally open for anyone to edit the
materials, delete another's change, debate the desirable contents,
survey archives for prior changes, and so forth. It depends on
self-conscious use of open discourse, usually aimed at consensus. While
there is the possibility that a user will call for a vote of the
participants on any given definition, such calls can, and usually are,
ignored by the community unless a sufficiently large number of users
have decided that debate has been exhausted. While the system operators
and server host-- Wales--have the practical power to block users who
are systematically disruptive, this power seems to be used rarely. The
project relies instead on social norms to secure the dedication of
project participants to objective writing. So, while not entirely
anarchic, the project is nonetheless substantially more social, human,
and intensively discourse- and trust-based than the other major
projects described here. The following fragments from an early version
of the self-described essential characteristics and basic policies of
<i>Wikipedia</i> are illustrative:
	</text>
</object>
<object id="146">
	<ocn>146</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		First and foremost, the <i>Wikipedia</i> project is self-consciously an
encyclopedia-- rather than a dictionary, discussion forum, web portal,
etc. <i>Wikipedia</i>'s participants <sub>[pg 73]</sub> commonly
follow, and enforce, a few basic policies that seem essential to
keeping the project running smoothly and productively. First, because
we have a huge variety of participants of all ideologies, and from
around the world, <i>Wikipedia</i> is committed to making its articles
as unbiased as possible. The aim is not to write articles from a single
objective point of view--this is a common misunderstanding of the
policy--but rather, to fairly and sympathetically present all views on
an issue. See "neutral point of view" page for further explanation.
<en>26</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="26">
		<number>26</number>
		<note>
			Yochai Benkler, "Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the
Firm," Yale Law Journal 112 (2001): 369.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="147">
	<ocn>147</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The point to see from this quotation is that the participants of
<i>Wikipedia</i> are plainly people who like to write. Some of them
participate in other collaborative authorship projects. However, when
they enter the common project of <i>Wikipedia</i>, they undertake to
participate in a particular way--a way that the group has adopted to
make its product be an encyclopedia. On their interpretation, that
means conveying in brief terms the state of the art on the item,
including divergent opinions about it, but not the author's opinion.
Whether that is an attainable goal is a subject of interpretive theory,
and is a question as applicable to a professional encyclopedia as it is
to <i>Wikipedia</i>. As the project has grown, it has developed more
elaborate spaces for discussing governance and for conflict resolution.
It has developed structures for mediation, and if that fails,
arbitration, of disputes about particular articles.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="148">
	<ocn>148</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The important point is that <i>Wikipedia</i> requires not only
mechanical cooperation among people, but a commitment to a particular
style of writing and describing concepts that is far from intuitive or
natural to people. It requires self-discipline. It enforces the
behavior it requires primarily through appeal to the common enterprise
that the participants are engaged in, coupled with a thoroughly
transparent platform that faithfully records and renders all individual
interventions in the common project and facilitates discourse among
participants about how their contributions do, or do not, contribute to
this common enterprise. This combination of an explicit statement of
common purpose, transparency, and the ability of participants to
identify each other's actions and counteract them--that is, edit out
"bad" or "faithless" definitions--seems to have succeeded in keeping
this community from devolving into inefficacy or worse. A case study by
IBM showed, for example, that while there were many instances of
vandalism on <i>Wikipedia</i>, including deletion of entire versions of
articles on controversial topics like "abortion," the ability of users
to see what was done and to fix it with a single click by reverting to
a past version meant that acts of vandalism were <sub>[pg 74]</sub>
corrected within minutes. Indeed, corrections were so rapid that
vandalism acts and their corrections did not even appear on a
mechanically generated image of the abortion definition as it changed
over time.<en>27</en> What is perhaps surprising is that this success
occurs not in a tightly knit community with many social relations to
reinforce the sense of common purpose and the social norms embodying
it, but in a large and geographically dispersed group of otherwise
unrelated participants. It suggests that even in a group of this size,
social norms coupled with a facility to allow any participant to edit
out purposeful or mistaken deviations in contravention of the social
norms, and a robust platform for largely unmediated conversation, keep
the group on track.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="27">
		<number>27</number>
		<note>
			IBM Collaborative User Experience Research Group, History Flows:
Results (2003), &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.research.ibm.com/history/results.htm">http://www.research.ibm.com/history/results.htm</link>&gt;.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="149">
	<ocn>149</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A very different cultural form of distributed content production is
presented by the rise of massive multiplayer online games (MMOGs) as
immersive entertainment. These fall in the same cultural "time slot" as
television shows and movies of the twentieth century. The interesting
thing about these types of games is that they organize the production
of "scripts" very differently from movies or television shows. In a
game like Ultima Online or EverQuest, the role of the commercial
provider is not to tell a finished, highly polished story to be
consumed start to finish by passive consumers. Rather, the role of the
game provider is to build tools with which users collaborate to tell a
story. There have been observations about this approach for years,
regarding MUDs (Multi-User Dungeons) and MOOs (Multi-User Object
Oriented games). The point to understand about MMOGs is that they
produce a discrete element of "content" that was in the past dominated
by centralized professional production. The screenwriter of an
immersive entertainment product like a movie is like the scientist
marking Mars craters--a professional producer of a finished good. In
MMOGs, this function is produced by using the appropriate software
platform to allow the story to be written by the many users as they
experience it. The individual contributions of the users/coauthors of
the story line are literally done for fun-- they are playing a game.
However, they are spending real economic goods-- their attention and
substantial subscription fees--on a form of entertainment that uses a
platform for active coproduction of a story line to displace what was
once passive reception of a finished, commercially and professionally
manufactured good.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="150">
	<ocn>150</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		By 2003, a company called Linden Lab took this concept a major step
forward by building an online game environment called Second Life.
Second Life began almost entirely devoid of content. It was tools all
the way down. <sub>[pg 75]</sub> Within a matter of months, it had
thousands of subscribers, inhabiting a "world" that had thousands of
characters, hundreds of thousands of objects, multiple areas, villages,
and "story lines." The individual users themselves had created more
than 99 percent of all objects in the game environment, and all story
lines and substantive frameworks for interaction--such as a particular
village or group of theme-based participants. The interactions in the
game environment involved a good deal of gift giving and a good deal of
trade, but also some very surprising structured behaviors. Some users
set up a university, where lessons were given in both in-game skills
and in programming. Others designed spaceships and engaged in alien
abductions (undergoing one seemed to become a status symbol within the
game). At one point, aiming (successfully) to prevent the company from
changing its pricing policy, users staged a demonstration by making
signs and picketing the entry point to the game; and a "tax revolt" by
placing large numbers of "tea crates" around an in-game reproduction of
the Washington Monument. Within months, Second Life had become an
immersive experience, like a movie or book, but one where the
commercial provider offered a platform and tools, while the users wrote
the story lines, rendered the "set," and performed the entire play.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="151">
	<ocn>151</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Relevance/Accreditation
	</text>
</object>
<object id="152">
	<ocn>152</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		How are we to know that the content produced by widely dispersed
individuals is not sheer gobbledygook? Can relevance and accreditation
itself be produced on a peer-production model? One type of answer is
provided by looking at commercial businesses that successfully break
off precisely the "accreditation and relevance" piece of their product,
and rely on peer production to perform that function. Amazon and Google
are probably the two most prominent examples of this strategy.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="153">
	<ocn>153</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Amazon uses a mix of mechanisms to get in front of their buyers of
books and other products that the users are likely to purchase. A
number of these mechanisms produce relevance and accreditation by
harnessing the users themselves. At the simplest level, the
recommendation "customers who bought items you recently viewed also
bought these items" is a mechanical means of extracting judgments of
relevance and accreditation from the actions of many individuals, who
produce the datum of relevance as byproduct of making their own
purchasing decisions. Amazon also allows users to create topical lists
and track other users as their "friends and favorites." Amazon, like
many consumer sites today, also provides users with the ability
<sub>[pg 76]</sub> to rate books they buy, generating a peer-produced
rating by averaging the ratings. More fundamentally, the core
innovation of Google, widely recognized as the most efficient general
search engine during the first half of the 2000s, was to introduce
peer-based judgments of relevance. Like other search engines at the
time, Google used a text-based algorithm to retrieve a given universe
of Web pages initially. Its major innovation was its PageRank
algorithm, which harnesses peer production of ranking in the following
way. The engine treats links from other Web sites pointing to a given
Web site as votes of confidence. Whenever someone who authors a Web
site links to someone else's page, that person has stated quite
explicitly that the linked page is worth a visit. Google's search
engine counts these links as distributed votes of confidence in the
quality of the page pointed to. Pages that are heavily linked-to count
as more important votes of confidence. If a highly linked-to site links
to a given page, that vote counts for more than the vote of a site that
no one else thinks is worth visiting. The point to take home from
looking at Google and Amazon is that corporations that have done
immensely well at acquiring and retaining users have harnessed peer
production to enable users to find things they want quickly and
efficiently.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="154">
	<ocn>154</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The most prominent example of a distributed project self-consciously
devoted to peer production of relevance is the Open Directory Project.
The site relies on more than sixty thousand volunteer editors to
determine which links should be included in the directory. Acceptance
as a volunteer requires application. Quality relies on a peer-review
process based substantially on seniority as a volunteer and level of
engagement with the site. The site is hosted and administered by
Netscape, which pays for server space and a small number of employees
to administer the site and set up the initial guidelines. Licensing is
free and presumably adds value partly to America Online's (AOL's) and
Netscape's commercial search engine/portal and partly through goodwill.
Volunteers are not affiliated with Netscape and receive no
compensation. They spend time selecting sites for inclusion in the
directory (in small increments of perhaps fifteen minutes per site
reviewed), producing the most comprehensive, highest-quality
human-edited directory of the Web--at this point outshining the
directory produced by the company that pioneered human edited
directories of the Web: Yahoo!.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="155">
	<ocn>155</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Perhaps the most elaborate platform for peer production of relevance
and accreditation, at multiple layers, is used by Slashdot. Billed as
"News for Nerds," Slashdot has become a leading technology newsletter
on the Web, coproduced by hundreds of thousands of users. Slashdot
primarily consists <sub>[pg 77]</sub> of users commenting on initial
submissions that cover a variety of technology-related topics. The
submissions are typically a link to an off-site story, coupled with
commentary from the person who submits the piece. Users follow up the
initial submission with comments that often number in the hundreds. The
initial submissions themselves, and more importantly, the approach to
sifting through the comments of users for relevance and accreditation,
provide a rich example of how this function can be performed on a
distributed, peer-production model.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="156">
	<ocn>156</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		First, it is important to understand that the function of posting a
story from another site onto Slashdot, the first "utterance" in a chain
of comments on Slashdot, is itself an act of relevance production. The
person submitting the story is telling the community of Slashdot users,
"here is a story that `News for Nerds' readers should be interested
in." This initial submission of a link is itself very coarsely filtered
by editors who are paid employees of Open Source Technology Group
(OSTG), which runs a number of similar platforms--like SourceForge, the
most important platform for free software developers. OSTG is a
subsidiary of VA Software, a software services company. The FAQ
(Frequently Asked Question) response to, "how do you verify the
accuracy of Slashdot stories?" is revealing: "We don't. You do. If
something seems outrageous, we might look for some corroboration, but
as a rule, we regard this as the responsibility of the submitter and
the audience. This is why it's important to read comments. You might
find something that refutes, or supports, the story in the main." In
other words, Slashdot very self-consciously is organized as a means of
facilitating peer production of accreditation; it is at the comments
stage that the story undergoes its most important form of
accreditation--peer review ex-post.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="157">
	<ocn>157</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Filtering and accreditation of comments on Slashdot offer the most
interesting case study of peer production of these functions. Users
submit comments that are displayed together with the initial submission
of a story. Think of the "content" produced in these comments as a
cross between academic peer review of journal submissions and a
peer-produced substitute for television's "talking heads." It is in the
means of accrediting and evaluating these comments that Slashdot's
system provides a comprehensive example of peer production of relevance
and accreditation. Slashdot implements an automated system to select
moderators from the pool of users. Moderators are chosen according to
several criteria; they must be logged in (not anonymous), they must be
regular users (who use the site averagely, not one-time page loaders or
compulsive users), they must have been using <sub>[pg 78]</sub> the
site for a while (this defeats people who try to sign up just to
moderate), they must be willing, and they must have positive "karma."
Karma is a number assigned to a user that primarily reflects whether he
or she has posted good or bad comments (according to ratings from other
moderators). If a user meets these criteria, the program assigns the
user moderator status and the user gets five "influence points" to
review comments. The moderator rates a comment of his choice using a
drop-down list with words such as "flamebait" and "informative." A
positive word increases the rating of a comment one point and a
negative word decreases the rating a point. Each time a moderator rates
a comment, it costs one influence point, so he or she can only rate
five comments for each moderating period. The period lasts for three
days and if the user does not use the influence points, they expire.
The moderation setup is designed to give many users a small amount of
power. This decreases the effect of users with an ax to grind or with
poor judgment. The site also implements some automated "troll filters,"
which prevent users from sabotaging the system. Troll filters stop
users from posting more than once every sixty seconds, prevent
identical posts, and will ban a user for twenty-four hours if he or she
has been moderated down several times within a short time frame.
Slashdot then provides users with a "threshold" filter that allows each
user to block lower-quality comments. The scheme uses the numerical
rating of the comment (ranging from 1 to 5). Comments start out at 0
for anonymous posters, 1 for registered users, and 2 for registered
users with good "karma." As a result, if a user sets his or her filter
at 1, the user will not see any comments from anonymous posters unless
the comments' ratings were increased by a moderator. A user can set his
or her filter anywhere from 1 (viewing all of the comments) to 5 (where
only the posts that have been upgraded by several moderators will show
up).
	</text>
</object>
<object id="158">
	<ocn>158</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Relevance, as distinct from accreditation, is also tied into the
Slashdot scheme because off-topic posts should receive an "off topic"
rating by the moderators and sink below the threshold level (assuming
the user has the threshold set above the minimum). However, the
moderation system is limited to choices that sometimes are not mutually
exclusive. For instance, a moderator may have to choose between "funny"
( 1) and "off topic" ( 1) when a post is both funny and off topic. As a
result, an irrelevant post can increase in ranking and rise above the
threshold level because it is funny or informative. It is unclear,
however, whether this is a limitation on relevance, or indeed mimics
our own normal behavior, say in reading a newspaper or browsing a
library, where we might let our eyes linger longer on a funny or
<sub>[pg 79]</sub> informative tidbit, even after we have ascertained
that it is not exactly relevant to what we were looking for.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="159">
	<ocn>159</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The primary function of moderation is to provide accreditation. If a
user sets a high threshold level, they will only see posts that are
considered of high quality by the moderators. Users also receive
accreditation through their karma. If their posts consistently receive
high ratings, their karma will increase. At a certain karma level,
their comments will start off with a rating of 2, thereby giving them a
louder voice in the sense that users with a threshold of 2 will now see
their posts immediately, and fewer upward moderations are needed to
push their comments even higher. Conversely, a user with bad karma from
consistently poorly rated comments can lose accreditation by having his
or her posts initially start off at 0 or 1. In addition to the
mechanized means of selecting moderators and minimizing their power to
skew the accreditation system, Slashdot implements a system of
peer-review accreditation for the moderators themselves. Slashdot
accomplishes this "metamoderation" by making any user that has an
account from the first 90 percent of accounts created on the system
eligible to evaluate the moderators. Each eligible user who opts to
perform metamoderation review is provided with ten random moderator
ratings of comments. The user/metamoderator then rates the moderator's
rating as either unfair, fair, or neither. The metamoderation process
affects the karma of the original moderator, which, when lowered
sufficiently by cumulative judgments of unfair ratings, will remove the
moderator from the moderation system.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="160">
	<ocn>160</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Together, these mechanisms allow for distributed production of both
relevance and accreditation. Because there are many moderators who can
moderate any given comment, and thanks to the mechanisms that
explicitly limit the power of any one moderator to overinfluence the
aggregate judgment, the system evens out differences in evaluation by
aggregating judgments. It then allows individual users to determine
what level of accreditation pronounced by this aggregate system fits
their particular time and needs by setting their filter to be more or
less inclusive. By introducing "karma," the system also allows users to
build reputation over time, and to gain greater control over the
accreditation of their own work relative to the power of the critics.
Users, moderators, and metamoderators are all volunteers.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="161">
	<ocn>161</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The primary point to take from the Slashdot example is that the same
dynamic that we saw used for peer production of initial utterances, or
content, can be implemented to produce relevance and accreditation.
Rather than using the full-time effort of professional accreditation
experts, the system <sub>[pg 80]</sub> is designed to permit the
aggregation of many small judgments, each of which entails a trivial
effort for the contributor, regarding both relevance and accreditation
of the materials. The software that mediates the communication among
the collaborating peers embeds both the means to facilitate the
participation and a variety of mechanisms designed to defend the common
effort from poor judgment or defection.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="162">
	<ocn>162</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Value-Added Distribution
	</text>
</object>
<object id="163">
	<ocn>163</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Finally, when we speak of information or cultural goods that exist
(content has been produced) and are made usable through some relevance
and accreditation mechanisms, there remains the question of
distribution. To some extent, this is a nonissue on the Internet.
Distribution is cheap. All one needs is a server and large pipes
connecting one's server to the world. Nonetheless, this segment of the
publication process has also provided us with important examples of
peer production, including one of its earliest examples--Project
Gutenberg.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="164">
	<ocn>164</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Project Gutenberg entails hundreds of volunteers who scan in and
correct books so that they are freely available in digital form. It has
amassed more than 13,000 books, and makes the collection available to
everyone for free. The vast majority of the "e-texts" offered are
public domain materials. The site itself presents the e-texts in ASCII
format, the lowest technical common denominator, but does not
discourage volunteers from offering the e-texts in markup languages. It
contains a search engine that allows a reader to search for typical
fields such as subject, author, and title. Project Gutenberg volunteers
can select any book that is in the public domain to transform into an
e-text. The volunteer submits a copy of the title page of the book to
Michael Hart--who founded the project--for copyright research. The
volunteer is notified to proceed if the book passes the copyright
clearance. The decision on which book to convert to e-text is left up
to the volunteer, subject to copyright limitations. Typically, a
volunteer converts a book to ASCII format using OCR (optical character
recognition) and proofreads it one time in order to screen it for major
errors. He or she then passes the ASCII file to a volunteer
proofreader. This exchange is orchestrated with very little
supervision. The volunteers use a Listserv mailing list and a bulletin
board to initiate and supervise the exchange. In addition, books are
labeled with a version number indicating how many times they have been
proofed. The site encourages volunteers to select a book that has a low
number and proof it. The Project Gutenberg proofing process is simple.
<sub>[pg 81]</sub> Proofreaders (aside from the first pass) are not
expected to have access to the book, but merely review the e-text for
self-evident errors.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="165">
	<ocn>165</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Distributed Proofreading, a site originally unaffiliated with Project
Gutenberg, is devoted to proofing Project Gutenberg e-texts more
efficiently, by distributing the volunteer proofreading function in
smaller and more information-rich modules. Charles Franks, a computer
programmer from Las Vegas, decided that he had a more efficient way to
proofread these etexts. He built an interface that allowed volunteers
to compare scanned images of original texts with the e-texts available
on Project Gutenberg. In the Distributed Proofreading process, scanned
pages are stored on the site, and volunteers are shown a scanned page
and a page of the e-text simultaneously so that they can compare the
e-text to the original page. Because of the fine-grained modularity,
proofreaders can come on the site and proof one or a few pages and
submit them. By contrast, on the Project Gutenberg site, the entire
book is typically exchanged, or at minimum, a chapter. In this fashion,
Distributed Proofreading clears the proofing of tens of thousands of
pages every month. After a couple of years of working independently,
Franks joined forces with Hart. By late 2004, the site had proofread
more than five thousand volumes using this method.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="166">
	<ocn>166</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Sharing of Processing, Storage, and Communications Platforms
	</text>
</object>
<object id="167">
	<ocn>167</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		All the examples of peer production that we have seen up to this point
have been examples where individuals pool their time, experience,
wisdom, and creativity to form new information, knowledge, and cultural
goods. As we look around the Internet, however, we find that users also
cooperate in similar loosely affiliated groups, without market signals
or managerial commands, to build supercomputers and massive data
storage and retrieval systems. In their radical decentralization and
reliance on social relations and motivations, these sharing practices
are similar to peer production of information, knowledge, and culture.
They differ in one important aspect: Users are not sharing their innate
and acquired human capabilities, and, unlike information, their inputs
and outputs are not public goods. The participants are, instead,
sharing material goods that they privately own, mostly personal
computers and their components. They produce economic, not public,
goods--computation, storage, and communications capacity.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="168">
	<ocn>168</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As of the middle of 2004, the fastest supercomputer in the world was
SETI@home. It ran about 75 percent faster than the supercomputer that
<sub>[pg 82]</sub> was then formally known as "the fastest
supercomputer in the world": the IBM Blue Gene/L. And yet, there was
and is no single SETI@home computer. Instead, the SETI@home project has
developed software and a collaboration platform that have enabled
millions of participants to pool their computation resources into a
single powerful computer. Every user who participates in the project
must download a small screen saver. When a user's personal computer is
idle, the screen saver starts up, downloads problems for
calculation--in SETI@home, these are radio astronomy signals to be
analyzed for regularities--and calculates the problem it has
downloaded. Once the program calculates a solution, it automatically
sends its results to the main site. The cycle continues for as long as,
and repeats every time that, the computer is idle from its user's
perspective. As of the middle of 2004, the project had harnessed the
computers of 4.5 million users, allowing it to run computations at
speeds greater than those achieved by the fastest supercomputers in the
world that private firms, using full-time engineers, developed for the
largest and best-funded government laboratories in the world. SETI@home
is the most prominent, but is only one among dozens of similarly
structured Internet-based distributed computing platforms. Another,
whose structure has been the subject of the most extensive formal
analysis by its creators, is Folding@home. As of mid-2004, Folding@home
had amassed contributions of about 840,000 processors contributed by
more than 365,000 users.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="169">
	<ocn>169</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		SETI@home and Folding@home provide a good basis for describing the
fairly common characteristics of Internet-based distributed computation
projects. First, these are noncommercial projects, engaged in pursuits
understood as scientific, for the general good, seeking to harness
contributions of individuals who wish to contribute to such
larger-than-themselves goals. SETI@home helps in the search for
extraterrestrial intelligence. Folding@home helps in protein folding
research. Fightaids@home is dedicated to running models that screen
compounds for the likelihood that they will provide good drug
candidates to fight HIV/AIDS. Genome@home is dedicated to modeling
artificial genes that would be created to generate useful proteins.
Other sites, like those dedicated to cryptography or mathematics, have
a narrower appeal, and combine "altruistic" with hobby as their basic
motivational appeal. The absence of money is, in any event, typical of
the large majority of active distributed computing projects. Less than
one-fifth of these projects mention money at all. Most of those that do
mention money refer to the contributors' eligibility for a share of a
generally available <sub>[pg 83]</sub> prize for solving a scientific
or mathematical challenge, and mix an appeal to hobby and altruism with
the promise of money. Only two of about sixty projects active in 2004
were built on a pay-per-contribution basis, and these were quite
small-scale by comparison to many of the others.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="170">
	<ocn>170</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Most of the distributed computing projects provide a series of
utilities and statistics intended to allow contributors to attach
meaning to their contributions in a variety of ways. The projects
appear to be eclectic in their implicit social and psychological
theories of the motivations for participation in the projects. Sites
describe the scientific purpose of the models and the specific
scientific output, including posting articles that have used the
calculations. In these components, the project organizers seem to
assume some degree of taste for generalized altruism and the pursuit of
meaning in contributing to a common goal. They also implement a variety
of mechanisms to reinforce the sense of purpose, such as providing
aggregate statistics about the total computations performed by the
project as a whole. However, the sites also seem to assume a healthy
dose of what is known in the anthropology of gift literature as
agonistic giving--that is, giving intended to show that the person
giving is greater than or more important than others, who gave less.
For example, most of the sites allow individuals to track their own
contributions, and provide "user of the month"-type rankings. An
interesting characteristic of quite a few of these is the ability to
create "teams" of users, who in turn compete on who has provided more
cycles or work units. SETI@home in particular taps into ready-made
nationalisms, by offering country-level statistics. Some of the team
names on Folding@home also suggest other, out-of-project bonding
measures, such as national or ethnic bonds (for example, Overclockers
Australia or Alliance Francophone), technical minority status (for
example, Linux or MacAddict4Life), and organizational affiliation
(University of Tennessee or University of Alabama), as well as shared
cultural reference points (Knights who say Ni!). In addition, the sites
offer platforms for simple connectedness and mutual companionship, by
offering user fora to discuss the science and the social participation
involved. It is possible that these sites are shooting in the dark, as
far as motivating sharing is concerned. It also possible, however, that
they have tapped into a valuable insight, which is that people behave
sociably and generously for all sorts of different reasons, and that at
least in this domain, adding reasons to participate--some agonistic,
some altruistic, some reciprocity-seeking--does not have a crowding-out
effect.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="171">
	<ocn>171</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Like distributed computing projects, peer-to-peer file-sharing networks
are <sub>[pg 84]</sub> an excellent example of a highly efficient
system for storing and accessing data in a computer network. These
networks of sharing are much less "mysterious," in terms of
understanding the human motivation behind participation. Nevertheless,
they provide important lessons about the extent to which large-scale
collaboration among strangers or loosely affiliated users can provide
effective communications platforms. For fairly obvious reasons, we
usually think of peer-to-peer networks, beginning with Napster, as a
"problem." This is because they were initially overwhelmingly used to
perform an act that, by the analysis of almost any legal scholar, was
copyright infringement. To a significant extent, they are still used in
this form. There were, and continue to be, many arguments about whether
the acts of the firms that provided peer-to-peer software were
responsible for the violations. However, there has been little argument
that anyone who allows thousands of other users to make copies of his
or her music files is violating copyright-- hence the public
interpretation of the creation of peer-to-peer networks as primarily a
problem. From the narrow perspective of the law of copyright or of the
business model of the recording industry and Hollywood, this may be an
appropriate focus. From the perspective of diagnosing what is happening
to our social and economic structure, the fact that the files traded on
these networks were mostly music in the first few years of this
technology's implementation is little more than a distraction. Let me
explain why.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="172">
	<ocn>172</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Imagine for a moment that someone--be it a legislator defining a policy
goal or a businessperson defining a desired service--had stood up in
mid1999 and set the following requirements: "We would like to develop a
new music and movie distribution system. We would like it to store all
the music and movies ever digitized. We would like it to be available
from anywhere in the world. We would like it to be able to serve tens
of millions of users at any given moment." Any person at the time would
have predicted that building such a system would cost tens if not
hundreds of millions of dollars; that running it would require large
standing engineering staffs; that managing it so that users could find
what they wanted and not drown in the sea of content would require some
substantial number of "curators"--DJs and movie buffs--and that it
would take at least five to ten years to build. Instead, the system was
built cheaply by a wide range of actors, starting with Shawn Fanning's
idea and implementation of Napster. Once the idea was out, others
perfected the idea further, eliminating the need for even the one
centralized feature that Napster included--a list of who had what files
on which computer that provided the matchmaking function in the Napster
<sub>[pg 85]</sub> network. Since then, under the pressure of suits
from the recording industry and a steady and persistent demand for
peer-to-peer music software, rapid successive generations of Gnutella,
and then the FastTrack clients KaZaa and Morpheus, Overnet and eDonkey,
the improvements of BitTorrent, and many others have enhanced the
reliability, coverage, and speed of the peer-to-peer music distribution
system--all under constant threat of litigation, fines, police searches
and even, in some countries, imprisonment of the developers or users of
these networks.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="173">
	<ocn>173</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		What is truly unique about peer-to-peer networks as a signal of what is
to come is the fact that with ridiculously low financial investment, a
few teenagers and twenty-something-year-olds were able to write
software and protocols that allowed tens of millions of computer users
around the world to cooperate in producing the most efficient and
robust file storage and retrieval system in the world. No major
investment was necessary in creating a server farm to store and make
available the vast quantities of data represented by the media files.
