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		The Autonomous Contract
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		Ralph Amissah
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		Copyright (C) 1997 Ralph Amissah
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		1997-10-07
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<object id="1">
	<ocn>1</ocn>
	<text class="h1">
		The Autonomous Contract,<br />Ralph Amissah
	</text>
</object>
<object id="2">
	<ocn>2</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Introduction
	</text>
</object>
<object id="3">
	<ocn>3</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Globalization is unstoppable. Even though it may be only in its early
stages, it is already intrinsic to the world economy. We have to live
with it, recognize its advantages and learn to manage it.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="4">
	<ocn>4</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		That imperative applies to governments, who would be unwise to attempt
to stem the tide for reasons of political expediency. It also goes for
companies of all sizes, who must now compete on global markets and
learn to adjust their strategies accordingly, seizing the opportunities
that globalization offers."<en>1</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="1">
		<number>1</number>
		<note>
			Maria Livanos Cattaui, <i>The global economy - an opportunity to be
seized</i> in <i>Business World</i> the Electronic magazine of the
International Chamber of Commerce (Paris, July 1997) at &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.iccwbo.org/html/globalec.htm">http://www.iccwbo.org/html/globalec.htm</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="5">
	<ocn>5</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		At a national level, jurists as lawmakers over time magically create
their own reality, that is, the world in which they work, and are
certified as oracles.<en>2</en> They are proud of their traditions in
which they are specialists and about which they tend to be protective.
Commercial men as contracting parties, with greater ease,
instantaneously, through an expression of their will, (by the wave of
their pens, if not by mere incantations), can choose to make any one of
several alternative parallel worlds their reality. The various dogmas
and beliefs held as sacrosanct by individual sovereign legal parishes,
are not necessarily so hallowed by the business community.<en>3</en>
The fact that the desired "law" may generally be selected by an
expression of the will of the parties, means that they can elect out of
any of these fettered systems. This paper is unsentimental about legal
systems, its loyalty is placed elsewhere, in the contract, and its
ability to find solutions to the needs of the parties it serves. An
eminent economist has suggested that the study not of contract law, but
rather of contract practice is the key to understanding the economic
properties of contracting that are necessary to work out sensible
uniform laws for commercial purposes. <en>4</en> That view is shared in
this paper. However, even within the frame of law and
economics<en>5</en> (to which only passing reference is made in this
paper) it is necessary to be mindful of the limitations of the
desirability of absolute freedom of contract.<en>6</en> And to
recognise the fact that the international business community as a whole
may benefit from a degree of control over such freedom.<en>7</en> This
possibility is recognised by more modern schools of law and economics
such as the Institutional Approach.<en>8</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="2">
		<number>2</number>
		<note>
			Tangential support for the simile from Hans Petter Graver, <i>"Den
juristskapte virkelightet og juristrollen"</i> in Jussens Venner (1986)
p. 314-324.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="3">
		<number>3</number>
		<note>
			Ren* David suggests the primary constraints on development are
"conservatism, routine, prejudice and inertia" cited by the <i>UNCITRAL
Secretariat, The Future Role of UNCITRAL - Promoting Wider Awareness
and Acceptance of Uniform Texts</i>, in <i>Uniform Commercial Law in
the Twenty First Century - Proceedings of the Congress of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law</i> (New York, 1992) pp.
249-259 on p. 252, referred to later as <i>25<sup>th</sup> UNCITRAL
Congress</i>. See also Ren? David comments in <i>International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law</i>, Vol. II, Chap. 5 (T?bingen, 1971)
pp. 24 and 25.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="4">
		<number>4</number>
		<note>
			Ronald Coase, <i>Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research</i>
(1972) in <i>The Firm, The Market and the Law</i> (Chicago, London,
1988) pp. 57-74, comp. Coase's Nobel Lecture <i>The Institutional
Structure of Production</i>, AER 82 (1992) pp. 713-719. For a web site
inspired by the work of Coase see <i>The Center for Research on
Contracts and the Structure of Enterprise</i> at the Katz School,
University of Pittsburgh &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://crcse.business.pitt.edu/">http://crcse.business.pitt.edu/</link>&gt;
also the <i>New Institutional Economics Network</i> &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://sykuta.business.pitt.edu/nie/">http://sykuta.business.pitt.edu/nie/</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="5">
		<number>5</number>
		<note>
			For an introduction to the different approaches to law and economics
see Nicholas Mercuro and Steven Medema, <i>Schools of Thought in Law
and Economics: A Kuhnian Competition</i> in Robin Malloy and
Christopher Brown (ed.) <i>Law and Economics New and Critical
Perspectives</i> (New York, 1995) pp. 65-123.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="6">
		<number>6</number>
		<note>
			See Michael Trebilcock, <i>The Limits of Freedom of Contract</i>
(Harvard, 1993).
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="7">
		<number>7</number>
		<note>
			Discussed very briefly in section 2.3.4 of this paper in relation to
protective principles.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="8">
		<number>8</number>
		<note>
			Which is pursued by Wisconsin University and Michigan State
University. Mercuro and Medema (1995) pp. 65-123 at pp. 95-108.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="6">
	<ocn>6</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		<u>The autonomous contract</u> is a concept based on three ideas, that
provide lenses or perspectives with which to view the needs of the
international business community as they affect and are affected by a
polymorphous set of interrelated issues and areas of law: *(i)*
<i><u>The "autonomous contract" as an expression of the will that
"governs" international commerce</u></i>. The extensive freedom of
contract granted the parties in international commerce, ensures that
the contract determines the nature of the business relationship and
most matters that govern it, including the "law" selected (subject to
the mandatory provisions of applicable governing law), and the means of
dispute resolution. In a real sense the contract is at the top of the
hierarchy of legal instruments that govern the parties' relationship.
This ensures that the selection of "law" and means of dispute
resolution is a market driven affair that will be based on their
ability to provide the parties with the greatest utility.
<i>Contractual autonomy as a function of freedom of choice in the
global economy</i>. *(ii)* <i><u>The "autonomous contract" as seeking
the means to transcend national boundaries</u></i>. Economic activities
have become increasingly global and the "law" that provides for them
should do so in the same dimension. The quest is to find or achieve a
uniform legal order that is preferably delocalised, transcends state
boundaries, provides cross-border transparency and world-wide
effect.<en>9</en> This idea is discussed in relative terms, the more
transnational and transcending of state law, the greater the uniformity
achieved, or the more a-national the "law", the more autonomous the
resulting contract.<en>10</en> Areas of particular interest are:
uniform substantive rules of law; uniform interpretation of such rules
and the contract; and the global enforcement of decisions. <i>Seeking a
foundation for contract that is more autonomous of individual states,
with the aim of attaining greater efficiency, consistency and
predictability in international business transactions, and thereby,
insofar as it is possible, to transcend the relevance of borders</i>.
*(iii)* <i><u>"The autonomous contract" designed to be virtually
self-contained and "self-governing"</u></i>. The contract could become
a transnational medium of regulation onto itself, being designed as a
one-stop reference, containing all the material required for its
functioning, governance and the resolution of any disputes arising
under it. Technology of the electronic age together with developments
in international law would allow a contract to be incorporated and
presented together with all material that was to have a binding
authoritative effect in relation to it, (excepting the mandatory
law).<en>11</en> <i>The self-contained autonomous contract as one
possible solution to the efficient achievement of global
predictability</i>.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="9">
		<number>9</number>
		<note>
			The concept of the autonomous contract becomes attractive when looked
upon as the collective embodiment of elusive characteristics that the
business community seeks upon which to base their transactions, and
includes: harmonisation, transnationalism and a-nationalism for our
purposes insofar as it furthers the other two objectives.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="10">
		<number>10</number>
		<note>
			An a-national uniform transnational legal framework for contracts
that is independent of, but supported by governments.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="11">
		<number>11</number>
		<note>
			Though parties can "legislate" an extensively autonomous contact,
they cannot "legislate" a contract that is entirely. Areas such as
"validity" are defined differently within different jurisdictions, and
international contracts can be subject to laws on currency control;
export and import control; hazardous substances; antitrust |
competition rules; anti-boycott; anti-bribery, etc. Similarly,
mandatory rules on such matters as good faith, fair dealing,
unconscionability, fraud, duress, extortion, interest, penalty clauses,
etc. In specialised fields, such as consumer contracts, contracts with
local sales representatives and specialised industries, such as banking
and insurance, one also encounters national laws that parties cannot
modify by their contract "legislation". See also article by Jan Ramberg
<i>Autonomy of Contract and Non-Mandatory Law</i> in <i>Scandinavian
Studies in Law (1993)</i> pp. 141-149.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="7">
	<ocn>7</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The practicability and utility of an "autonomous contract" (e.g. one
founded in a-national law) is dependent on its ability to serve the
international business community as a suitable risk management tool and
to result in improved transaction costs. Much discussion is focused on
the underlying supportive structure for contracting and how a
predictable and efficient means of contracting world-wide might be
achieved. There is a relationship (sometimes co-operative at others
competitive) between the efforts of interested international
organisations and governments to provide services to the international
business community on which they can choose to base the substance of
their contracts and the resolution of disputes arising thereunder.
Given the scope of the subject matter of the paper, only a broad
outline and general framework can be developed. The discussion though
occasioned by and made more current by the nature and growth of
electronic-commerce, is a broader one that holds true for all contracts
that have a transnational aspiration and as such is of general
relevance to international commerce. The wider frame is adopted under
the assumption that solutions should, as far as possible, be technology
neutral. <u>Section 2</u> of this paper looks at the various means
available to the international business community to cope with the
multitude of states in which they conduct business. It suggests a
correlation between the search to establish reliable internationally
uniform business methods and having greater autonomy from state law.
The autonomous contract in the second sense, seeking the means through
greater autonomy of individual state to reflect a desired borderless
transnational environment in contracting. <u>Section 3</u> looks at the
difficulty in achieving predictability in international disputes, which
is a requisite for commercial contract planning, and which all legal
orders, especially those that are autonomous of state, must
satisfactorily cope with if they are to succeed. <u>Section 4</u> looks
at possible alternative ways of improving uniform predictability and/or
efficiency of dispute resolution, that would result in greater autonomy
or lead to the further transcending of state law.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="8">
	<ocn>8</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		In search of autonomy
	</text>
</object>
<object id="9">
	<ocn>9</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The business community engaged in international commerce has had to
find ways to cope with the high degree of legal uncertainty brought
about by the crossing of numerous legal systems whose rules are
expressed in a multitude of languages. This section discusses the
business community's search to reduce the relevance of borders and
attain greater uniformity for their contracts by various means,
including basing their contracts on a-national law and reliance upon
international commercial arbitration for the resolution of disputes
that may arise. Methods employed to reduce the legal relevance of
borders include <i>inter alia</i>:
	</text>
</object>
<object id="10">
	<ocn>10</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		*(1.a)* Use of standard contracts. *(1.b)* Reference to uniform
principles and rules. *(2.a)* Choice of law of an acceptable
state.<en>12</en> *(2.b)* Choice of law of a state applying relevant
uniform laws. *(3)* Choice of jurisdiction of an acceptable
state.<en>13</en> *(4.a)* Recourse to international commercial
arbitration (ICA) which gives the greatest effect to the will of the
parties, and provides the most extensive regime for enforcement.
*(4.b)* In ICA excluding the application of the law of any sovereign
state - through application instead of <i>lex mercatoria</i> or the
like - the rules and principles of the international business
community. *(5)* Use of self-regulating constitutional contracts that
attempt to internalise all aspects of the parties' relationship, e.g. a
long-term joint venture which may or may not be designed so as to
result in the establishment of a separate company (Shell is such a
company). *(6)* Large multinationals which are vertically and
horizontally integrated in their production and provision of services
across national boundaries are able to arrange their transactions
internally within the corporate structure to a large extent avoiding
the need for contract law and practice. Examples 5 and 6 are related to
corporate structuring and are outside the scope of this paper.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="12">
		<number>12</number>
		<note>
			Criteria for selection might include: familiarity; application of
uniform law; neutrality; reputation; language; and convenience.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="13">
		<number>13</number>
		<note>
			Similar criteria to choice of law in addition to which include:
appropriate enforcement treaties; location.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="11">
	<ocn>11</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The contract is a formal tool used by the business community to
structure their relations, for which business practice and economics
suggest the importance of a predictable and efficient underlying legal
framework. However, any kind of legal regulation is a potential source
of unpredictability. The transnational nature of international business
provides an additional dimension to the difficulty of securing these
requirements. The predictability of business relations is dependent on
such aspects of "law" as the predictable interpretation and
construction of legal texts, and the global recognition and enforcement
of the dispute resolution judgement or award. Predictability and
efficiency, which may be roughly equated to risk management and
transaction costs, can be enhanced through the establishment and use of
uniform "laws", rules and principles, insofar as they result in reduced
complexity. The "autonomous contract" in the three senses of the
concept, if directed towards these ends by the business community
suggests various means to secure these collective ends for the
international business community. A more autonomous basis for contract
is already given support by relevant international institutions (and
states competing for international business) that take into account the
needs of the business community, signalled by their choices (of law and
legal framework).
	</text>
</object>
<object id="12">
	<ocn>12</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		The diminishing role of States
	</text>
</object>
<object id="13">
	<ocn>13</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The paradigmatic concept of law and model of legal order is still that
of the sovereign state.<en>14</en> National systems, for all their
shortcomings, tend to consistently apply themselves in a way that
becomes publicly known to the relevant legal community, and allows for
the predictable structuring of relations. However, members of the
international business community are not well served by having to
employ lawyers in each country in which they operate to provide
specialist advice on similar areas of law<en>15</en> and are in a
constant search for ways around these obstacles. There are a number of
ways in which this paradigm is being broken down in the sphere of
international commerce. *(a)* At one level the concept of law of the
nation state is eroded through action of the states themselves, by
their implementation of uniform laws (both at an international and
regional<en>16</en> level). This may be the result of a state wishing
to modernise its law, or recognising the limitations of a fractal
international legal order and wishing to facilitate trade by
simplifying their relationship to it. This is typically done by working
through international institutions to achieve substantive uniformity in
a particular area of commercial law. The result of this being that
individual state law becomes less important. *(b)* With modern
substantive uniform law, states are increasingly called upon to bind
themselves and their judiciaries,<en>17</en> to take account of the
"international character" of the uniform law and "the need to promote
uniformity in international trade." In spite of the formidable problems
associated with achieving uniformity of application of such uniform
laws in the judiciaries of different states acting independently of
each other, this obligation further internationalises state law. *(c)*
Perhaps more importantly, the contract regulatory order represented by
the laws and judiciary of the sovereign state, has a significant
competitor that is arguably much better suited to the needs of
transnational commerce, in the package represented by the many forms of
international commercial arbitration. *(d)* States, in accepting the
preference of the international business community, play a further
essential role in giving support to the framework required by
arbitration for it to function effectively. This in fact is carried
further as competition exists on a state level as regards providing
national arbitration laws that attract arbitration.<en>18</en> *(e)*
Most important and underlying this advance has been the granting of
full effect to the "will" of contracting businessmen. Through freedom
of contract in commercial affairs, states have provided parties with
comprehensive autonomy in the organisation of their commercial affairs,
with the exception of course of mandatory law. If state law does not
suit the demands of the business community, they are free to go
elsewhere. Businessmen can and do limit the role of the state in their
contractual relations, seeking more globally applicable and uniform
solutions. Responding to this demand there are various international
institutions and service providers that are sensitive to the needs of
the business community that increasingly target the contracting parties
as representing an alternative means of unifying "law" and providing
global solutions.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="14">
		<number>14</number>
		<note>
			E.g. Thomas Wilhelmsson, <i>Legal Integration as Disintegration of
National Law</i> in <i>Legal Polycentricity - Consequences of Pluralism
in Law</i> (1995) pp. 127-147 on p. 128.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="15">
		<number>15</number>
		<note>
			E.g. arbitration law (different arbitration statutes), electronic
commerce (the validity of electronic documents and signatures), or sale
of goods law (England and Japan do not apply the /CISG/) for example.