The users' computers are themselves the "server farm." No massive
investment in dedicated distribution channels made of high-quality
fiber optics was necessary. The standard Internet connections of users,
with some very intelligent file transfer protocols, sufficed.
Architecture oriented toward enabling users to cooperate with each
other in storage, search, retrieval, and delivery of files was all that
was necessary to build a content distribution network that dwarfed
anything that existed before.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="174">
	<ocn>174</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Again, there is nothing mysterious about why users participate in
peer-to-peer networks. They want music; they can get it from these
networks for free; so they participate. The broader point to take from
looking at peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, however, is the sheer
effectiveness of large-scale collaboration among individuals once they
possess, under their individual control, the physical capital necessary
to make their cooperation effective. These systems are not
"subsidized," in the sense that they do not pay the full marginal cost
of their service. Remember, music, like all information, is a nonrival
public good whose marginal cost, once produced, is zero. Moreover,
digital files are not "taken" from one place in order to be played in
the other. They are replicated wherever they are wanted, and thereby
made more ubiquitous, not scarce. The only actual social cost involved
at the time of the transmission is the storage capacity, communications
capacity, and processing capacity necessary to store, catalog, search,
retrieve, and transfer the information necessary to replicate the files
from where copies reside to where more copies are desired. As with any
nonrival good, if Jane is willing <sub>[pg 86]</sub> to spend the
actual social costs involved in replicating the music file that already
exists and that Jack possesses, then it is efficient that she do so
without paying the creator a dime. It may throw a monkey wrench into
the particular way in which our society has chosen to pay musicians and
recording executives. This, as we saw in chapter 2, trades off
efficiency for longer-term incentive effects for the recording
industry. However, it is efficient within the normal meaning of the
term in economics in a way that it would not have been had Jane and
Jack used subsidized computers or network connections.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="175">
	<ocn>175</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As with distributed computing, peer-to-peer file-sharing systems build
on the fact that individual users own vast quantities of excess
capacity embedded in their personal computers. As with distributed
computing, peer-to-peer networks developed architectures that allowed
users to share this excess capacity with each other. By cooperating in
these sharing practices, users construct together systems with
capabilities far exceeding those that they could have developed by
themselves, as well as the capabilities that even the best-financed
corporations could provide using techniques that rely on components
they fully owned. The network components owned by any single music
delivery service cannot match the collective storage and retrieval
capabilities of the universe of users' hard drives and network
connections. Similarly, the processors arrayed in the supercomputers
find it difficult to compete with the vast computation resource
available on the millions of personal computers connected to the
Internet, and the proprietary software development firms find
themselves competing, and in some areas losing to, the vast pool of
programming talent connected to the Internet in the form of
participants in free and open source software development projects.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="176">
	<ocn>176</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In addition to computation and storage, the last major element of
computer communications networks is connectivity. Here, too, perhaps
more dramatically than in either of the two other functionalities, we
have seen the development of sharing-based techniques. The most direct
transfer of the design characteristics of peer-to-peer networks to
communications has been the successful development of Skype--an
Internet telephony utility that allows the owners of computers to have
voice conversations with each other over the Internet for free, and to
dial into the public telephone network for a fee. As of this writing,
Skype is already used by more than two million users at any given
moment in time. They use a FastTrack-like architecture to share their
computing and communications resources to create a global <sub>[pg
87]</sub> telephone system running on top of the Internet. It was
created, and is run by, the developers of KaZaa.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="177">
	<ocn>177</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Most dramatically, however, we have seen these techniques emerging in
wireless communications. Throughout almost the entire twentieth
century, radio communications used a single engineering approach to
allow multiple messages to be sent wirelessly in a single geographic
area. This approach was to transmit each of the different simultaneous
messages by generating separate electromagnetic waves for each, which
differed from each other by the frequency of oscillation, or
wavelength. The receiver could then separate out the messages by
ignoring all electromagnetic energy received at its antenna unless it
oscillated at the frequency of the desired message. This engineering
technique, adopted by Marconi in 1900, formed the basis of our notion
of "spectrum": the range of frequencies at which we know how to
generate electromagnetic waves with sufficient control and
predictability that we can encode and decode information with them, as
well as the notion that there are "channels" of spectrum that are
"used" by a communication. For more than half a century, radio
communications regulation was thought necessary because spectrum was
scarce, and unless regulated, everyone would transmit at all
frequencies causing chaos and an inability to send messages. From 1959,
when Ronald Coase first published his critique of this regulatory
approach, until the early 1990s, when spectrum auctions began, the
terms of the debate over "spectrum policy," or wireless communications
regulation, revolved around whether the exclusive right to transmit
radio signals in a given geographic area should be granted as a
regulatory license or a tradable property right. In the 1990s, with the
introduction of auctions, we began to see the adoption of a primitive
version of a property-based system through "spectrum auctions." By the
early 2000s, this system allowed the new "owners" of these exclusive
rights to begin to shift what were initially purely mobile telephony
systems to mobile data communications as well.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="178">
	<ocn>178</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		By this time, however, the century-old engineering assumptions that
underlay the regulation-versus-property conceptualization of the
possibilities open for the institutional framework of wireless
communications had been rendered obsolete by new computation and
network technologies.<en>28</en> The dramatic decline in computation
cost and improvements in digital signal processing, network
architecture, and antenna systems had fundamentally changed the design
space of wireless communications systems. Instead of having one primary
parameter with which to separate out messages--the <sub>[pg 88]</sub>
frequency of oscillation of the carrier wave--engineers could now use
many different mechanisms to allow much smarter receivers to separate
out the message they wanted to receive from all other sources of
electromagnetic radiation in the geographic area they occupied. Radio
transmitters could now transmit at the same frequency, simultaneously,
without "interfering" with each other--that is, without confusing the
receivers as to which radiation carried the required message and which
did not. Just like automobiles that can share a commons-based
medium--the road--and unlike railroad cars, which must use dedicated,
owned, and managed railroad tracks--these new radios could share "the
spectrum" as a commons. It was no longer necessary, or even efficient,
to pass laws--be they in the form of regulations or of exclusive
property-like rights--that carved up the usable spectrum into
exclusively controlled slices. Instead, large numbers of transceivers,
owned and operated by end users, could be deployed and use
equipment-embedded protocols to coordinate their communications.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="28">
		<number>28</number>
		<note>
			For the full argument, see Yochai Benkler, "Some Economics of
Wireless Communications," Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 16
(2002): 25; and Yochai Benkler, "Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the
Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment," Harvard Journal of Law
and Technology 11 (1998): 287. For an excellent overview of the
intellectual history of this debate and a contribution to the
institutional design necessary to make space for this change, see Kevin
Werbach, "Supercommons: Towards a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication," Texas Law Review 82 (2004): 863. The policy
implications of computationally intensive radios using wide bands were
first raised by George Gilder in "The New Rule of the Wireless," Forbes
ASAP, March 29, 1993, and Paul Baran, "Visions of the 21st Century
Communications: Is the Shortage of Radio Spectrum for Broadband
Networks of the Future a Self Made Problem?" (keynote talk transcript,
8th Annual Conference on Next Generation Networks, Washington, DC,
November 9, 1994). Both statements focused on the potential abundance
of spectrum, and how it renders "spectrum management" obsolete. Eli
Noam was the first to point out that, even if one did not buy the idea
that computationally intensive radios eliminated scarcity, they still
rendered spectrum property rights obsolete, and enabled instead a
fluid, dynamic, real-time market in spectrum clearance rights. See Eli
Noam, "Taking the Next Step Beyond Spectrum Auctions: Open Spectrum
Access," Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Communications Magazine 33, no. 12 (1995): 66-73; later elaborated in
Eli Noam, "Spectrum Auction: Yesterday's Heresy, Today's Orthodoxy,
Tomorrow's Anachronism. Taking the Next Step to Open Spectrum Access,"
Journal of Law and Economics 41 (1998): 765, 778-780. The argument that
equipment markets based on a spectrum commons, or free access to
frequencies, could replace the role planned for markets in spectrum
property rights with computationally intensive equipment and
sophisticated network sharing protocols, and would likely be more
efficient even assuming that scarcity persists, was made in Benkler,
"Overcoming Agoraphobia." Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of
Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999) and Lawrence Lessig, The
Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New
York: Random House, 2001) developed a rationale based on the innovation
dynamic in support of the economic value of open wireless networks.
David Reed, "Comments for FCC Spectrum Task Force on Spectrum Policy,"
filed with the Federal Communications Commission July 10, 2002,
crystallized the technical underpinnings and limitations of the idea
that spectrum can be regarded as property.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="179">
	<ocn>179</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The reasons that owners would share the excess capacity of their new
radios are relatively straightforward in this case. Users want to have
wireless connectivity all the time, to be reachable and immediately
available everywhere. However, they do not actually want to communicate
every few microseconds. They will therefore be willing to purchase and
keep turned on equipment that provides them with such connectivity.
Manufacturers, in turn, will develop and adhere to standards that will
improve capacity and connectivity. As a matter of engineering, what has
been called "cooperation gain"--the improved quality of the system
gained when the nodes cooperate--is the most promising source of
capacity scaling for distributed wireless systems.<en>29</en>
Cooperation gain is easy to understand from day-to-day interactions.
When we sit in a lecture and miss a word or two, we might turn to a
neighbor and ask, "Did you hear what she said?" In radio systems, this
kind of cooperation among the antennae (just like the ears) of
neighbors is called antenna diversity, and is the basis for the design
of a number of systems to improve reception. We might stand in a loud
crowd without being able to shout or walk over to the other end of the
room, but ask a friend: "If you see so and so, tell him x"; that friend
then bumps into a friend of so and so and tells that person: "If you
see so and so, tell him x"; and so forth. When we do this, we are using
what in radio engineering is called repeater networks. These kinds of
cooperative systems can carry much higher loads without interference,
sharing wide swaths of spectrum, <sub>[pg 89]</sub> in ways that are
more efficient than systems that rely on explicit market transactions
based on property in the right to emit power in discrete frequencies.
The design of such "ad hoc mesh networks"--that is, networks of radios
that can configure themselves into cooperative networks as need arises,
and help each other forward messages and decipher incoming messages
over the din of radio emissions--are the most dynamic area in radio
engineering today.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="29">
		<number>29</number>
		<note>
			See Benkler, "Some Economics," 44-47. The term "cooperation gain"
was developed by Reed to describe a somewhat broader concept than
"diversity gain" is in multiuser information theory.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="180">
	<ocn>180</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This technological shift gave rise to the fastest-growing sector in the
wireless communications arena in the first few years of the
twenty-first century-- WiFi and similar unlicensed wireless devices.
The economic success of the equipment market that utilizes the few
primitive "spectrum commons" available in the United States--originally
intended for low-power devices like garage openers and the spurious
emissions of microwave ovens--led toward at first slow, and more
recently quite dramatic, change in U.S. wireless policy. In the past
two years alone, what have been called "commons-based" approaches to
wireless communications policy have come to be seen as a legitimate,
indeed a central, component of the Federal Communication Commission's
(FCC's) wireless policy.<en>30</en> We are beginning to see in this
space the most prominent example of a system that was entirely oriented
toward regulation aimed at improving the institutional conditions of
marketbased production of wireless transport capacity sold as a
finished good (connectivity minutes), shifting toward enabling the
emergence of a market in shareable goods (smart radios) designed to
provision transport on a sharing model.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="30">
		<number>30</number>
		<note>
			Spectrum Policy Task Force Report to the Commission (Federal
Communications Commission, Washington, DC, 2002); Michael K. Powell,
"Broadband Migration III: New Directions in Wireless Policy" (Remarks
at the Silicon Flatiron Telecommunications Program, University of
Colorado at Boulder, October 30, 2002).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="181">
	<ocn>181</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		I hope these detailed examples provide a common set of mental pictures
of what peer production looks like. In the next chapter I explain the
economics of peer production of information and the sharing of material
resources for computation, communications, and storage in particular,
and of nonmarket, social production more generally: why it is
efficient, how we can explain the motivations that lead people to
participate in these great enterprises of nonmarket cooperation, and
why we see so much more of it online than we do off-line. The moral and
political discussion throughout the remainder of the book does not,
however, depend on your accepting the particular analysis I offer in
chapter 4 to "domesticate" these phenomena within more or less standard
economics. At this point, it is important that the stories have
provided a texture for, and established the plausibility of, <sub>[pg
90]</sub> the claim that nonmarket production in general and peer
production in particular are phenomena of much wider application than
free software, and exist in important ways throughout the networked
information economy. For purposes of understanding the political
implications that occupy most of this book, that is all that is
necessary. <sub>[pg 91]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="182">
	<ocn>182</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Chapter 4 - The Economics of Social Production
	</text>
</object>
<object id="183">
	<ocn>183</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The increasing salience of nonmarket production in general, and peer
production in particular, raises three puzzles from an economics
perspective. First, why do people participate? What is their motivation
when they work for or contribute resources to a project for which they
are not paid or directly rewarded? Second, why now, why here? What, if
anything, is special about the digitally networked environment that
would lead us to believe that peer production is here to stay as an
important economic phenomenon, as opposed to a fad that will pass as
the medium matures and patterns of behavior settle toward those more
familiar to us from the economy of steel, coal, and temp agencies.
Third, is it efficient to have all these people sharing their computers
and donating their time and creative effort? Moving through the answers
to these questions, it becomes clear that the diverse and complex
patterns of behavior observed on the Internet, from Viking ship
hobbyists to the developers of the GNU/ Linux operating system, are
perfectly consistent with much of our contemporary understanding of
human economic behavior. We need to assume no fundamental change in the
nature of humanity; <sub>[pg 92]</sub> we need not declare the end of
economics as we know it. We merely need to see that the material
conditions of production in the networked information economy have
changed in ways that increase the relative salience of social sharing
and exchange as a modality of economic production. That is, behaviors
and motivation patterns familiar to us from social relations generally
continue to cohere in their own patterns. What has changed is that now
these patterns of behavior have become effective beyond the domains of
building social relations of mutual interest and fulfilling our
emotional and psychological needs of companionship and mutual
recognition. They have come to play a substantial role as modes of
motivating, informing, and organizing productive behavior at the very
core of the information economy. And it is this increasing role as a
modality of information production that ripples through the rest this
book. It is the feasibility of producing information, knowledge, and
culture through social, rather than market and proprietary
relations--through cooperative peer production and coordinate
individual action--that creates the opportunities for greater
autonomous action, a more critical culture, a more discursively engaged
and better informed republic, and perhaps a more equitable global
community.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="184">
	<ocn>184</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		MOTIVATION
	</text>
</object>
<object id="185">
	<ocn>185</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Much of economics achieves analytic tractability by adopting a very
simple model of human motivation. The basic assumption is that all
human motivations can be more or less reduced to something like
positive and negative utilities--things people want, and things people
want to avoid. These are capable of being summed, and are usually
translatable into a universal medium of exchange, like money. Adding
more of something people want, like money, to any given interaction
will, all things considered, make that interaction more desirable to
rational people. While simplistic, this highly tractable model of human
motivation has enabled policy prescriptions that have proven far more
productive than prescriptions that depended on other models of human
motivation--such as assuming that benign administrators will be
motivated to serve their people, or that individuals will undertake
self-sacrifice for the good of the nation or the commune.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="186">
	<ocn>186</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Of course, this simple model underlying much of contemporary economics
is wrong. At least it is wrong as a universal description of human
motivation. If you leave a fifty-dollar check on the table at the end
of a dinner party at a friend's house, you do not increase the
probability that you will <sub>[pg 93]</sub> be invited again. We live
our lives in diverse social frames, and money has a complex
relationship with these--sometimes it adds to the motivation to
participate, sometimes it detracts from it. While this is probably a
trivial observation outside of the field of economics, it is quite
radical within that analytic framework. The present generation's
efforts to formalize and engage it began with the Titmuss-Arrow debate
of the early 1970s. In a major work, Richard Titmuss compared the U.S.
and British blood supply systems. The former was largely commercial at
the time, organized by a mix of private for-profit and nonprofit
actors; the latter entirely voluntary and organized by the National
Health Service. Titmuss found that the British system had
higher-quality blood (as measured by the likelihood of recipients
contracting hepatitis from transfusions), less blood waste, and fewer
blood shortages at hospitals. Titmuss also attacked the U.S. system as
inequitable, arguing that the rich exploited the poor and desperate by
buying their blood. He concluded that an altruistic blood procurement
system is both more ethical and more efficient than a market system,
and recommended that the market be kept out of blood donation to
protect the "right to give."<en>31</en> Titmuss's argument came under
immediate attack from economists. Most relevant for our purposes here,
Kenneth Arrow agreed that the differences in blood quality indicated
that the U.S. blood system was flawed, but rejected Titmuss's central
theoretical claim that markets reduce donative activity. Arrow reported
the alternative hypothesis held by "economists typically," that if some
people respond to exhortation/moral incentives (donors), while others
respond to prices and market incentives (sellers), these two groups
likely behave independently--neither responds to the other's
incentives. Thus, the decision to allow or ban markets should have no
effect on donative behavior. Removing a market could, however, remove
incentives of the "bad blood" suppliers to sell blood, thereby
improving the overall quality of the blood supply. Titmuss had not
established his hypothesis analytically, Arrow argued, and its proof or
refutation would lie in empirical study.<en>32</en> Theoretical
differences aside, the U.S. blood supply system did in fact transition
to an allvolunteer system of social donation since the 1970s. In
surveys since, blood donors have reported that they "enjoy helping"
others, experienced a sense of moral obligation or responsibility, or
exhibited characteristics of reciprocators after they or their
relatives received blood.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="31">
		<number>31</number>
		<note>
			Richard M. Titmuss, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to
Social Policy (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 94.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="32">
		<number>32</number>
		<note>
			Kenneth J. Arrow, "Gifts and Exchanges," Philosophy &amp; Public
Affairs 1 (1972): 343.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="187">
	<ocn>187</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A number of scholars, primarily in psychology and economics, have
attempted to resolve this question both empirically and theoretically.
The most systematic work within economics is that of Swiss economist
Bruno Frey <sub>[pg 94]</sub> and various collaborators, building on
the work of psychologist Edward Deci.<en>33</en> A simple statement of
this model is that individuals have intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations. Extrinsic motivations are imposed on individuals from the
outside. They take the form of either offers of money for, or prices
imposed on, behavior, or threats of punishment or reward from a manager
or a judge for complying with, or failing to comply with, specifically
prescribed behavior. Intrinsic motivations are reasons for action that
come from within the person, such as pleasure or personal satisfaction.
Extrinsic motivations are said to "crowd out" intrinsic motivations
because they (a) impair self-determination--that is, people feel
pressured by an external force, and therefore feel overjustified in
maintaining their intrinsic motivation rather than complying with the
will of the source of the extrinsic reward; or (b) impair
self-esteem--they cause individuals to feel that their internal
motivation is rejected, not valued, and as a result, their self-esteem
is diminished, causing them to reduce effort. Intuitively, this model
relies on there being a culturally contingent notion of what one
"ought" to do if one is a welladjusted human being and member of a
decent society. Being offered money to do something you know you
"ought" to do, and that self-respecting members of society usually in
fact do, implies that the person offering the money believes that you
are not a well-adjusted human being or an equally respectable member of
society. This causes the person offered the money either to believe the
offerer, and thereby lose self-esteem and reduce effort, or to resent
him and resist the offer. A similar causal explanation is formalized by
Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole, who claim that the person receiving the
monetary incentives infers that the person offering the compensation
does not trust the offeree to do the right thing, or to do it well of
their own accord. The offeree's self-confidence and intrinsic
motivation to succeed are reduced to the extent that the offeree
believes that the offerer--a manager or parent, for example--is better
situated to judge the offeree's abilities.<en>34</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="33">
		<number>33</number>
		<note>
			Bruno S. Frey, Not Just for Money: An Economic Theory of Personal
Motivation (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgar, 1997); Bruno S. Frey,
Inspiring Economics: Human Motivation in Political Economy
(Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2001), 52-72. An excellent survey of
this literature is Bruno S. Frey and Reto Jegen, "Motivation Crowding
Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys 15, no. 5 (2001): 589. For a
crystallization of the underlying psychological theory, see Edward L.
Deci and Richard M. Ryan, Intrinsic Motivation and Self-Determination
in Human Behavior (New York: Plenum, 1985).
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="34">
		<number>34</number>
		<note>
			Roland Benabou and Jean Tirole, "Self-Confidence and Social
Interactions" (working paper no. 7585, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA, March 2000).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="188">
	<ocn>188</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		More powerful than the theoretical literature is the substantial
empirical literature--including field and laboratory experiments,
econometrics, and surveys--that has developed since the mid-1990s to
test the hypotheses of this model of human motivation. Across many
different settings, researchers have found substantial evidence that,
under some circumstances, adding money for an activity previously
undertaken without price compensation reduces, rather than increases,
the level of activity. The work has covered contexts as diverse as the
willingness of employees to work more or to share their experience and
knowledge with team members, of communities to <sub>[pg 95]</sub>
accept locally undesirable land uses, or of parents to pick up children
from day-care centers punctually.<en>35</en> The results of this
empirical literature strongly suggest that across various domains some
displacement or crowding out can be identified between monetary rewards
and nonmonetary motivations. This does not mean that offering monetary
incentives does not increase extrinsic rewards--it does. Where
extrinsic rewards dominate, this will increase the activity rewarded as
usually predicted in economics. However, the effect on intrinsic
motivation, at least sometimes, operates in the opposite direction.
Where intrinsic motivation is an important factor because pricing and
contracting are difficult to achieve, or because the payment that can
be offered is relatively low, the aggregate effect may be negative.
Persuading experienced employees to communicate their tacit knowledge
to the teams they work with is a good example of the type of behavior
that is very hard to specify for efficient pricing, and therefore
occurs more effectively through social motivations for teamwork than
through payments. Negative effects of small payments on participation
in work that was otherwise volunteer-based are an example of low
payments recruiting relatively few people, but making others shift
their efforts elsewhere and thereby reducing, rather than increasing,
the total level of volunteering for the job.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="35">
		<number>35</number>
		<note>
			Truman F. Bewley, "A Depressed Labor Market as Explained by
Participants," American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 85
(1995): 250, provides survey data about managers' beliefs about the
effects of incentive contracts; Margit Osterloh and Bruno S. Frey,
"Motivation, Knowledge Transfer, and Organizational Form," Organization
Science 11 (2000): 538, provides evidence that employees with tacit
knowledge communicate it to coworkers more efficiently without
extrinsic motivations, with the appropriate social motivations, than
when money is offered for "teaching" their knowledge; Bruno S. Frey and
Felix Oberholzer-Gee, "The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out," American Economic Review 87
(1997): 746; and Howard Kunreuther and Douslar Easterling, "Are
Risk-Benefit Tradeoffs Possible in Siting Hazardous Facilities?"
American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 80 (1990): 252-286,
describe empirical studies where communities became less willing to
accept undesirable public facilities (Not in My Back Yard or NIMBY)
when offered compensation, relative to when the arguments made were
policy based on the common weal; Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, "A
Fine Is a Price," Journal of Legal Studies 29 (2000): 1, found that
introducing a fine for tardy pickup of kindergarten kids increased,
rather than decreased, the tardiness of parents, and once the sense of
social obligation was lost to the sense that it was "merely" a
transaction, the parents continued to be late at pickup, even after the
fine was removed.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="189">
	<ocn>189</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The psychology-based alternative to the "more money for an activity
will mean more of the activity" assumption implicit in most of these
new economic models is complemented by a sociology-based alternative.
This comes from one branch of the social capital literature--the branch
that relates back to Mark Granovetter's 1974 book, Getting a Job, and
was initiated as a crossover from sociology to economics by James
Coleman.<en>36</en> This line of literature rests on the claim that, as
Nan Lin puts it, "there are two ultimate (or primitive) rewards for
human beings in a social structure: economic standing and social
standing."<en>37</en> These rewards are understood as instrumental and,
in this regard, are highly amenable to economics. Both economic and
social aspects represent "standing"--that is, a relational measure
expressed in terms of one's capacity to mobilize resources. Some
resources can be mobilized by money. Social relations can mobilize
others. For a wide range of reasons-- institutional, cultural, and
possibly technological--some resources are more readily capable of
being mobilized by social relations than by money. If you want to get
your nephew a job at a law firm in the United States today, a friendly
relationship with the firm's hiring partner is more likely to help than
passing on an envelope full of cash. If this theory of social capital
is correct, then sometimes you should be willing to trade off financial
rewards for social <sub>[pg 96]</sub> capital. Critically, the two are
not fungible or cumulative. A hiring partner paid in an economy where
monetary bribes for job interviews are standard does not acquire a
social obligation. That same hiring partner in that same culture, who
is also a friend and therefore forgoes payment, however, probably does
acquire a social obligation, tenable for a similar social situation in
the future. The magnitude of the social debt, however, may now be
smaller. It is likely measured by the amount of money saved from not
having to pay the price, not by the value of getting the nephew a job,
as it would likely be in an economy where jobs cannot be had for
bribes. There are things and behaviors, then, that simply cannot be
commodified for market exchange, like friendship. Any effort to mix the
two, to pay for one's friendship, would render it something completely
different--perhaps a psychoanalysis session in our culture. There are
things that, even if commodified, can still be used for social
exchange, but the meaning of the social exchange would be diminished.
One thinks of borrowing eggs from a neighbor, or lending a hand to
friends who are moving their furniture to a new apartment. And there
are things that, even when commodified, continue to be available for
social exchange with its full force. Consider gamete donations as an
example in contemporary American culture. It is important to see,
though, that there is nothing intrinsic about any given "thing" or
behavior that makes it fall into one or another of these categories.
The categories are culturally contingent and cross-culturally diverse.
What matters for our purposes here, though, is only the realization
that for any given culture, there will be some acts that a person would
prefer to perform not for money, but for social standing, recognition,
and probably, ultimately, instrumental value obtainable only if that
person has performed the action through a social, rather than a market,
transaction.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="36">
		<number>36</number>
		<note>
			James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,"
American Journal of Sociology 94, supplement (1988): S95, S108. For
important early contributions to this literature, see Mark Granovetter,
"The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology 78 (1973):
1360; Mark Granovetter, Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974); Yoram BenPorath, "The
F-Connection: Families, Friends and Firms and the Organization of
Exchange," Population and Development Review 6 (1980): 1.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="37">
		<number>37</number>
		<note>
			Nan Lin, Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 150-151.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="190">
	<ocn>190</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		It is not necessary to pin down precisely the correct or most complete
theory of motivation, or the full extent and dimensions of crowding out
nonmarket rewards by the introduction or use of market rewards. All
that is required to outline the framework for analysis is recognition
that there is some form of social and psychological motivation that is
neither fungible with money nor simply cumulative with it. Transacting
within the price system may either increase or decrease the
social-psychological rewards (be they intrinsic or extrinsic,
functional or symbolic). The intuition is simple. As I have already
said, leaving a fifty-dollar check on the table after one has finished
a pleasant dinner at a friend's house would not increase the host's
<sub>[pg 97]</sub> social and psychological gains from the evening.
Most likely, it would diminish them sufficiently that one would never
again be invited. A bottle of wine or a bouquet of flowers would, to
the contrary, improve the social gains. And if dinner is not
intuitively obvious, think of sex. The point is simple. Money-oriented
motivations are different from socially oriented motivations. Sometimes
they align. Sometimes they collide. Which of the two will be the case
is historically and culturally contingent. The presence of money in
sports or entertainment reduced the social psychological gains from
performance in late-nineteenth-century Victorian England, at least for
members of the middle and upper classes. This is reflected in the
long-standing insistence on the "amateur" status of the Olympics, or
the status of "actors" in the Victorian society. This has changed
dramatically more than a century later, where athletes' and popular
entertainers' social standing is practically measured in the millions
of dollars their performances can command.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="191">
	<ocn>191</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The relative relationships of money and social-psychological rewards
are, then, dependent on culture and context. Similar actions may have
different meanings in different social or cultural contexts. Consider
three lawyers contemplating whether to write a paper presenting their
opinion--one is a practicing attorney, the second is a judge, and the
third is an academic. For the first, money and honor are often, though
not always, positively correlated. Being able to command a very high
hourly fee for writing the requested paper is a mode of expressing
one's standing in the profession, as well as a means of putting caviar
on the table. Yet, there are modes of acquiring esteem--like writing
the paper as a report for a bar committee-- that are not improved by
the presence of money, and are in fact undermined by it. This latter
effect is sharpest for the judge. If a judge is approached with an
offer of money for writing an opinion, not only is this not a mark of
honor, it is a subversion of the social role and would render corrupt
the writing of the opinion. For the judge, the intrinsic "rewards" for
writing the opinion when matched by a payment for the product would be
guilt and shame, and the offer therefore an expression of disrespect.
Finally, if the same paper is requested of the academic, the presence
of money is located somewhere in between the judge and the
practitioner. To a high degree, like the judge, the academic who writes
for money is rendered suspect in her community of scholarship. A paper
clearly funded by a party, whose results support the party's regulatory
or litigation position, is practically worthless as an academic work.
In a mirror image of the practitioner, however, there <sub>[pg
98]</sub> are some forms of money that add to and reinforce an
academic's social psychological rewards--peer-reviewed grants and
prizes most prominent among them.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="192">
	<ocn>192</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Moreover, individuals are not monolithic agents. While it is possible
to posit idealized avaricious money-grubbers, altruistic saints, or
social climbers, the reality of most people is a composite of these
all, and one that is not like any of them. Clearly, some people are
more focused on making money, and others are more generous; some more
driven by social standing and esteem, others by a psychological sense
of well-being. The for-profit and nonprofit systems probably draw
people with different tastes for these desiderata. Academic science and
commercial science also probably draw scientists with similar training
but different tastes for types of rewards. However, welladjusted,
healthy individuals are rarely monolithic in their requirements. We
would normally think of someone who chose to ignore and betray friends
and family to obtain either more money or greater social recognition as
a fetishist of some form or another. We spend some of our time making
money, some of our time enjoying it hedonically; some of our time being
with and helping family, friends, and neighbors; some of our time
creatively expressing ourselves, exploring who we are and what we would
like to become. Some of us, because of economic conditions we occupy,
or because of our tastes, spend very large amounts of time trying to
make money-- whether to become rich or, more commonly, just to make
ends meet. Others spend more time volunteering, chatting, or writing.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="193">
	<ocn>193</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		For all of us, there comes a time on any given day, week, and month,
every year and in different degrees over our lifetimes, when we choose
to act in some way that is oriented toward fulfilling our social and
psychological needs, not our market-exchangeable needs. It is that part
of our lives and our motivational structure that social production
taps, and on which it thrives. There is nothing mysterious about this.
It is evident to any of us who rush home to our family or to a
restaurant or bar with friends at the end of a workday, rather than
staying on for another hour of overtime or to increase our billable
hours; or at least regret it when we cannot. It is evident to any of us
who has ever brought a cup of tea to a sick friend or relative, or
received one; to anyone who has lent a hand moving a friend's
belongings; played a game; told a joke, or enjoyed one told by a
friend. What needs to be understood now, however, is under what
conditions these many and diverse social actions can turn into an
important modality of economic production. When can all these acts,
distinct from our desire for <sub>[pg 99]</sub> money and motivated by
social and psychological needs, be mobilized, directed, and made
effective in ways that we recognize as economically valuable?
	</text>
</object>
<object id="194">
	<ocn>194</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		SOCIAL PRODUCTION: FEASIBILITY CONDITIONS AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
	</text>
</object>
<object id="195">
	<ocn>195</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The core technologically contingent fact that enables social relations
to become a salient modality of production in the networked information
economy is that all the inputs necessary to effective productive
activity are under the control of individual users. Human creativity,
wisdom, and life experience are all possessed uniquely by individuals.
The computer processors, data storage devices, and communications
capacity necessary to make new meaningful conversational moves from the
existing universe of information and stimuli, and to render and
communicate them to others near and far are also under the control of
these same individual users--at least in the advanced economies and in
some portions of the population of developing economies. This does not
mean that all the physical capital necessary to process, store, and
communicate information is under individual user control. That is not
necessary. It is, rather, that the majority of individuals in these
societies have the threshold level of material capacity required to
explore the information environment they occupy, to take from it, and
to make their own contributions to it.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="196">
	<ocn>196</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		There is nothing about computation or communication that naturally or
necessarily enables this fact. It is a felicitous happenstance of the
fabrication technology of computing machines in the last quarter of the
twentieth century, and, it seems, in the reasonably foreseeable future.
It is cheaper to build freestanding computers that enable their owners
to use a wide and dynamically changing range of information
applications, and that are cheap enough that each machine is owned by
an individual user or household, than it is to build massive
supercomputers with incredibly high-speed communications to yet cheaper
simple terminals, and to sell information services to individuals on an
on-demand or standardized package model. Natural or contingent, it is
nevertheless a fact of the industrial base of the networked information
economy that individual users--susceptible as they are to acting on
diverse motivations, in diverse relationships, some market-based, some
social--possess and control the physical capital necessary to make
effective the human capacities they uniquely and individually possess.
<sub>[pg 100]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="197">
	<ocn>197</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Now, having the core inputs of information production ubiquitously
distributed in society is a core enabling fact, but it alone cannot
assure that social production will become economically significant.
Children and teenagers, retirees, and very rich individuals can spend
most of their lives socializing or volunteering; most other people
cannot. While creative capacity and judgment are universally
distributed in a population, available time and attention are not, and
human creative capacity cannot be fully dedicated to nonmarket,
nonproprietary production all the time. Someone needs to work for
money, at least some of the time, to pay the rent and put food on the
table. Personal computers too are only used for earnings-generating
activities some of the time. In both these resources, there remain
large quantities of excess capacity--time and interest in human beings;
processing, storage, and communications capacity in
computers--available to be used for activities whose rewards are not
monetary or monetizable, directly or indirectly.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="198">
	<ocn>198</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		For this excess capacity to be harnessed and become effective, the
information production process must effectively integrate widely
dispersed contributions, from many individual human beings and
machines. These contributions are diverse in their quality, quantity,
and focus, in their timing and geographic location. The great success
of the Internet generally, and peer-production processes in particular,
has been the adoption of technical and organizational architectures
that have allowed them to pool such diverse efforts effectively. The
core characteristics underlying the success of these enterprises are
their modularity and their capacity to integrate many finegrained
contributions.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="199">
	<ocn>199</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		"Modularity" is a property of a project that describes the extent to
which it can be broken down into smaller components, or modules, that
can be independently produced before they are assembled into a whole.
If modules are independent, individual contributors can choose what and
when to contribute independently of each other. This maximizes their
autonomy and flexibility to define the nature, extent, and timing of
their participation in the project. Breaking up the maps of Mars
involved in the clickworkers project (described in chapter 3) and
rendering them in small segments with a simple marking tool is a way of
modularizing the task of mapping craters. In the SETI@home project (see
chapter 3), the task of scanning radio astronomy signals is broken down
into millions of little computations as a way of modularizing the
calculations involved.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="200">
	<ocn>200</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		"Granularity" refers to the size of the modules, in terms of the time
and effort that an individual must invest in producing them. The five
minutes <sub>[pg 101]</sub> required for moderating a comment on
Slashdot, or for metamoderating a moderator, is more fine-grained than
the hours necessary to participate in writing a bug fix in an
open-source project. More people can participate in the former than in
the latter, independent of the differences in the knowledge required
for participation. The number of people who can, in principle,
participate in a project is therefore inversely related to the size of
the smallest-scale contribution necessary to produce a usable module.
The granularity of the modules therefore sets the smallest possible
individual investment necessary to participate in a project. If this
investment is sufficiently low, then "incentives" for producing that
component of a modular project can be of trivial magnitude. Most
importantly for our purposes of understanding the rising role of
nonmarket production, the time can be drawn from the excess time we
normally dedicate to having fun and participating in social
interactions. If the finest-grained contributions are relatively large
and would require a large investment of time and effort, the universe
of potential contributors decreases. A successful large-scale
peer-production project must therefore have a predominate portion of
its modules be relatively fine-grained.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="201">
	<ocn>201</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Perhaps the clearest example of how large-grained modules can make
projects falter is the condition, as of the middle of 2005, of efforts
to peer produce open textbooks. The largest such effort is Wikibooks, a
site associated with <i>Wikipedia</i>, which has not taken off as did
its famous parent project. Very few texts there have reached maturity
to the extent that they could be usable as a partial textbook, and
those few that have were largely written by one individual with minor
contributions by others. Similarly, an ambitious initiative launched in
California in 2004 still had not gone far beyond an impassioned plea
for help by mid-2005. The project that seems most successful as of 2005
was a South African project, Free High School Science Texts (FHSST),
founded by a physics graduate student, Mark Horner. As of this writing,
that three-year-old project had more or less completed a physics text,
and was about halfway through chemistry and mathematics textbooks. The
whole FHSST project involves a substantially more managed approach than
is common in peer-production efforts, with a core group of dedicated
graduate student administrators recruiting contributors, assigning
tasks, and integrating the contributions. Horner suggests that the
basic limiting factor is that in order to write a high school textbook,
the output must comply with state-imposed guidelines for content and
form. To achieve these requirements, the various modules must cohere to
a degree <sub>[pg 102]</sub> much larger than necessary in a project
like <i>Wikipedia</i>, which can endure high diversity in style and
development without losing its utility. As a result, the individual
contributions have been kept at a high level of abstraction-- an idea
or principle explained at a time. The minimal time commitment required
of each contributor is therefore large, and has led many of those who
volunteered initially to not complete their contributions. In this
case, the guideline requirements constrained the project's granularity,
and thereby impeded its ability to grow and capture the necessary
thousands of smallgrained contributions. With orders of magnitude fewer
contributors, each must be much more highly motivated and available
than is necessary in <i>Wikipedia</i>, Slashdot, and similar successful
projects.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="202">
	<ocn>202</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		It is not necessary, however, that each and every chunk or module be
fine grained. Free software projects in particular have shown us that
successful peer-production projects may also be structured, technically
and culturally, in ways that make it possible for different individuals
to contribute vastly different levels of effort commensurate with their
ability, motivation, and availability. The large free software projects
might integrate thousands of people who are acting primarily for social
psychological reasons--because it is fun or cool; a few hundred young
programmers aiming to make a name for themselves so as to become
employable; and dozens of programmers who are paid to write free
software by firms that follow one of the nonproprietary strategies
described in chapter 2. IBM and Red Hat are the quintessential examples
of firms that contribute paid employee time to peer-production projects
in this form. This form of link between a commercial firm and a peer
production community is by no means necessary for a peer-production
process to succeed; it does, however, provide one constructive
interface between market- and nonmarket-motivated behavior, through
which actions on the two types of motivation can reinforce, rather than
undermine, each other.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="203">
	<ocn>203</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The characteristics of planned modularization of a problem are highly
visible and explicit in some peer-production projects--the distributed
computing projects like SETI@home are particularly good examples of
this. However, if we were to step back and look at the entire
phenomenon of Web-based publication from a bird's-eye view, we would
see that the architecture of the World Wide Web, in particular the
persistence of personal Web pages and blogs and their self-contained,
technical independence of each other, give the Web as a whole the
characteristics of modularity and variable but fine-grained
granularity. Imagine that you were trying to evaluate <sub>[pg
103]</sub> how, if at all, the Web is performing the task of media
watchdog. Consider one example, which I return to in chapter 7: The
Memory Hole, a Web site created and maintained by Russ Kick, a
freelance author and editor. Kick spent some number of hours preparing
and filing a Freedom of Information Act request with the Defense
Department, seeking photographs of coffins of U.S. military personnel
killed in Iraq. He was able to do so over some period, not having to
rely on "getting the scoop" to earn his dinner. At the same time, tens
of thousands of other individual Web publishers and bloggers were
similarly spending their time hunting down stories that moved them, or
that they happened to stumble across in their own daily lives. When
Kick eventually got the photographs, he could upload them onto his Web
site, where they were immediately available for anyone to see. Because
each contribution like Kick's can be independently created and stored,
because no single permission point or failure point is present in the
architecture of the Web--it is merely a way of conveniently labeling
documents stored independently by many people who are connected to the
Internet and use HTML (hypertext markup language) and HTTP (hypertext
transfer protocol)--as an "information service," it is highly modular
and diversely granular. Each independent contribution comprises as
large or small an investment as its owner-operator chooses to make.
Together, they form a vast almanac, trivia trove, and news and
commentary facility, to name but a few, produced by millions of people
at their leisure--whenever they can or want to, about whatever they
want.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="204">
	<ocn>204</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The independence of Web sites is what marks their major difference from
more organized peer-production processes, where contributions are
marked not by their independence but by their interdependence. The Web
as a whole requires no formal structure of cooperation. As an
"information good" or medium, it emerges as a pattern out of coordinate
coexistence of millions of entirely independent acts. All it requires
is a pattern recognition utility superimposed over the outputs of these
acts--a search engine or directory. Peer-production processes, to the
contrary, do generally require some substantive cooperation among
users. A single rating of an individual comment on Slashdot does not by
itself moderate the comment up or down, neither does an individual
marking of a crater. Spotting a bug in free software, proposing a fix,
reviewing the proposed fix, and integrating it into the software are
interdependent acts that require a level of cooperation. This necessity
for cooperation requires peer-production processes to adopt more
engaged strategies for assuring that everyone who participates is doing
so in <sub>[pg 104]</sub> good faith, competently, and in ways that do
not undermine the whole, and weeding out those would-be participants
who are not.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="205">
	<ocn>205</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Cooperation in peer-production processes is usually maintained by some
combination of technical architecture, social norms, legal rules, and a
technically backed hierarchy that is validated by social norms.
<i>Wikipedia</i> is the strongest example of a discourse-centric model
of cooperation based on social norms. However, even <i>Wikipedia</i>
includes, ultimately, a small number of people with system
administrator privileges who can eliminate accounts or block users in
the event that someone is being genuinely obstructionist. This
technical fallback, however, appears only after substantial play has
been given to self-policing by participants, and to informal and
quasi-formal communitybased dispute resolution mechanisms. Slashdot, by
contrast, provides a strong model of a sophisticated technical system
intended to assure that no one can "defect" from the cooperative
enterprise of commenting and moderating comments. It limits behavior
enabled by the system to avoid destructive behavior before it happens,
rather than policing it after the fact. The Slash code does this by
technically limiting the power any given person has to moderate anyone
else up or down, and by making every moderator the subject of a peer
review system whose judgments are enforced technically-- that is, when
any given user is described by a sufficiently large number of other
users as unfair, that user automatically loses the technical ability to
moderate the comments of others. The system itself is a free software
project, licensed under the GPL (General Public License)--which is
itself the quintessential example of how law is used to prevent some
types of defection from the common enterprise of peer production of
software. The particular type of defection that the GPL protects
against is appropriation of the joint product by any single individual
or firm, the risk of which would make it less attractive for anyone to
contribute to the project to begin with. The GPL assures that, as a
legal matter, no one who contributes to a free software project need
worry that some other contributor will take the project and make it
exclusively their own. The ultimate quality judgments regarding what is
incorporated into the "formal" releases of free software projects
provide the clearest example of the extent to which a meritocratic
hierarchy can be used to integrate diverse contributions into a
finished single product. In the case of the Linux kernel development
project (see chapter 3), it was always within the power of Linus
Torvalds, who initiated the project, to decide which contributions
should be included in a new release, and which should not. But it is a
funny sort of hierarchy, whose quirkiness Steve Weber <sub>[pg
105]</sub> well explicates.<en>38</en> Torvalds's authority is
persuasive, not legal or technical, and certainly not determinative. He
can do nothing except persuade others to prevent them from developing
anything they want and add it to their kernel, or to distribute that
alternative version of the kernel. There is nothing he can do to
prevent the entire community of users, or some subsection of it, from
rejecting his judgment about what ought to be included in the kernel.
Anyone is legally free to do as they please. So these projects are
based on a hierarchy of meritocratic respect, on social norms, and, to
a great extent, on the mutual recognition by most players in this game
that it is to everybody's advantage to have someone overlay a peer
review system with some leadership.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="38">
		<number>38</number>
		<note>
			Steve Weber, The Success of Open Source (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2004).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="206">
	<ocn>206</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In combination then, three characteristics make possible the emergence
of information production that is not based on exclusive proprietary
claims, not aimed toward sales in a market for either motivation or
information, and not organized around property and contract claims to
form firms or market exchanges. First, the physical machinery necessary
to participate in information and cultural production is almost
universally distributed in the population of the advanced economies.
Certainly, personal computers as capital goods are under the control of
numbers of individuals that are orders of magnitude larger than the
number of parties controlling the use of massproduction-capable
printing presses, broadcast transmitters, satellites, or cable systems,
record manufacturing and distribution chains, and film studios and
distribution systems. This means that the physical machinery can be put
in service and deployed in response to any one of the diverse
motivations individual human beings experience. They need not be
deployed in order to maximize returns on the financial capital, because
financial capital need not be mobilized to acquire and put in service
any of the large capital goods typical of the industrial information
economy. Second, the primary raw materials in the information economy,
unlike the industrial economy, are public goods--existing information,
knowledge, and culture. Their actual marginal social cost is zero.
Unless regulatory policy makes them purposefully expensive in order to
sustain the proprietary business models, acquiring raw materials also
requires no financial capital outlay. Again, this means that these raw
materials can be deployed for any human motivation. They need not
maximize financial returns. Third, the technical architectures,
organizational models, and social dynamics of information production
and exchange on the Internet have developed so that they allow us to
structure the solution to problems--in particular to information
production problems--in ways <sub>[pg 106]</sub> that are highly
modular. This allows many diversely motivated people to act for a wide
range of reasons that, in combination, cohere into new useful
information, knowledge, and cultural goods. These architectures and
organizational models allow both independent creation that coexists and
coheres into usable patterns, and interdependent cooperative
enterprises in the form of peer-production processes.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="207">
	<ocn>207</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Together, these three characteristics suggest that the patterns of
social production of information that we are observing in the digitally
networked environment are not a fad. They are, rather, a sustainable
pattern of human production given the characteristics of the networked
information economy. The diversity of human motivation is nothing new.
We now have a substantial literature documenting its importance in free
and open-source software development projects, from Josh Lerner and
Jean Tirole, Rishab Ghosh, Eric Von Hippel and Karim Lakhani, and
others. Neither is the public goods nature of information new. What is
new are the technological conditions that allow these facts to provide
the ingredients of a much larger role in the networked information
economy for nonmarket, nonproprietary production to emerge. As long as
capitalization and ownership of the physical capital base of this
economy remain widely distributed and as long as regulatory policy does
not make information inputs artificially expensive, individuals will be
able to deploy their own creativity, wisdom, conversational capacities,
and connected computers, both independently and in loose interdependent
cooperation with others, to create a substantial portion of the
information environment we occupy. Moreover, we will be able to do so
for whatever reason we choose--through markets or firms to feed and
clothe ourselves, or through social relations and open communication
with others, to give our lives meaning and context.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="208">
	<ocn>208</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		TRANSACTION COSTS AND EFFICIENCY
	</text>
</object>
<object id="209">
	<ocn>209</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		For purposes of analyzing the political values that are the concern of
most of this book, all that is necessary is that we accept that peer
production in particular, and nonmarket information production and
exchange in general, are sustainable in the networked information
economy. Most of the remainder of the book seeks to evaluate why, and
to what extent, the presence of a substantial nonmarket, commons-based
sector in the information production system is desirable from the
perspective of various aspects of freedom and justice. Whether this
sector is "efficient" within the meaning of the <sub>[pg 107]</sub>
word in welfare economics is beside the point to most of these
considerations. Even a strong commitment to a pragmatic political
theory, one that accepts and incorporates into its consideration the
limits imposed by material and economic reality, need not aim for
"efficient" policy in the welfare sense. It is sufficient that the
policy is economically and socially sustainable on its own bottom--in
other words, that it does not require constant subsidization at the
expense of some other area excluded from the analysis. It is
nonetheless worthwhile spending a few pages explaining why, and under
what conditions, commons-based peer production, and social production
more generally, are not only sustainable but actually efficient ways of
organizing information production.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="210">
	<ocn>210</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The efficient allocation of two scarce resources and one public good
are at stake in the choice between social production--whether it is
peer production or independent nonmarket production--and market-based
production. Because most of the outputs of these processes are nonrival
goods-- information, knowledge, and culture--the fact that the social
production system releases them freely, without extracting a price for
using them, means that it would, all other things being equal, be more
efficient for information to be produced on a nonproprietary social
model, rather than on a proprietary market model. Indeed, all other
things need not even be equal for this to hold. It is enough that the
net value of the information produced by commons-based social
production processes and released freely for anyone to use as they
please is no less than the total value of information produced through
property-based systems minus the deadweight loss caused by the
above-marginal-cost pricing practices that are the intended result of
the intellectual property system.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="211">
	<ocn>211</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The two scarce resources are: first, human creativity, time, and
attention; and second, the computation and communications resources
used in information production and exchange. In both cases, the primary
reason to choose among proprietary and nonproprietary strategies,
between marketbased systems--be they direct market exchange or
firm-based hierarchical production--and social systems, are the
comparative transaction costs of each, and the extent to which these
transaction costs either outweigh the benefits of working through each
system, or cause the system to distort the information it generates so
as to systematically misallocate resources.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="212">
	<ocn>212</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The first thing to recognize is that markets, firms, and social
relations are three distinct transactional frameworks. Imagine that I
am sitting in a room and need paper for my printer. I could (a) order
paper from a store; (b) call <sub>[pg 108]</sub> the storeroom, if I am
in a firm or organization that has one, and ask the clerk to deliver
the paper I need; or (c) walk over to a neighbor and borrow some paper.
Choice (a) describes the market transactional framework. The store
knows I need paper immediately because I am willing to pay for it now.
Alternative (b) is an example of the firm as a transactional framework.
The paper is in the storeroom because someone in the organization
planned that someone else would need paper today, with some
probability, and ordered enough to fill that expected need. The clerk
in the storeroom gives it to me because that is his job; again, defined
by someone who planned to have someone available to deliver paper when
someone else in the proper channels of authority says that she needs
it. Comparing and improving the efficiency of (a) and (b),
respectively, has been a central project in transaction-costs
organization theory. We might compare, for example, the costs of taking
my call, verifying the credit card information, and sending a delivery
truck for my one batch of paper, to the costs of someone planning for
the average needs of a group of people like me, who occasionally run
out of paper, and stocking a storeroom with enough paper and a clerk to
fill our needs in a timely manner. However, notice that (c) is also an
alternative transactional framework. I could, rather than incurring the
costs of transacting through the market with the local store or of
building a firm with sufficient lines of authority to stock and manage
the storeroom, pop over to my neighbor and ask for some paper. This
would make sense even within an existing firm when, for example, I need
two or three pages immediately and do not want to wait for the
storeroom clerk to do his rounds, or more generally, if I am working at
home and the costs of creating "a firm," stocking a storeroom, and
paying a clerk are too high for my neighbors and me. Instead, we
develop a set of neighborly social relations, rather than a firm-based
organization, to deal with shortfalls during periods when it would be
too costly to assure a steady flow of paper from the market--for
example, late in the evening, on a weekend, or in a sparsely populated
area.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="213">
	<ocn>213</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The point is not, of course, to reduce all social relations and human
decency to a transaction-costs theory. Too many such straight planks
have already been cut from the crooked timber of humanity to make that
exercise useful or enlightening. The point is that most of economics
internally has been ignoring the social transactional framework as an
alternative whose relative efficiency can be accounted for and
considered in much the same way as the relative cost advantages of
simple markets when compared to the hierarchical organizations that
typify much of our economic activity--firms. <sub>[pg 109]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="214">
	<ocn>214</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A market transaction, in order to be efficient, must be clearly
demarcated as to what it includes, so that it can be priced
efficiently. That price must then be paid in equally crisply delineated
currency. Even if a transaction initially may be declared to involve
sale of "an amount reasonably required to produce the required output,"
for a "customary" price, at some point what was provided and what is
owed must be crystallized and fixed for a formal exchange. The
crispness is a functional requirement of the price system. It derives
from the precision and formality of the medium of
exchange--currency--and the ambition to provide refined representations
of the comparative value of marginal decisions through denomination in
an exchange medium that represents these incremental value differences.
Similarly, managerial hierarchies require a crisp definition of who
should be doing what, when, and how, in order to permit the planning
and coordination process to be effective.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="215">
	<ocn>215</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Social exchange, on the other hand, does not require the same degree of
crispness at the margin. As Maurice Godelier put it in <i>The Enigma of
the Gift</i>, "the mark of the gift between close friends and relatives
. . . is not the absence of obligations, it is the absence of
`calculation.' "<en>39</en> There are, obviously, elaborate and
formally ritualistic systems of social exchange, in both ancient
societies and modern. There are common-property regimes that monitor
and record calls on the common pool very crisply. However, in many of
the common-property regimes, one finds mechanisms of bounding or fairly
allocating access to the common pool that more coarsely delineate the
entitlements, behaviors, and consequences than is necessary for a
proprietary system. In modern market society, where we have money as a
formal medium of precise exchange, and where social relations are more
fluid than in traditional societies, social exchange certainly occurs
as a fuzzier medium. Across many cultures, generosity is understood as
imposing a debt of obligation; but none of the precise amount of value
given, the precise nature of the debt to be repaid, or the date of
repayment need necessarily be specified. Actions enter into a cloud of
goodwill or membership, out of which each agent can understand him- or
herself as being entitled to a certain flow of dependencies or benefits
in exchange for continued cooperative behavior. This may be an ongoing
relationship between two people, a small group like a family or group
of friends, and up to a general level of generosity among strangers
that makes for a decent society. The point is that social exchange does
not require defining, for example, "I will lend you my car and help you
move these five boxes on Monday, and in exchange you will feed my
<sub>[pg 110]</sub> fish next July," in the same way that the following
would: "I will move five boxes on Tuesday for $100, six boxes for
$120." This does not mean that social systems are cost free--far from
it. They require tremendous investment, acculturation, and maintenance.