Also see comment by Charles Brower, in the arbitration panel, <i>Are
International Institutions Doing Their Job? - The American Society of
International Law, Proceedings of the 90th Annual Meeting, 1996</i>
(Washington D.C. 1996) p. 249.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="16">
		<number>16</number>
		<note>
			E.g. <i>EC, NAFTA, ASEAN</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="17">
		<number>17</number>
		<note>
			<i>De jure</i> if not <i>de facto</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="18">
		<number>18</number>
		<note>
			See William W. Park, <i>International forum selection</i> (Hague,
1995).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="14">
	<ocn>14</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		Solutions available within national law
	</text>
</object>
<object id="15">
	<ocn>15</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Uniform law and its limitations
	</text>
</object>
<object id="16">
	<ocn>16</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Selection of the law of a municipal system that applies uniform law is
one important step that can be taken within the framework of municipal
law, to make the contract more autonomous. The comments in this paper
will be restricted to uniform substantive law, in the form of
conventions that are to be adopted and applied in a uniform manner at
an international level.<en>19</en> Several other approaches to reaching
various levels of uniformity exist.<en>20</en> The model law approach
for example, is based on ensuring that the law of different countries
has a similar recognisable structure and essential elements. This is
used where structural similarity is desirable but uniformity is not
essential,<en>21</en> or where the achievement of greater uniformity
would prove difficult or impossible due to differences in national law.
Also discussed in this paper are "restatements" of law, in the form of
general principles of contract, with the /UNIDROIT/<en>22</en>
<i>Principles of International Commercial Contracts</i>,<en>23</en>
providing a prominent current example.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="19">
		<number>19</number>
		<note>
			Regional efforts with their frequently associated political
objectives are outside the scope of this paper.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="20">
		<number>20</number>
		<note>
			See Roy Goode, <i>Reflections on the Harmonisation of Commercial
Law</i> in <i>Uniform Law Review</i> (1991) pp. 54-74 for a more
detailed account of the alternatives and related considerations.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="21">
		<number>21</number>
		<note>
			E.g. <i>UN Model Law on Arbitration 1985</i>; <i>UN Model Law on
Electronic Commerce 1996</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="22">
		<number>22</number>
		<note>
			The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law,
Rome, &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.agora.stm.it/unidroit/">http://www.agora.stm.it/unidroit/</link>&gt;
also &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/unidroit.html">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/unidroit.html</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="23">
		<number>23</number>
		<note>
			<i>UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts</i>
(Rome, 1994) text of the principles and accompanying commentary;
Joachim Bonell, <i>An international restatement of contract law: the
UNIDROIT principles of international commercial contracts</i> (New
York, 1994); and <i>UNIDROIT Principles for International Commercial
Contracts: A New Lex Mercatoria? </i> (Paris, 1995) referred to later
as <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex Mercatoria? </i> The black letter
text of the /Principles/ are on the Internet at &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.agora.stm.it/unidroit/english/principles/pr-main.htms">http://www.agora.stm.it/unidroit/english/principles/pr-main.htms</link>&gt;
and &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/doc/Unidroit.Contract.Principles.1994.html">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/doc/Unidroit.Contract.Principles.1994.html</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="17">
	<ocn>17</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		<b><i>The CISG as a uniform law example</i></b>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="18">
	<ocn>18</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Can clear, predictable international law be made from the divergent
rules of dozens of domestic legal systems, rules built with local
idioms for which there are no equivalent terms in other languages? The
answer, unhappily, is no, but that is not the end of the
story."<en>24</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="24">
		<number>24</number>
		<note>
			John Honnold, <i>Goals of unification - Process and value of the
unification of commercial law: lessons for the future drawn from the
past 25 years</i> (1992) in <i>25<sup>th</sup> UNCITRAL Congress</i>,
pp. 11-13, p. 11.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="19">
	<ocn>19</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The greatest success for the unification of substantive commercial
contract law to date, has been by /UNCITRAL/<en>25</en> with respect to
the sale of goods in the <i>Vienna Sales Convention</i>
(/CISG/).<en>26</en> The /CISG/ is currently applied by 49 states,
commonly estimated as representing two-thirds of world trade. It may be
regarded as the culmination of an effort in the field dating back to
Ernst Rabel,<en>27</en> followed by the Cornell Project,<en>28</en> and
connected most directly to the /UNIDROIT/ inspired <i>Hague Uniform Law
for International Sales</i> (/ULIS/ and /ULF/),<en>29</en> the main
preparatory works behind the /CISG/.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="25">
		<number>25</number>
		<note>
			United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Vienna,
&lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.un.or.at/uncitral">http://www.un.or.at/uncitral</link>&gt;
also &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/UNCITRAL.html">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/UNCITRAL.html</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="26">
		<number>26</number>
		<note>
			<i>United Nations Convention On Contracts For The International Sale
Of Goods (1980) </i>. See Honnold, <i>Uniform Law for International
Sales, Under the 1980 United Nations Convention</i> (Philadelphia,
1991); Fritz Enderlein and Dietrich Maskow, <i>International Sales Law,
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Good... </i> (1992); Kritzer, <i>International Contract Manual: Guide
to Practical Applications of the United Nations Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods</i> (1994) and the <i>CISG W3
Database</i>, Institute of International Commercial Law, Pace
University School of Law &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/">http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/</link>&gt;
For some general links &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/nav/sales.html">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/nav/sales.html</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="27">
		<number>27</number>
		<note>
			Ernst Rabel, <i>Das Recht des Warenkaufs</i> Bd. I&amp;II (Berlin,
1936-1958). Two volume study on sales law.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="28">
		<number>28</number>
		<note>
			Cornell Project on Formation of Contracts 1968 - Rudolf Schlesinger,
<i>Formation of Contracts. A study of the Common Core of Legal
Systems</i>, 2 vols. (New York, London 1968). Arthur von Mehren (ed.),
<i>International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law</i> - Konrad Zweigert,
including an agenda for national reports and general reports on various
issues of contract law from formation to termination. For more
information see Erich Schanze, New Directions in Business Research in
B?rge Dahl &amp; Ruth Nielsen (ed.), <i>New Directions in Contract
Research</i> (Copenhagen, 1996) pp. 61-90, on p. 61.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="29">
		<number>29</number>
		<note>
			<i>Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods</i> (/ULF/) and the <i>Convention relating to a Uniform
Law on the International Sale of Goods</i> (/ULIS/) The Hague, 1964.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="20">
	<ocn>20</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The development and formulation of uniform law takes time, as does the
formulation of uniform principles and rules. Unlike principles and
rules, however, for uniform law to come into force and to be
applicable, must go through a long process of ratification and
accession by states. Even where states implement uniform law they
frequently do so with various reservations. Success that is by no means
guaranteed, takes time. For every uniform law that is a success, there
are more failures. Even where there is widespread use of a uniform law,
there are usually as many or more states that are exceptions. The
implementation of uniform law is however, not the end of the story, as
immediately the question of its uniform application arises. This is a
fascinating subject that is of central importance to the development of
autonomy, both within and outside the framework of municipal law.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="21">
	<ocn>21</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"If /UNCITRAL/ manages to become accepted by the whole world in any
domain of the law or a set of rules, one believes that the problem of
conflict of laws will be eliminated in this field, but this is not the
case. A counter-effect enters into the picture. The uniform law from
the very moment of its coming into operation starts to differ from
itself. Every judge in every country is a sovereign interpreter of the
text, and the judge became a judge by learning the system of law of his
own country. And as the speediest bird is unable to fly out of itself,
so the judge is unable to forget the law that he has learned. Divergent
or contradictory interpretations, like the application of rules of
different countries, lead to different judgements"<en>30</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="30">
		<number>30</number>
		<note>
			L?szl? R?czei, <i>Process and value of the unification of commercial
law: lessons for the future drawn from the past 25 years</i> (1992) in
<i>25<sup>th</sup> UNCITRAL Congress</i>, pp. 5-7, on p. 6.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="22">
	<ocn>22</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		We shall return to the problem of uniform application, under that
heading and in the context of seeking means of achieving solutions to
the problem of predictability. It should be noted here however, that
uniform law does not cover all aspects of the relationship between the
contracting parties, its scope is defined.<en>31</en> Relevant
applicable and mandatory law continues to apply.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="31">
		<number>31</number>
		<note>
			The /CISG/ for example covers international sale of goods of
specific types not those listed under Article 2; and specifically
excludes its application to factors that vitiate a contract and the
passing of property under Article 4.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="23">
	<ocn>23</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Uniform rules and principles
	</text>
</object>
<object id="24">
	<ocn>24</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		We include in this category, rules and principles governing specific
aspects of the contractual relationship,<en>32</en> negotiated standard
contracts, and more comprehensive negotiated standard contracts drafted
by international institutions<en>33</en> and trade
associations.<en>34</en> In addition to these are the newcomers in the
form of comprehensive general contract principles or contract law
restatements that create an entire "legal" environment for contracting.
Standard rules and principles provide greater flexibility, and have one
clear advantage over uniform law in their being contractually agreed,
and thereby, as Honnold put it "becoming effective by a stroke of the
pen of the parties concerned."<en>35</en> Amongst the reasons for their
use is the reduction of transaction cost, "parties often want to close
contracts quickly, rather than hold up the transaction to negotiate
solutions for every problem that might arise",<en>36</en> and they
satisfy risk management criteria, being known, tried and tested, their
effects being predictable. Furthermore uniform principles allow
unification on matters that at the present stage of national and
regional pluralism could not be achieved at a treaty level. Take for
example the question of "interest", which is a politically sensitive
issue in some countries, though largely accepted by the business
community, and compare the provision in the /CISG/ with that of the
<i>UNIDROIT International Contract Principles</i>.<en>37</en> Such
provisions are extremely useful to have for clarity, and may be varied
if unacceptable to the contracting parties. With the
/UNIDROIT/<en>38</en> and /EU/<en>39</en> <i>Contract Principles</i>,
we have contract law restatements, that is, standard rules and
principles of contract that create what is close to an autonomous
(complete and independent) environment for contracting. This is so even
where selected in conjunction with the law of a sovereign state whether
in the context of litigation or arbitration. We shall return to
consider the <i>UNIDROIT International Contract Principles</i> in the
context of international commercial arbitration where it is possible to
achieve even greater autonomy.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="32">
		<number>32</number>
		<note>
			E.g. <i>ICC's Incoterms</i> (1990) and contract clauses on
<i>Hardship and Force Majeure</i>, and recently completed model for
various /CISG/ transactions.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="33">
		<number>33</number>
		<note>
			Such as the European Council for Europe, <i>General Conditions for
the Supply of Plant and Machinery for Export</i> (Form No. 574) (UN -
ECE, 1955); The International Federation of (independent) Consulting
Engineers, <i>FIDIC Red Book on Construction</i> (1996); Works of the
European trade association /Orgalime/.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="34">
		<number>34</number>
		<note>
			Such as the Grain and Feed Trade Association - /GAFTA/
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="35">
		<number>35</number>
		<note>
			Honnold (1992) on p. 12.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="36">
		<number>36</number>
		<note>
			Honnold id. p. 13.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="37">
		<number>37</number>
		<note>
			/CISG/ Article 78 - Interest; <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>, Article
7.4.9 - "interest for failure to pay money," and Article 7.4.10 -
"interest on damages."
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="38">
		<number>38</number>
		<note>
			See footnote 23.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="39">
		<number>39</number>
		<note>
			<i>The Principles of European Contract Law 1998</i> (publication
expected in 1998). Previews of the final text of the <i>Principles of
European Contract Law</i> are available on the Net at &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.ufsia.ac.be/~storme/PECL.html">http://www.ufsia.ac.be/~storme/PECL.html</link>&gt;
and &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/doc/EU.Contract.Principles.1997.preview.html">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/doc/EU.Contract.Principles.1997.preview.html</link>&gt;
Also the earlier edition of the principles and accompanying commentary
is published: Ole Lando and Hugh Beale (ed.) <i>Principles of European
Contract Law, Part I: Performance, Non-performance and Remedies</i>
(1995).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="25">
	<ocn>25</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Situation specific standard contracts
	</text>
</object>
<object id="26">
	<ocn>26</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Standard contracts may attempt to be autonomous in themselves, but
seldom are, having a limited scope of regulation and depending for
their ultimate interpretation and gap filling on the applicable "law".
This type of standard contract is more often than not drafted
unilaterally by a single firm that represents a particular contractual
interest. These are too diverse for much of a general nature to be
extracted for our current purposes, being specific to the business that
prepares them and to the type of goods or services for which they
provide.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="27">
	<ocn>27</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		A transnational regulatory order for contracts
	</text>
</object>
<object id="28">
	<ocn>28</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Within the traditional municipal order a limited degree of autonomy is
available in contract. Autonomy is here used in the sense of reducing
the relevance of specific national laws. This is achieved as discussed
through: the selection of the law of a state that applies uniform law;
the use of uniform rules and principles; and/or the use of negotiated
standard contracts. There are problems however, with state's
judiciaries' limited ability to disengage themselves from their
traditional legal process, methods of legal reasoning, use of sources,
and interpretation of uniform law, principles, rules and contracts. In
addition to these there are problems associated with the enforcement of
claims in other states world-wide as required for international
commerce. These constraints have long represented a hindrance to the
business community that has sought and found a preferable solution in
international commercial arbitration. This may be further enhanced
through the selection of a-national law as the governing law of the
contract under arbitration, such as <i>lex mercatoria</i>. This
a-national regulatory order is made possible by: *(a)* States'
acceptance of <u>freedom of contract</u> (<i>odre public</i> or public
policy excepted). *(b)* Sanctity of contract embodied in the principle
<i><u>pacta sunt servanda</u></i>. *(c)* Written contractual selection
of dispute resolution by <u>international commercial arbitration</u> -
<i>ad hoc</i> or institutional, usually under internationally accepted
arbitration rules. *(d)* Enforcement: arbitration where necessary
borrowing the state apparatus for <u>law enforcement through the</u>
<i><u> New York Convention</u> on Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards 1958</i>. *(e)* Greater transnational effect is
achieved through the exclusion of state law as governing the contract.
Usually substituting the choice of general principles of law or
<i><u>lex mercatoria</u></i> as governing the contract, or calling upon
the arbitrators to act as <i>amiable compositeur</i> or <i>ex aequo et
bono</i>. For increased predictability preferably through application
of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="29">
	<ocn>29</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		International commercial arbitration (ICA)
	</text>
</object>
<object id="30">
	<ocn>30</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		It appears accepted that ICA has become the most prevalent means of
dispute resolution in international commerce.<en>40</en> This is hardly
surprising as ICA is a cornerstone of the autonomous contract, and
unlike litigation survives on its merits as a commercial service to
provide for the needs of the trading community. As such ICA adheres
more closely to the rules of the market economy, responding to those
needs and catering for them more adequately. It has consequently been
more dynamic than the national courts, in adjusting to the changing
requirements of modern world trade.<en>41</en> ICA, in taking its
mandate from and giving effect to the will of the parties, provides
them with greater flexibility and frees them from many of the
limitations of municipal law. As examples of this, it seeks to give
effect to the parties' agreement upon: the <i>lex mercatoria</i> as the
law of the contract; the number of, and persons to be "adjudicators";
the language of proceedings; the procedural rules to be used, and; as
to the finality of the decision. ICA through state support provided by
the <i>New York Convention</i> (and where implemented by the <i>UN
Model Law</i> on ICA) grants international commercial contracts an
unparalleled enforcement apparatus world-wide.<en>42</en> Much that has
been essential to the success of ICA has been contributed by the
activities of international organisations, both governmental<en>43</en>
and non-governmental,<en>44</en> in providing the necessary legal
infrastructure for arbitration in the form of international legal
instruments and the dissemination of information about their
application on a world-wide basis. There are multitudes of papers and
publications dedicated to ICA.<en>45</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="40">
		<number>40</number>
		<note>
			Alexander Komarov <i>Remarks on the Applications of the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts in International
Commercial Arbitration</i> (1995) in <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex
Mercatoria?</i> pp. 157-166 on p. 157; Stewart Hancock <i>A Uniform
Commercial Code for International Sales? We Have it Now</i> in New York
State Bar Journal (January, 1995) quoting oral statement by Werner
Melis to the effect that practically all international commercial
disputes are settled by arbitration and not before state courts. Also
see comments by Yasuhei Taniguchi, <i>The Changing Attitude to
International Commercial Dispute Settlement in Asia</i> in
<i>Arbitration and Dispute Resolution Law Journal</i> (London, 1997)
pp. 67-77 at pp. 72-73.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="41">
		<number>41</number>
		<note>
			Dispute resolution is a service industry - with many competing
arbitration entities, both institutional and freelance, it is sensitive
to its market. An arbitration tribunal's mandate is determined by the
"will" of the contracting parties, this extends to the methods and
"law" employed by it in dispute resolution. Competition exists also on
a national level as regards national arbitration laws to attract ICA,
see Park (Hague, 1995).
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="42">
		<number>42</number>
		<note>
			Attained through state support of the <i>New York Convention
1958</i> (108 states contracting states) said to be honoured/ effective
in 98 per cent of cases, see Albert Jan Van Den Berg, <i>Some practical
questions concerning the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards</i> (1992) in
<i>25<sup>th</sup> UNCITRAL Congress</i> pp. 212-220 at p. 213. Also
through the subsequent <i>UN Model Law on Arbitration 1985</i>. In the
important but less generic area of investment disputes were a
contracting state is a party to the contract, the <i>ICSID Arbitration
Rules</i> have even wider and further reaching effect.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="43">
		<number>43</number>
		<note>
			Such as /UNCITRAL/.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="44">
		<number>44</number>
		<note>
			Such as the <i>ICC's International Court of Arbitration</i>; <i>LCIA
- London Court of International Arbitration</i>; <i>AAA - American
Arbitration Association</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="45">
		<number>45</number>
		<note>
			For a brief overview see Sir Michael Kerr, <i>Concord and Conflict
in International Arbitration</i>, in <i>Arbitration International</i>
(London, LCIA, 1997) Vol. 13 pp. 121-143.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="31">
	<ocn>31</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Note: Arbitration under the World Bank supported <i>ICSID
Rules</i><en>46</en> is of special importance for investment disputes
involving a state which is a contracting party to the convention.
/ICSID/ arbitration (which is beyond the scope of this paper) is
binding and enforceable without appeal even on the grounds of public
policy, and has an even wider global range of enforceability than is
available to ICA under the <i>New York Convention</i>.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="46">
		<number>46</number>
		<note>
			See Allan Redfern and Martin Hunter, <i>Law and Practice of
International Commercial Arbitration</i> (London, 1991) pp. 47-49; and
Esa Paasivirta, <i>Participation of States in International
Contracts</i> (Helsinki, 1990).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="32">
	<ocn>32</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Lex Mercatoria - and its essential link to arbitration
	</text>
</object>
<object id="33">
	<ocn>33</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"The <i>lex mercatoria</i> has sufficient intellectual credentials to
merit serious study, and yet is not so generally accepted as to escape
the sceptical eye."<en>47</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="47">
		<number>47</number>
		<note>
			The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Mustill, <i>The New Lex Mercatoria: The
First Twenty-five Years</i> in Maarten Bos and Ian Brownlie, Liber
Amicorum for the Rt. Hon. Lord Wilberforce, Clarendon Press (Oxford,
1987) pp.149-183.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="34">
	<ocn>34</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Let me just note that in Europe the <i>lex mercatoria</i> is a fact.
Arbitrators apply it and those courts which have faced awards applying
it have accepted its application."<en>48</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="48">
		<number>48</number>
		<note>
			See Ole Lando, <i>The Law Applicable to the Merits of the
Dispute</i>, in Julian Lew (ed.) <i>Contemporary Problems in
International Arbitration</i> (1987) pp. 101-112 on p. 104.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="35">
	<ocn>35</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Arbitrators entrusted with the task of settling a dispute in
accordance with the intention of the parties and without recourse to
any national legal system usually find themselves in a rather
challenging situation. However, it is widely recognised as a matter of
fact that arbitrators are not so reluctant to apply a-national and less
definite systems of rules agreed upon by the parties as their
colleagues from a state judiciary, who are more concerned with legal
technicalities than with the desire to find a solution in a way
contemplated by the parties at the time of conclusion of the
contract.<en>49</en> Obviously that can also explain the reason why
arbitrators of differing nationalities who have applied the <i>lex
mercatoria</i> in collegiate arbitral tribunals have not experienced
great difficulties in reaching consensus."<en>50</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="49">
		<number>49</number>
		<note>
			W. Laurence Craig, William W. Park, Jan Paulsson, <i>International
Chamber of Commerce Arbitration</i> (New York, looseleaf updated, 2nd
ed.) p. 640.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="50">
		<number>50</number>
		<note>
			Lando, <i>The lex mercatoria in International Commercial
Arbitration</i>, 34 ICLQ (1985) p. 753. as cited by Komarov (1995) pp.
157-166 on p. 161.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="36">
	<ocn>36</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The concept of <i>lex mercatoria</i>: of an autonomous set of rules and
practices accepted by the international business community as
regulating their transactions, has been actively promoted by a number
of eminent authorities, mainly in continental Europe, and has continued
to gain in stature over the years.<en>51</en> The concept has developed
particularly in conjunction with ICA, identified by Clive Schmitthoff
of England and advanced by such authorities as Berthold Goldman of
France and Pierre Lalive of Switzerland. Under current legal thinking,
most national courts still require a contract to be governed by a
national legal system,<en>52</en> although on this front also <i>lex
mercatoria</i> advances.<en>53</en> ICA is not so constrained. It has
been suggested that <i>lex mercatoria</i> was being used in as many as
5-10% of ICA cases.<en>54</en> Ole Lando identified 1985 as the
landmark year when the <i>UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration</i> in Article 28(1) allowed for arbitral
disputes to be determined "in accordance with the rules of law as
chosen by the parties".<en>55</en> This clarification is welcome,
though hardly revolutionary.<en>56</en> It has long been accepted that
arbitrators in executing their mandate derived from the will of the
parties, if so requested, will settle the dispute on non legal grounds,
in equity or on the merits, acting as <i>amiable compositeur</i> or
<i>ex aequo bono</i>.<en>57</en> Given that ICA is decided according to
"the will" of the contracting parties, it was open earlier for an
a-national (autonomous) decision based on <i>lex mercatoria</i> by
specification of its application together with the rules of
equity.<en>58</en> This would have fallen under the accepted provisions
of the earlier recognition and enforcement of arbitration rules. It
appears to be accepted that <u>when agreed by the parties in ICA</u>,
<i>lex mercatoria</i> may be applied as a separate legal frame
independently of national law (mandatory law apart), and that such
decisions will be enforced as valid by national courts.<en>59</en>
Equally, if so instructed, both in arbitration and in national courts,
<i>lex mercatoria</i> may be called upon to play a gap filling function
for the selected applicable national law. <i>Lex mercatoria</i> is a
polycentric and integrative concept that has eluded precise definition,
its precise nature, scope, content and application being vague, with
wide latitude granted arbitrators.<en>60</en> It has been suggested
that "there can at most be no universal <i>lex mercatoria</i>, but
merely a variety of <i>lex mercatoria</i> systems depending on sector
or region."<en>61</en> It has been pointed out that <i>lex
mercatoria</i> is a distinct concept from harmonisation and
transnationalism.<en>62</en> There is a convergence however, if one
takes the perspective of the businesss community's needs and goals. The
business community usually refers to <i>lex mercatoria</i> by what are
regarded as loose synonyms, in such phrases as "internationally
accepted principles of law governing contractual relations", that more
clearly indicate the intent behind their subscription to it.<en>63</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="51">
		<number>51</number>
		<note>
			Discussions and examples of <i>lex mercatoria</i> are to be found
in: Berthold Goldman, <i>Fronti?res du droit et lex mercatoria</i>,
Archives de philosophie du droit (Paris 1964); <i>La lex mercatoria
dans les contrats et l'arbitrage internationaux: r?alit? et
perspectives</i>, 106 Culnet Journal du droit international (1979) p.
475; <i>Etudes off?rtes ? Berthold Goldman</i> (Paris 1982)
contributions by Battifol, Kahn, von Mehren, Rigaux, Weil; Cremades and
Pehn, <i>The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmonisation of the Laws of
International Commercial Transactions</i> 3 Boston Univ Intl LJ 317
(1984); <i>The applicable Law: General Principles of Law - the Lex
Mercatoria</i> in J. Lew (ed.), <i>Contemporary Problems in
International Arbitration</i> (1986) p. 113; <i>Lex Mercatoria</i> in
Forum Internationale, No.3 (Nov. 1983); Pierre Lalive of Switzerland,
<i>Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and
International Arbitration</i>; Mustill, <i>The New Lex Mercatoria: The
First Twenty-five Years</i>, (Oxford, 1987) pp.149-183; E. Gaillard
(ed.), <i>Transnational Rules in International Commercial
Arbitration</i> (Paris, 1993); Lando, <i>Lex mercatoria</i> 1985-1996
in <i>Festskrift till Stig Str?mholm</i>, Vol. II p. 567-584
(G?tenborg, 1997). Also Clive Schmitthoff, <i>Nature and Evolution of
the Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions in the Transnational
law of International Commercial Transactions</i> in Studies in
Transnational Economic Law, Vol. 2 (1982) pp. 23-24. See also the
<i>UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 1994</i>
and the <i>Principles Of European Contract Law 1998.</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="52">
		<number>52</number>
		<note>
			See Himlar Raeschke-Kessler, <i>Should an Arbitrator in an
International Arbitration Procedure apply the UNIDROIT Principles?</i>
(1995) in <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex Mercatoria?</i>, pp.
167-177 on p. 169 "It is no secret that the prevailing opinion among
jurists in some countries, like mine, is plainly adverse towards an
uncodified <i>lex mercatoria</i> as an independent body of
transnational law" and discussion by Ulrich Drobnig, <i>The Use of the
UNIDROIT Principles by National and Supranational Courts</i> (1995) in
<i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex Mercatoria? </i>, pp. 223-229 on p.
226-227.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="53">
		<number>53</number>
		<note>
			The <i>Inter American Convention on the Law Applicable to
International Contracts 1994</i> invites state courts to apply <i>lex
mercatoria</i>, Article 10. This is done in addition to the application
of state law. In the absence of its selection by the parties the state
with the closest ties, Article 9(1). Significantly, Article 9(2)
provides that the court also take into account the general principles
of international commercial law recognised by international
organisations. See Lando (1997) pp. 567-584.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="54">
		<number>54</number>
		<note>
			Kazuaki Sono, <i>The Changing Role of UNCITRAL</i> within <i>The
Future Role of UNCITRAL</i> (1992) in <i>25<sup>th</sup> UNCITRAL
Congress</i>, pp. 249-252, on p. 250. Statement made prior to the
<i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>, a significant figure as pinning down the
exact content and effect of use of <i>lex mercatoria</i> is far from
certain.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="55">
		<number>55</number>
		<note>
			Lando (1997) p. 575. See also <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>, Preamble 4
a. Also Arthur Hartkamp, <i>The Use of UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts by National and Supranational
Courts</i> (1995) in <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex Mercatoria?</i>,
pp. 253-260 on p. 255, notes that "there is a growing tendency to
permit them to choose 'rules of law' other than national laws on which
the arbitrators may base their decisions".
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="56">
		<number>56</number>
		<note>
			Innovative and new are the ("Lando" and "Bonell") codifications of
contract principles <i>"lex mercatoria"</i> discussed in the following
section. Though these may be regarded as being inspired by the <i>US
Restatement of Contract Law</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="57">
		<number>57</number>
		<note>
			As indicated e.g. by the <i>European Arbitration Convention
1961</i>, <i>UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 1975</i>, <i>UNCITRAL Model Law
1985</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="58">
		<number>58</number>
		<note>
			Komarov (1995) on p. 163; Hans Van Houtte, <i>The UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts and International
Commercial Arbitration: Their Reciprocal Relevance</i> (A:1995) in
<i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex Mercatoria? </i>, pp. 181-195 on p.