This is true in this case every bit as much as it is true for markets
or states. Once functional, however, social exchanges require less
information crispness at the margin.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="39">
		<number>39</number>
		<note>
			Maurice Godelier, The Enigma of the Gift, trans. Nora Scott
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 5.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="216">
	<ocn>216</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Both social and market exchange systems require large fixed costs--the
setting up of legal institutions and enforcement systems for markets,
and creating social networks, norms, and institutions for the social
exchange. Once these initial costs have been invested, however, market
transactions systematically require a greater degree of precise
information about the content of actions, goods, and obligations, and
more precision of monitoring and enforcement on a per-transaction basis
than do social exchange systems.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="217">
	<ocn>217</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This difference between markets and hierarchical organizations, on the
one hand, and peer-production processes based on social relations, on
the other, is particularly acute in the context of human creative
labor--one of the central scarce resources that these systems must
allocate in the networked information economy. The levels and focus of
individual effort are notoriously hard to specify for pricing or
managerial commands, considering all aspects of individual effort and
ability--talent, motivation, workload, and focus--as they change in
small increments over the span of an individual's full day, let alone
months. What we see instead is codification of effort types--a garbage
collector, a law professor--that are priced more or less finely.
However, we only need to look at the relative homogeneity of law firm
starting salaries as compared to the high variability of individual
ability and motivation levels of graduating law students to realize
that pricing of individual effort can be quite crude. Similarly, these
attributes are also difficult to monitor and verify over time, though
perhaps not quite as difficult as predicting them ex ante. Pricing
therefore continues to be a function of relatively crude information
about the actual variability among people. More importantly, as aspects
of performance that are harder to fully specify in advance or
monitor--like creativity over time given the occurrence of new
opportunities to be creative, or implicit know-how--become a more
significant aspect of what is valuable about an individual's
contribution, market mechanisms become more and more costly to maintain
efficiently, and, as a practical matter, simply lose a lot of
information.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="218">
	<ocn>218</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		People have different innate capabilities; personal, social, and
educational histories; emotional frameworks; and ongoing lived
experiences, which make <sub>[pg 111]</sub> for immensely diverse
associations with, idiosyncratic insights into, and divergent
utilization of existing information and cultural inputs at different
times and in different contexts. Human creativity is therefore very
difficult to standardize and specify in the contracts necessary for
either market-cleared or hierarchically organized production. As the
weight of human intellectual effort increases in the overall mix of
inputs into a given production process, an organization model that does
not require contractual specification of the individual effort required
to participate in a collective enterprise, and which allows individuals
to self-identify for tasks, will be better at gathering and utilizing
information about who should be doing what than a system that does
require such specification. Some firms try to solve this problem by
utilizing market- and social-relations-oriented hybrids, like incentive
compensation schemes and employee-of-the-month-type social motivational
frameworks. These may be able to improve on firm-only or market-only
approaches. It is unclear, though, how well they can overcome the core
difficulty: that is, that both markets and firm hierarchies require
significant specification of the object of organization and pricing--in
this case, human intellectual input. The point here is qualitative. It
is not only, or even primarily, that more people can participate in
production in a commons-based effort. It is that the widely distributed
model of information production will better identify the best person to
produce a specific component of a project, considering all abilities
and availability to work on the specific module within a specific time
frame. With enough uncertainty as to the value of various productive
activities, and enough variability in the quality of both information
inputs and human creative talent vis-a-vis any set of production `
opportunities, freedom of action for individuals coupled with
continuous communications among the pool of potential producers and
consumers can generate better information about the most valuable
productive actions, and the best human inputs available to engage in
these actions at a given time. Markets and firm incentive schemes are
aimed at producing precisely this form of self-identification. However,
the rigidities associated with collecting and comprehending bids from
individuals through these systems (that is, transaction costs) limit
the efficacy of self-identification by comparison to a system in which,
once an individual self-identifies for a task, he or she can then
undertake it without permission, contract, or instruction from another.
The emergence of networked organizations (described and analyzed in the
work of Charles Sabel and others) suggests that firms are in fact
trying to overcome these limitations by developing parallels to the
freedom to learn, <sub>[pg 112]</sub> innovate, and act on these
innovations that is intrinsic to peer-production processes by loosening
the managerial bonds, locating more of the conception and execution of
problem solving away from the managerial core of the firm, and
implementing these through social, as well as monetary, motivations.
However, the need to assure that the value created is captured within
the organization limits the extent to which these strategies can be
implemented within a single enterprise, as opposed to their
implementation in an open process of social production. This effect, in
turn, is in some sectors attenuated through the use of what Walter
Powell and others have described as learning networks. Engineers and
scientists often create frameworks that allow them to step out of their
organizational affiliations, through conferences or workshops. By
reproducing the social production characteristics of academic exchange,
they overcome some of the information loss caused by the boundary of
the firm. While these organizational strategies attenuate the problem,
they also underscore the degree to which it is widespread and
understood by organizations as such. The fact that the direction of the
solutions business organizations choose tends to shift elements of the
production process away from market- or firm-based models and toward
networked social production models is revealing. Now, the
self-identification that is central to the relative information
efficiency of peer production is not always perfect. Some mechanisms
used by firms and markets to codify effort levels and abilities--like
formal credentials--are the result of experience with substantial
errors or misstatements by individuals of their capacities. To succeed,
therefore, peer-production systems must also incorporate mechanisms for
smoothing out incorrect self-assessments--as peer review does in
traditional academic research or in the major sites like
<i>Wikipedia</i> or Slashdot, or as redundancy and statistical
averaging do in the case of NASA clickworkers. The prevalence of
misperceptions that individual contributors have about their own
ability and the cost of eliminating such errors will be part of the
transaction costs associated with this form of organization. They
parallel quality control problems faced by firms and markets.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="219">
	<ocn>219</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The lack of crisp specification of who is giving what to whom, and in
exchange for what, also bears on the comparative transaction costs
associated with the allocation of the second major type of scarce
resource in the networked information economy: the physical resources
that make up the networked information environment--communications,
computation, and storage capacity. It is important to note, however,
that these are very different from creativity and information as
inputs: they are private goods, not a <sub>[pg 113]</sub> public good
like information, and they are standardized goods with well-specified
capacities, not heterogeneous and highly uncertain attributes like
human creativity at a given moment and context. Their outputs, unlike
information, are not public goods. The reasons that they are
nonetheless subject to efficient sharing in the networked environment
therefore require a different economic explanation. However, the
sharing of these material resources, like the sharing of human
creativity, insight, and attention, nonetheless relies on both the
comparative transaction costs of markets and social relations and the
diversity of human motivation.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="220">
	<ocn>220</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Personal computers, wireless transceivers, and Internet connections are
"shareable goods." The basic intuition behind the concept of shareable
goods is simple. There are goods that are "lumpy": given a state of
technology, they can only be produced in certain discrete bundles that
offer discontinuous amounts of functionality or capacity. In order to
have any ability to run a computation, for example, a consumer must buy
a computer processor. These, in turn, only come in discrete units with
a certain speed or capacity. One could easily imagine a world where
computers are very large and their owners sell computation capacity to
consumers "on demand," whenever they needed to run an application. That
is basically the way the mainframe world of the 1960s and 1970s worked.
However, the economics of microchip fabrication and of network
connections over the past thirty years, followed by storage technology,
have changed that. For most functions that users need, the
price-performance trade-off favors stand-alone, general-purpose
personal computers, owned by individuals and capable of running locally
most applications users want, over remote facilities capable of selling
on-demand computation and storage. So computation and storage today
come in discrete, lumpy units. You can decide to buy a faster or slower
chip, or a larger or smaller hard drive, but once you buy them, you
have the capacity of these machines at your disposal, whether you need
it or not.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="221">
	<ocn>221</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Lumpy goods can, in turn, be fine-, medium-, or large-grained. A
large-grained good is one that is so expensive it can only be used by
aggregating demand for it. Industrial capital equipment, like a steam
engine, is of this type. Fine-grained goods are of a granularity that
allows consumers to buy precisely as much of the goods needed for the
amount of capacity they require. Medium-grained goods are small enough
for an individual to justify buying for her own use, given their price
and her willingness and ability to pay for the functionality she plans
to use. A personal computer is a medium-grained lumpy good in the
advanced economies and among the more well-to-do <sub>[pg 114]</sub> in
poorer countries, but is a large-grained capital good for most people
in poor countries. If, given the price of such a good and the wealth of
a society, a large number of individuals buy and use such
medium-grained lumpy goods, that society will have a large amount of
excess capacity "out there," in the hands of individuals. Because these
machines are put into service to serve the needs of individuals, their
excess capacity is available for these individuals to use as they
wish--for their own uses, to sell to others, or to share with others.
It is the combination of the fact that these machines are available at
prices (relative to wealth) that allow users to put them in service
based purely on their value for personal use, and the fact that they
have enough capacity to facilitate additionally the action and fulfill
the needs of others, that makes them "shareable." If they were so
expensive that they could only be bought by pooling the value of a
number of users, they would be placed in service either using some
market mechanism to aggregate that demand, or through formal
arrangements of common ownership by all those whose demand was combined
to invest in purchasing the resource. If they were so finely grained in
their capacity that there would be nothing left to share, again,
sharing would be harder to sustain. The fact that they are both
relatively inexpensive and have excess capacity makes them the basis
for a stable model of individual ownership of resources combined with
social sharing of that excess capacity.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="222">
	<ocn>222</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Because social sharing requires less precise specification of the
transactional details with each transaction, it has a distinct
advantage over market-based mechanisms for reallocating the excess
capacity of shareable goods, particularly when they have small quanta
of excess capacity relative to the amount necessary to achieve the
desired outcome. For example, imagine that there are one thousand
people in a population of computer owners. Imagine that each computer
is capable of performing one hundred computations per second, and that
each computer owner needs to perform about eighty operations per
second. Every owner, in other words, has twenty operations of excess
capacity every second. Now imagine that the marginal transaction costs
of arranging a sale of these twenty operations--exchanging PayPal (a
widely used low-cost Internet-based payment system) account
information, insurance against nonpayment, specific statement of how
much time the computer can be used, and so forth--cost ten cents more
than the marginal transaction costs of sharing the excess capacity
socially. John wants to render a photograph in one second, which takes
two hundred operations per second. Robert wants to model the folding of
proteins, which takes ten thousand <sub>[pg 115]</sub> operations per
second. For John, a sharing system would save fifty cents--assuming he
can use his own computer for half of the two hundred operations he
needs. He needs to transact with five other users to "rent" their
excess capacity of twenty operations each. Robert, on the other hand,
needs to transact with five hundred individual owners in order to use
their excess capacity, and for him, using a sharing system is fifty
dollars cheaper. The point of the illustration is simple. The cost
advantage of sharing as a transactional framework relative to the price
system increases linearly with the number of transactions necessary to
acquire the level of resources necessary for an operation. If excess
capacity in a society is very widely distributed in small dollops, and
for any given use of the excess capacity it is necessary to pool the
excess capacity of thousands or even millions of individual users, the
transaction-cost advantages of the sharing system become significant.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="223">
	<ocn>223</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The transaction-cost effect is reinforced by the motivation crowding
out theory. When many discrete chunks of excess capacity need to be
pooled, each distinct contributor cannot be paid a very large amount.
Motivation crowding out theory would predict that when the monetary
rewards to an activity are low, the negative effect of crowding out the
social-psychological motivation will weigh more heavily than any
increased incentive that is created by the promise of a small payment
to transfer one's excess capacity. The upshot is that when the
technological state results in excess capacity of physical capital
being widely distributed in small dollops, social sharing can
outperform secondary markets as a mechanism for harnessing that excess
capacity. This is so because of both transaction costs and motivation.
Fewer owners will be willing to sell their excess capacity cheaply than
to give it away for free in the right social context and the
transaction costs of selling will be higher than those of sharing.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="224">
	<ocn>224</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		From an efficiency perspective, then, there are clear reasons to think
that social production systems--both peer production of information,
knowledge, and culture and sharing of material resources--can be more
efficient than market-based systems to motivate and allocate both human
creative effort and the excess computation, storage, and communications
capacity that typify the networked information economy. That does not
mean that all of us will move out of market-based productive
relationships all of the time. It does mean that alongside our
market-based behaviors we generate substantial amounts of human
creativity and mechanical capacity. The transaction costs of clearing
those resources through the price system or through <sub>[pg 116]</sub>
firms are substantial, and considerably larger for the marginal
transaction than clearing them through social-sharing mechanisms as a
transactional framework. With the right institutional framework and
peer-review or quality-control mechanisms, and with well-modularized
organization of work, social sharing is likely to identify the best
person available for a job and make it feasible for that person to work
on that job using freely available information inputs. Similarly,
social transactional frameworks are likely to be substantially less
expensive than market transactions for pooling large numbers of
discrete, small increments of the excess capacity of the personal
computer processors, hard drives, and network connections that make up
the physical capital base of the networked information economy. In both
cases, given that much of what is shared is excess capacity from the
perspective of the contributors, available to them after they have
fulfilled some threshold level of their market-based consumption
requirements, social-sharing systems are likely to tap in to social
psychological motivations that money cannot tap, and, indeed, that the
presence of money in a transactional framework could nullify. Because
of these effects, social sharing and collaboration can provide not only
a sustainable alternative to market-based and firm-based models of
provisioning information, knowledge, culture, and communications, but
also an alternative that more efficiently utilizes the human and
physical capital base of the networked information economy. A society
whose institutional ecology permitted social production to thrive would
be more productive under these conditions than a society that optimized
its institutional environment solely for market- and firm-based
production, ignoring its detrimental effects to social production.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="225">
	<ocn>225</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL PRODUCTION IN THE DIGITALLY NETWORKED
ENVIRONMENT
	</text>
</object>
<object id="226">
	<ocn>226</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		There is a curious congruence between the anthropologists of the gift
and mainstream economists today. Both treat the gift literature as
being about the periphery, about societies starkly different from
modern capitalist societies. As Godelier puts it, "What a contrast
between these types of society, these social and mental universes, and
today's capitalist society where the majority of social relations are
impersonal (involving the individual as citizen and the state, for
instance), and where the exchange of things and services is conducted
for the most part in an anonymous marketplace, leaving little room for
an economy and moral code based on gift-giving."<en>40</en> And yet,
<sub>[pg 117]</sub> sharing is everywhere around us in the advanced
economies. Since the 1980s, we have seen an increasing focus, in a
number of literatures, on production practices that rely heavily on
social rather than price-based or governmental policies. These include,
initially, the literature on social norms and social capital, or
trust.<en>41</en> Both these lines of literature, however, are
statements of the institutional role of social mechanisms for enabling
market exchange and production. More direct observations of social
production and exchange systems are provided by the literature on
social provisioning of public goods-- like social norm enforcement as a
dimension of policing criminality, and the literature on common
property regimes.<en>42</en> The former are limited by their focus on
public goods provisioning. The latter are usually limited by their
focus on discretely identifiable types of resources--common pool
resources-- that must be managed as among a group of claimants while
retaining a proprietary outer boundary toward nonmembers. The focus of
those who study these phenomena is usually on relatively small and
tightly knit communities, with clear boundaries between members and
nonmembers.<en>43</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="40">
		<number>40</number>
		<note>
			Godelier, The Enigma, 106.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="41">
		<number>41</number>
		<note>
			In the legal literature, Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law: How
Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1991), is the locus classicus for showing how social norms can
substitute for law. For a bibliography of the social norms literature
outside of law, see Richard H. McAdams, "The Origin, Development, and
Regulation of Norms," Michigan Law Review 96 (1997): 338n1, 339n2.
Early contributions were: Edna Ullman-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977); James Coleman, "Norms as Social
Capital," in Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach Applied
Outside the Field of Economics, ed. Peter Bernholz and Gerard Radnitsky
(New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 133-155; Sally E. Merry,
"Rethinking Gossip and Scandal," in Toward a Theory of Social Control,
Fundamentals, ed. Donald Black (New York: Academic Press, 1984).
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="42">
		<number>42</number>
		<note>
			On policing, see Robert C. Ellickson, "Controlling Chronic
Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space
Zoning," Yale Law Journal 105 (1996): 1165, 1194-1202; and Dan M.
Kahan, "Between Economics and Sociology: The New Path of Deterrence,"
Michigan Law Review 95 (1997): 2477.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="43">
		<number>43</number>
		<note>
			An early and broad claim in the name of commons in resources for
communication and transportation, as well as human community
building--like roads, canals, or social-gathering places--is Carol
Rose, "The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently
Public Property," University Chicago Law Review 53 (1986): 711.
Condensing around the work of Elinor Ostrom, a more narrowly defined
literature developed over the course of the 1990s: Elinor Ostrom,
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Another seminal
study was James M. Acheson, The Lobster Gangs of Maine (New Hampshire:
University Press of New England, 1988). A brief intellectual history of
the study of common resource pools and common property regimes can be
found in Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom, "Ideas, Artifacts,
Facilities, and Content: Information as a Common-Pool Resource," Law
&amp; Contemporary Problems 66 (2003): 111.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="227">
	<ocn>227</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		These lines of literature point to an emerging understanding of social
production and exchange as an alternative to markets and firms. Social
production is not limited to public goods, to exotic, out-of-the-way
places like surviving medieval Spanish irrigation regions or the shores
of Maine's lobster fishing grounds, or even to the ubiquitous
phenomenon of the household. As SETI@home and Slashdot suggest, it is
not necessarily limited to stable communities of individuals who
interact often and know each other, or who expect to continue to
interact personally. Social production of goods and services, both
public and private, is ubiquitous, though unnoticed. It sometimes
substitutes for, and sometimes complements, market and state production
everywhere. It is, to be fanciful, the dark matter of our economic
production universe.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="228">
	<ocn>228</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Consider the way in which the following sentences are intuitively
familiar, yet as a practical matter, describe the provisioning of goods
or services that have well-defined NAICS categories (the categories
used by the Economic Census to categorize economic sectors) whose
provisioning through the markets is accounted for in the Economic
Census, but that are commonly provisioned in a form consistent with the
definition of sharing--on a radically distributed model, without price
or command.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="229">
	<ocn>229</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 624410624410 [Babysitting services, child day care]<br />&#160;&#160;"John, could you pick up Bobby today when you take Lauren to soccer?<br />I have a conference call I have to make." &lt;sub&gt;[pg 118]&lt;/sub&gt;<br />&#160;&#160;"Are you doing homework with Zoe today, or shall I?"<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="230">
	<ocn>230</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 484210 [Trucking used household, office, or institutional<br />furniture and equipment]<br />&#160;&#160;"Jane, could you lend a hand moving this table to the dining room?"<br />&#160;&#160;"Here, let me hold the elevator door for you, this looks heavy."<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="231">
	<ocn>231</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 484122 [Trucking, general freight, long-distance,<br />less-than-truckload]<br />&#160;&#160;"Jack, do you mind if I load my box of books in your trunk so<br />you can drop it off at my brother's on your way to Boston?"<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="232">
	<ocn>232</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 514110 [Traffic reporting services]<br />&#160;&#160;"Oh, don't take I-95, it's got horrible construction traffic to<br />exit 39."<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="233">
	<ocn>233</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 711510 [Newspaper columnists, independent (freelance)]<br />&#160;&#160;"I don't know about Kerry, he doesn't move me, I think he should be<br />more aggressive in criticizing Bush on Iraq."<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="234">
	<ocn>234</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 621610 [Home health-care services]<br />&#160;&#160;"Can you please get me my medicine? I'm too wiped to get up."<br />&#160;&#160;"Would you like a cup of tea?"<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="235">
	<ocn>235</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 561591 [Tourist information bureaus]<br />&#160;&#160;"Excuse me, how do I get to Carnegie Hall?"<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="236">
	<ocn>236</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 561321 [Temporary help services]<br />&#160;&#160;"I've got a real crunch on the farm, can you come over on Saturday<br />and lend a hand?"<br />&#160;&#160;"This is crazy, I've got to get this document out tonight, could you<br />lend me a hand with proofing and pulling it all together tonight?"<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="237">
	<ocn>237</ocn>
	<text class="group">	
		NAICS 71 [Arts, entertainment, and recreation]<br />&#160;&#160;"Did you hear the one about the Buddhist monk, the Rabbi, and<br />the Catholic priest...?"<br />&#160;&#160;"Roger, bring out your guitar...."<br />&#160;&#160;"Anybody up for a game of...?"<br />	
	</text>
</object>
<object id="238">
	<ocn>238</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The litany of examples generalizes through a combination of four
dimensions that require an expansion from the current focus of the
literatures related to social production. First, they relate to
production of goods and services, not only of norms or rules. Social
relations provide the very motivations for, and information relating
to, production and exchange, not only the institutional framework for
organizing action, which itself is motivated, informed, and organized
by markets or managerial commands. Second, they relate to all kinds of
goods, not only public goods. In particular, the paradigm cases of free
software development and distributed computing involve labor and
shareable goods--each plainly utilizing private goods as inputs,
<sub>[pg 119]</sub> and, in the case of distributed computing,
producing private goods as outputs. Third, at least some of them relate
not only to relations of production within well-defined communities of
individuals who have repeated interactions, but extend to cover
baseline standards of human decency. These enable strangers to ask one
another for the time or for directions, enable drivers to cede the road
to each other, and enable strangers to collaborate on software
projects, on coauthoring an online encyclopedia, or on running
simulations of how proteins fold. Fourth, they may either complement or
substitute for market and state production systems, depending on the
social construction of mixed provisioning. It is hard to measure the
weight that social and sharing-based production has in the economy. Our
intuitions about capillary systems would suggest that the total volume
of boxes or books moved or lifted, instructions given, news relayed,
and meals prepared by family, friends, neighbors, and minimally decent
strangers would be very high relative to the amount of substitutable
activity carried on through market exchanges or state provisioning.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="239">
	<ocn>239</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Why do we, despite the ubiquity of social production, generally ignore
it as an economic phenomenon, and why might we now reconsider its
importance? A threshold requirement for social sharing to be a modality
of economic production, as opposed to one purely of social
reproduction, is that sharing-based action be effective. Efficacy of
individual action depends on the physical capital requirements for
action to become materially effective, which, in turn, depend on
technology. Effective action may have very low physical capital
requirements, so that every individual has, by natural capacity, "the
physical capital" necessary for action. Social production or sharing
can then be ubiquitous (though in practice, it may not). Vocal cords to
participate in a sing-along or muscles to lift a box are obvious
examples. When the capital requirements are nontrivial, but the capital
good is widely distributed and available, sharing can similarly be
ubiquitous and effective. This is true both when the shared resource or
good is the capacity of the capital good itself--as in the case of
shareable goods--and when some widely distributed human capacity is
made effective through the use of the widely distributed capital
goods--as in the case of human creativity, judgment, experience, and
labor shared in online peer-production processes--in which participants
contribute using the widespread availability of connected computers.
When use of larger-scale physical capital goods is a threshold
requirement of effective action, we should not expect to see widespread
reliance on decentralized sharing as a standard modality of production.
Industrial <sub>[pg 120]</sub> mass-manufacture of automobiles, steel,
or plastic toys, for example, is not the sort of thing that is likely
to be produced on a social-sharing basis, because of the capital
constraints. This is not to say that even for large-scale capital
projects, like irrigation systems and dams, social production systems
cannot step into the breach. We have those core examples in the
common-property regime literature, and we have worker-owned firms as
examples of mixed systems. However, those systems tend to replicate the
characteristics of firm, state, or market production--using various
combinations of quotas, scrip systems, formal policing by
"professional" officers, or management within worker-owned firms. By
comparison, the "common property" arrangements described among lobster
gangs of Maine or fishing groups in Japan, where capital requirements
are much lower, tend to be more social-relations-based systems, with
less formalized or crisp measurement of contributions to, and calls on,
the production system.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="240">
	<ocn>240</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		To say that sharing is technology dependent is not to deny that it is a
ubiquitous human phenomenon. Sharing is so deeply engrained in so many
of our cultures that it would be difficult to argue that with the
"right" (or perhaps "wrong") technological contingencies, it would
simply disappear. My claim, however, is narrower. It is that the
relative economic role of sharing changes with technology. There are
technological conditions that require more or less capital, in larger
or smaller packets, for effective provisioning of goods, services, and
resources the people value. As these conditions change, the relative
scope for social-sharing practices to play a role in production
changes. When goods, services, and resources are widely dispersed,
their owners can choose to engage with each other through social
sharing instead of through markets or a formal, state-based
relationship, because individuals have available to them the resources
necessary to engage in such behavior without recourse to capital
markets or the taxation power of the state. If technological changes
make the resources necessary for effective action rare or expensive,
individuals may wish to interact in social relations, but they can now
only do so ineffectively, or in different fields of endeavor that do
not similarly require high capitalization. Large-packet, expensive
physical capital draws the behavior into one or the other of the
modalities of production that can collect the necessary financial
capital--through markets or taxation. Nothing, however, prevents change
from happening in the opposite direction. Goods, services, and
resources that, in the industrial stage of the information economy
required large-scale, concentrated capital investment to provision, are
now subject to a changing technological environment <sub>[pg 121]</sub>
that can make sharing a better way of achieving the same results than
can states, markets, or their hybrid, regulated industries.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="241">
	<ocn>241</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Because of changes in the technology of the industrial base of the most
advanced economies, social sharing and exchange is becoming a common
modality of production at their very core--in the information, culture,
education, computation, and communications sectors. Free software,
distributed computing, ad hoc mesh wireless networks, and other forms
of peer production offer clear examples of large-scale, measurably
effective sharing practices. The highly distributed capital structure
of contemporary communications and computation systems is largely
responsible for this increased salience of social sharing as a modality
of economic production in that environment. By lowering the capital
costs required for effective individual action, these technologies have
allowed various provisioning problems to be structured in forms
amenable to decentralized production based on social relations, rather
than through markets or hierarchies.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="242">
	<ocn>242</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		My claim is not, of course, that we live in a unique moment of
humanistic sharing. It is, rather, that our own moment in history
suggests a more general observation. The technological state of a
society, in particular the extent to which individual agents can engage
in efficacious production activities with material resources under
their individual control, affects the opportunities for, and hence the
comparative prevalence and salience of, social, market-- both
price-based and managerial--and state production modalities. The
capital cost of effective economic action in the industrial economy
shunted sharing to its economic peripheries--to households in the
advanced economies, and to the global economic peripheries that have
been the subject of the anthropology of gift or the common-property
regime literatures. The emerging restructuring of capital investment in
digital networks--in particular, the phenomenon of user-capitalized
computation and communications capabilities--are at least partly
reversing that effect. Technology does not determine the level of
sharing. It does, however, set threshold constraints on the effective
domain of sharing as a modality of economic production. Within the
domain of the practically feasible, the actual level of sharing
practices will be culturally driven and cross-culturally diverse.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="243">
	<ocn>243</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Most practices of production--social or market-based--are already
embedded in a given technological context. They present no visible
"problem" to solve or policy choice to make. We do not need to be
focused consciously on improving the conditions under which friends
lend a hand to each other to move boxes, make dinner, or take kids to
school. We feel no need to <sub>[pg 122]</sub> reconsider the
appropriateness of market-based firms as the primary modality for the
production of automobiles. However, in moments where a field of action
is undergoing a technological transition that changes the opportunities
for sharing as a modality of production, understanding that sharing is
a modality of production becomes more important, as does understanding
how it functions as such. This is so, as we are seeing today, when
prior technologies have already set up market- or state-based
production systems that have the law and policy-making systems already
designed to fit their requirements. While the prior arrangement may
have been the most efficient, or even may have been absolutely
necessary for the incumbent production system, its extension under new
technological conditions may undermine, rather than improve, the
capacity of a society to produce and provision the goods, resources, or
capacities that are the object of policy analysis. This is, as I
discuss in part III, true of wireless communications regulation, or
"spectrum management," as it is usually called; of the regulation of
information, knowledge, and cultural production, or "intellectual
property," as it is usually now called; and it may be true of policies
for computation and wired communications networks, as distributed
computing and the emerging peer-to-peer architectures suggest.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="244">
	<ocn>244</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		THE INTERFACE OF SOCIAL PRODUCTION AND MARKET-BASED BUSINESSES
	</text>
</object>
<object id="245">
	<ocn>245</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The rise of social production does not entail a decline in market-based
production. Social production first and foremost harnesses impulses,
time, and resources that, in the industrial information economy, would
have been wasted or used purely for consumption. Its immediate effect
is therefore likely to increase overall productivity in the sectors
where it is effective. But that does not mean that its effect on
market-based enterprises is neutral. A newly effective form of social
behavior, coupled with a cultural shift in tastes as well as the
development of new technological and social solution spaces to problems
that were once solved through market-based firms, exercises a
significant force on the shape and conditions of market action.
Understanding the threats that these developments pose to some
incumbents explains much of the political economy of law in this area,
which will occupy chapter 11. At the simplest level, social production
in general and peer production in particular present new sources of
competition to incumbents that produce information goods for which
there are now socially produced substitutes. <sub>[pg 123]</sub> Open
source software development, for example, first received mainstream
media attention in 1998 due to publication of a leaked internal
memorandum from Microsoft, which came to be known as The Halloween
Memo. In it, a Microsoft strategist identified the open source
methodology as the one major potential threat to the company's
dominance over the desktop. As we have seen since, definitively in the
Web server market and gradually in segments of the operating system
market, this prediction proved prescient. Similarly, <i>Wikipedia</i>
now presents a source of competition to online encyclopedias like
Columbia, Grolier, or Encarta, and may well come to be seen as an
adequate substitute for Britannica as well. Most publicly visible,
peer-to-peer file sharing networks have come to compete with the
recording industry as an alternative music distribution system, to the
point where the longterm existence of that industry is in question.
Some scholars like William Fisher, and artists like Jenny Toomey and
participants in the Future of Music Coalition, are already looking for
alternative ways of securing for artists a living from the music they
make.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="246">
	<ocn>246</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The competitive threat from social production, however, is merely a
surface phenomenon. Businesses often face competition or its potential,
and this is a new source, with new economics, which may or may not put
some of the incumbents out of business. But there is nothing new about
entrants with new business models putting slow incumbents out of
business. More basic is the change in opportunity spaces, the
relationships of firms to users, and, indeed, the very nature of the
boundary of the firm that those businesses that are already adapting to
the presence and predicted persistence of social production are
exhibiting. Understanding the opportunities social production presents
for businesses begins to outline how a stable social production system
can coexist and develop a mutually reinforcing relationship with
market-based organizations that adapt to and adopt, instead of fight,
them.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="247">
	<ocn>247</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Consider the example I presented in chapter 2 of IBM's relationship to
the free and open source software development community. IBM, as I
explained there, has shown more than $2 billion a year in
"Linux-related revenues." Prior to IBM's commitment to adapting to what
the firm sees as the inevitability of free and open source software,
the company either developed in house or bought from external vendors
the software it needed as part of its hardware business, on the one
hand, and its software services-- customization, enterprise solutions,
and so forth--on the other hand. In each case, the software development
follows a well-recognized supply chain model. Through either an
employment contract or a supply contract the <sub>[pg 124]</sub>
company secures a legal right to require either an employee or a vendor
to deliver a given output at a given time. In reliance on that notion
of a supply chain that is fixed or determined by a contract, the
company turns around and promises to its clients that it will deliver
the integrated product or service that includes the contracted-for
component. With free or open source software, that relationship
changes. IBM is effectively relying for its inputs on a loosely defined
cloud of people who are engaged in productive social relations. It is
making the judgment that the probability that a sufficiently good
product will emerge out of this cloud is high enough that it can
undertake a contractual obligation to its clients, even though no one
in the cloud is specifically contractually committed to it to produce
the specific inputs the firm needs in the time-frame it needs it. This
apparent shift from a contractually deterministic supply chain to a
probabilistic supply chain is less dramatic, however, than it seems.
Even when contracts are signed with employees or suppliers, they merely
provide a probability that the employee or the supplier will in fact
supply in time and at appropriate quality, given the difficulties of
coordination and implementation. A broad literature in organization
theory has developed around the effort to map the various strategies of
collaboration and control intended to improve the likelihood that the
different components of the production process will deliver what they
are supposed to: from early efforts at vertical integration, to
relational contracting, pragmatic collaboration, or Toyota's fabled
flexible specialization. The presence of a formalized enforceable
contract, for outputs in which the supplier can claim and transfer a
property right, may change the probability of the desired outcome, but
not the fact that in entering its own contract with its clients, the
company is making a prediction about the required availability of
necessary inputs in time. When the company turns instead to the cloud
of social production for its inputs, it is making a similar prediction.
And, as with more engaged forms of relational contracting, pragmatic
collaborations, or other models of iterated relations with
co-producers, the company may engage with the social process in order
to improve the probability that the required inputs will in fact be
produced in time. In the case of companies like IBM or Red Hat, this
means, at least partly, paying employees to participate in the open
source development projects. But managing this relationship is tricky.
The firms must do so without seeking to, or even seeming to seek to,
take over the project; for to take over the project in order to steer
it more "predictably" toward the firm's needs is to kill the goose that
lays the golden eggs. For IBM and more recently Nokia, supporting
<sub>[pg 125]</sub> the social processes on which they rely has also
meant contributing hundreds of patents to the Free Software Foundation,
or openly licensing them to the software development community, so as
to extend the protective umbrella created by these patents against
suits by competitors. As the companies that adopt this strategic
reorientation become more integrated into the peer-production process
itself, the boundary of the firm becomes more porous. Participation in
the discussions and governance of open source development projects
creates new ambiguity as to where, in relation to what is "inside" and
"outside" of the firm boundary, the social process is. In some cases, a
firm may begin to provide utilities or platforms for the users whose
outputs it then uses in its own products. The Open Source Development
Group (OSDG), for example, provides platforms for Slashdot and
SourceForge. In these cases, the notion that there are discrete
"suppliers" and "consumers," and that each of these is clearly
demarcated from the other and outside of the set of stable relations
that form the inside of the firm becomes somewhat attenuated.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="248">
	<ocn>248</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As firms have begun to experience these newly ambiguous relationships
with individuals and social groups, they have come to wrestle with
questions of leadership and coexistence. Businesses like IBM, or eBay,
which uses peer production as a critical component of its business
ecology--the peer reviewed system of creating trustworthiness, without
which person-to-person transactions among individual strangers at a
distance would be impossible-- have to structure their relationship to
the peer-production processes that they co-exist with in a helpful and
non-threatening way. Sometimes, as we saw in the case of IBM's
contributions to the social process, this may mean support without
attempting to assume "leadership" of the project. Sometimes, as when
peer production is integrated more directly into what is otherwise a
commercially created and owned platform--as in the case of eBay--the
relationship is more like that of a peer-production leader than of a
commercial actor. Here, the critical and difficult point for business
managers to accept is that bringing the peer-production community into
the newly semi-porous boundary of the firm--taking those who used to be
customers and turning them into participants in a process of
co-production-- changes the relationship of the firm's managers and its
users. Linden Labs, which runs Second Life, learned this in the context
of the tax revolt described in chapter 3. Users cannot be ordered
around like employees. Nor can they be simply advertised-to and
manipulated, or even passively surveyed, like customers. To do that
would be to lose the creative and generative social <sub>[pg 126]</sub>
character that makes integration of peer production into a commercial
business model so valuable for those businesses that adopt it. Instead,
managers must be able to identify patterns that emerge in the community
and inspire trust that they are correctly judging the patterns that are
valuable from the perspective of the users, not only the enterprise, so
that the users in fact coalesce around and extend these patterns.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="249">
	<ocn>249</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The other quite basic change wrought by the emergence of social
production, from the perspective of businesses, is a change in taste.
Active users require and value new and different things than passive
consumers did. The industrial information economy specialized in
producing finished goods, like movies or music, to be consumed
passively, and well-behaved appliances, like televisions, whose use was
fully specified at the factory door. The emerging businesses of the
networked information economy are focusing on serving the demand of
active users for platforms and tools that are much more loosely
designed, late-binding--that is, optimized only at the moment of use
and not in advance--variable in their uses, and oriented toward
providing users with new, flexible platforms for relationships.
Personal computers, camera phones, audio and video editing software,
and similar utilities are examples of tools whose value increases for
users as they are enabled to explore new ways to be creative and
productively engaged with others. In the network, we are beginning to
see business models emerge to allow people to come together, like
MeetUp, and to share annotations of Web pages they read, like
del.icio.us, or photographs they took, like Flickr. Services like
Blogger and Technorati similarly provide platforms for the new social
and cultural practices of personal journals, or the new modes of
expression described in chapters 7 and 8.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="250">
	<ocn>250</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The overarching point is that social production is reshaping the market
conditions under which businesses operate. To some of the incumbents of
the industrial information economy, the pressure from social production
is experienced as pure threat. It is the clash between these incumbents
and the new practices that was most widely reported in the media in the
first five years of the twenty-first century, and that has driven much
of policy making, legislation, and litigation in this area. But the
much more fundamental effect on the business environment is that social
production is changing the relationship of firms to individuals outside
of them, and through this changing the strategies that firms internally
are exploring. It is creating new sources of inputs, and new tastes and
opportunities for outputs. Consumers are changing into users--more
active and productive than the consumers of the <sub>[pg 127]</sub>
industrial information economy. The change is reshaping the
relationships necessary for business success, requiring closer
integration of users into the process of production, both in inputs and
outputs. It requires different leadership talents and foci. By the time
of this writing, in 2005, these new opportunities and adaptations have
begun to be seized upon as strategic advantages by some of the most
successful companies working around the Internet and information
technology, and increasingly now around information and cultural
production more generally. Eric von Hippel's work has shown how the
model of user innovation has been integrated into the business model of
innovative firms even in sectors far removed from either the network or
from information production--like designing kite-surfing equipment or
mountain bikes. As businesses begin to do this, the platforms and tools
for collaboration improve, the opportunities and salience of social
production increases, and the political economy begins to shift. And as
these firms and social processes coevolve, the dynamic accommodation
they are developing provides us with an image of what the future stable
interface between market-based businesses and the newly salient social
production is likely to look like. <sub>[pg 128]</sub> <sub>[pg
129]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="251">
	<ocn>251</ocn>
	<text class="h2">
		Part Two - The Political Economy of Property and Commons
	</text>
</object>
<object id="252">
	<ocn>252</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Introduction
	</text>
</object>
<object id="253">
	<ocn>253</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		How a society produces its information environment goes to the very
core of freedom. Who gets to say what, to whom? What is the state of
the world? What counts as credible information? How will different
forms of action affect the way the world can become? These questions go
to the foundations of effective human action. They determine what
individuals understand to be the range of options open to them, and the
range of consequences to their actions. They determine what is
understood to be open for debate in a society, and what is considered
impossible as a collective goal or a collective path for action. They
determine whose views count toward collective action, and whose views
are lost and never introduced into the debate of what we should do as
political entities or social communities. Freedom depends on the
information environment that those individuals and societies occupy.
Information underlies the very possibility of individual
self-direction. Information and communication constitute the practices
that enable a community to form a common range of understandings of
what is at stake and what paths are open for the taking. They are
constitutive <sub>[pg 130]</sub> components of both formal and informal
mechanisms for deciding on collective action. Societies that embed the
emerging networked information economy in an institutional ecology that
accommodates nonmarket production, both individual and cooperative,
will improve the freedom of their constituents along all these
dimensions.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="254">
	<ocn>254</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The networked information economy makes individuals better able to do
things for and by themselves, and makes them less susceptible to
manipulation by others than they were in the mass-media culture. In
this sense, the emergence of this new set of technical, economic,
social, and institutional relations can increase the relative role that
each individual is able to play in authoring his or her own life. The
networked information economy also promises to provide a much more
robust platform for public debate. It enables citizens to participate
in public conversation continuously and pervasively, not as passive
recipients of "received wisdom" from professional talking heads, but as
active participants in conversations carried out at many levels of
political and social structure. Individuals can find out more about
what goes on in the world, and share it more effectively with others.
They can check the claims of others and produce their own, and they can
be heard by others, both those who are like-minded and opponents. At a
more foundational level of collective understanding, the shift from an
industrial to a networked information economy increases the extent to
which individuals can become active participants in producing their own
cultural environment. It opens the possibility of a more critical and
reflective culture.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="255">
	<ocn>255</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Unlike the relationship of information production to freedom, the
relationship between the organization of information production and
distributive justice is not intrinsic. However, the importance of
knowledge in contemporary economic production makes a change in the
modality of information production important to justice as well. The
networked information economy can provide opportunities for global
development and for improvements in the justice of distribution of
opportunities and capacities everywhere. Economic opportunity and
welfare today--of an individual, a social group, or a nation--depend on
the state of knowledge and access to opportunities to learn and apply
practical knowledge. Transportation networks, global financial markets,
and institutional trade arrangements have made material resources and
outputs capable of flowing more efficiently from any one corner of the
globe to another than they were at any previous period. Economic
welfare and growth now depend more on knowledge and social <sub>[pg
131]</sub> organization than on natural sources. Knowledge transfer and
social reform, probably more than any other set of changes, can affect
the economic opportunities and material development of different parts
of the global economic system, within economies both advanced and less
developed. The emergence of a substantial nonmarket sector in the
networked information economy offers opportunities for providing better
access to knowledge and information as input from, and better access
for information outputs of, developing and less-developed economies and
poorer geographic and social sectors in the advanced economies. Better
access to knowledge and the emergence of less capital-dependent forms
of productive social organization offer the possibility that the
emergence of the networked information economy will open up
opportunities for improvement in economic justice, on scales both
global and local.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="256">
	<ocn>256</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The basic intuition and popular belief that the Internet will bring
greater freedom and global equity has been around since the early
1990s. It has been the technophile's basic belief, just as the horrors
of cyberporn, cybercrime, or cyberterrorism have been the standard
gut-wrenching fears of the technophobe. The technophilic response is
reminiscent of claims made in the past for electricity, for radio, or
for telegraph, expressing what James Carey described as "the mythos of
the electrical sublime." The question this part of the book explores is
whether this claim, given the experience of the past decade, can be
sustained on careful analysis, or whether it is yet another instance of
a long line of technological utopianism. The fact that earlier utopias
were overly optimistic does not mean that these previous technologies
did not in fact alter the conditions of life--material, social, and
intellectual. They did, but they did so differently in different
societies, and in ways that diverged from the social utopias attached
to them. Different nations absorbed and used these technologies
differently, diverging in social and cultural habits, but also in
institutional strategies for adoption--some more state-centric, others
more market based; some more controlled, others less so. Utopian or at
least best-case conceptions of the emerging condition are valuable if
they help diagnose the socially and politically significant attributes
of the emerging networked information economy correctly and allow us to
form a normative conception of their significance. At a minimum, with
these in hand, we can begin to design our institutional response to the
present technological perturbation in order to improve the conditions
of freedom and justice over the next few decades. <sub>[pg 132]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="257">
	<ocn>257</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The chapters in this part focus on major liberal commitments or
concerns. Chapter 5 addresses the question of individual autonomy.
Chapters 6, 7, and 8 address democratic participation: first in the
political public sphere and then, more broadly, in the construction of
culture. Chapter 9 deals with justice and human development. Chapter 10
considers the effects of the networked information economy on
community. <sub>[pg 133]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="258">
	<ocn>258</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Chapter 5 - Individual Freedom: Autonomy, Information, and Law
	</text>
</object>
<object id="259">
	<ocn>259</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The emergence of the networked information economy has the potential to
increase individual autonomy. First, it increases the range and
diversity of things that individuals can do for and by themselves. It
does this by lifting, for one important domain of life, some of the
central material constraints on what individuals can do that typified
the industrial information economy. The majority of materials, tools,
and platforms necessary for effective action in the information
environment are in the hands of most individuals in advanced economies.
Second, the networked information economy provides nonproprietary
alternative sources of communications capacity and information,
alongside the proprietary platforms of mediated communications. This
decreases the extent to which individuals are subject to being acted
upon by the owners of the facilities on which they depend for
communications. The construction of consumers as passive objects of
manipulation that typified television culture has not disappeared
overnight, but it is losing its dominance in the information
environment. Third, the networked information environment qualitatively
increases the range and diversity of information <sub>[pg 134]</sub>
available to individuals. It does so by enabling sources commercial and
noncommercial, mainstream and fringe, domestic or foreign, to produce
information and communicate with anyone. This diversity radically
changes the universe of options that individuals can consider as open
for them to pursue. It provides them a richer basis to form critical
judgments about how they could live their lives, and, through this
opportunity for critical reflection, why they should value the life
they choose.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="260">
	<ocn>260</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		FREEDOM TO DO MORE FOR ONESELF, BY ONESELF, AND WITH OTHERS
	</text>
</object>
<object id="261">
	<ocn>261</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Rory Cejas was a twenty-six-year-old firefighter/paramedic with the
Miami Fire Department in 2003, when he enlisted the help of his
brother, wife, and a friend to make a Star Wars-like fan film. Using a
simple camcorder and tripod, and widely available film and image
generation and editing software on his computer, he made a
twenty-minute film he called <i>The Jedi Saga</i>. The film is not a
parody. It is not social criticism. It is a straightforward effort to
make a movie in the genre of <i>Star Wars</i>, using the same type of
characters and story lines. In the predigital world, it would have been
impossible, as a practical matter, for Cejas to do this. It would have
been an implausible part of his life plan to cast his wife as a dark
femme fatale, or his brother as a Jedi Knight, so they could battle
shoulder-to-shoulder, light sabers drawn, against a platoon of Imperial
clone soldiers. And it would have been impossible for him to distribute
the film he had made to friends and strangers. The material conditions
of cultural production have changed, so that it has now become part of
his feasible set of options. He needs no help from government to do so.
He needs no media access rules that give him access to fancy film
studios. He needs no cable access rules to allow him to distribute his
fantasy to anyone who wants to watch it. The new set of feasible
options open to him includes not only the option passively to sit in
the theatre or in front of the television and watch the images created
by George Lucas, but also the option of trying his hand at making this
type of film by himself.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="262">
	<ocn>262</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		<i>Jedi Saga</i> will not be a blockbuster. It is not likely to be
watched by many people. Those who do watch it are not likely to enjoy
it in the same way that they enjoyed any of Lucas's films, but that is
not its point. When someone like Cejas makes such a film, he is not
displacing what Lucas does. He is changing what he himself does--from
sitting in front of a screen that <sub>[pg 135]</sub> is painted by
another to painting his own screen. Those who watch it will enjoy it in
the same way that friends and family enjoy speaking to each other or
singing together, rather than watching talking heads or listening to
Talking Heads. Television culture, the epitome of the industrial
information economy, structured the role of consumers as highly
passive. While media scholars like John Fiske noted the continuing role
of viewers in construing and interpreting the messages they receive,
the role of the consumer in this model is well defined. The media
product is a finished good that they consume, not one that they make.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the movie theatre, where the absence of
light, the enveloping sound, and the size of the screen are all
designed to remove the viewer as agent, leaving only a set of
receptors--eyes, ears--through which to receive the finished good that
is the movie. There is nothing wrong with the movies as one mode of
entertainment. The problem emerges, however, when the movie theatre
becomes an apt metaphor for the relationship the majority of people
have with most of the information environment they occupy. That
increasing passivity of television culture came to be a hallmark of
life for most people in the late stages of the industrial information
economy. The couch potato, the eyeball bought and sold by Madison
Avenue, has no part in making the information environment he or she
occupies.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="263">
	<ocn>263</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Perhaps no single entertainment product better symbolizes the shift
that the networked information economy makes possible from television
culture than the massive multiplayer online game. These games are
typified by two central characteristics. First, they offer a persistent
game environment. That is, any action taken or "object" created
anywhere in the game world persists over time, unless and until it is
destroyed by some agent in the game; and it exists to the same extent
for all players. Second, the games are effectively massive
collaboration platforms for thousands, tens of thousands--or in the
case of Lineage, the most popular game in South Korea, more than four
million--users. These platforms therefore provide individual players
with various contexts in which to match their wits and skills with
other human players. The computer gaming environment provides a
persistent relational database of the actions and social interactions
of players. The first games that became mass phenomena, like Ultima
Online or Everquest, started with an already richly instantiated
context. Designers of these games continue to play a large role in
defining the range of actions and relations feasible for players. The
basic medieval themes, the role of magic and weapons, and the types and
ranges of actions that are possible create much of the context, and
<sub>[pg 136]</sub> therefore the types of relationships pursued.
Still, these games leave qualitatively greater room for individual
effort and personal taste in producing the experience, the
relationships, and hence the story line, relative to a television or
movie experience. Second Life, a newer game by Linden Labs, offers us a
glimpse into the next step in this genre of immersive entertainment.
Like other massively multiplayer online games, Second Life is a
persistent collaboration platform for its users. Unlike other games,
however, Second Life offers only tools, with no story line, stock
objects, or any cultural or meaning-oriented context whatsoever. Its
users have created 99 percent of the objects in the game environment.
The medieval village was nothing but blank space when they started. So
was the flying vehicle design shop, the futuristic outpost, or the
university, where some of the users are offering courses in basic
programming skills and in-game design. Linden Labs charges a flat
monthly subscription fee. Its employees focus on building tools that
enable users to do everything from basic story concept down to the
finest details of their own appearance and of objects they use in the
game world. The in-game human relationships are those made by the users
as they interact with each other in this immersive entertainment
experience. The game's relationship to its users is fundamentally
different from that of the movie or television studio. Movies and
television seek to control the entire experience--rendering the viewer
inert, but satisfied. Second Life sees the users as active makers of
the entertainment environment that they occupy, and seeks to provide
them with the tools they need to be so. The two models assume
fundamentally different conceptions of play. Whereas in front of the
television, the consumer is a passive receptacle, limited to selecting
which finished good he or she will consume from a relatively narrow
range of options, in the world of Second Life, the individual is
treated as a fundamentally active, creative human being, capable of
building his or her own fantasies, alone and in affiliation with
others.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="264">
	<ocn>264</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Second Life and <i>Jedi Saga</i> are merely examples, perhaps trivial
ones, within the entertainment domain. They represent a shift in
possibilities open both to human beings in the networked information
economy and to the firms that sell them the tools for becoming active
creators and users of their information environment. They are stark
examples because of the centrality of the couch potato as the image of
human action in television culture. Their characteristics are
representative of the shift in the individual's role that is typical of
the networked information economy in general and of peer production in
particular. Linus Torvalds, the original creator of the Linux kernel
<sub>[pg 137]</sub> development community, was, to use Eric Raymond's
characterization, a designer with an itch to scratch. Peer-production
projects often are composed of people who want to do something in the
world and turn to the network to find a community of peers willing to
work together to make that wish a reality. Michael Hart had been
working in various contexts for more than thirty years when he--at
first gradually, and more recently with increasing speed--harnessed the
contributions of hundreds of volunteers to Project Gutenberg in pursuit
of his goal to create a globally accessible library of public domain
e-texts. Charles Franks was a computer programmer from Las Vegas when
he decided he had a more efficient way to proofread those e-texts, and
built an interface that allowed volunteers to compare scanned images of
original texts with the e-texts available on Project Gutenberg. After
working independently for a couple of years, he joined forces with
Hart. Franks's facility now clears the volunteer work of more than one
thousand proofreaders, who proof between two hundred and three hundred
books a month. Each of the thousands of volunteers who participate in
free software development projects, in <i>Wikipedia</i>, in the Open
Directory Project, or in any of the many other peer-production
projects, is living some version, as a major or minor part of their
lives, of the possibilities captured by the stories of a Linus
Torvalds, a Michael Hart, or <i>The Jedi Saga</i>. Each has decided to
take advantage of some combination of technical, organizational, and
social conditions within which we have come to live, and to become an
active creator in his or her world, rather than merely to accept what
was already there. The belief that it is possible to make something
valuable happen in the world, and the practice of actually acting on
that belief, represent a qualitative improvement in the condition of
individual freedom. They mark the emergence of new practices of
self-directed agency as a lived experience, going beyond mere formal
permissibility and theoretical possibility.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="265">
	<ocn>265</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Our conception of autonomy has not only been forged in the context of
the rise of the democratic, civil rights?respecting state over its
major competitors as a political system. In parallel, we have occupied
the context of the increasing dominance of market-based industrial
economy over its competitors. The culture we have developed over the
past century is suffused with images that speak of the loss of agency
imposed by that industrial economy. No cultural image better captures
the way that mass industrial production reduced workers to cogs and
consumers to receptacles than the one-dimensional curves typical of
welfare economics--those that render human beings as mere production
and demand functions. Their cultural, if <sub>[pg 138]</sub> not
intellectual, roots are in Fredrick Taylor's Theory of Scientific
Management: the idea of abstracting and defining all motions and
actions of employees in the production process so that all the
knowledge was in the system, while the employees were barely more than
its replaceable parts. Taylorism, ironically, was a vast improvement
over the depredations of the first industrial age, with its sweatshops
and child labor. It nonetheless resolved into the kind of mechanical
existence depicted in Charlie Chaplin's tragic-comic portrait, Modern
Times. While the grind of industrial Taylorism seems far from the core
of the advanced economies, shunted as it is now to poorer economies,
the basic sense of alienation and lack of effective agency persists.
Scott Adams's Dilbert comic strip, devoted to the life of a
white-collar employee in a nameless U.S. corporation, thoroughly
alienated from the enterprise, crimped by corporate hierarchy,
resisting in all sorts of ways-- but trapped in a cubicle--powerfully
captures this sense for the industrial information economy in much the
same way that Chaplin's Modern Times did for the industrial economy
itself.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="266">
	<ocn>266</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In the industrial economy and its information adjunct, most people live
most of their lives within hierarchical relations of production, and
within relatively tightly scripted possibilities after work, as
consumers. It did not necessarily have to be this way. Michael Piore
and Charles Sabel's Second Industrial Divide and Roberto Mangabeira
Unger's False Necessity were central to the emergence of a "third way"
literature that developed in the 1980s and 1990s to explore the
possible alternative paths to production processes that did not depend
so completely on the displacement of individual agency by hierarchical
production systems. The emergence of radically decentralized, nonmarket
production provides a new outlet for the attenuation of the constrained
and constraining roles of employees and consumers. It is not limited to
Northern Italian artisan industries or imagined for emerging economies,
but is at the very heart of the most advanced market economies. Peer
production and otherwise decentralized nonmarket production can alter
the producer/consumer relationship with regard to culture,
entertainment, and information. We are seeing the emergence of the user
as a new category of relationship to information production and
exchange. Users are individuals who are sometimes consumers and
sometimes producers. They are substantially more engaged participants,
both in defining the terms of their productive activity and in defining
what they consume and how they consume it. In these two great domains
of life--production and consumption, work and play--the networked
information economy promises to enrich individual <sub>[pg 139]</sub>
autonomy substantively by creating an environment built less around
control and more around facilitating action.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="267">
	<ocn>267</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The emergence of radically decentralized nonmarket production in
general and of peer production in particular as feasible forms of
action opens new classes of behaviors to individuals. Individuals can
now justifiably believe that they can in fact do things that they want
to do, and build things that they want to build in the digitally
networked environment, and that this pursuit of their will need not,
perhaps even cannot, be frustrated by insurmountable cost or an alien
bureaucracy. Whether their actions are in the domain of political
organization (like the organizers of MoveOn.org), or of education and
professional attainment (as with the case of Jim Cornish, who decided
to create a worldwide center of information on the Vikings from his
fifth-grade schoolroom in Gander, Newfoundland), the networked
information environment opens new domains for productive life that
simply were not there before. In doing so, it has provided us with new
ways to imagine our lives as productive human beings. Writing a free
operating system or publishing a free encyclopedia may have seemed
quixotic a mere few years ago, but these are now far from delusional.