183.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="59">
		<number>59</number>
		<note>
			There is no dissent on this from the correspondents of various
nationalities in <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex Mercatoria? </i>
E.g. Michael Furmston in <i>The UNIDROIT Principles in International
Commercial Arbitration</i> (1995) in <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex
Mercatoria?</i>, pp. 199-208 on p. 202; Raeschke-Kessler (1995) p. 170.
See also <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>, Preamble 4 a. See also Van Houtte
(A:1995) p. 183. Apart from the <i>UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration</i> (Article 28) specific provision permitting
the selection of "rules of law" (as opposed merely to "the law") is
provided in the new <i>Arbitration Rules</i> of both the /ICC/ (Article
17) and /LCIA/ (Article 22(2)), both effective from 1 January 1998.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="60">
		<number>60</number>
		<note>
			See comment by Van Houtte, <i>International Trade Law</i> (London,
1995) p. 28-29 and p. 399 suggests that <i>lex mercatoria</i> is too
vague and imprecise to be "self-sufficient". See the next section of
this paper on "general contract principles as <i>lex mercatoria</i>."
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="61">
		<number>61</number>
		<note>
			Van Houtte (London, 1995) p. 28. Given the uncertainty as to its
precise scope and application he also suggests that it is safer to
apply a given system of state law, Van Houtte (London, 1995) p. 412 and
p. 399.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="62">
		<number>62</number>
		<note>
			Mustill (1987) pp.149-183 at pp.152-153.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="63">
		<number>63</number>
		<note>
			As applied in <i>Deutsche Schachtbau-und Tiefbohrgesellschaft v. Ras
Al Khaimah National Oil Co.</i> [1987] 2 All ER 769. See comment by
Komarov (1995) on p. 162.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="37">
	<ocn>37</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Some reservation must be expressed to their unconsidered use based on
the uncertainty they represent. Amongst the items of which the <i>lex
mercatoria</i> has grown to be comprised of,<en>64</en> in a not
necessarily hierarchical manner, are: *(a)* Customs and
usages<en>65</en> of international trade. *(b)* Relevant rules
promulgated by international institutions on the area of law concerned
- <i>ICC - Incoterms</i>, or the <i>Uniform Customs and Practices for
Documentary Credits</i>. *(c)* The rules and principles common to all
or most states engaged in international trade, or to those states which
are connected to the contract. Apart from individual principles and
rules for given circumstances, this includes uniform law such as
<i>UNCITRAL's CISG</i>. The following quotation is of interest as
regards general principles constituting <i>Lex Mercatoria</i>:
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="64">
		<number>64</number>
		<note>
			See for example Lando (1997) pp. 567-584.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="65">
		<number>65</number>
		<note>
			Trade usages are actual practices of the relevant business
community, the existence of which must be established and if necessary
proven, e.g. by expert witnesses. The trade usage is not a source of
law.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="38">
	<ocn>38</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Distilled from a vast literature, these general principles have been
enumerated by Lord Justice Mustill as (in abridged form):<en>66</en>
(1) <i>Pacta sunt servanda</i> (contracts should be enforced according
to their terms); (2) <i>Rebus sic stantibus</i> (substantially changed
circumstances can entail a revision of contract terms); (3) <i>Abus de
droit</i> (unfair and unconscionable contracts should not be enforced);
(4) <i>Culpa in contrahendo</i>; (5) Good faith <i>[and fair
dealing]</i>; (6) Bribes render a contract void or unenforceable; (7) A
state may not evade its obligations by denying its own capacity to make
an agreement to arbitrate; (8) The controlling interest of a group of
companies is regarded as contracting on behalf of all members; (9)
Parties should negotiate in good faith if unforeseen circumstances
arise; (10) "Gold clause" agreements are valid and enforceable; (11)
One party may be released from its obligations if there is a
fundamental breach by the other; (12) No party can be allowed by its
own act to bring about a non-performance of a condition precedent to
its own obligation; (13) A tribunal is bound by the characterisation of
the contract ascribed to it by the parties; (14) Damages for breach of
contract are limited to the foreseeable consequences of the breach;
(15) A party which has suffered a breach of contract must mitigate its
losses; (16) Damages for non-delivery are calculated by reference to
the market price of the goods and the price at which the buyer has
purchased equivalent goods in replacement; (17) A party must act
promptly to enforce its rights, lest lose them by waiver; (18) A debtor
may set off his own cross-claim to diminish his liability to a
creditor; (19) Contracts should be construed according to <i>ut res
magis valeat quam pereat</i>; (20) Failure to respond to a letter is
regarded as evidence of assent to its terms."<en>67</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="66">
		<number>66</number>
		<note>
			Mustill (1987) pp.149-183 at pp.174-177.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="67">
		<number>67</number>
		<note>
			As presented by Jarrod Wiener, <i>The 'Transnational' Political
Economy: A Framework for Analysis</i> (1995) at &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/The.Transnational.Political.Economy.a.Framework.for.Analysis.Jarrod.Wiener.UKC.html">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/The.Transnational.Political.Economy.a.Framework.for.Analysis.Jarrod.Wiener.UKC.html</link>&gt;
For a listing of general principles to be found within the /CISG/, see
Ulrich Magnus, <i>Die Allgemeinen Grnds?tze im UN-Kaufrecht</i> <i>[The
General Principles of the CISG- in German]</i>, Rabels Zeitschrift f?r
ausl?ndisches und internationales Privatrecht (1995) 469-494. For an
english translation of this text, see &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/magnus.html">http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/magnus.html</link>&gt;
at the <i>CISG W3 Database</i>, Institute of International Commercial
Law, Pace University School of Law.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="39">
	<ocn>39</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		(d) In the absence of the above the arbitrators will apply or establish
the rule which appears to them to be best suited to the situation. (e)
In ICA also relevant is the public policy of the country in which the
award is likely to be requested.<en>68</en> (f) Recently the definition
of <i>lex mercatoria</i> has been greatly if controversially assisted,
by comprehensive international rules made for this purpose by
/UNIDROIT/ and the Commission on European Contract Law.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="68">
		<number>68</number>
		<note>
			Mustill (1987) pp.149-183 at p. 173.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="40">
	<ocn>40</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Codified general contract principles as <i>lex mercatoria</i>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="41">
	<ocn>41</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"The unification of law has ceased to be the prerogative of State
legislators.... The hope of all of us who believe in the necessity of a
flexible and pluralistic approach to the international unification of
law, is that this equilibrium will be maintained in future."<en>69</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="69">
		<number>69</number>
		<note>
			Bonell, <i>Various Techniques of Unification - Non-legislative means
of harmonisation</i> (1992) in <i>25<sup>th</sup> UNCITRAL
Congress</i>, pp. 33-40 on p. 40.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="42">
	<ocn>42</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"In offering the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> to the international legal
and business communities, the Governing Council is fully conscious of
the fact that the /Principles/, which do not involve the endorsement of
governments, are not a binding instrument and that in consequence their
acceptance will depend on their persuasive authority."<en>70</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="70">
		<number>70</number>
		<note>
			Introduction of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts</i> (Rome, 1994) p. ix.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="43">
	<ocn>43</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"The objective of the UNIDROIT Principles is to establish a balanced
set of rules designated for use throughout the world irrespective of
the legal traditions and the economic and political conditions of the
countries in which they are to be applied. This goal is reflected both
in their formal presentation and in the general policy underlying
them."<en>71</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="71">
		<number>71</number>
		<note>
			Id. p. viii.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="44">
	<ocn>44</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The precise contents of "the general principles of law" and of <i>lex
mercatoria</i> have always been vague and obscure, and presented the
arbitrator who was to apply them with something of a
challenge.<en>72</en> This is changed by reference to the <i>UNIDROIT
International Contract Principles</i> or <i>European Contract
Principles</i> as the proper law of the contract.<en>73</en> They
provide a comprehensive set of rules to govern contractual relations
and may be regarded as contract law restatements, although it has been
pointed out that it is not for these principles to advance themselves
as <i>lex mercatoria</i>.<en>74</en> Given our global perspective, we
shall confine ourselves to the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>, which were
more international in their formulation and purpose.<en>75</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="72">
		<number>72</number>
		<note>
			As pointed out, their general nature, and the wide latitude granted
arbitrators to determine the case, has led to some reservation as to
the general suitability of their use, see Van Houtte, id. p. 412 and p.
399.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="73">
		<number>73</number>
		<note>
			Whether so instructed specifically by the parties, or referred to as
suggested by the Preamble of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles 1994</i>. Comp.
Article 1.101 - Application of the Principles of the <i>European
Principles, European Principles 1998</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="74">
		<number>74</number>
		<note>
			The most constraining suggestion being that it is only when the
<i>UNIDROIT Principles 1994</i> and the <i>EU Principles 1998</i>
converge, together with the /CISG/ that there is a clear indication
that they represent the <i>Lex Mercatoria</i>, see Raeschke-Kessler
(1995) on p. 174.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="75">
		<number>75</number>
		<note>
			Bonell, <i>The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law: Similar Rules
for the Same Purpose?</i> in <i>UNIDROIT Uniform Law Review</i> (Rome,
1996) pp. 229-246 at pp. 242-243; Lando (1997) pp. 567-584 where he
states "The <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> are for the World ... The
<i>PECL [Principles of European Contract Law]</i> are for the European
Union" on p. 572.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="45">
	<ocn>45</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The arrival of the <i>UNIDROIT International Contract Principles</i>
was particularly timely. It coincided with the successful attempt at
reducing trade barriers represented by the <i>World Trade
Agreement</i>, and the start of the general use of the
Internet,<en>76</en> which has allowed for the exponential growth of
electronic commerce, and has further emphasised its transnational
nature. This is all the more opportune bearing in mind that it takes
years to prepare such a legal instrument. The <i>UNIDROIT
Principles</i> were contemplated in 1971, a steering committee was
formed composed of Ren? David, Clive Schmitthoff and Tudor Popescu to
make a study into the feasibility of such a project. Their first report
in 1974 stressed the importance of the project laying down the broad
outlines for its structure. In 1980 a special working group was
constituted, "members of the Group, which included representatives of
all the major legal and socio-economic systems of the world, were
leading experts in the field of contract law and international trade
law... all sitting ... in a personal capacity, and not expressing the
views of their governments."<en>77</en> The first edition of the
<i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> were finalised in 1994, 23 years after their
first conception, and 14 years after work started on them in earnest.
The <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> constitute a system of principles and
rules that govern most aspects of contractual relations. They were
drawn up after consideration of different legal systems, but such
influence has been deliberately obscured, with the intention and
instruction that the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> should be interpreted
according to an autonomous international standard. The only earlier set
of rules to which reference is made within their commentary being the
/CISG/.<en>78</en> Nevertheless they have been met with certain
reservation, especially as regards their relationship to <i>lex
mercatoria</i>. It has been expressed on the one hand that:
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="76">
		<number>76</number>
		<note>
			See Amissah, <i>On the Net and the Liberation of Information that
wants to be Free</i> in <i>Fra institutt til fakultet, Jubileumsskrift
i anledning av at IRV ved Universitetet i Troms&#248; feirer 10 ?r og
er blitt til Det juridiske fakultet</i> (Troms&#248;, 1996) pp. 59-76
or the same at &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/On.the.Net.and.Information.17.02.1997.Amissah.d.html">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/On.the.Net.and.Information.17.02.1997.Amissah.d.html</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="77">
		<number>77</number>
		<note>
			See Bonell (1996) on pp. 230-231.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="78">
		<number>78</number>
		<note>
			Bonell, <i>The UNIDROIT principles of International commercial
contracts: Why? What? How?</i> in B?rge Dahl &amp; Ruth Nielsen (ed.),
(1996) pp. 91-98 on p. 93 and in id. (1997) on p. 231, comments on
sources of inspiration mentioning diverse sources including (articles
combined) the United States <i>Uniform Commercial Code and the
Restatement (Second) of the law of Contracts</i>, the drafts of the
<i>Dutch Civil Code 1992</i>, the <i>Civil Code of Quebec 1994</i>,
also the <i>Foreign Economic Contract Law of the Peoples Republic of
China 1985</i>, and the <i>Algerian Civil Code of 1975</i>. The
international instrument referred to is the /CISG/. Also to
non-legislative instruments such as Incoterms, the UCP, FIDIC Red book,
and various works by /UNCITRAL/.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="46">
	<ocn>46</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"It is not up to the /Principles/ to advance themselves as general
principles of law or as <i>lex mercatoria</i>. As general principles of
law the /UNIDROIT/ text will only be accepted when the legal community
and not merely the some twenty drafters of the /UNIDROIT/ text, no
matter how skilled and reputed these lawyers may be, has recognised
that the /UNIDROIT/ document states principles which underlie most
legal systems and are generally accepted. In fact some /UNIDROIT/ rules
are certainly too specific to be perceived as such. The /UNIDROIT/
standards will only be part of the <i>lex mercatoria</i> if they are
recognised as such by the business community and its arbitrators. Since
the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> have just been launched, it is too early
to assess this possibility."<en>79</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="79">
		<number>79</number>
		<note>
			Van Houtte, <i>The UNIDROIT Principles as a Guide to Drafting
Contracts</i> (B:1995) in <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex
Mercatoria?</i> pp. 115-125 on p. 118.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="47">
	<ocn>47</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Or again that:
	</text>
</object>
<object id="48">
	<ocn>48</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"No one doubts of course that the principles are the brainchild of
learned lawyers who laboured independently. All the same is it not
somewhat pretentious to claim that the principles represent the
generally accepted principles of law?" ... "For the time being, the
<i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> remain no more than a learned
codification."<en>80</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="80">
		<number>80</number>
		<note>
			J?r?me Huet, /Synthesis/ (1995) in <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex
Mercatoria?</i> pp. 273-281 on p. 278 and p. 281.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="49">
	<ocn>49</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		And it has been suggested that an indication of the traditional <i>lex
mercatoria</i> is only firmly established by these codified principles
where the three new systems represented by the /CISG/ the <i>UNIDROIT
Principles</i> and <i>EU Principles</i> converge.<en>81</en> Be these
objections as they may, the <i>UNIDROIT </i> (and /EU/) /Principles/ as
contract law restatements cater to the needs of the business community
that seeks an a-national or transnational law as the basis of its
contracts. Where in the past they would have been forced to rely on the
ethereal and nebulous <i>lex mercatoria</i>, the business community is
finally provided with the opportunity to make use of such a "law" that
is readily accessible, and has a clear and reasonably well defined
content. As such the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> allow for more
universal and uniform solutions. Their future success will depend on
such factors as: *(a)* Suitability of their contract terms to the needs
of the business community. *(b)* Their becoming widely known and
understood. *(c)* Their predictability evidenced by a reasonable degree
of consistency in the results of their application. *(d)* Recognition
of their potential to reduce transaction costs. *(e)* Recognition of
their being neutral as between different nations' interests (East,
West; North, South). At the present time the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>
have to overcome the deterrent fact that they are relatively new and
untested. Their content, which needs to be known for their practical
application, is as yet unfamiliar. Their suitability for various tasks
has not yet been fully ascertained. And the workings of many
discretionary powers granted the arbitrators have not yet been observed
much in practice.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="81">
		<number>81</number>
		<note>
			Supra footnote 74.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="50">
	<ocn>50</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		There are those within the business community who point out that "any
pretension to interfere from the outside, through the imposition of
uniform legislation, would be inopportune and in any case doomed to
failure."<en>82</en> In this regard, the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>
advancing themselves as a matter of choice for the parties do not
constitute such an imposition.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="82">
		<number>82</number>
		<note>
			J. Carver, <i>Uniform law and its impact on business circles: the
experience of the legal profession</i>, in /UNIDROIT/ (ed.),
<i>International Uniform Law in Practice</i> (N.Y., 1988) p. 411. see
also Bonell (1992) p. 39.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="51">
	<ocn>51</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		<i>The UNIDROIT Principles</i> require study and understanding for
their effective use in contracting. *(a)* The <i>UNIDROIT
Principles</i> are broad in scope covering most aspects of contract and
as such create a largely autonomous uniform legal environment for
contracting. Exceptions are mandatory law, and some validity issues
including capacity. These occur in a minority of disputes.<en>83</en>
*(b)* The <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> adhere to the principle of freedom
of contract, but contain mandatory provisions, that parties voluntarily
choosing to use them cannot contract out of. *(c)* They are to be
understood not on their own but in conjunction with their commentary.