Human beings who live in a material and social context that lets them
aspire to such things as possible for them to do, in their own lives,
by themselves and in loose affiliation with others, are human beings
who have a greater realm for their agency. We can live a life more
authored by our own will and imagination than by the material and
social conditions in which we find ourselves. At least we can do so
more effectively than we could until the last decade of the twentieth
century.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="268">
	<ocn>268</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This new practical individual freedom, made feasible by the digital
environment, is at the root of the improvements I describe here for
political participation, for justice and human development, for the
creation of a more critical culture, and for the emergence of the
networked individual as a more fluid member of community. In each of
these domains, the improvements in the degree to which these liberal
commitments are honored and practiced emerge from new behaviors made
possible and effective by the networked information economy. These
behaviors emerge now precisely because individuals have a greater
degree of freedom to act effectively, unconstrained by a need to ask
permission from anyone. It is this freedom that increases the salience
of nonmonetizable motivations as drivers of production. It is this
freedom to seek out whatever information we wish, to write about it,
and to join and leave various projects and associations with others
that underlies <sub>[pg 140]</sub> the new efficiencies we see in the
networked information economy. These behaviors underlie the cooperative
news and commentary production that form the basis of the networked
public sphere, and in turn enable us to look at the world as potential
participants in discourse, rather than as potential viewers only. They
are at the root of making a more transparent and reflective culture.
They make possible the strategies I suggest as feasible avenues to
assure equitable access to opportunities for economic participation and
to improve human development globally.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="269">
	<ocn>269</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Treating these new practical opportunities for action as improvements
in autonomy is not a theoretically unproblematic proposition. For all
its intuitive appeal and centrality, autonomy is a notoriously nebulous
concept. In particular, there are deep divisions within the literature
as to whether it is appropriate to conceive of autonomy in substantive
terms--as Gerald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, and Joel Feinberg most
prominently have, and as I have here--or in formal terms. Formal
conceptions of autonomy are committed to assuming that all people have
the capacity for autonomous choice, and do not go further in attempting
to measure the degree of freedom people actually exercise in the world
in which they are in fact constrained by circumstances, both natural
and human. This commitment is not rooted in some stubborn unwillingness
to recognize the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune that actually
constrain our choices. Rather, it comes from the sense that only by
treating people as having these capacities and abilities can we accord
them adequate respect as free, rational beings, and avoid sliding into
overbearing paternalism. As Robert Post put it, while autonomy may well
be something that needs to be "achieved" as a descriptive matter, the
"structures of social authority" will be designed differently depending
on whether or not individuals are treated as autonomous. "From the
point of view of the designer of the structure, therefore, the presence
or absence of autonomy functions as an axiomatic and foundational
principle."<en>44</en> Autonomy theory that too closely aims to
understand the degree of autonomy people actually exercise under
different institutional arrangements threatens to form the basis of an
overbearing benevolence that would undermine the very possibility of
autonomous action.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="44">
		<number>44</number>
		<note>
			Robert Post, "Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the
Reform of Public Discourse," University of Colorado Law Review 64
(1993): 1109, 1130-1132.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="270">
	<ocn>270</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		While the fear of an overbearing bureaucracy benevolently guiding us
through life toward becoming more autonomous is justifiable, the formal
conception of autonomy pays a high price in its bluntness as a tool to
diagnose the autonomy implications of policy. Given how we are:
situated, <sub>[pg 141]</sub> context-bound, messy individuals, it
would be a high price to pay to lose the ability to understand how law
and policy actually affect whatever capacity we do have to be the
authors of our own life choices in some meaningful sense. We are
individuals who have the capacity to form beliefs and to change them,
to form opinions and plans and defend them--but also to listen to
arguments and revise our beliefs. We experience some decisions as being
more free than others; we mock or lament ourselves when we find
ourselves trapped by the machine or the cubicle, and we do so in terms
of a sense of helplessness, a negation of freedom, not only, or even
primarily, in terms of lack of welfare; and we cherish whatever
conditions those are that we experience as "free" precisely for that
freedom, not for other reasons. Certainly, the concerns with an
overbearing state, whether professing benevolence or not, are real and
immediate. No one who lives with the near past of the totalitarianism
of the twentieth century or with contemporary authoritarianism and
fundamentalism can belittle these. But the great evils that the state
can impose through formal law should not cause us to adopt
methodological commitments that would limit our ability to see the many
ways in which ordinary life in democratic societies can nonetheless be
more or less free, more or less conducive to individual
self-authorship.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="271">
	<ocn>271</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		If we take our question to be one concerned with diagnosing the
condition of freedom of individuals, we must observe the conditions of
life from a first-person, practical perspective--that is, from the
perspective of the person whose autonomy we are considering. If we
accept that all individuals are always constrained by personal
circumstances both physical and social, then the way to think about
autonomy of human agents is to inquire into the relative capacity of
individuals to be the authors of their lives within the constraints of
context. From this perspective, whether the sources of constraint are
private actors or public law is irrelevant. What matters is the extent
to which a particular configuration of material, social, and
institutional conditions allows an individual to be the author of his
or her life, and to what extent these conditions allow others to act
upon the individual as an object of manipulation. As a means of
diagnosing the conditions of individual freedom in a given society and
context, we must seek to observe the extent to which people are, in
fact, able to plan and pursue a life that can reasonably be described
as a product of their own choices. It allows us to compare different
conditions, and determine that a certain condition allows individuals
to do more for themselves, without asking permission from anyone. In
this sense, we can say that the conditions that enabled Cejas <sub>[pg
142]</sub> to make <i>Jedi Saga</i> are conditions that made him more
autonomous than he would have been without the tools that made that
movie possible. It is in this sense that the increased range of actions
we can imagine for ourselves in loose affiliation with others--like
creating a Project Gutenberg--increases our ability to imagine and
pursue life plans that would have been impossible in the recent past.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="272">
	<ocn>272</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		From the perspective of the implications of autonomy for how people act
in the digital environment, and therefore how they are changing the
conditions of freedom and justice along the various dimensions explored
in these chapters, this kind of freedom to act is central. It is a
practical freedom sufficient to sustain the behaviors that underlie the
improvements in these other domains. From an internal perspective of
the theory of autonomy, however, this basic observation that people can
do more by themselves, alone or in loose affiliation with others, is
only part of the contribution of the networked information economy to
autonomy, and a part that will only be considered an improvement by
those who conceive of autonomy as a substantive concept. The
implications of the networked information economy for autonomy are,
however, broader, in ways that make them attractive across many
conceptions of autonomy. To make that point, however, we must focus
more specifically on law as the source of constraint, a concern common
to both substantive and formal conceptions of autonomy. As a means of
analyzing the implications of law to autonomy, the perspective offered
here requires that we broaden our analysis beyond laws that directly
limit autonomy. We must also look to laws that structure the conditions
of action for individuals living within the ambit of their effect. In
particular, where we have an opportunity to structure a set of core
resources necessary for individuals to perceive the state of the world
and the range of possible actions, and to communicate their intentions
to others, we must consider whether the way we regulate these resources
will create systematic limitations on the capacity of individuals to
control their own lives, and in their susceptibility to manipulation
and control by others. Once we recognize that there cannot be a person
who is ideally "free," in the sense of being unconstrained or uncaused
by the decisions of others, we are left to measure the effects of all
sorts of constraints that predictably flow from a particular legal
arrangement, in terms of the effect they have on the relative role that
individuals play in authoring their own lives. <sub>[pg 143]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="273">
	<ocn>273</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		AUTONOMY, PROPERTY, AND COMMONS
	</text>
</object>
<object id="274">
	<ocn>274</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The first legal framework whose role is altered by the emergence of the
networked information economy is the property-like regulatory structure
of patents, copyrights, and similar exclusion mechanisms applicable to
information, knowledge, and culture. Property is usually thought in
liberal theory to enhance, rather than constrain, individual freedom,
in two quite distinct ways. First, it provides security of material
context--that is, it allows one to know with some certainty that some
set of resources, those that belong to her, will be available for her
to use to execute her plans over time. This is the core of Kant's
theory of property, which relies on a notion of positive liberty, the
freedom to do things successfully based on life plans we can lay for
ourselves. Second, property and markets provide greater freedom of
action for the individual owner as compared both, as Marx diagnosed, to
the feudal arrangements that preceded them, and, as he decidedly did
not but Hayek did, to the models of state ownership and regulation that
competed with them throughout most of the twentieth century.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="275">
	<ocn>275</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Markets are indeed institutional spaces that enable a substantial
degree of free choice. "Free," however, does not mean "anything goes."
If John possesses a car and Jane possesses a gun, a market will develop
only if John is prohibited from running Jane over and taking her gun,
and also if Jane is prohibited from shooting at John or threatening to
shoot him if he does not give her his car. A market that is more or
less efficient will develop only if many other things are prohibited
to, or required of, one or both sides--like monopolization or
disclosure. Markets are, in other words, structured relationships
intended to elicit a particular datum--the comparative willingness and
ability of agents to pay for goods or resources. The most basic set of
constraints that structure behavior in order to enable markets are
those we usually call property. Property is a cluster of background
rules that determine what resources each of us has when we come into
relations with others, and, no less important, what "having" or
"lacking" a resource entails in our relations with these others. These
rules impose constraints on who can do what in the domain of actions
that require access to resources that are the subjects of property law.
They are aimed to crystallize asymmetries of power over resources,
which then form the basis for exchanges--I will allow you to do X,
which I am asymmetrically empowered to do (for example, watch
television using this cable system), and you, in turn, will allow me to
do Y, which you are asymmetrically empowered to do (for example,
receive payment <sub>[pg 144]</sub> from your bank account). While a
necessary precondition for markets, property also means that choice in
markets is itself not free of constraints, but is instead constrained
in a particular pattern. It makes some people more powerful with regard
to some things, and must constrain the freedom of action of others in
order to achieve this asymmetry.<en>45</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="45">
		<number>45</number>
		<note>
			This conception of property was first introduced and developed
systematically by Robert Lee Hale in the 1920s and 1930s, and was more
recently integrated with contemporary postmodern critiques of power by
Duncan Kennedy, Sexy Dressing Etc.: Essays on the Power and Politics of
Cultural Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="276">
	<ocn>276</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Commons are an alternative form of institutional space, where human
agents can act free of the particular constraints required for markets,
and where they have some degree of confidence that the resources they
need for their plans will be available to them. Both freedom of action
and security of resource availability are achieved in very different
patterns than they are in property-based markets. As with markets,
commons do not mean that anything goes. Managing resources as commons
does, however, mean that individuals and groups can use those resources
under different types of constraints than those imposed by property
law. These constraints may be social, physical, or regulatory. They may
make individuals more free or less so, in the sense of permitting a
greater or lesser freedom of action to choose among a range of actions
that require access to resources governed by them than would property
rules in the same resources. Whether having a particular type of
resource subject to a commons, rather than a property-based market,
enhances freedom of action and security, or harms them, is a
context-specific question. It depends on how the commons is structured,
and how property rights in the resource would have been structured in
the absence of a commons. The public spaces in New York City, like
Central Park, Union Square, or any sidewalk, afford more people greater
freedom than does a private backyard--certainly to all but its owner.
Given the diversity of options that these public spaces make possible
as compared to the social norms that neighbors enforce against each
other, they probably offer more freedom of action than a backyard
offers even to its owner in many loosely urban and suburban
communities. Swiss pastures or irrigation districts of the type that
Elinor Ostrom described as classic cases of long-standing sustainable
commons offer their participants security of holdings at least as
stable as any property system, but place substantial traditional
constraints on who can use the resources, how they can use them, and
how, if at all, they can transfer their rights and do something
completely different. These types of commons likely afford their
participants less, rather than more, freedom of action than would have
been afforded had they owned the same resource in a market-alienable
property arrangement, although they retain security in much the same
way. Commons, like the air, the sidewalk, the road and highway, the
<sub>[pg 145]</sub> ocean, or the public beach, achieve security on a
very different model. I can rely on the resources so managed in a
probabilistic, rather than deterministic sense. I can plan to meet my
friends for a picnic in the park, not because I own the park and can
direct that it be used for my picnic, but because I know there will be
a park, that it is free for me to use, and that there will be enough
space for us to find a corner to sit in. This is also the sort of
security that allows me to plan to leave my house at some hour, and
plan to be at work at some other hour, relying not on owning the
transportation path, but on the availability to me of the roads and
highways on symmetric terms to its availability to everyone else. If we
look more closely, we will see that property and markets also offer
only a probabilistic security of context, whose parameters are
different--for example, the degree of certainty we have as to whether
the resource we rely on as our property will be stolen or damaged,
whether it will be sufficient for what we need, or if we need more,
whether it will be available for sale and whether we will be able to
afford it.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="277">
	<ocn>277</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Like property and markets, then, commons provide both freedom of action
and security of context. They do so, however, through the imposition of
different constraints than do property and market rules. In particular,
what typifies all these commons in contradistinction to property is
that no actor is empowered by law to act upon another as an object of
his or her will. I can impose conditions on your behavior when you are
walking on my garden path, but I have no authority to impose on you
when you walk down the sidewalk. Whether one or the other of the two
systems, used exclusively, will provide "greater freedom" in some
aggregate sense is not a priori determinable. It will depend on the
technical characteristics of the resource, the precise contours of the
rules of, respectively, the proprietary market and the commons, and the
distribution of wealth in society. Given the diversity of resources and
contexts, and the impossibility of a purely "anything goes" absence of
rules for either system, some mix of the two different institutional
frameworks is likely to provide the greatest diversity of freedom to
act in a material context. This diversity, in turn, enables the
greatest freedom to plan action within material contexts, allowing
individuals to trade off the availabilities of, and constraints on,
different resources to forge a context sufficiently provisioned to
enable them to execute their plans, while being sufficiently
unregulated to permit them to do so. Freedom inheres in diversity of
constraint, not in the optimality of the balance of freedom and
constraint represented by any single institutional arrangement. It is
the diversity of constraint that allows individuals to plan to live out
different <sub>[pg 146]</sub> portions and aspects of their lives in
different institutional contexts, taking advantage of the different
degrees of freedom and security they make possible.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="278">
	<ocn>278</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In the context of information, knowledge, and culture, because of the
nonrivalry of information and its characteristic as input as well as
output of the production process, the commons provides substantially
greater security of context than it does when material resources, like
parks or roadways, are at stake. Moreover, peer production and the
networked information economy provide an increasingly robust source of
new information inputs. This reduces the risk of lacking resources
necessary to create new expressions or find out new things, and renders
more robust the freedom to act without being susceptible to constraint
from someone who holds asymmetrically greater power over the
information resources one needs. As to information, then, we can say
with a high degree of confidence that a more expansive commons improves
individual autonomy, while enclosure of the public domain undermines
it. This is less determinate with communications systems. Because
computers and network connections are rival goods, there is less
certainty that a commons will deliver the required resources. Under
present conditions, a mixture of commons-based and proprietary
communications systems is likely to improve autonomy. If, however,
technological and social conditions change so that, for example,
sharing on the model of peer-to-peer networks, distributed computation,
or wireless mesh networks will be able to offer as dependable a set of
communications and computation resources as the Web offers information
and knowledge resources, the relative attractiveness of
commons-oriented communications policies will increase from the
perspective of autonomy.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="279">
	<ocn>279</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		AUTONOMY AND THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
	</text>
</object>
<object id="280">
	<ocn>280</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The structure of our information environment is constitutive of our
autonomy, not only functionally significant to it. While the capacity
to act free of constraints is most immediately and clearly changed by
the networked information economy, information plays an even more
foundational role in our very capacity to make and pursue life plans
that can properly be called our own. A fundamental requirement of
self-direction is the capacity to perceive the state of the world, to
conceive of available options for action, to connect actions to
consequences, to evaluate alternative outcomes, and to <sub>[pg
147]</sub> decide upon and pursue an action accordingly. Without these,
no action, even if mechanically self-directed in the sense that my
brain consciously directs my body to act, can be understood as
autonomous in any normatively interesting sense. All of the components
of decision making prior to action, and those actions that are
themselves communicative moves or require communication as a
precondition to efficacy, are constituted by the information and
communications environment we, as agents, occupy. Conditions that cause
failures at any of these junctures, which place bottlenecks, failures
of communication, or provide opportunities for manipulation by a
gatekeeper in the information environment, create threats to the
autonomy of individuals in that environment. The shape of the
information environment, and the distribution of power within it to
control information flows to and from individuals, are, as we have
seen, the contingent product of a combination of technology, economic
behavior, social patterns, and institutional structure or law.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="281">
	<ocn>281</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In 1999, Cisco Systems issued a technical white paper, which described
a new router that the company planned to sell to cable broadband
providers. In describing advantages that these new "policy routers"
offer cable providers, the paper explained that if the provider's users
want to subscribe to a service that "pushes" information to their
computer: "You could restrict the incoming push broadcasts as well as
subscribers' outgoing access to the push site to discourage its use. At
the same time, you could promote your own or a partner's services with
full speed features to encourage adoption of your services."<en>46</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="46">
		<number>46</number>
		<note>
			White Paper, "Controlling Your Network, A Must for Cable Operators"
(1999), http:// www.cptech.org/ecom/openaccess/cisco1.html.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="282">
	<ocn>282</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In plain English, the broadband provider could inspect the packets
flowing to and from a customer, and decide which packets would go
through faster and more reliably, and which would slow down or be lost.
Its engineering purpose was to improve quality of service. However, it
could readily be used to make it harder for individual users to receive
information that they want to subscribe to, and easier for them to
receive information from sites preferred by the provider--for example,
the provider's own site, or sites of those who pay the cable operator
for using this function to help "encourage" users to adopt their
services. There are no reports of broadband providers using these
capabilities systematically. But occasional events, such as when
Canada's second largest telecommunications company blocked access for
all its subscribers and those of smaller Internet service providers
that relied on its network to the website of the Telecommunications
Workers Union in 2005, suggest that the concern is far from imaginary.
<sub>[pg 148]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="283">
	<ocn>283</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		It is fairly clear that the new router increases the capacity of cable
operators to treat their subscribers as objects, and to manipulate
their actions in order to make them act as the provider wills, rather
than as they would have had they had perfect information. It is less
obvious whether this is a violation of, or a decrease in, the autonomy
of the users. At one extreme, imagine the home as a black box with no
communications capabilities save one--the cable broadband connection.
Whatever comes through that cable is, for all practical purposes, "the
state of the world," as far as the inhabitants of that home know. In
this extreme situation, the difference between a completely neutral
pipe that carries large amounts of information indiscriminately, and a
pipe finely controlled by the cable operator is a large one, in terms
of the autonomy of the home's inhabitants. If the pipe is
indiscriminate, then the choices of the users determine what they know;
decisions based on that knowledge can be said to be autonomous, at
least to the extent that whether they are or are not autonomous is a
function of the state of the agent's knowledge when forming a decision.
If the pipe is finely controlled and purposefully manipulated by the
cable operator, by contrast, then decisions that individuals make based
on the knowledge they acquire through that pipe are substantially a
function of the choices of the controller of the pipe, not of the
users. At the other extreme, if each agent has dozens of alternative
channels of communication to the home, and knows how the information
flow of each one is managed, then the introduction of policy routers
into one or some of those channels has no real implications for the
agent's autonomy. While it may render one or more channels manipulable
by their provider, the presence of alternative, indiscriminate
channels, on the one hand, and of competition and choice among various
manipulated channels, on the other hand, attenuates the extent to which
the choices of the provider structure the universe of information
within which the individual agent operates. The provider no longer can
be said to shape the individual's choices, even if it tries to shape
the information environment observable through its channel with the
specific intent of manipulating the actions of users who view the world
through its pipe. With sufficient choice among pipes, and sufficient
knowledge about the differences between pipes, the very choice to use
the manipulated pipe can be seen as an autonomous act. The resulting
state of knowledge is self-selected by the user. Even if that state of
knowledge then is partial and future actions constrained by it, the
limited range of options is itself an expression of the user's
autonomy, not a hindrance on it. For example, consider the following:
Odysseus and his men mix different <sub>[pg 149]</sub> forms of freedom
and constraint in the face of the Sirens. Odysseus maintains his
capacity to acquire new information by leaving his ears unplugged, but
binds himself to stay on the ship by having his men tie him to the
mast. His men choose the same course at the same time, but bind
themselves to the ship by having Odysseus stop their ears with wax, so
that they do not get the new information--the siren songs--that might
change their minds and cause them not to stay the course. Both are
autonomous when they pass by the Sirens, though both are free only
because of their current incapacity. Odysseus's incapacity to jump into
the water and swim to the Sirens and his men's incapacity to hear the
siren songs are a result of their autonomously chosen past actions.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="284">
	<ocn>284</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The world we live in is neither black box nor cornucopia of
well-specified communications channels. However, characterizing the
range of possible configurations of the communications environment we
occupy as lying on a spectrum from one to the other provides us with a
framework for describing the degree to which actual conditions of a
communications environment are conducive to individual autonomy. More
important perhaps, it allows us to characterize policy and law that
affects the communications environment as improving or undermining
individual autonomy. Law can affect the range of channels of
communications available to individuals, as well as the rules under
which they are used. How many communications channels and sources of
information can an individual receive? How many are available for him
or her to communicate with others? Who controls these communications
channels? What does control over the communications channels to an
agent entail? What can the controller do, and what can it not? All of
these questions are the subject of various forms of policy and law.
Their implications affect the degree of autonomy possessed by
individuals operating with the institutional-technical-economic
framework thus created.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="285">
	<ocn>285</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		There are two primary types of effects that information law can have on
personal autonomy. The first type is concerned with the relative
capacity of some people systematically to constrain the perceptions or
shape the preferences of others. A law that systematically gives some
people the power to control the options perceived by, or the
preferences of, others, is a law that harms autonomy. Government
regulation of the press and its propaganda that attempts to shape its
subjects' lives is a special case of this more general concern. This
concern is in some measure quantitative, in the sense that a greater
degree of control to which one is subject is a greater offense to
autonomy. More fundamentally, a law that systematically makes one adult
<sub>[pg 150]</sub> susceptible to the control of another offends the
autonomy of the former. Law has created the conditions for one person
to act upon another as an object. This is the nonpragmatic offense to
autonomy committed by abortion regulations upheld in <i>Planned
Parenthood v. Casey</i> --such as requirements that women who seek
abortions listen to lectures designed to dissuade them. These were
justified by the plurality there, not by the claim that they did not
impinge on a woman's autonomy, but that the state's interest in the
potential life of a child trumps the autonomy of the pregnant woman.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="286">
	<ocn>286</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The second type of effect that law can have on autonomy is to reduce
significantly the range and variety of options open to people in
society generally, or to certain classes of people. This is different
from the concern with government intervention generally. It is not
focused on whether the state prohibits these options, but only on
whether the effect of the law is to remove options. It is less
important whether this effect is through prohibition or through a set
of predictable or observable behavioral adaptations among individuals
and organizations that, as a practical matter, remove these options. I
do not mean to argue for the imposition of restraints, in the name of
autonomy, on any lawmaking that results in a removal of any single
option, irrespective of the quantity and variety of options still open.
Much of law does that. Rather, the autonomy concern is implicated by
laws that systematically and significantly reduce the number, and more
important, impoverish the variety, of options open to people in the
society for which the law is passed.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="287">
	<ocn>287</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		"Number and variety" is intended to suggest two dimensions of effect on
the options open to an individual. The first is quantitative. For an
individual to author her own life, she must have a significant set of
options from which to choose; otherwise, it is the choice set--or
whoever, if anyone, made it so--and not the individual, that is
governing her life. This quantitative dimension, however, does not mean
that more choices are always better, from the individual's perspective.
It is sufficient that the individual have some adequate threshold level
of options in order for him or her to exercise substantive
self-authorship, rather than being authored by circumstances. Beyond
that threshold level, additional options may affect one's welfare and
success as an autonomous agent, but they do not so constrain an
individual's choices as to make one not autonomous. Beyond quantitative
adequacy, the options available to an individual must represent
meaningfully different paths, not merely slight variations on a theme.
Qualitatively, autonomy requires the availability of options in whose
adoption or rejection the individual <sub>[pg 151]</sub> can practice
critical reflection and life choices. In order to sustain the autonomy
of a person born and raised in a culture with a set of socially
embedded conventions about what a good life is, one would want a choice
set that included at least some unconventional, non-mainstream, if you
will, critical options. If all the options one has--even if, in a
purely quantitative sense, they are "adequate"--are conventional or
mainstream, then one loses an important dimension of self-creation. The
point is not that to be truly autonomous one necessarily must be
unconventional. Rather, if self-governance for an individual consists
in critical reflection and re-creation by making choices over the
course of his life, then some of the options open must be different
from what he would choose simply by drifting through life, adopting a
life plan for no reason other than that it is accepted by most others.
A person who chooses a conventional life in the presence of the option
to live otherwise makes that conventional life his or her own in a way
that a person who lives a conventional life without knowing about
alternatives does not.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="288">
	<ocn>288</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As long as our autonomy analysis of information law is sensitive to
these two effects on information flow to, from, and among individuals
and organizations in the regulated society, it need not conflict with
the concerns of those who adopt the formal conception of autonomy. It
calls for no therapeutic agenda to educate adults in a wide range of
options. It calls for no one to sit in front of educational programs.
It merely focuses on two core effects that law can have through the way
it structures the relationships among people with regard to the
information environment they occupy. If a law--passed for any reason
that may or may not be related to autonomy concerns--creates systematic
shifts of power among groups in society, so that some have a greater
ability to shape the perceptions of others with regard to available
options, consequences of action, or the value of preferences, then that
law is suspect from an autonomy perspective. It makes the choices of
some people less their own and more subject to manipulation by those to
whom the law gives the power to control perceptions. Furthermore, a law
that systematically and severely limits the range of options known to
individuals is one that imposes a normative price, in terms of
autonomy, for whatever value it is intended to deliver. As long as the
focus of autonomy as an institutional design desideratum is on securing
the best possible information flow to the individual, the designer of
the legal structure need not assume that individuals are not
autonomous, or have failures of autonomy, in order to serve autonomy.
All the designer need assume is that individuals <sub>[pg 152]</sub>
will not act in order to optimize the autonomy of their neighbors. Law
then responds by avoiding institutional designs that facilitate the
capacity of some groups of individuals to act on others in ways that
are systematically at the expense of the ability of those others to
control their own lives, and by implementing policies that predictably
diversify the set of options that all individuals are able to see as
open to them.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="289">
	<ocn>289</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Throughout most of the 1990s and currently, communications and
information policy around the globe was guided by a wish to "let the
private sector lead," interpreted in large measure to mean that various
property and property-like regulatory frameworks should be
strengthened, while various regulatory constraints on property-like
rights should be eased. The drive toward proprietary, market-based
provisioning of communications and information came from
disillusionment with regulatory systems and state-owned communications
networks. It saw the privatization of national postal, telephone, and
telegraph authorities (PTTs) around the world. Even a country with a
long tradition of state-centric communications policy, like France,
privatized much of its telecommunications systems. In the United
States, this model translated into efforts to shift telecommunications
from the regulated monopoly model it followed throughout most of the
twentieth century to a competitive market, and to shift Internet
development from being primarily a government-funded exercise, as it
had been from the late 1960s to the mid 1990s, to being purely private
property, market based. This model was declared in the Clinton
administration's 1993 National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for
Action, which pushed for privatization of Internet deployment and
development. It was the basis of that administration's 1995 White Paper
on Intellectual Property, which mapped the most aggressive agenda ever
put forward by any American administration in favor of perfect
enclosure of the public domain; and it was in those years when the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) first implemented spectrum
auctions aimed at more thorough privatization of wireless
communications in the United States. The general push for stronger
intellectual property rights and more marketcentric telecommunications
systems also became a central tenet of international trade regimes,
pushing similar policies in smaller and developing economies.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="290">
	<ocn>290</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The result of the push toward private provisioning and deregulation has
led to the emergence of a near-monopolistic market structure for wired
physical broadband services. By the end of 2003, more than 96 percent
of homes and small offices in the United States that had any kind of
"high-speed" <sub>[pg 153]</sub> Internet services received their
service from either their incumbent cable operator or their incumbent
local telephone company. If one focuses on the subset of these homes
and offices that get service that provides more substantial room for
autonomous communicative action--that is, those that have upstream
service at high-speed, enabling them to publish and participate in
online production efforts and not simply to receive information at high
speeds--the picture is even more dismal. Less than 2 percent of homes
and small offices receive their broadband connectivity from someone
other than their cable carrier or incumbent telephone carrier. More
than 83 percent of these users get their access from their cable
operator. Moreover, the growth rate in adoption of cable broadband and
local telephone digital subscriber line (DSL) has been high and
positive, whereas the growth rate of the few competing platforms, like
satellite broadband, has been stagnant or shrinking. The proprietary
wired environment is gravitating toward a high-speed connectivity
platform that will be either a lopsided duopoly, or eventually resolve
into a monopoly platform.<en>47</en> These owners are capable, both
technically and legally, of installing the kind of policy routers with
which I opened the discussion of autonomy and information law--routers
that would allow them to speed up some packets and slow down or reject
others in ways intended to shape the universe of information available
to users of their networks.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="47">
		<number>47</number>
		<note>
			Data are all based on FCC Report on High Speed Services, Appendix to
Fourth 706 Report NOI (Washington, DC: Federal Communications
Commission, December 2003).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="291">
	<ocn>291</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The alternative of building some portions of our telecommunications and
information production and exchange systems as commons was not
understood in the mid-1990s, when the policy that resulted in this
market structure for communications was developed. As we saw in chapter
3, however, wireless communications technology has progressed to the
point where it is now possible for users to own equipment that
cooperates in mesh networks to form a "last-mile" infrastructure that
no one other than the users own. Radio networks can now be designed so
that their capital structure more closely approximates the Internet and
personal computer markets, bringing with it a greater scope for
commons-based peer production of telecommunications infrastructure.
Throughout most of the twentieth century, wireless communications
combined high-cost capital goods (radio transmitters and antennae
towers) with cheaper consumer goods (radio receivers), using regulated
proprietary infrastructure, to deliver a finished good of wireless
communications on an industrial model. Now WiFi is marking the
possibility of an inversion of the capital structure of wireless
communication. We see end-user equipment manufacturers like Intel,
Cisco, and others producing <sub>[pg 154]</sub> and selling radio
"transceivers" that are shareable goods. By using ad hoc mesh
networking techniques, some early versions of which are already being
deployed, these transceivers allow their individual owners to cooperate
and coprovision their own wireless communications network, without
depending on any cable carrier or other wired provider as a carrier of
last resort. Almost the entire debate around spectrum policy and the
relative merits of markets and commons in wireless policy is conducted
today in terms of efficiency and innovation. A common question these
days is which of the two approaches will lead to greater growth of
wireless communications capacity and will more efficiently allocate the
capacity we already have. I have contributed my fair share of this form
of analysis, but the question that concerns us here is different. We
must ask what, if any, are the implications of the emergence of a
feasible, sustainable model of a commons-based physical infrastructure
for the first and last mile of the communications environment, in terms
of individual autonomy?
	</text>
</object>
<object id="292">
	<ocn>292</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The choice between proprietary and commons-based wireless data networks
takes on new significance in light of the market structure of the wired
network, and the power it gives owners of broadband networks to control
the information flow into the vast majority of homes. Commons-based
wireless systems become the primary legal form of communications
capacity that does not systematically subject its users to manipulation
by an infrastructure owner.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="293">
	<ocn>293</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Imagine a world with four agents--A, B, C, and D--connected to each
other by a communications network. Each component, or route, of the
network could be owned or unowned. If all components are unowned, that
is, are organized as a commons, each agent has an equal privilege to
use any component of the network to communicate with any other agent.
If all components are owned, the owner of any network component can
deny to any other agent use of that network component to communicate
with anyone else. This translates in the real world into whether or not
there is a "spectrum owner" who "owns" the link between any two users,
or whether the link is simply a consequence of the fact that two users
are communicating with each other in a way that no one has a right to
prevent them from doing.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="294">
	<ocn>294</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In this simple model, if the network is unowned, then for any
communication all that is required is a willing sender and a willing
recipient. No third agent gets a say as to whether any other pair will
communicate with each other. Each agent determines independently of the
others whether to <sub>[pg 155]</sub> participate in a communicative
exchange, and communication occurs whenever all its participants, and
only they, agree to communicate with each other. For example, A can
exchange information with B, as long as B consents. The only person who
has a right to prevent A from receiving information from, or sending
information to, B, is B, in the exercise of B's own autonomous choice
whether to change her information environment. Under these conditions,
neither A nor B is subject to control of her information environment by
others, except where such control results from denying her the capacity
to control the information environment of another. If all network
components are owned, on the other hand, then for any communication
there must be a willing sender, a willing recipient, and a willing
infrastructure owner. In a pure property regime, infrastructure owners
have a say over whether, and the conditions under which, others in
their society will communicate with each other. It is precisely the
power to prevent others from communicating that makes infrastructure
ownership a valuable enterprise: One can charge for granting one's
permission to communicate. For example, imagine that D owns all lines
connecting A to B directly or through D, and C owns all lines
connecting A or B to C. As in the previous scenario, A wishes to
exchange information with B. Now, in addition to B, A must obtain
either C's or D's consent. A now functions under two distinct types of
constraint. The first, as before, is a constraint imposed by B's
autonomy: A cannot change B's information environment (by exchanging
information with her) without B's consent. The second constraint is
that A must persuade an owner of whatever carriage medium connects A to
B to permit A and B to communicate. The communication is not sent to or
from C or D. It does not change C's or D's information environment, and
that is not A's intention. C and D's ability to consent or withhold
consent is not based on the autonomy principle. It is based, instead,
on an instrumental calculus: namely, that creating such property rights
in infrastructure will lead to the right incentives for the deployment
of infrastructure necessary for A and B to communicate in the first
place.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="295">
	<ocn>295</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Now imagine that D owns the entire infrastructure. If A wants to get
information from B or to communicate to C in order to persuade C to act
in a way that is beneficial to A, A needs D's permission. D may grant
or withhold permission, and may do so either for a fee or upon the
imposition of conditions on the communication. Most significantly, D
can choose to prevent anyone from communicating with anyone else, or to
expose each participant to the communications of only some, but not
all, members of <sub>[pg 156]</sub> society. This characteristic of her
ownership gives D the power to shape A's information environment by
selectively exposing A to information in the form of communications
from others. Most commonly, we might see this where D decides that B
will pay more if all infrastructure is devoted to permitting B to
communicate her information to A and C, rather than any of it used to
convey A's statements to C. D might then refuse to carry A's message to
C and permit only B to communicate to A and C. The point is that from
A's perspective, A is dependent upon D's decisions as to what
information can be carried on the infrastructure, among whom, and in
what directions. To the extent of that dependence, A's autonomy is
compromised. We might call the requirement that D can place on A as a
precondition to using the infrastructure an "influence exaction."
	</text>
</object>
<object id="296">
	<ocn>296</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The magnitude of the negative effect on autonomy, or of the influence
exaction, depends primarily on (a) the degree to which it is hard or
easy to get around D's facility, and (b) the degree of transparency of
the exaction. Compare, for example, Cisco's policy router for cable
broadband, which allows the cable operator to speed up and slow down
packets based on its preferences, to Amazon's brief experiment in
1998-1999 with accepting undisclosed payments from publishers in
exchange for recommending their books. If a cable operator programs its
routers to slow down packets of competitors, or of information
providers that do not pay, this practice places a significant exaction
on users. First, the exaction is entirely nontransparent. There are
many reasons that different sites load at different speeds, or even
fail to load altogether. Users, the vast majority of whom are unaware
that the provider could, if it chose, regulate the flow of information
to them, will assume that it is the target site that is failing, not
that their own service provider is manipulating what they can see.
Second, there is no genuine work-around. Cable broadband covers roughly
two-thirds of the home market, in many places without alternative; and
where there is an alternative, there is only one--the incumbent
telephone company. Without one of these noncompetitive infrastructure
owners, the home user has no broadband access to the Internet. In
Amazon's case, the consumer outrage when the practice was revealed
focused on the lack of transparency. Users had little objection to
clearly demarcated advertisement. The resistance was to the
nontransparent manipulation of the recommendation system aimed at
causing the consumers to act in ways consistent with Amazon's goals,
rather than their own. In that case, however, there were alternatives.
There are many different places from which to find book reviews and
recommendations, and <sub>[pg 157]</sub> at the time,
barnesandnoble.com was already available as an online bookseller--and
had not significantly adopted similar practices. The exaction was
therefore less significant. Moreover, once the practice was revealed,
Amazon publicly renounced it and began to place advertisements in a
clearly recognizable separate category. The lesson was not lost on
others. When Google began at roughly the same time as a search engine,
it broke with the then common practice of selling search-result
location. When the company later introduced advertised links, it
designed its interface to separate out clearly the advertisements from
the algorithm-based results, and to give the latter more prominent
placement than the former. This does not necessarily mean that any
search engine that accepts payments for linking is necessarily bad. A
search engine like Overture, which explicitly and publicly returns
results ranked according to which, among the sites retrieved, paid
Overture the most, has its own value for consumers looking for
commercial sites. A transparent, nonmonopolistic option of this sort
increases, rather than decreases, the freedom of users to find the
information they want and act on it. The problem would be with search
engines that mix the two strategies and hide the mix, or with a
monopolistic search engine.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="297">
	<ocn>297</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Because of the importance of the possibility to work around the owned
infrastructure, the degree of competitiveness of any market in such
infrastructure is important. Before considering the limits of even
competitive markets by comparison to commons, however, it is important
to recognize that a concern with autonomy provides a distinct
justification for the policy concern with media concentration. To
understand the effects of concentration, we can think of freedom from
constraint as a dimension of welfare. Just as we have no reason to
think that in a concentrated market, total welfare, let alone consumer
welfare, will be optimal, we also have no reason to think that a
component of welfare--freedom from constraint as a condition to access
one's communicative environment--will be optimal. Moreover, when we use
a "welfare" calculus as a metaphor for the degree of autonomy users
have in the system, we must optimize not total welfare, as we do in
economic analysis, but only what in the metaphorical calculus would
count as "consumer surplus." In the domain of influence and autonomy,
only "consumer surplus" counts as autonomy enhancing. "Producer
surplus," the degree of successful imposition of influence on others as
a condition of service, translates in an autonomy calculus into control
exerted by some people (providers) over others (consumers). It reflects
the successful negation of autonomy. The monopoly case therefore
presents a new normative <sub>[pg 158]</sub> dimension of the
well-known critiques of media concentration. Why, however, is this not
solely an analysis of media concentration? Why does a competitive
market in infrastructure not solve the autonomy deficit of property?
	</text>
</object>
<object id="298">
	<ocn>298</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		If we make standard assumptions of perfectly competitive markets and
apply them to our A-B-D example, one would think that the analysis must
change. D no longer has monopoly power. We would presume that the
owners of infrastructure would be driven by competition to allocate
infrastructure to uses that users value most highly. If one owner
"charges" a high price in terms of conditions imposed on users, say to
forgo receiving certain kinds of speech uncongenial to the owner, then
the users will go to a competitor who does not impose that condition.
This standard market response is far from morally irrelevant if one is
concerned with autonomy. If, in fact, every individual can choose
precisely the package of influence exactions and the cash-to-influence
trade-off under which he or she is willing to communicate, then the
autonomy deficit that I suggest is created by property rights in
communications infrastructure is minimal. If all possible degrees of
freedom from the influence of others are available to autonomous
individuals, then respecting their choices, including their decisions
to subject themselves to the influence of others in exchange for
releasing some funds so they are available for other pursuits, respects
their autonomy.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="299">
	<ocn>299</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Actual competition, however, will not eliminate the autonomy deficit of
privately owned communications infrastructure, for familiar reasons.
The most familiar constraint on the "market will solve it" hunch is
imposed by transaction costs--in particular, information-gathering and
negotiation costs. Influence exactions are less easily homogenized than
prices expressed in currency. They will therefore be more expensive to
eliminate through transactions. Some people value certain kinds of
information lobbed at them positively; others negatively. Some people
are more immune to suggestion, others less. The content and context of
an exaction will have a large effect on its efficacy as a device for
affecting the choices of the person subject to its influence, and these
could change from communication to communication for the same person,
let alone for different individuals. Both users and providers have
imperfect information about the users' susceptibility to manipulated
information flows; they have imperfect information about the value that
each user would place on being free of particular exactions. Obtaining
the information necessary to provide a good fit for each consumer's
preferences regarding the right influence-to-cash ratio for a given
service <sub>[pg 159]</sub> would be prohibitively expensive. Even if
the information were obtained, negotiating the precise
cash-to-influence trade-off would be costly. Negotiation also may fail
because of strategic behavior. The consumer's ideal outcome is to labor
under an exaction that is ineffective. If the consumer can reduce the
price by submitting to constraints on communication that would affect
an average consumer, but will not change her agenda or subvert her
capacity to author her life, she has increased her welfare without
compromising her autonomy. The vendor's ideal outcome, however, is that
the influence exaction be effective--that it succeed in changing the
recipient's preferences or her agenda to fit those of the vendor. The
parties, therefore, will hide their true beliefs about whether a
particular condition to using proprietary infrastructure is of a type
that is likely to be effective at influencing the particular recipient.
Under anything less than a hypothetical and practically unattainable
perfect market in communications infrastructure services, users of a
proprietary infrastructure will face a less-than-perfect menu of
influence exactions that they must accept before they can communicate
using owned infrastructure.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="300">
	<ocn>300</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Adopting a regulatory framework under which all physical means of
communication are based on private property rights in the
infrastructure will therefore create a cost for users, in terms of
autonomy. This cost is the autonomy deficit of exclusive reliance on
proprietary models. If ownership of infrastructure is concentrated, or
if owners can benefit from exerting political, personal, cultural, or
social influence over others who seek access to their infrastructure,
they will impose conditions on use of the infrastructure that will
satisfy their will to exert influence. If agents other than owners
(advertisers, tobacco companies, the U.S. drug czar) value the ability
to influence users of the infrastructure, then the influence-exaction
component of the price of using the infrastructure will be sold to
serve the interests of these third parties. To the extent that these
influence exactions are effective, a pure private-property regime for
infrastructure allows owners to constrain the autonomy of users. The
owners can do this by controlling and manipulating the users'
information environment to shape how they perceive their life choices
in ways that make them more likely to act in a manner that the owners
prefer.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="301">
	<ocn>301</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The traditional progressive or social-democratic response to failures
of property-based markets has been administrative regulation. In the
area of communications, these responses have taken the form of access
regulations-- ranging from common carriage to more limited
right-of-reply, fairness <sub>[pg 160]</sub> doctrine-type regulations.
Perfect access regulation--in particular, common-carrier
obligations--like a perfectly competitive market, could in principle
alleviate the autonomy deficit of property. Like markets, however,
actual regulation that limits the powers that go with property in
infrastructure suffers from a number of limitations. First, the
institutional details of the common-carriage regime can skew incentives
for what types of communications will be available, and with what
degree of freedom. If we learned one thing from the history of American
communications policy in the twentieth century, it is that regulated
entities are adept at shaping their services, pricing, and business
models to take advantage of every weakness in the common-carriage
regulatory system. They are even more adept at influencing the
regulatory process to introduce lucrative weaknesses into the
regulatory system. At present, cable broadband has succeeded in
achieving a status almost entirely exempt from access requirements that
might mitigate its power to control how the platform is used, and
broadband over legacy telephone systems is increasingly winning a
parallel status of unregulated semi-monopoly. Second, the organization
that owns the infrastructure retains the same internal incentives to
control content as it would in the absence of common carriage and will
do so to the extent that it can sneak by any imperfections in either
the carriage regulations or their enforcement. Third, as long as the
network is built to run through a central organizational clearinghouse,
that center remains a potential point at which regulators can reassert
control or delegate to owners the power to prevent unwanted speech by
purposefully limiting the scope of the common-carriage requirements.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="302">
	<ocn>302</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As a practical matter, then, if all wireless systems are based on
property, just like the wired systems are, then wireless will offer
some benefits through the introduction of some, albeit imperfect,
competition. However, it will not offer the autonomy-enhancing effects
that a genuine diversity of constraint can offer. If, on the other
hand, policies currently being experimented with in the United States
do result in the emergence of a robust, sustainable wireless
communications infrastructure, owned and shared by its users and freely
available to all under symmetric technical constraints, it will offer a
genuinely alternative communications platform. It may be as technically
good as the wired platforms for all users and uses, or it may not.
Nevertheless, because of its radically distributed capitalization, and
its reliance on commons rendered sustainable by equipment-embedded
technical protocols, rather than on markets that depend on
institutionally created asymmetric power over communications, a
commons-based wireless system will offer an <sub>[pg 161]</sub>
infrastructure that operates under genuinely different institutional
constraints. Such a system can become an infrastructure of first and
last resort for uses that would not fit the constraints of the
proprietary market, or for users who find the price-to-influence
exaction bundles offered in the market too threatening to their
autonomy.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="303">
	<ocn>303</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The emerging viability of commons-based strategies for the provisioning
of communications, storage, and computation capacity enables us to take
a practical, real world look at the autonomy deficit of a purely
property-based communications system. As we compare property to
commons, we see that property, by design, introduces a series of legal
powers that asymmetrically enable owners of infrastructure to exert
influence over users of their systems. This asymmetry is necessary for
the functioning of markets. Predictably and systematically, however, it
allows one group of actors--owners--to act upon another group of
actors--consumers--as objects of manipulation. No single idiom in
contemporary culture captures this characteristic better than the term
"the market in eyeballs," used to describe the market in advertising
slots. Commons, on the other hand, do not rely on asymmetric
constraints. They eliminate points of asymmetric control over the
resources necessary for effective communication, thereby eliminating
the legal bases of the objectification of others. These are not spaces
of perfect freedom from all constraints. However, the constraints they
impose are substantively different from those generated by either the
property system or by an administrative regulatory system. Their
introduction alongside proprietary networks therefore diversifies the
constraints under which individuals operate. By offering alternative
transactional frameworks for alternative information flows, these
networks substantially and qualitatively increase the freedom of
individuals to perceive the world through their own eyes, and to form
their own perceptions of what options are open to them and how they
might evaluate alternative courses of action.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="304">
	<ocn>304</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		AUTONOMY, MASS MEDIA, AND NONMARKET INFORMATION PRODUCERS
	</text>
</object>
<object id="305">
	<ocn>305</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The autonomy deficit of private communications and information systems
is a result of the formal structure of property as an institutional
device and the role of communications and information systems as basic
requirements in the ability of individuals to formulate purposes and
plan actions to fit their lives. The gains flow directly from the
institutional characteristics of <sub>[pg 162]</sub> commons. The
emergence of the networked information economy makes one other
important contribution to autonomy. It qualitatively diversifies the
information available to individuals. Information, knowledge, and
culture are now produced by sources that respond to a myriad of
motivations, rather than primarily the motivation to sell into mass
markets. Production is organized in any one of a myriad of productive
organizational forms, rather than solely the for-profit business firm.
The supplementation of the profit motive and the business organization
by other motivations and organizational forms--ranging from individual
play to large-scale peer-production projects--provides not only a
discontinuously dramatic increase in the number of available
information sources but, more significantly, an increase in available
information sources that are qualitatively different from others.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="306">
	<ocn>306</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Imagine three storytelling societies: the Reds, the Blues, and the
Greens. Each society follows a set of customs as to how they live and
how they tell stories. Among the Reds and the Blues, everyone is busy
all day, and no one tells stories except in the evening. In the
evening, in both of these societies, everyone gathers in a big tent,
and there is one designated storyteller who sits in front of the
audience and tells stories. It is not that no one is allowed to tell
stories elsewhere. However, in these societies, given the time
constraints people face, if anyone were to sit down in the shade in the
middle of the day and start to tell a story, no one else would stop to
listen. Among the Reds, the storyteller is a hereditary position, and
he or she alone decides which stories to tell. Among the Blues, the
storyteller is elected every night by simple majority vote. Every
member of the community is eligible to offer him- or herself as that
night's storyteller, and every member is eligible to vote. Among the
Greens, people tell stories all day, and everywhere. Everyone tells
stories. People stop and listen if they wish, sometimes in small groups
of two or three, sometimes in very large groups. Stories in each of
these societies play a very important role in understanding and
evaluating the world. They are the way people describe the world as
they know it. They serve as testing grounds to imagine how the world
might be, and as a way to work out what is good and desirable and what
is bad and undesirable. The societies are isolated from each other and
from any other source of information.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="307">
	<ocn>307</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Now consider Ron, Bob, and Gertrude, individual members of the Reds,
Blues, and Greens, respectively. Ron's perception of the options open
to him and his evaluation of these options are largely controlled by
the hereditary storyteller. He can try to contact the storyteller to
persuade him to tell <sub>[pg 163]</sub> different stories, but the
storyteller is the figure who determines what stories are told. To the
extent that these stories describe the universe of options Ron knows
about, the storyteller defines the options Ron has. The storyteller's
perception of the range of options largely will determine the size and
diversity of the range of options open to Ron. This not only limits the
range of known options significantly, but it also prevents Ron from
choosing to become a storyteller himself. Ron is subjected to the
storyteller's control to the extent that, by selecting which stories to
tell and how to tell them, the storyteller can shape Ron's aspirations
and actions. In other words, both the freedom to be an active producer
and the freedom from the control of another are constrained. Bob's
autonomy is constrained not by the storyteller, but by the majority of
voters among the Blues. These voters select the storyteller, and the
way they choose will affect Bob's access to stories profoundly. If the
majority selects only a small group of entertaining, popular, pleasing,
or powerful (in some other dimension, like wealth or political power)
storytellers, then Bob's perception of the range of options will be
only slightly wider than Ron's, if at all. The locus of power to
control Bob's sense of what he can and cannot do has shifted. It is not
the hereditary storyteller, but rather the majority. Bob can
participate in deciding which stories can be told. He can offer himself
as a storyteller every night. He cannot, however, decide to become a
storyteller independently of the choices of a majority of Blues, nor
can he decide for himself what stories he will hear. He is
significantly constrained by the preferences of a simple majority.
Gertrude is in a very different position. First, she can decide to tell
a story whenever she wants to, subject only to whether there is any
other Green who wants to listen. She is free to become an active
producer except as constrained by the autonomy of other individual
Greens. Second, she can select from the stories that any other Green
wishes to tell, because she and all those surrounding her can sit in
the shade and tell a story. No one person, and no majority, determines
for her whether she can or cannot tell a story. No one can unilaterally
control whose stories Gertrude can listen to. And no one can determine
for her the range and diversity of stories that will be available to
her from any other member of the Greens who wishes to tell a story.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="308">
	<ocn>308</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The difference between the Reds, on the one hand, and the Blues or
Greens, on the other hand, is formal. Among the Reds, only the
storyteller may tell the story as a matter of formal right, and
listeners only have a choice of whether to listen to this story or to
no story at all. Among the <sub>[pg 164]</sub> Blues and the Greens
anyone may tell a story as a matter of formal right, and listeners, as
a matter of formal right, may choose from whom they will hear. The
difference between the Reds and the Blues, on the one hand, and the
Greens, on the other hand, is economic. In the former, opportunities
for storytelling are scarce. The social cost is higher, in terms of
stories unavailable for hearing, or of choosing one storyteller over
another. The difference between the Blues and the Greens, then, is not
formal, but practical. The high cost of communication created by the
Blues' custom of listening to stories only in the evening, in a big
tent, together with everyone else, makes it practically necessary to
select "a storyteller" who occupies an evening. Since the stories play
a substantive role in individuals' perceptions of how they might live
their lives, that practical difference alters the capacity of
individual Blues and Greens to perceive a wide and diverse set of
options, as well as to exercise control over their perceptions and
evaluations of options open for living their lives and to exercise the
freedom themselves to be storytellers. The range of stories Bob is
likely to listen to, and the degree to which he can choose unilaterally
whether he will tell or listen, and to which story, are closer, as a
practical matter, to those of Ron than to those of Gertrude. Gertrude
has many more stories and storytelling settings to choose from, and
many more instances where she can offer her own stories to others in
her society. She, and everyone else in her society, can be exposed to a
wider variety of conceptions of how life can and ought to be lived.
This wider diversity of perceptions gives her greater choice and
increases her ability to compose her own life story out of the more
varied materials at her disposal. She can be more self-authored than
either Ron or Bob. This diversity replicates, in large measure, the
range of perceptions of how one might live a life that can be found
among all Greens, precisely because the storytelling customs make every
Green a potential storyteller, a potential source of information and
inspiration about how one might live one's life.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="309">
	<ocn>309</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		All this could sound like a morality tale about how wonderfully the
market maximizes autonomy. The Greens easily could sound like
Greenbacks, rather than like environmentalists staking out public parks
as information commons. However, this is not the case in the industrial
information economy, where media markets have high entry barriers and
large economies of scale. It is costly to start up a television
station, not to speak of a network, a newspaper, a cable company, or a
movie distribution system. It is costly to produce the kind of content
delivered over these systems. Once production costs or the costs of
laying a network are incurred, the additional marginal <sub>[pg
165]</sub> cost of making information available to many users, or of
adding users to the network, is much smaller than the initial cost.
This is what gives information and cultural products and communications
facilities supply-side economies of scale and underlies the industrial
model of producing them. The result is that the industrial information
economy is better stylized by the Reds and Blues rather than by the
Greens. While there is no formal limitation on anyone producing and
disseminating information products, the economic realities limit the
opportunities for storytelling in the mass-mediated environment and
make storytelling opportunities a scarce good. It is very costly to
tell stories in the mass-mediated environment. Therefore, most
storytellers are commercial entities that seek to sell their stories to
the audience. Given the discussion earlier in this chapter, it is
fairly straightforward to see how the Greens represent greater freedom
to choose to become an active producer of one's own information
environment. It is similarly clear that they make it exceedingly
difficult for any single actor to control the information flow to any
other actor. We can now focus on how the story provides a way of
understanding the justification and contours of the third focus of
autonomy-respecting policy: the requirement that government not limit
the quantity and diversity of information available.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="310">
	<ocn>310</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The fact that our mass-mediated environment is mostly commercial makes
it more like the Blues than the Reds. These outlets serve the tastes of
the majority--expressed in some combination of cash payment and
attention to advertising. I do not offer here a full analysis--covered
so well by Baker in Media, Markets, and Democracy--as to why mass-media
markets do not reflect the preferences of their audiences very well.