*(d)* The <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> cover most aspects of contract
including chapters on: formation, validity, interpretation, content,
performance, and non-performance. The section on formation also covers
pre-contractual negotiations. *(e)* The standards applied are meant to
be international and may be different from similar domestic standards -
e.g. good faith and fair dealings "in international trade."<en>84</en>
*(f)* The <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> contain separate provisions for
the interpretation of the text of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>
themselves (Article 1.6), and those of the contract to which they apply
(Chapter 4). *(g)* Most of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> can be
regarded as "default rules" that save the parties the time and cost "of
negotiating and drafting by providing rules that they would probably
have agreed upon had they taken the time to do so."<en>85</en> *(h)* An
important consideration is that these rules are drafted specifically to
take into account the needs of international trade, and as such contain
provisions specifically directed at such matters as: determination of
price; currency of payment; government permissions to perform;
liquidated damages; interest rate on money due; reference back to
original language text of a contract in case of doubt. *(i)* Unlikely
to be familiar to those used to contract law models based on <i>caveat
subscriptor</i>, are a number of protective principles, including those
of good faith and fair dealing, and loyalty, which are discussed
briefly later in this paper. *(j)* There are also rules which (in
contrast with the regular acceptable default rules) serve rather the
role of inducing the parties to negotiate more suitable terms for their
transaction.<en>86</en> *(k)* In yet other areas the rules are
extremely general such as the hardship provision and other works on
standard rules may provide more suitable solutions.<en>87</en> *(l)*
The <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> contain many discretions, that arise
from their nature as principles, and use of standards within them (such
as reasonable) that are without specific meaning, the content of which
depends on the context in which they are applied.<en>88</en> *(m)* One
might additionally observe that the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> can be
used in conjunction with more specific rules and regulations. Of
particular interest in the sale of goods, the <i>UNIDROIT
Principles</i> are suitable for use (on the contracting parties'
election<en>89</en>) together with the /CISG/ to fill gaps in the
provisions of the /CISG/. Provisions of the /CISG/ would be given
precedence over the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> under the accepted
principle of <i>specialia generalibus derogant</i>.<en>90</en> The
/CISG/ has many situations that are not provided for at all, or which
are provided for in less detail than the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>.
Examples include: the deliberately excluded validity (Article 4); the
provision on interest (Article 78); impediment (Article 79), and; what
many believe to be the inadequate coverage of battle of forms (Article
19).<en>91</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="83">
		<number>83</number>
		<note>
			Honnold, <i>Documentary History of the Uniform Law for International
Sales</i> (1989) para. 19 on p. 256.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="84">
		<number>84</number>
		<note>
			Article 1.7, Comment 2. Also see Van Houtte (A:1995), p. 186.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="85">
		<number>85</number>
		<note>
			See Allan Farnsworth, <i>An American View to the Principles as a
Guide to Drafting Contracts</i> in <i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex
Mercatoria?</i> pp. 85-92 on p. 87.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="86">
		<number>86</number>
		<note>
			Farnsworth id. as an example points out Article 6.1.4(2) does not
reflect commercial practice.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="87">
		<number>87</number>
		<note>
			E.g. the <i>ICC's Force Majeure and Hardship clauses</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="88">
		<number>88</number>
		<note>
			Van Houtte (A:1995), p. 185.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="89">
		<number>89</number>
		<note>
			Also consider present and future possibilities for such use of
<i>The Principles</i> under /CISG/ articles 8 and 9.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="90">
		<number>90</number>
		<note>
			Special principles have precedence over general ones. See Huet,
/Synthesis/ (1995) p. 277.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="91">
		<number>91</number>
		<note>
			Drobnig, id. p. 228, comment that the /CISG/ precludes recourse to
general principles of contract law in Article 7. This does not refer to
the situation where parties determine that the <i>UNIDROIT
Principles</i> should do so, see /CISG/ Article 6.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="52">
	<ocn>52</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As to the suitability of The <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> for complex
international contracts, there are differing views. As pointed out
forcefully by Vivian Gaymer:
	</text>
</object>
<object id="53">
	<ocn>53</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"In relation to the complex type of contracts, I have to say that if
the parties are content that the contract would be governed by a
well-developed existing law which has been found to be satisfactory in
relation to similar contracts in the past they would be unlikely even
to consider using the /Principles/. The reasons are obvious. Parties
like to know where they stand. They like to have access to an existing
body of expert advice. <i>The Principles</i>, for the time being at
least, suffer from the disadvantage of novelty. The lawyers seem to be
resistant to change."<en>92</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="92">
		<number>92</number>
		<note>
			Vivien Gaymer, <i>The UNIDROIT Principles as a Guide for Drafting
Contracts: A View from an International Commercial Lawyer</i>, in
<i>UNIDROIT Principles: A New Lex Mercatoria?</i> pp. 97-102 on p. 100.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="54">
	<ocn>54</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Paradoxically, where governments are involved (in complex agreements),
they not infrequently find it necessary to resort to an a-national
order to govern the contract. Kazuaki Sono before the promulgation of
the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> writes:
	</text>
</object>
<object id="55">
	<ocn>55</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"For complex transactions which were seldom heard of in the past, there
is a tendency to have resort to "the general principle of law", <i>lex
mercatoria</i>, or "the principle of good faith and fair dealing"
particularly through arbitration clauses. During the Congress, I have
been told personally from a reliable source that 5 to 10 per cent of
the disputes which are submitted to arbitration now contain such
clauses. The person who provided me with this information said "only 5
to 10 per cent", but to me it is an extremely significant percentage.
Yet, the contents of these principles are still far from
certain."<en>93</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="93">
		<number>93</number>
		<note>
			Sono (1992) p. 250.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="56">
	<ocn>56</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In such situations selection of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> should
provide a welcome increase in clarity.<en>94</en> Their use where
states participate in international contracts is likely to generally
boost confidence in their use for more complicated agreements also
within the business community.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="94">
		<number>94</number>
		<note>
			Furmston (1995) p. 202, provides the compelling examples of two such
agreements involving *(i)* the construction and *(ii)* the operation of
the Channel Tunnel by Anglo-French consortiums. Both agreed upon
disputes being "governed by those Principles of English and French
contract law which are common and, if were no relevant common
principles, by general principles of international commercial law."
Dispute resolution to be by /ICC/ arbitration in Brussels.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="57">
	<ocn>57</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Protective principles as a necessary part of <i>lex mercatoria</i>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="58">
	<ocn>58</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The virtues of freedom of contract are stressed in this paper in that
they allow the international business community to structure their
business relationships to suit their needs. The protective principles
of good faith and fair dealing are of particular interest as in the
<i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> they are mandatory and place an encumbrance
on this freedom. Other protective principles such as loyalty also
absent from some traditional contract systems are of similar interest.
It has been pointed out however, that it is necessary to be mindful of
the limitations of the benefits of absolute freedom of contract. The
mandatory protective principles may be justified in that they (on the
balance) reflect the collective needs of the international business
community. It may be further and more positively argued that they are
in fact beneficial and facilitate trade. *(a)* The protective
principles help bring about confidence and foster relations between
parties. They provide an assurance in the international arena where
parties are less likely to know each other and may have more difficulty
in finding out about each other. *(b)* They better reflect the focus of
the international business community on a business relationship from
which both sides seek to gain. *(c)* They result in wider acceptability
of the principles within both governments and the business community in
the pluralistic international community. These protective principles
may be regarded as enabling the /Principles/ to better represent the
needs of "<i>the Commonwealth</i>" (here used to mean the world as a
whole). *(d)* Good faith and fair dealing are fundamental underlying
principles of international commercial relations. More generally,
freedom of contract benefits from these protective priciples that need
mandatory protection from contractual freedom to effectively serve
their function. One might suggest that for most types of international
contract based on a-national law, this is the minimum price of freedom
of contract that should be insisted upon by mandatory international
law, as the limitation which hinders the misuse by one party of
unlimited contractual freedom. They appear to be an essential basis for
acceptability of the autonomous contract (a-national contract, based on
agreed rules and principles). As mandatory principles they become the
default standard for the conduct of international business and as such
may be looked upon as "common property." Unless mandatory they suffer a
fate somewhat analogous to that of "the tragedy of the
commons."<en>95</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="95">
		<number>95</number>
		<note>
			Special problem regarding common/shared resources discussed by
Garrett Hardin in /Science/ (1968) 162 pp. 1243-1248. For short
discussion and summary see Trebilcock, (1993) p. 13-15.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="59">
	<ocn>59</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Modern contract "law" models lay greater emphasis on the contract as an
expression of co-operation between the parties.<en>96</en> Both the
<i>UNIDROIT Contract Principles</i> and the <i>EU Contract
Principles</i> display these modern features. They include protective
principles such as good faith and fair dealing, loyalty, and
hardship<en>97</en> that will not be as familiar to those used to the
traditional contract model<en>98</en> though they will be more familiar
to others. These may be justified as co-operative rules and principles
to which members of the international business community are prepared
to subscribe in order to be able to assume the same of others. Being
able to make these assumptions may facilitate trade, by allowing for
greater trust between parties that are in less of a position to know of
or find out about each other, than would be the case in a domestic
transaction. Good faith and fair dealing, also identified by the
English Lord Justice Mustill as part of "The" <i>Lex
Mercatoria</i>,<en>99</en> is a pervasive and fundamental underlying
principle common to both the /UNIDROIT/ and <i>EU
Principles</i>.<en>100</en> The loyalty principle means that a party
cannot take a completely singular view of its own interests to the
exclusion of the other, having in some circumstances to take account of
those of the other party.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="96">
		<number>96</number>
		<note>
			Hugh Collins, <i>The Law of Contract</i> (London, 1986) p. 160; Lars
Erik Taxell, <i>Avtalsr?ttens normer</i> (Turku, 1987) p. 11; cited by
Wilhelmsson, <i>Questions for a Critical Contract Law - and a
Contradictory Answer: Contract as Social Cooperation</i> in Wilhelmsson
(ed.), <i>Perspectives of Critical Contract Law</i> (1993) pp. 9-52 on
p. 20.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="97">
		<number>97</number>
		<note>
			There are other protective provisions in the form of: hardship
(Chapter 6, Section 2); surprising terms (2.20); duty of
confidentiality (2.16); and negotiation in bad faith (2.15). The
principles also have specific provisions on: fraud (3.8); threat (3.9)
gross disparity (3.10); and mistake (3.4, 3.5).
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="98">
		<number>98</number>
		<note>
			Gaymer (1995) p. 97 states "I particularly noted Article 1.7, which
requires each party to act in accordance with good faith and fair
dealing. This is not a general principle of English contract law, nor
can it be readily achieved under that law and I am interested to learn
more about its perceived application and benefits." The US has come
further than England with the development of the doctrine of
unconscionability, and in basing the Uniform Commercial Code on the
principle of good faith, which is hailed as its "single most important
concept" and as "the foundation on which the [UCC] was drafted",
citations to Dore and DeFranco from Albert Kritzer, International
Contract Manual: Guides to Practical Applications of the /CISG/
(looseleaf 1994) p. 74. See also the <i>Official UCC Commentary</i>,
Section 1-203.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="99">
		<number>99</number>
		<note>
			Supra 2.3.2. in e?39.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="100">
		<number>100</number>
		<note>
			<i>UNIDROIT Contract Principles</i>, General provisions - Article
1.7 Each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing
in international trade. (2) The parties may not exclude or limit this
liability.<br /><i>EU Contract Principles</i>, General Obligations -
Article 1.201 (ex art. 1.106) - Good faith and fair dealing: "(1) Each
party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing. (2) The
parties may not exclude or limit this duty." Good faith and fair
dealing is also to be found in several national contract law systems,
if not the English and "American". Generally see Lando, <i>Each
Contracting Party Must Act In Accordance with Good Faith and Fair
Dealing</i> in <i>Festskrift til Jan Ramberg</i> (Stockholm, 1997) pp.
345-361.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="60">
	<ocn>60</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Conversely, it is instructive to question the role in international
commerce of the traditional contract represented by English contract
reasoning and inherited by the British Commonwealth. Based on freedom
of contract, <i>pacta sunt servanda</i> and <i>caveat subscriptor</i>.