Presented here is a tweak of an older set of analyses of whether
monopoly or competition is better in mass-media markets to illustrate
the relationship between markets, channels, and diversity of content.
In chapter 6, I describe in greater detail the SteinerBeebe model of
diversity and number of channels. For our purposes here, it is enough
to note that this model shows how advertiser-supported media tend to
program lowest-common-denominator programs, intended to "capture the
eyeballs" of the largest possible number of viewers. These media do not
seek to identify what viewers intensely want to watch, but tend to
clear programs that are tolerable enough to viewers so that they do not
switch off their television. The presence or absence of smaller-segment
oriented television depends on the shape of demand in an audience, the
number of channels available to serve that audience, and the ownership
structure. The relationship between diversity of content and diversity
of structure or ownership <sub>[pg 166]</sub> is not smooth. It occurs
in leaps. Small increases in the number of outlets continue to serve
large clusters of low-intensity preferences--that is, what people find
acceptable. A new channel that is added will more often try to take a
bite out of a large pie represented by some lowest-commondenominator
audience segment than to try to serve a new niche market. Only after a
relatively high threshold number of outlets are reached do
advertiser-supported media have sufficient reason to try to capture
much smaller and higher-intensity preference clusters--what people are
really interested in. The upshot is that if all storytellers in society
are profit maximizing and operate in a market, the number of
storytellers and venues matters tremendously for the diversity of
stories told in a society. It is quite possible to have very active
market competition in how well the same narrow set of stories are told,
as opposed to what stories are told, even though there are many people
who would rather hear different stories altogether, but who are in
clusters too small, too poor, or too uncoordinated to persuade the
storytellers to change their stories rather than their props.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="311">
	<ocn>311</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The networked information economy is departing from the industrial
information economy along two dimensions that suggest a radical
increase in the number of storytellers and the qualitative diversity of
stories told. At the simplest level, the cost of a channel is so low
that some publication capacity is becoming available to practically
every person in society. Ranging from an e-mail account, to a few
megabytes of hosting capacity to host a subscriber's Web site, to space
on a peer-to-peer distribution network available for any kind of file
(like FreeNet or eDonkey), individuals are now increasingly in
possession of the basic means necessary to have an outlet for their
stories. The number of channels is therefore in the process of jumping
from some infinitesimally small fraction of the population--whether
this fraction is three networks or five hundred channels almost does
not matter by comparison--to a number of channels roughly equal to the
number of users. This dramatic increase in the number of channels is
matched by the fact that the low costs of communications and production
enable anyone who wishes to tell a story to do so, whether or not the
story they tell will predictably capture enough of a paying (or
advertising-susceptible) audience to recoup production costs.
Self-expression, religious fervor, hobby, community seeking, political
mobilization, any one of the many and diverse reasons that might drive
us to want to speak to others is now a sufficient reason to enable us
to do so in mediated form to people both distant and close. The basic
filter of marketability has been removed, allowing anything <sub>[pg
167]</sub> that emerges out of the great diversity of human experience,
interest, taste, and expressive motivation to flow to and from everyone
connected to everyone else. Given that all diversity within the
industrial information economy needed to flow through the marketability
filter, the removal of that filter marks a qualitative increase in the
range and diversity of life options, opinions, tastes, and possible
life plans available to users of the networked information economy.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="312">
	<ocn>312</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The image of everyone being equally able to tell stories brings,
perhaps more crisply than any other image, two critical objections to
the attractiveness of the networked information economy: quality and
cacophony. The problem of quality is easily grasped, but is less
directly connected to autonomy. Having many high school plays and
pickup basketball games is not the same as having Hollywood movies or
the National Basketball Association (NBA). The problem of quality
understood in these terms, to the extent that the shift from industrial
to networked information production in fact causes it, does not
represent a threat to autonomy as much as a welfare cost of making the
autonomy-enhancing change. More troubling from the perspective of
autonomy is the problem of information overload, which is related to,
but distinct from, production quality. The cornucopia of stories out of
which each of us can author our own will only enhance autonomy if it
does not resolve into a cacophony of meaningless noise. How, one might
worry, can a system of information production enhance the ability of an
individual to author his or her life, if it is impossible to tell
whether this or that particular story or piece of information is
credible, or whether it is relevant to the individual's particular
experience? Will individuals spend all their time sifting through
mounds of inane stories and fairy tales, instead of evaluating which
life is best for them based on a small and manageable set of credible
and relevant stories? None of the philosophical accounts of substantive
autonomy suggests that there is a linearly increasing relationship
between the number of options open to an individual--or in this case,
perceivable by an individual--and that person's autonomy. Information
overload and decision costs can get in the way of actually living one's
autonomously selected life.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="313">
	<ocn>313</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The quality problem is often raised in public discussions of the
Internet, and takes the form of a question: Where will high-quality
information products, like movies, come from? This form of the
objection, while common, is underspecified normatively and overstated
descriptively. First, it is not at all clear what might be meant by
"quality," insofar as it is a characteristic of <sub>[pg 168]</sub>
information, knowledge, and cultural production that is negatively
affected by the shift from an industrial to a networked information
economy. Chapter 2 explains that information has always been produced
in various modalities, not only in market-oriented organizations and
certainly not in proprietary strategies. Political theory is not
"better" along any interesting dimension when written by someone aiming
to maximize her own or her publisher's commercial profits. Most of the
commercial, proprietary online encyclopedias are not better than
<i>Wikipedia</i> along any clearly observable dimension. Moreover, many
information and cultural goods are produced on a relational model,
rather than a packaged-goods model. The emergence of the digitally
networked environment does not much change their economics or
sustainability. Professional theatre that depends on live performances
is an example, as are musical performances. To the extent, therefore,
that the emergence of substantial scope for nonmarket, distributed
production in a networked information economy places pressure on
"quality," it is quality of a certain kind. The threatened desiderata
are those that are uniquely attractive about industrially produced
mass-market products. The high-production-cost Hollywood movie or
television series are the threatened species. Even that species is not
entirely endangered, and the threat varies for different industries, as
explained in some detail in chapter 11. Some movies, particularly those
currently made for video release only, may well, in fact, recede.
However, truly high-production-value movies will continue to have a
business model through release windows other than home video
distribution. Independently, the pressure on advertising-supported
television from multichannel video-- cable and satellite--on the other
hand, is pushing for more low-cost productions like reality TV. That
internal development in mass media, rather than the networked
information economy, is already pushing industrial producers toward
low-cost, low-quality productions. Moreover, as a large section of
chapter 7 illustrates, peer production and nonmarket production are
producing desirable public information--news and commentary--that offer
qualities central to democratic discourse. Chapter 8 discusses how
these two forms of production provide a more transparent and plastic
cultural environment--both central to the individual's capacity for
defining his or her goals and options. What emerges in the networked
information environment, therefore, will not be a system for
low-quality amateur mimicry of existing commercial products. What will
emerge is space for much more expression, from diverse sources and of
diverse qualities. Freedom--the freedom to speak, but also to be free
from manipulation and to be cognizant <sub>[pg 169]</sub> of many and
diverse options--inheres in this radically greater diversity of
information, knowledge, and culture through which to understand the
world and imagine how one could be.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="314">
	<ocn>314</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Rejecting the notion that there will be an appreciable loss of quality
in some absolute sense does not solve the deeper problem of information
overload, or having too much information to be able to focus or act
upon it. Having too much information with no real way of separating the
wheat from the chaff forms what we might call the Babel objection.
Individuals must have access to some mechanism that sifts through the
universe of information, knowledge, and cultural moves in order to
whittle them down to a manageable and usable scope. The question then
becomes whether the networked information economy, given the human need
for filtration, actually improves the information environment of
individuals relative to the industrial information economy. There are
three elements to the answer: First, as a baseline, it is important to
recognize the power that inheres in the editorial function. The extent
to which information overload inhibits autonomy relative to the
autonomy of an individual exposed to a well-edited information flow
depends on how much the editor who whittles down the information flow
thereby gains power over the life of the user of the editorial
function, and how he or she uses that power. Second, there is the
question of whether users can select and change their editor freely, or
whether the editorial function is bundled with other communicative
functions and sold by service providers among which users have little
choice. Finally, there is the understanding that filtration and
accreditation are themselves information goods, like any other, and
that they too can be produced on a commonsbased, nonmarket model, and
therefore without incurring the autonomy deficit that a reintroduction
of property to solve the Babel objection would impose.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="315">
	<ocn>315</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Relevance filtration and accreditation are integral parts of all
communications. A communication must be relevant for a given sender to
send to a given recipient and relevant for the recipient to receive.
Accreditation further filters relevant information for credibility.
Decisions of filtration for purposes of relevance and accreditation are
made with reference to the values of the person filtering the
information, not the values of the person receiving the information.
For instance, the editor of a cable network newsmagazine decides
whether a given story is relevant to send out. The owner of the cable
system decides whether it is, in the aggregate, relevant to its viewers
to see that newsmagazine on its system. Only if both so decide, does
each viewer <sub>[pg 170]</sub> get the residual choice of whether to
view the story. Of the three decisions that must coincide to mark the
newsmagazine as relevant to the viewer, only one is under the control
of the individual recipient. And, while the editor's choice might be
perceived in some sense as inherent to the production of the
information, the cable operator's choice is purely a function of its
role as proprietor of the infrastructure. The point to focus on is that
the recipient's judgment is dependent on the cable operator's decision
as to whether to release the program. The primary benefit of
proprietary systems as mechanisms of avoiding the problem of
information overload or the Babel objection is precisely the fact that
the individual cannot exercise his own judgment as to all the programs
that the cable operator--or other commercial intermediary between
someone who makes a statement and someone who might receive it--has
decided not to release.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="316">
	<ocn>316</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As with any flow, control over a necessary passageway or bottleneck in
the course of a communication gives the person controlling that point
the power to direct the entire flow downstream from it. This power
enables the provision of a valuable filtration service, which promises
the recipient that he or she will not spend hours gazing at irrelevant
materials. However, filtration only enhances the autonomy of users if
the editor's notions of relevance and quality resemble those of the
sender and the recipient. Imagine a recipient who really wants to be
educated about African politics, but also likes sports. Under perfect
conditions, he would seek out information on African politics most of
the time, with occasional searches for information on sports. The
editor, however, makes her money by selling advertising. For her, the
relevant information is whatever will keep the viewer's attention most
closely on the screen while maintaining a pleasantly acquisitive mood.
Given a choice between transmitting information about famine in Sudan,
which she worries will make viewers feel charitable rather than
acquisitive, and transmitting a football game that has no similar
adverse effects, she will prefer the latter. The general point should
be obvious. For purposes of enhancing the autonomy of the user, the
filtering and accreditation function suffers from an agency problem. To
the extent that the values of the editor diverge from those of the
user, an editor who selects relevant information based on her values
and plans for the users does not facilitate user autonomy, but rather
imposes her own preferences regarding what should be relevant to users
given her decisions about their life choices. A parallel effect occurs
with accreditation. An editor might choose to treat as credible a
person whose views or manner of presentation draw audiences, rather
than necessary <sub>[pg 171]</sub> the wisest or best-informed of
commentators. The wide range in quality of talking heads on television
should suffice as an example. The Babel objection may give us good
reason to pause before we celebrate the networked information economy,
but it does not provide us with reasons to celebrate the autonomy
effects of the industrial information economy.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="317">
	<ocn>317</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The second component of the response to the Babel objection has to do
with the organization of filtration and accreditation in the industrial
information economy. The cable operator owns its cable system by virtue
of capital investment and (perhaps) expertise in laying cables, hooking
up homes, and selling video services. However, it is control over the
pipeline into the home that gives it the editorial role in the
materials that reach the home. Given the concentrated economics of
cable systems, this editorial power is not easy to replace and is not
subject to open competition. The same phenomenon occurs with other
media that are concentrated and where the information production and
distribution functions are integrated with relevance filtration and
accreditation: from one-newspaper towns to broadcasters or cable
broadband service providers. An edited environment that frees the
individual to think about and choose from a small selection of
information inputs becomes less attractive when the editor takes on
that role as a result of the ownership of carriage media, a large
printing press, or copyrights in existing content, rather than as a
result of selection by the user as a preferred editor or filter. The
existence of an editor means that there is less information for an
individual to process. It does not mean that the values according to
which the information was pared down are those that the user would have
chosen absent the tied relationship between editing and either
proprietary content production or carriage.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="318">
	<ocn>318</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Finally, and most important, just like any other form of information,
knowledge, and culture, relevance and accreditation can be, and are,
produced in a distributed fashion. Instead of relying on the judgment
of a record label and a DJ of a commercial radio station for what music
is worth listening to, users can compare notes as to what they like,
and give music to friends whom they think will like it. This is the
virtue of music file-sharing systems as distribution systems. Moreover,
some of the most interesting experiments in peer production described
in chapter 3 are focused on filtration. From the discussions of
<i>Wikipedia</i> to the moderation and metamoderation scheme of
Slashdot, and from the sixty thousand volunteers that make up the Open
Directory Project to the PageRank system used by Google, the means of
filtering data are being produced within the networked information
<sub>[pg 172]</sub> economy using peer production and the coordinate
patterns of nonproprietary production more generally. The presence of
these filters provides the most important answer to the Babel
objection. The presence of filters that do not depend on proprietary
control, and that do not bundle proprietary content production and
carriage services with filtering, offers a genuinely distinct approach
toward presenting autonomous individuals with a choice among different
filters that reflect genuinely diverse motivations and organizational
forms of the providers.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="319">
	<ocn>319</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Beyond the specific efforts at commons-based accreditation and
relevance filtration, we are beginning to observe empirically that
patterns of use of the Internet and the World Wide Web exhibit a
significant degree of order. In chapter 7, I describe in detail and
apply the literature that has explored network topology to the Babel
objection in the context of democracy and the emerging networked public
sphere, but its basic lesson applies here as well. In brief, the
structure of linking on the Internet suggests that, even without
quasi-formal collaborative filtering, the coordinate behavior of many
autonomous individuals settles on an order that permits us to make
sense of the tremendous flow of information that results from universal
practical ability to speak and create. We observe the Web developing an
order--with high-visibility nodes, and clusters of thickly connected
"regions" where groups of Web sites accredit each other by mutual
referencing. The high-visibility Web sites provide points of
condensation for informing individual choices, every bit as much as
they form points of condensation for public discourse. The enormous
diversity of topical and context-dependent clustering, whose content is
nonetheless available for anyone to reach from anywhere, provides both
a way of slicing through the information and rendering it
comprehensible, and a way of searching for new sources of information
beyond those that one interacts with as a matter of course. The Babel
objection is partly solved, then, by the fact that people tend to
congregate around common choices. We do this not as a result of
purposeful manipulation, but rather because in choosing whether or not
to read something, we probably give some weight to whether or not other
people have chosen to read it. Unless one assumes that individual human
beings are entirely dissimilar from each other, then the fact that many
others have chosen to read something is a reasonable signal that it may
be worthwhile for me to read. This phenomenon is both universal--as we
see with the fact that Google successfully provides useful ranking by
aggregating all judgments around the Web as to the relevance of any
given Web site--and recursively <sub>[pg 173]</sub> present within
interest-based and context-based clusters or groups. The clustering and
actual degree distribution in the Web suggests, however, that people do
not simply follow the herd--they will not read whatever a majority
reads. Rather, they will make additional rough judgments about which
other people's preferences are most likely to predict their own, or
which topics to look in. From these very simple rules--other people
share something with me in their tastes, and some sets of other people
share more with me than others--we see the Babel objection solved on a
distributed model, without anyone exerting formal legal control or
practical economic power.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="320">
	<ocn>320</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Why, however, is this not a simple reintroduction of heteronomy, of
dependence on the judgment of others that subjects individuals to their
control? The answer is that, unlike with proprietary filters imposed at
bottlenecks or gateways, attention-distribution patterns emerge from
many small-scale, independent choices where free choice exists. They
are not easily manipulable by anyone. Significantly, the millions of
Web sites that do not have high traffic do not "go out of business." As
Clay Shirky puts it, while my thoughts about the weekend are unlikely
to be interesting to three random users, they may well be interesting,
and a basis for conversation, for three of my close friends. The fact
that power law distributions of attention to Web sites result from
random distributions of interests, not from formal or practical
bottlenecks that cannot be worked around, means that whenever an
individual chooses to search based on some mechanism other than the
simplest, thinnest belief that individuals are all equally similar and
dissimilar, a different type of site will emerge as highly visible.
Topical sites cluster, unsurprisingly, around topical preference
groups; one site does not account for all readers irrespective of their
interests. We, as individuals, also go through an iterative process of
assigning a likely relevance to the judgments of others. Through this
process, we limit the information overload that would threaten to swamp
our capacity to know; we diversify the sources of information to which
we expose ourselves; and we avoid a stifling dependence on an editor
whose judgments we cannot circumvent. We might spend some of our time
using the most general, "human interest has some overlap" algorithm
represented by Google for some things, but use political common
interest, geographic or local interest, hobbyist, subject matter, or
the like, to slice the universe of potential others with whose
judgments we will choose to affiliate for any given search. By a
combination of random searching and purposeful deployment of social
mapping--who is likely to be interested in what is relevant to me
now--we can solve the Babel objection while subjecting <sub>[pg
174]</sub> ourselves neither to the legal and market power of
proprietors of communications infrastructure or media products nor to
the simple judgments of the undifferentiated herd. These observations
have the virtue of being not only based on rigorous mathematical and
empirical studies, as we see in chapter 7, but also being more
consistent with intuitive experience of anyone who has used the
Internet for any decent length of time. We do not degenerate into
mindless meandering through a cacophonous din. We find things we want
quite well. We stumble across things others suggest to us. When we do
go on an unplanned walk, within a very short number of steps we either
find something interesting or go back to looking in ways that are more
self-conscious and ordered.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="321">
	<ocn>321</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The core response to the Babel objection is, then, to accept that
filtration is crucial to an autonomous individual. Nonetheless, that
acknowledgement does not suggest that the filtration and accreditation
systems that the industrial information economy has in fact produced,
tied to proprietary control over content production and exchange, are
the best means to protect autonomous individuals from the threat of
paralysis due to information overload. Property in infrastructure and
content affords control that can be used to provide filtration. To that
extent, property provides the power for some people to shape the
will-formation processes of others. The adoption of distributed
information-production systems--both structured as cooperative
peer-production enterprises and unstructured coordinate results of
individual behavior, like the clustering of preferences around Web
sites--does not mean that filtration and accreditation lose their
importance. It only means that autonomy is better served when these
communicative functions, like others, are available from a
nonproprietary, open model of production alongside the proprietary
mechanisms of filtration. Being autonomous in this context does not
mean that we have to make all the information, read it all, and sift
through it all by ourselves. It means that the combination of
institutional and practical constraints on who can produce information,
who can access it, and who can determine what is worth reading leaves
each individual with a substantial role in determining what he shall
read, and whose judgment he shall adhere to in sifting through the
information environment, for what purposes, and under what
circumstances. As always in the case of autonomy for context-bound
individuals, the question is the relative role that individuals play,
not some absolute, context-independent role that could be defined as
being the condition of freedom.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="322">
	<ocn>322</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The increasing feasibility of nonmarket, nonproprietary production of
information, <sub>[pg 175]</sub> knowledge, and culture, and of
communications and computation capacity holds the promise of increasing
the degree of autonomy for individuals in the networked information
economy. By removing basic capital and organizational constraints on
individual action and effective cooperation, the networked information
economy allows individuals to do more for and by themselves, and to
form associations with others whose help they require in pursuing their
plans. We are beginning to see a shift from the highly constrained
roles of employee and consumer in the industrial economy, to more
flexible, self-authored roles of user and peer participant in
cooperative ventures, at least for some part of life. By providing as
commons a set of core resources necessary for perceiving the state of
the world, constructing one's own perceptions of it and one's own
contributions to the information environment we all occupy, the
networked information economy diversifies the set of constraints under
which individuals can view the world and attenuates the extent to which
users are subject to manipulation and control by the owners of core
communications and information systems they rely on. By making it
possible for many more diversely motivated and organized individuals
and groups to communicate with each other, the emerging model of
information production provides individuals with radically different
sources and types of stories, out of which we can work to author our
own lives. Information, knowledge, and culture can now be produced not
only by many more people than could do so in the industrial information
economy, but also by individuals and in subjects and styles that could
not pass the filter of marketability in the mass-media environment. The
result is a proliferation of strands of stories and of means of
scanning the universe of potential stories about how the world is and
how it might become, leaving individuals with much greater leeway to
choose, and therefore a much greater role in weaving their own life
tapestry. <sub>[pg 176]</sub>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="323">
	<ocn>323</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Chapter 6 - Political Freedom Part 1: The Trouble with Mass Media
	</text>
</object>
<object id="324">
	<ocn>324</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Modern democracies and mass media have coevolved throughout the
twentieth century. The first modern national republics--the early
American Republic, the French Republic from the Revolution to the
Terror, the Dutch Republic, and the early British parliamentary
monarchy--preexisted mass media. They provide us with some model of the
shape of the public sphere in a republic without mass media, what
Jurgen Habermas called the bourgeois public sphere. However, the
expansion of democracies in complex modern societies has largely been a
phenomenon of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries--in
particular, the post-World War II years. During this period, the
platform of the public sphere was dominated by mass media--print,
radio, and television. In authoritarian regimes, these means of mass
communication were controlled by the state. In democracies, they
operated either under state ownership, with varying degrees of
independence from the sitting government, or under private ownership
financially dependent on advertising markets. We do not, therefore,
have examples of complex modern democracies whose public sphere is
built on a platform that is widely <sub>[pg 177]</sub> distributed and
independent of both government control and market demands. The Internet
as a technology, and the networked information economy as an
organizational and social model of information and cultural production,
promise the emergence of a substantial alternative platform for the
public sphere. The networked public sphere, as it is currently
developing, suggests that it will have no obvious points of control or
exertion of influence--either by fiat or by purchase. It seems to
invert the mass-media model in that it is driven heavily by what dense
clusters of users find intensely interesting and engaging, rather than
by what large swathes of them find mildly interesting on average. And
it promises to offer a platform for engaged citizens to cooperate and
provide observations and opinions, and to serve as a watchdog over
society on a peer-production model.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="325">
	<ocn>325</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The claim that the Internet democratizes is hardly new. "Everyone a
pamphleteer" has been an iconic claim about the Net since the early
1990s. It is a claim that has been subjected to significant critique.
What I offer, therefore, in this chapter and the next is not a
restatement of the basic case, but a detailed analysis of how the
Internet and the emerging networked information economy provide us with
distinct improvements in the structure of the public sphere over the
mass media. I will also explain and discuss the solutions that have
emerged within the networked environment itself to some of the
persistent concerns raised about democracy and the Internet: the
problems of information overload, fragmentation of discourse, and the
erosion of the watchdog function of the media.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="326">
	<ocn>326</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		For purposes of considering political freedom, I adopt a very limited
definition of "public sphere." The term is used in reference to the set
of practices that members of a society use to communicate about matters
they understand to be of public concern and that potentially require
collective action or recognition. Moreover, not even all communications
about matters of potential public concern can be said to be part of the
public sphere. Communications within self-contained relationships whose
boundaries are defined independently of the political processes for
collective action are "private," if those communications remain purely
internal. Dinner-table conversations, grumblings at a bridge club, or
private letters have that characteristic, if they occur in a context
where they are not later transmitted across the associational
boundaries to others who are not part of the family or the bridge club.
Whether these conversations are, or are not, part of the public sphere
depends on the actual communications practices in a given society. The
same practices can become an initial step in generating public opinion
<sub>[pg 178]</sub> in the public sphere if they are nodes in a network
of communications that do cross associational boundaries. A society
with a repressive regime that controls the society-wide communications
facilities nonetheless may have an active public sphere if social
networks and individual mobility are sufficient to allow opinions
expressed within discrete associational settings to spread throughout a
substantial portion of the society and to take on political meaning for
those who discuss them. The public sphere is, then, a sociologically
descriptive category. It is a term for signifying how, if at all,
people in a given society speak to each other in their relationship as
constituents about what their condition is and what they ought or ought
not to do as a political unit. This is a purposefully narrow conception
of the public sphere. It is intended to focus on the effects of the
networked environment on what has traditionally been understood to be
political participation in a republic. I postpone consideration of a
broader conception of the public sphere, and of the political nature of
who gets to decide meaning and how cultural interpretations of the
conditions of life and the alternatives open to a society are created
and negotiated in a society until chapter 8.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="327">
	<ocn>327</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The practices that define the public sphere are structured by an
interaction of culture, organization, institutions, economics, and
technical communications infrastructure. The technical platforms of ink
and rag paper, handpresses, and the idea of a postal service were
equally present in the early American Republic, Britain, and France of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. However, the degree
of literacy, the social practices of newspaper reading, the relative
social egalitarianism as opposed to elitism, the practices of political
suppression or subsidy, and the extent of the postal system led to a
more egalitarian, open public sphere, shaped as a network of
smaller-scale local clusters in the United States, as opposed to the
more tightly regulated and elitist national and metropolis-centered
public spheres of France and Britain. The technical platforms of
mass-circulation print and radio were equally available in the Soviet
Union and Nazi Germany, in Britain, and in the United States in the
1930s. Again, however, the vastly different political and legal
structures of the former created an authoritarian public sphere, while
the latter two, both liberal public spheres, differed significantly in
the business organization and economic model of production, the legal
framework and the cultural practices of reading and listening-- leading
to the then still elitist overlay on the public sphere in Britain
relative to a more populist public sphere in the United States.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="328">
	<ocn>328</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Mass media structured the public sphere of the twentieth century in all
<sub>[pg 179]</sub> advanced modern societies. They combined a
particular technical architecture, a particular economic cost
structure, a limited range of organizational forms, two or three
primary institutional models, and a set of cultural practices typified
by consumption of finished media goods. The structure of the mass media
resulted in a relatively controlled public sphere--although the degree
of control was vastly different depending on whether the institutional
model was liberal or authoritarian--with influence over the debate in
the public sphere heavily tilted toward those who controlled the means
of mass communications. The technical architecture was a one-way,
hub-and-spoke structure, with unidirectional links to its ends, running
from the center to the periphery. A very small number of production
facilities produced large amounts of identical copies of statements or
communications, which could then be efficiently sent in identical form
to very large numbers of recipients. There was no return loop to send
observations or opinions back from the edges to the core of the
architecture in the same channel and with similar salience to the
communications process, and no means within the massmedia architecture
for communication among the end points about the content of the
exchanges. Communications among the individuals at the ends were
shunted to other media--personal communications or telephones-- which
allowed communications among the ends. However, these edge media were
either local or one-to-one. Their social reach, and hence potential
political efficacy, was many orders of magnitude smaller than that of
the mass media.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="329">
	<ocn>329</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The economic structure was typified by high-cost hubs and cheap,
ubiquitous, reception-only systems at the ends. This led to a limited
range of organizational models available for production: those that
could collect sufficient funds to set up a hub. These included:
state-owned hubs in most countries; advertising-supported commercial
hubs in some of the liberal states, most distinctly in the United
States; and, particularly for radio and television, the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) model or hybrid models like the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in Canada. The role of hybrid and purely
commercial, advertising-supported media increased substantially around
the globe outside the United States in the last two to three decades of
the twentieth century. Over the course of the century, there also
emerged civil-society or philanthropy-supported hubs, like the party
presses in Europe, nonprofit publications like Consumer Reports (later,
in the United States), and, more i