Although claimed to be neutral in making no judgement as to the
contents of a contract, this claim is misleading. It is based on free
market arguments that parties best understand their interests, and the
contract arrived at will be an optimum compromise between their
competing interests. It not being for an outsider to regulate or
evaluate what a party of its own free will and volition has gained from
electing to contract on those terms. This approach to contract is
adversarial, based on the conflicting wills of the parties, achieving a
meeting of minds. It imposes no duty of good faith and fair dealing or
of loyalty (including the disclosure of material facts) upon the
contracting parties to one another, who are to protect their own
interests. The traditional model's failings are known in the domestic
and international arena, frequently producing contractual relations
that take advantage of the weaker, and less informed party.<en>101</en>
Information presents particular problems in international
commerce.<en>102</en> Adherents to the <i>caveat subscriptor</i> model,
point to the fact that parties have conflicting interests, and should
look out for their own interests. However, as compared with domestic
transactions the contracting parties in international commerce are less
likely to possess information about each other or of what material
facts there may be within the other party's knowledge, and will find it
more difficult (and costly) to acquire. And as Michael Trebilcock put
it: "Even the most committed proponents of free markets and freedom of
contract recognise that certain information preconditions must be met
for a given exchange to possess Pareto superior qualities."<en>103</en>
Furthermore the more information one already has, the less it costs to
identify and to obtain any additional information that is
required.<en>104</en> This suggests that some parties will be in a much
better position to determine and access what they need to know, a
factor that should be reflected in the application of the
principle.<en>105</en> It is also increasingly accepted that it is not
possible to fix long-term contracts once and for all, without future
adjustments, as the traditional model would suggest. Also of interest
are the claims of those who point out that this method of contracting
is out of step with the reality of what businessmen do when entering an
agreement. Ian Macneil<en>106</en> suggests that contract has become an
unrealistic abstraction, there being no solidarity except in legal
remedies, with reciprocity absent except in the case of the discrete
transaction. And it has been pointed out that business-persons at the
time of contracting look not to their rights and remedies, but to the
success of the business relationship.<en>107</en> Modern contract
models in placing greater emphasis on co-operation between the parties,
and recognising a distinction between procedural and substantive
fairness, go some way towards redressing these objections and arguably
better reflect the ideology and needs of the international business
community, notwithstanding such other issues as risk allocation.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="101">
		<number>101</number>
		<note>
			Roger Brownsword, <i>Towards a Rational Law of Contract</i> in
Wilhelmsson (ed.), <i>Perspectives of Critical Contract Law</i> (1993)
pp. 241-272 on p. 241. Furmston (1995) on p. 201 notes: "It is
recognised that even between commercial parties there may be stronger
and weaker parties" in discussing Article 3.10 of the <i>UNIDROIT
Principles</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="102">
		<number>102</number>
		<note>
			Apart from the more straightforward cases of different types of
misrepresentation.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="103">
		<number>103</number>
		<note>
			Trebilcock, (1993) p. 102, followed by a quotation of Milton
Friedman, from <i>Capitalism and Freedom</i> (1962) p. 13.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="104">
		<number>104</number>
		<note>
			Trebilcock, (1993) p. 102, note quoted passage of Kim Lane
Scheppele, <i>Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common
Law</i> (1988) p. 25.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="105">
		<number>105</number>
		<note>
			On the loyalty principle generally see L.E. Taxell, /Avtalstr?tt/
(Stockholm, 1997). For a critical opinion on the principle of loyalty
see Ernst Nordtveit, <i>Partnerskap ved utveksling av ytingar. Realitet
eller illusjon</i> in <i>Lov og Rett</i> (1996) p. 337.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="106">
		<number>106</number>
		<note>
			Ian Macneil, <i>Barriers to the Idea of Relational Contracts</i>,
in F. Nicklisch (ed.), <i>Der komplexe Langzeitvertrag</i> (Heidelberg,
1987) 31-49, at 35.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="107">
		<number>107</number>
		<note>
			Stewart Macaulay, <i>Non-Contractual Relations in Business a
Preliminary Study</i>, in <i>American Sociological Review</i> (1963)
pp. 55-67 on p. 61.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="61">
	<ocn>61</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The area represented by protective provisions generally, placing a
limitation on freedom of contract, is a large and complicated one,
which beyond these comments is outside the scope of this
paper.<en>108</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="108">
		<number>108</number>
		<note>
			Writing on EC law Hans-W. Micklitz, <i>Principles of Justice in
Private Law within the European Union</i> pp. 259-258 at pp. 284.290,
discusses the concept of "legitimate expectations" as having the
potential to cover similar ground in a more constructive manner as
being as yet without national connotations it may be easier to
achieve/develop an internationally uniform definition and
interpretation.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="62">
	<ocn>62</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Caveat: Contract law is not built on one model, but on several
competing ones.<en>109</en> Protective principles, though they may be
widely suited for most types of contract, may be persuasively argued
against for others. Protective principles may for example be generally
suited for trade in goods and services or use in joint venture
agreements, (which may benefit from their tendency to foster trust
between international business contracting parties). However, they are
less certain suit the needs of financial agreements and some specialist
contract areas.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="109">
		<number>109</number>
		<note>
			Wilhelmsson, <i>Legal Polycentricity: Consequences of Pluralism in
Law</i> (1995) pp.127-147 on p. 131.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="63">
	<ocn>63</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		The autonomous contract - an a-national solution, a summary
	</text>
</object>
<object id="64">
	<ocn>64</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The autonomous contract, in the sense of one based on an a-national,
autonomous order, is possible both in form and substance where based on
ICA and <i>lex mercatoria</i>, with the mandatory law of states
excepted. The mandatory law exception referring principally to the laws
of states in which performance is to be made or awards are to be
enforced. This arrangement can be provided with greater predictability
through application of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>. This model
provides the potential to reduce transaction cost through the
possibility of adherence to a uniform acceptable standard that can be
applied across borders with minimal concern as to the underlying
municipal legal structure.<en>110</en> This presupposes the functional
and substantive predictability of the a-national "law" based contract.
Functional predictability appears to have been provided, ICA being
better catered for on a world-wide basis than the national legal order,
having secured for itself an unparalleled regime for the recognition
and enforcement of awards.<en>111</en> Discussion might focus on how
much could usefully be adopted in ICA from the /ICSID/ approach to
arbitration. The issue is much more complicated where substantive
predictability is concerned. The simple answer would appear to be, to
accept a degree of uncertainty, as being in the nature of legal
reasoning. Parties should perhaps look more to a reasonable solution
based on the application of the relevant rules and principles, as many
parties do. With this in mind there is nothing to prevent the updating
of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> periodically in the light of
experience of their use. The principals are analogous to the <i>US
Restatement of Contract Law</i>, which is periodically updated, as are
<i>ICC's Incoterms</i> and <i>Uniform Customs and Practices</i> and
even the <i>FIDIC Red Book</i> on construction. Occasional updating
would allow the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> to keep pace with
developments and should not fall foul of the point raised by J?r?me
Huet:
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="110">
		<number>110</number>
		<note>
			Secured as required by relevant conditions precedent and
contractual guarantee.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="111">
		<number>111</number>
		<note>
			Under the <i>New York Convention 1958</i>, <i>UNCITRAL Model Law on
Arbitration 1985</i> and arbitration laws that have been influenced by
it.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="65">
	<ocn>65</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"However, if the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> were to be modified,
corrected or improved they might also finally be rejected. This is
because, even if one believes in the merits of "soft law" which is
often more effective than written law, it remains that any law must be
known and accepted. There must be sufficient time to get used to it. In
other words it must be reasonably stable, and not be a 'changing
law'".<en>112</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="112">
		<number>112</number>
		<note>
			Huet (1995) p. 278 and p. 281.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="66">
	<ocn>66</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The commentaries could be updated with greater frequency (than the
black letter text of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>) in the light of
experience. So doing should allow for adjustments in the text that
assist in ensuring the more uniform application of the principles. The
question however remains as to how such predictability might be
improved for an a-national legal order.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="67">
	<ocn>67</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		The problem of predictability
	</text>
</object>
<object id="68">
	<ocn>68</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		However parties contractually structure their relations there is always
the question of the interpretation of their contract and any "law" on
which it is based whether municipal, uniform law, or rules and
principles. The question is how to achieve the uniform application of
uniform "law" and legal texts. It is necessary to understand the nature
of the problem in order to discuss the viability of and to seek ways of
achieving: uniform international contract law; an autonomous contract
order; and the autonomous contract (in the third sense used in this
paper) as a possible solution. Note that much in this section is an
overview related to problems regarding the unification of international
law.<en>113</en> it examines the nature of the problem of achieving a
uniform global "legal" platform on which to base the autonomous
contract and the problems associated with attaining a high degree of
predictability for international commerce. Consider the following
passage by Ole Lando:
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="113">
		<number>113</number>
		<note>
			For more detailed reading see Goode (1991) pp. 54-74. For an
English law perspective on uniform statutes see F.A. Mann, <i>Uniform
Statutes in English Law</i> in P.V. Baker (ed.) <i>The Law Quarterly
Review</i> (London, 1983) Vol. 99 pp. 376-406.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="69">
	<ocn>69</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"I believe that in many arbitrators, as in many lawyers, there are two
conflicting attitudes. One wishes the law to be a perfect and stringent
system of rules under which the good lawyer can always find the true
and only solution. To apply the law is the same as to apply the
theorems of mathematics. This will produce certainty and predictability
for the citizen.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="70">
	<ocn>70</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		The other attitude tells the arbitrator that absolute predictability is
not attainable. Each legal system has many gaps and the most provident
legislator cannot close them all. Nor can he prevent new gaps from
arising when social conditions change. No legal system provides certain
solutions to all problems. Even the best lawyer in the most
highly-developed country is often in doubt. Besides, predictability is
only one of several legal values. Rules which create certainty also
tend to bring about rigidity. They do not consider special
circumstances and changing conditions. The legal process is not and can
never be a mere syllogism. It is above all an effort to reach the most
fair and appropriate decision. In this process which is often inventive
the arbitrator will weigh the possible solutions against each other and
make his choice."<en>114</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="114">
		<number>114</number>
		<note>
			Lando (1987) p. 111.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="71">
	<ocn>71</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Uniform "law" has the potential to reduce transaction costs and
increase world-wide predictability in international commerce. However,
the success of an autonomous uniform international regulatory order is
tied to its ability to provide for the risk management needs of the
business community and has proved to be one of the most challenging,
fascinating, and enduring problems. The selection of uniform laws and
uniform rules is not enough, as this does not ensure their uniform
application, without which the purpose of establishing uniform law is
largely defeated. Pragmatically the issue of predictability may be
regarded as one of degree. "Uniformity of application" is closely
related to the "predictability" of a legal text and although not
identical, their use has at times been interchanged in this writing.
What degree of uniformity is necessary or acceptable in the ordering of
relations, and what trade-offs are there in achieving or attaining this
predictability? There is clearly a tension between certainty and
flexibility - "rules which create certainty also tend to bring about
rigidity."
	</text>
</object>
<object id="72">
	<ocn>72</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Some comments may be made on the decision-making process and discretion
in relation to rules and principles. An attempt to base a legal system
on rules alone would create gaps. Discretion is required, which is
applied through principles of law, which are more holistic constraining
legal standards. Ronald Dworkin<en>115</en> appears to distinguish them
in two ways. *(i)* Whereas a rule is either applicable or not,
principles do not operate in this all or nothing way, having a
dimension and weight, they can apply to varying extents. *(ii)* Rules
cannot conflict, either they apply or they do not, whereas principles
may conflict with each other.<en>116</en> Some principles will be more
pervasive than others.<en>117</en> Their relative importance may vary
according to the circumstances in which they are to be applied. The
work of the legal craftsman being to know when and how they are to be
applied in a given factual situation, according to the different
considerations and relationships between particular conflicting
circumstances, and in so doing arrive at the "correct" legal solution.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="115">
		<number>115</number>
		<note>
			Ronald Dworkin, <i>Laws Empire</i> (Harvard, 1986); <i>Hard
Cases</i> in <i>Harvard Law Review</i> (1988). For a short summary see
Wayne Morrison, <i>Jurisprudence: from the Greeks to post-modernism</i>
(London, 1997) pp. 415-448.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="116">
		<number>116</number>
		<note>
			E.g. <i>pacta sunt servanda</i> and the narrow <i>clausula rebus
sic stantibus</i>.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="117">
		<number>117</number>
		<note>
			E.g. <i>pacta sunt servanda</i> and good faith under the /UNIDROIT/
and <i>EU Principles</i> and their interpretation clauses.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="73">
	<ocn>73</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		Predictability at a municipal level
	</text>
</object>
<object id="74">
	<ocn>74</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Complete predictability in a legal or regulatory regime is not
attainable - this is a charge that can be levelled against all legal
systems including those of sovereign states. At a national level the
nature of legal reasoning and application of particular rules of law
and principles is understood by its practitioners, and certified by
supreme authority. Consider the comment of John Honnold:
	</text>
</object>
<object id="75">
	<ocn>75</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Perfect clarity and predictability in law, as most of you know all too
well, is not for this world ... Nevertheless, within a single domestic
system it usually has been possible to keep uncertainty within
tolerable limits so that nearly everyone prefers law to
anarchy."<en>118</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="118">
		<number>118</number>
		<note>
			Honnold (1992) p. 11.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="76">
	<ocn>76</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This issue is important enough to merit special consideration. *(i)*
Ignoring evidentiary problems, total predictability is unattainable
even at a domestic level where we are confined to the workings of legal
reasoning, without admitting the possibility of extraneous influences.
The nature of the decision-making process, in this case, in the
application of rules and principles with various sources of law for
appropriate guidance<en>119</en> has all the hallmarks of a highly
complex system, indeed in the nature of the chaoplexic.<en>120</en> The
fact that decisions stem from deterministic processes does not mean
jurists can predict all their meanderings. The application of simple
deterministic axioms<en>121</en> to subtly differing sets of
circumstance can lead to complex results that often cannot be predicted
with certainty. Simple sets of principles and rules applied give rise
to extremely complicated patterns that never quite repeat themselves.
*(ii)* Even within a single national jurisdiction, whether or not they
should, extraneous influences will play a role in the decision-making
process. There will be differences in the basic ideologies and beliefs
of the adjudicators, and these will sometimes have an effect on the
decision-making process. The diversity of basic ideology, views and
politics accepted within a democracy, together with the different
social, economic and cultural backgrounds of adjudicators guarantee a
difference in their basic assumptions that cannot be excluded from
playing a role in their application of discretion and in the weighing
of principles. Even Dworkin's super-judge Hercules is not unaffected.
In a democracy accepting the pluralism of views, there is no single set
of background characteristics that may be used to define such a being.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="119">
		<number>119</number>
		<note>
			In the common law system based on the earlier authoritative legal
reasoning of binding precedent and persuasive authority.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="120">
		<number>120</number>
		<note>
			Word coined by John Horgan in <i>The End of Science</i> (London,
1996) to cover the related fields of chaos and complexity. Chaos theory
is a branch of mathematics and physics. Sometimes described as the edge
of chaos, what is studied here is not randomness or disorder.
Chaoplexity examines non-linear systems in which simple sets of
deterministic rules can lead to highly complicated (detailed) results,
which cannot be predicted accurately. A good introduction to the
subject chaos is provided by James Gleick, <i>Chaos: Making a New
Science</i> (New York, 1987).
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="121">
		<number>121</number>
		<note>
			Such as those provided by Dworkin in explaining the application of
rules and principles (to determine judicial outcomes).
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="77">
	<ocn>77</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		Uniformity at an international level
	</text>
</object>
<object id="78">
	<ocn>78</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Absolute predictability does not exist at a purely domestic level.
These problems are compounded in the context of the application of a
uniform law by different judiciaries.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="79">
	<ocn>79</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Even within a common set of rules and concepts, the habits of mind of
lawyers in different legal systems, no doubt reinforced by rules of
civil procedure, are too deeply ingrained to achieve practical
uniformity in approach ... the instinct of civil lawyers is to turn to
rules contained in the code, whereas English lawyers turn principally
to the terms of the contract. The difference between legal systems
about what constitutes a good argument, what has intellectual strength
and integrity, will prove hard to abolish..."<en>122</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="122">
		<number>122</number>
		<note>
			Hugh Collins, <i>European Private Law and Cultural Identity of
States</i> in <i>European Review of Private Law</i> 3 (1995) pp. 353 at
356, 357-58, citation used by Christian Joerges, <i>The Process of
European Integration and the 'Denationalization' of Private Law</i> in
B?rge Dahl &amp; Ruth Nielsen (ed.), (1996) pp. 73-90, p. 82.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="80">
	<ocn>80</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Adjudicators (especially within national courts) are faced with
formidable compounded complexity where attempting to apply a uniform
law in a uniform manner, that will frequently prove difficult to
satisfactorily overcome, even where assuming that there is no problem
of access to information. These are a consequence of their different
legal traditions, which have different technical rules of procedure,
rely on different sources for authority and respect different reasoning
as legally sound. (There are also additional extraneous influences
resulting from their different cultures and ideologies).
	</text>
</object>
<object id="81">
	<ocn>81</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		The <i>UN Convention on the Law of Treaties</i>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="82">
	<ocn>82</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Where dealing with uniform law, the way of discovering the rights and
duties of contracting parties is by its interpretation, and that of the
parties' contract. Herbert Briggs in <i>The Law of Nations; Cases,
Documents and Notes</i> on the interpretation of treaties
states:<en>124</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="124">
		<number>124</number>
		<note>
			Herbert Briggs, <i>The Law of Nations; Cases, Documents and
Notes</i> (New York, 1952) on p. 897.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="83">
	<ocn>83</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Practically all treatises on international law have sections on the
so-called 'canons of interpretation' of treaties. Analysis reveals that
the canons consist largely of the application of the principles of
logic, equity, and common sense to the text of a treaty in an endeavour
to discover its 'clear' or 'natural' meaning."
	</text>
</object>
<object id="84">
	<ocn>84</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The <i>UN Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969</i> (in force 1980) is
considered to be a codification of existing public international law
with regard to the interpretation of treaties.<en>125</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="125">
		<number>125</number>
		<note>
			Lord Diplock in <i>Fothergill v Monarch Airlines</i> [1981], A.C.
251, 282 or see &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/England.Fothergill.v.Monarch.Airlines.HL.1980.html#ecs85">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/papers/England.Fothergill.v.Monarch.Airlines.HL.1980.html#ecs85</link>&gt;.
Also Mann (London, 1983) at p. 379.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="85">
	<ocn>85</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The relevant articles on interpretation are Article 31 and 32. Article
31 instructs that a "treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
Article 32 instructing that reference be made to its <i>travaux
pr?paratoires</i> and circumstances of its conclusion to confirm the
meaning resulting through application of Article 31, and resolve any
ambiguity, or that which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Article
31(2) takes into account agreements made by the parties as to its
interpretation on the conclusion of the treaty. Article 31(3)(a) and
(b) instruct the taking into account of any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provisions, including that which is evidenced by a
practice in its application by the parties; Article 31(3)(c) makes any
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties; Article 31(4) states that the application of a special
meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties
so intended.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="86">
	<ocn>86</ocn>
	<text class="h6">
		Interpretation clauses within uniform laws
	</text>
</object>
<object id="87">
	<ocn>87</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"The more successful the activities of /UNCITRAL/,<en>126</en> "the
more it extends its activities in the field of international trade
relations, the more necessary the uniform interpretation of the uniform
rules will be."<en>127</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="126">
		<number>126</number>
		<note>
			And other international organisations such as /UNIDROIT/ - footnote
added.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="127">
		<number>127</number>
		<note>
			R?czei (1992), p. 6.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="88">
	<ocn>88</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Modern uniform laws and principles increasingly contain their own
interpretation clauses, which increasingly provide for the taking into
account of their international character, and the need to promote
uniformity in their application.<en>128</en> The /CISG/ provision on
interpretation - Article 7:
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="128">
		<number>128</number>
		<note>
			Examples: <i>The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods</i> 1980, Article 7; <i>The UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts</i> 1994, Article 1.6;
<i>The Principles of European Contract Law</i> 1998 Article 1.106;
<i>The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (The
Hamburg Rules) </i> 1978, Article 3; <i>The United Nations Convention
on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods</i> 1974
and 1978, Article 7; <i>UN Model Law on Electronic Commerce</i> 1996,
Article 3; <i>UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring</i> 1988,
Article 4; <i>UNIDROIT Convention on International Financial
Leasing</i> 1988? Article 6; also <i>EC Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations</i> 1980, Article 18.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="89">
	<ocn>89</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in
its application and the observance of good faith in international
trade.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="90">
	<ocn>90</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="91">
	<ocn>91</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> provision on the "interpretation and
supplementation of the Principles" - Article 1.6:
	</text>
</object>
<object id="92">
	<ocn>92</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		(1) In the interpretation of these Principles, regard is to be had to
their international character and to their purposes including the need
to promote uniformity in their application.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="93">
	<ocn>93</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		(2) Issues within the scope of these Principles but not expressly
settled by them are as far as possible to be settled in accordance with
their underlying general principles.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="94">
	<ocn>94</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Most scholarly writing to date has centred on the /CISG/, though much
of the discussion there holds true generally for all uniform law. It is
instructive to read Honnold's text <i>Uniform Words and Uniform
Application</i>,<en>129</en> prepared with input from 16 professors to
get an idea of the dimension of the problem faced, as seen through the
eyes of scholars representing each of the major legal systems. The
professors agreed that to achieve the uniform application of texts it
was necessary to look at writings in other jurisdictions, and to look
beyond the traditional national sources and methods of interpretation.
They also agreed that this was a Convention duty imposed upon
Contracting States.<en>130</en> Relevant sources were identified as:
*(a)* The legislative history. *(b)* Rulings world-wide. *(c)* The
official and other commentaries. *(d)* Scholarly writings. However,
perhaps not surprisingly, despite such forward thinking as to how
uniformity might be achieved, success so far has been limited and a
number of questions have been raised. Where a particularly novel
solution is employed by a court, is it to be followed elsewhere? Where
a solution thought to be inappropriate is adopted, is this to be
followed, must it be distinguished, or can it simply be ignored? If
there is much text generated on a particular uniform law, how much is
it necessary to cover, and what should be approached first and what
relative weight should be given the different sources? Courts will
still have a tendency to look first to domestic decisions and writings.
In one sense ICA with an international arbitral panel provides a better
balance in having a more international perspective as to how the
uniform law should be applied. This will allow arbitrators to reach a
reasonable conclusion in the circumstances, taking into account their
multi-national perspective of the uniform law. Such a method of
reaching a reasonable decision, though more flexible, has its measure
of predictability where the approach is understood. It may be what a
significant proportion of the international business community that
chooses ICA are after. A distinction is to be made between world-wide
predictability in application, and predictability on a national scale.
Where national law is applied by its national court "A" that looks
first to its domestic writings, it may have a clear - predictable
manner of application, even if not in the spirit of the Convention.
Another nation "B", may apply the uniform law in a different way that
is equally predictable, being perfectly consistent internally. This
however defeats much of the purpose of the uniform law. The court of
nation "B", applying the national law of state "A", is much more likely
to take seriously the treaty obligation undertaken by that
state,<en>131</en> and much the same is the case where a nation fails
in its Convention obligations as to its implementation of a uniform
law.<en>132</en> The question both as regards the adoption of uniform
substantive law, and attempting to achieve its uniform application is
not so much whether or not a country has a perfectly good and modern
contract law tradition, and should definitely not be whether it is felt
that the effort could be improved upon. The question should be how far
is it possible to end up with a common understanding and application of
a uniform text, so as to achieve a uniform and predictable law, at as
international a level as possible, and thereby facilitate international
commerce by simplifying it.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="129">
		<number>129</number>
		<note>
			Honnold, <i>Uniform words and uniform applications. Uniform Words
and Uniform Application: The 1980 Sales Convention and International
Juridical Practice in Einheitliches Kaufrecht und nationales
Obligationenrecht</i>. Referate Diskussionen der Fachtagung. am
16/17-2-1987, hrsg. von Peter Schlechtriem (Baden-Baden, 1987) pp.
115-147.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="130">
		<number>130</number>
		<note>
			Under Article 7. See also footnote 126.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="131">
		<number>131</number>
		<note>
			To take account of its international nature and the need to promote
uniformity in international trade.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="132">
		<number>132</number>
		<note>
			For an example based on the probable international treatment of
Norway's singular and controversial transformation of the /CISG/ see
Viggo Hagstr?m, <i>Kj?psrettskonvensjon, Norsk Kj?pslov og
Internasjonal Rettsenhet</i> in Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap (1995)
pp. 561-588 on p. 569 and Joseph Lookofsky, <i>Understanding the CISG
in Scandinavia</i> (Copenhagen, 1996) on p. 5, 13, and 105. Compare Kai
Kr?ger's argument in <i>Komparativ rettsmetode - observasjoner
vedr?rende prinsipper for rettsanvendelse i Europa nord og s?r -
illustrert ved tilfellet Norge og Italia</i> in Jussens Venner (1996)
pp. 281-312 on p. 312.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="95">
	<ocn>95</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Among the solutions levelled at the problem is the greater
dissemination of information, including making use of information
technology to ensure that writings are commonly known world-wide.
Efforts have been started by /UNCITRAL/, /UNIDROIT/ and some academic
institutions.<en>133</en> But assuming successful updating and
dissemination of relevant international texts, if much writing is
generated, whether in the form of decisions or literature, there is an
information management challenge. What does one look at, if one has to
be selective, and in any event, what weight should be given to any
given legal writing?<en>134</en> And according to whose legal
methodology and practice should they be applied? And the question, is
this really the best way to promote the development of uniform law?
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="133">
		<number>133</number>
		<note>
			For further information on such projects and information sources,
see ITL the <i>International Trade Law Monitor</i> by Amissah at
&lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="134">
		<number>134</number>
		<note>
			Coming as they do from different: states; genre of writing; sources
and levels of authority.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="96">
	<ocn>96</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Alternative solutions
	</text>
</object>
<object id="97">
	<ocn>97</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Whoever is able to provide the business community with the solutions it
is seeking, in an acceptable way, has a reasonable chance of being
subscribed to. Keep in mind: *(i)* the business community's interest in
greater efficiency and predictability in the uniform and if possible
transnational application of "law" and uniform texts; *(ii)* the
business community's lack of focus on national law as a goal <i>per
se</i>, increased autonomy from state law being acceptable and in fact
desirable if successfully able to further the mentioned goals, and;
*(iii)* the business community's ability through freedom of contract to
take advantage of what is made available to them.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="98">
	<ocn>98</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		However a question does arise as to whether the ability to create
alternative solutions and even an independent /lex/ is or should be
without limits. The present author is of the opinion that the duties of
good faith and fair dealing and loyalty (or an acceptable equivalent)
should be a necessary part of any attempt at the self-legislation or
institutional legislation of any contract regime that is based on
"rules and principles" (rather than a national legal order). If absent
a requirement for them should be imposed by mandatory international
law. As discussed in section 2.3.4 such protective provisions are to be
found within the /UNIDROIT/ and <i>EU Contract Principles</i> on good
faith and fair dealing, and loyalty.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="99">
	<ocn>99</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		Independent supra-national interpretation tribunals
	</text>
</object>
<object id="100">
	<ocn>100</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A radical approach has been proposed,<en>135</en> to have states accept
an independent supra-national interpretation tribunal, to whom
questions of an international commercial character concerning a uniform
law would be referred for clarification, and whose rulings would be
followed under a <i>droit commune</i>.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="135">
		<number>135</number>
		<note>
			/UNCITRAL/ Secretariat (1992) p. 253. Proposed by David (France) at
the second /UNCITRAL/ Congress and on later occasions put forward by
Farnsworth (USA). For references on interpretation of the /CISG/ by a
supranational committee of experts or council of "wise men" see Bonell,
<i>Proposal for the Establishment of a Permanent Editorial Board for
the Vienna Sales Convention</i>, in <i>International Uniform Law in
Practice/Le droit uniforme international dans la pratique [Acts and
Proceedings of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress on Private Law held by the
International Institute for the Unification of Private law</i> (Rome
7-10 September 1987)], (New York, 1988) pp. 241-244; and Drobnig,
/Observations/ in <i>Uniform Law in Practice</i>, /supra./ at p. 306.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="101">
	<ocn>101</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"[O]nly a fundamental methodological change would have a chance to
reduce the gap between the slow pace of international legislation and
the requirements of the modern world, especially in the field of
international trade. He suggested that States should agree, by way of a
general Convention, to accept rules established by the Commission, or
under its auspices as a body of common law (<i>droit
commune</i>)."<en>136</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="136">
		<number>136</number>
		<note>
			/UNCITRAL/ Secretariat, id.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="102">
	<ocn>102</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This suggestion was advanced on more than one occasion at early
sessions of /UNCITRAL/ where it drew respectful attention but little
enthusiastic support.<en>137</en> A mitigation might be to give such a
tribunal only persuasive authority.<en>138</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="137">
		<number>137</number>
		<note>
			/UNCITRAL/ Secretariat, id.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="138">
		<number>138</number>
		<note>
			/UNCITRAL/ Secretariat, id. p. 258.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="103">
	<ocn>103</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"As Professor Don King also indicated, a need may soon be felt for the
establishment of a global court of commerce initially for those cases
where resort has been made in arbitration to a national <i>lex
mercatoria</i> or to general principles of contract law. At this
Congress, we already heard a suggestion of Professor Sohn for the
establishment of an international tribunal to interpret uniform
texts."<en>139</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="139">
		<number>139</number>
		<note>
			Sono (1992) p. 251. The suggestion by Louis Sohn found in,
<i>Uniform laws require uniform interpretation: proposals for an
international tribunal to interpret uniform legal texts</i> (1992) in
<i>25<sup>th</sup> UNCITRAL Congress</i>, pp. 50-54.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="104">
	<ocn>104</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		To date the political will backed by the financing for either such
organ has not been forthcoming. In 1992 the /UNCITRAL/ Secretariat's
conclusion was that "probably the time still has not yet
come".<en>140</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="140">
		<number>140</number>
		<note>
			/UNCITRAL/ Secretariat, id.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="105">
	<ocn>105</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		Authoritative reviews as co-ordinating guides
	</text>
</object>
<object id="106">
	<ocn>106</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A less radical possibility is that there might be some body charged
with (or that charges itself with) the task of reviewing important
developments in relation to uniform texts over the course of time, and
giving their authoritative, or persuasive opinion on the issue as to
the right course to be taken in future. This might be an international
body of scholars formed by the institution concerned, or in some other
manner acceptable to legal counsel of the international business
community, that reviews the decisions and writings made over the year
and makes recommendations as to the future course that should be taken
by others in the interpretation of the text. This could alternatively
be pursued as an international interdisciplinary research effort
(involving legal academics and practitioners, economists, business
schools, and representatives of the business community) that is
co-ordinated by a central institution.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="107">
	<ocn>107</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		If pursued through the original formulating agency, this could be done
as a periodic update to a relevant commentary such as that of the
<i>UNIDROIT Principles</i>, which could be updated in light of the
experience that has been gained from the application of the text. Again
this would be able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by
information technology. Alternatively an independent authoritative
guide on uniform application could be published annually (as a complete
text). However organised, and whether by integral commentary update, or
independent guide, provided the publication is reputable and acceptable
to the business community it has a number of attractive features. The
parties in their contract could specifically refer to the commentary or
guide, together with the black letter text, as the primary source of
regulation and means of interpretation of the uniform "law" in dispute
resolution.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="108">
	<ocn>108</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		Limiting of sources for interpretation
	</text>
</object>
<object id="109">
	<ocn>109</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This suggests the possibility of another approach to the problem of
unpredictability of uniform application. Given the mentioned problems,
serious consideration should be given to the fact that improved
predictability and efficiency may be better achieved by limiting of
sources to be applied for the purpose of interpretation. What might
such an alternative solution be? In attempting to achieve the uniform
transnational application of a uniform text it is most efficient to
look for answers as far as possible within the text itself, and if
there is one, in the commentary or guide. An argument may be made for
leaving the rest largely to the discretion of arbitrators. Part of the
appeal of the <i>UNIDROIT Principles</i> is that they may be regarded
(at the parties' election) as largely self-contained and that they
allow for the arrival at efficient reasonable resolutions of disputes.
The parties may wish to rely on the substantive text and accompanying
commentary or guide to the greatest possible extent, and to restrict
external sources for their interpretation in the interests of
efficiency - achieving this "at the stroke of a pen". This to the
common law lawyer is unfamiliar territory.<en>141</en> Predictability
in most circumstances may be increased by reduced complexity in knowing
where to look, the parties having a uniform, clear and concise idea of
what there is to be aware of on the issue. Transaction cost should be
reduced as a result, in knowing that there is a single set of
transnational uniform rules and principles, and a limited amount of
text to be ploughed through. This would represent the further rise of
pragmatism over legal technicalities.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="141">
		<number>141</number>
		<note>
			Which is not the same as to suggest that the idea would be new. As
Goode points out "Truly there is nothing new under the sun. Nearly two
thousand years have elapsed since Cicero proclaimed the virtues of
legal harmonisation", see Goode (1991) p. 54.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="110">
	<ocn>110</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Robert Hillman writing on Article 7 of the CISG (contemporaneously with
the writing and presentation of this paper) makes the following
observations, that are of general relevance to harmonisation efforts,
and with which the present author is in full agreement as suggesting
the sensible approach and way forward:
	</text>
</object>
<object id="111">
	<ocn>111</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Professor Honnold suggests that decisions construing the Convention
and secondary analysis will also clarify the significance of focusing
on the "international character" of the Convention. In fact, most
authorities have called for the publication of cases construing the
Convention to increase the potential for its uniform application. The
problem with this approach is that a high reliance on cases may create
the impression that they are the primary source of international sales
law and that the Convention's principles are inadequate. Such an
environment may encourage tribunals not only to take their eyes off the
principles but to engage in distinguishing, overruling, and even
manipulating precedent. Lawyers from common-law states may feel
comfortable with these activities, but they do not offer much promise
if the goal is to achieve uniformity and certainty in the international
sales law. Perhaps most worrisome, de-emphasizing principles may
encourage tribunals facilely to turn to domestic cases, expressly or
implicitly, when interpreting and gap-filling under Article 7. Analysts
should therefore urge tribunals to try to find answers within the four
corners of the Convention and to look to cases only in the unusual case
where the Convention does not supply adequate guidance."<en>142</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="142">
		<number>142</number>
		<note>
			Robert Hillman, <i>CISG Cross Reference and Editorial Analysis:
Article 7</i> in <i>CISG W3 Database</i>, Institute of International
Commercial Law, Pace University School of Law (New York, September
1997) &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/hillman.html">http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/hillman.html</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="112">
	<ocn>112</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In addition to original texts, international supra-national bodies or
acceptable third parties might produce works on interpretation which,
if not overly voluminous, and if they become generally known and
recognised, could provide a particularly efficient way of reducing
transaction costs and achieving sufficient predictability. Relying upon
the reasonable resolution of the dispute by an arbitrator directed to
use these specific sources as authority for reaching the decision.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="113">
	<ocn>113</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		Information technology solutions - transnational harmonising
information and knowledge-bases
	</text>
</object>
<object id="114">
	<ocn>114</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		There can be no doubt that the information potential of information
technology will play a vital role in this process. As a tool what is
most valuable is its potential to make instantly available large
volumes of information if required (from anywhere on the globe). At the
most basic level tremendous potential is provided for comparative study
of developments around the world with regard to uniform law texts -
academic writings, court decisions. However, its most exciting
potential is realised when designed for transnational harmonisation.
There is every possibility to adopt the approaches discussed in section
4.1-4.3 combined with an educational aspect (section 4.6). One
possibility is the development of specialist sites dedicated to
particular uniform law texts, that attempt to catalogue and manage
information regarding international developments, and in so doing
implicitly or explicitly recommend and provide a guiding hand as to how
it should be interpreted and applied. Such "databases" dedicated to the
task of international harmonisation would serve more than "data". Such
use of information technology appears over time to offer the best
chance of altering the orientation and focus of the world's legal
communities in the way necessary to achieve the internationally uniform
application of uniform texts and more generally to achieve greater
harmonisation of international trade law.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="115">
	<ocn>115</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		E-contract solutions?
	</text>
</object>
<object id="116">
	<ocn>116</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		The electronic environment provides possibilities for designing
standard contracts that are virtually self contained and
self-governing. The contract together with an entire /Lex/ can easily
be stored on electronic media - illustrated by the possibility of
storing relevant portions of such databases as /Lexis/, /Westlaw/, or
/Lovdata/ on "disk". The parties may confine themselves to their
electronic contract, which contains or incorporates all sources of
regulation and their interpretation in a convenient one-stop location,
including <i>inter alia</i>: all relevant conventions, principles,
rules and standard terms on which it is based, together with relevant
commentaries and contractually authorised sources of authority
(copyright problems apart). Having relevant material easily available
from a single source is of some interest, however, the idea in itself
is only of marginally greater interest than what is made possible by
the use of one of the large commercial law databases.<en>143</en> The
real value of such a concept arises where the electronic contract (as a
one-stop solution) is designed to meet the "objective" of the business
community for a relatively straightforward transnational and uniform
/Lex/, (see Section 2.4) that is of a limited textual dimension, (see
Section 4 and 4.1 - 4.4). It was suggested that limiting the sources
for the interpretation of uniform texts might be a better way to
achieve uniformity than seeking to know and distinguish all that has
been decided on point internationally.
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="143">
		<number>143</number>
		<note>
			It should be noted that whilst electronic media makes such a
solution more practicable and attractive, the same thing is achieved
through the age-old tradition of incorporation by reference.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="117">
	<ocn>117</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		In the electronic contract further steps could be taken in the design
of the contract so as to limit the necessity to look elsewhere. Several
issues that might not usually be agreed in advance could be covered,
including procedural ones, such as the manner and amount of discovery
in the event of a dispute. In creating an environment for the parties,
it could also be used as a means of broaching some differences between
civil law and common law approaches. There are numerous other
possibilities, the contract could for example become part of a standard
software utility program (being incorporated into a standard model
regulatory order, based for example on the structure outlined within
this text). Such a contract, even if agreed at a specific point in
time, is likely to be more dynamic. It could guide the parties during
contractual negotiations as to some of the more important factors to
consider. On having entered a contract it could assist the parties in
determining the nature and timing of their relative obligations. For
longer term and more complex agreements, part of the contract directed
towards the parties goals could be designed to have interactive
logistical functions. It could make use of live data from specified
sources - that is continually updated. "appendices" to the electronic
contract could record submitted logs of performances of the parties.
The parties may be guided to use electronic communication for third
party conciliation and mediation, before the more serious step of
adversarial dispute resolution through ICA.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="118">
	<ocn>118</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Beyond this the imagination is the only limitation as to what might
technically be done. Drawing back to the more mundane, but essential in
today's world, the standard electronic contract could have country
specific profiles that might include such details as the status of
electronic documents and signatures, and relevant country specific
details and peculiarities.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="119">
	<ocn>119</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		A standard electronic "autonomous contract" could provide greater
control, and further simplify the parties' contractual environment.
Given that this would be the result of the parties' contractual freedom
there is no need to suggest that this would be the only or best
solution, only that it should be workable, and should have potential if
pursued.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="120">
	<ocn>120</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		<b><i>Note on the validity of electronic documents and
signatures</i></b>
	</text>
</object>
<object id="121">
	<ocn>121</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"Contract law is one of Rome's most important contributions to legal
history. Yet, Watson (The Evolution of Law) writes, it is <i>prima
facie</i> astonishing that the Romans never developed a written
contract that would take its place by the side of /stipulatio/ as a
second contract form. Stipulation required the presence of both parties
and was oral. A written contract could have been negotiated at a
distance and would have been easier to prove. The Romans knew that
written contracts had been standard and useful in classical Athens. But
the idea of /stipulatio/ as the contract form had become so ingrained
in the Roman legal mind that the option of using an alternative form
simply was not adopted."<en>144</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="144">
		<number>144</number>
		<note>
			John Robert Cassidy Mahwah, <i>An Undergraduate Course in
Comparative Legal Studies</i> in <i>Rechtstheorie Zeitschrift f?r
Logik, Methodenlehre Kybernetik und Soziologie des Rechts, Beiheft 12
Monistic or Pluralistic Legal Culture?</i> Ed. Peter Sack, Carl
Wellman, Mitsukunk Yasaki (Berlin, 1987) pp. 200-207 on p. 205. See
also footnote 3 of this text.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="122">
	<ocn>122</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		For most purposes but not all and in most jurisdictions though not all,
contracts may be entered into without regard as to form: orally, in
writing, or by conduct. It being possible, where necessary, to adduce
evidence as to the existence and contents of an agreement. In some
cases however, an agreement must be in writing, as for example in the
case of an arbitration agreement for its recognition and enforcement
under the <i>New York Convention</i>.<en>145</en> Needless to say, for
such purposes, acceptance of the validity of electronic documents is
essential for truly electronic contracting and commerce. For electronic
contracting to be borderless and effective globally such acceptance of
validity should be world-wide. Some states including some "modern"
European ones do not recognise the validity of electronic documents or
electronic signatures, however well authenticated and free from the
possibility of tampering they may be.<en>146</en> <i>The UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Commerce 1996</i> addresses these and other issues
related to electronic commerce. In the interest of a global rather than
regional solutions, it makes sense that states give electronic commerce
the support it needs by adopting the <i>Model Law</i> or by enacting
laws that are in conformity with it. The guiding principle, here to be
applied to writing on paper or electronically, that is found in the
<i>UN Model Law on Electronic Commerce</i>, is suggested by the <i>US
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce</i> (1997):
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="145">
		<number>145</number>
		<note>
			<i>United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards New York, 1958</i>, Article II. The convention
is available off ITL.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="146">
		<number>146</number>
		<note>
			Noted in the <i>European Initiative on Electronic Commerce</i>
(1997) ?45. "A number of Member States' rules governing the formation
and the performance of contracts are not appropriate for an electronic
commerce environment and are generating uncertainties relating to the
validity and enforceability of electronic contracts (for example the
requirements for written documents, for hand written signatures, or the
rules of evidence that do not take into account electronic
documents)..." &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/ecomcomx.htm">http://www.cordis.lu/esprit/src/ecomcomx.htm</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="123">
	<ocn>123</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"rules should be technology-neutral (i.e., the rules should neither
require nor assume a particular technology) and forward looking (i.e.,
the rules should not hinder the use or development of technologies in
the future)"<en>147</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="147">
		<number>147</number>
		<note>
			<i>US Framework for Global Electronic Commerce</i> (1997) &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Commerce/">http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/Commerce/</link>&gt;
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="124">
	<ocn>124</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This in a sense is a rejoinder to the Roman favouring of oral over
written contracts, which today sounds backward, but in fact is no less
so than the blanket non-acceptance of electronic writing and signatures
regardless of suitable authentication and verification possibilities.
Beyond these observations on the need for electronic documents to be
held valid for electronic commerce, the discussion in this paper is
generic to international commerce. Under the current diverse national
orders, however, it is necessary to know the requirements of individual
state laws to ensure the validity of electronic contracts where a
contract is required to be in writing, and if in doubt to resort to
paper.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="125">
	<ocn>125</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		It may be observed that the business counterparts are least cognisant
of location in transactions that can be carried out entirely within the
electronic world, such as trade in intangibles, money transfers,
services, many areas on intellectual property; whereas trade in
tangibles, including goods and most types of investment include a
physical (off-line) component.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="126">
	<ocn>126</ocn>
	<text class="h5">
		Education
	</text>
</object>
<object id="127">
	<ocn>127</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"... one should create awareness about the fact that an international
contract or transaction is not naturally rooted in one particular
domestic law, and that its international specifics are best catered for
in a uniform law."<en>148</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="148">
		<number>148</number>
		<note>
			/UNCITRAL/ Secretariat (1992) p. 255.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="128">
	<ocn>128</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Within the framework described in this section, education and
sensitivity to the needs of the business community by the legal
profession and academia would appear to be a necessary part of any
solution. However, while the business community seeks and requires
greater uniformity in their business relations, there has
paradoxically, at a national level, been a trend towards a
nationalisation of contract law, and a regionalisation of business
practice. <en>149</en> As Pierre Lalive points out quoting Roy Goode:
"The undeniable fact is that, in most countries today, the part played
in a student's /curriculum/ by what I would call 'non-national'
subjects (ie public and private international law, comparative law,
international trade law and the like) has steadily diminished over the
years, paradoxically, at the very time when everyone can observe and
should know that the world is becoming more and more international."
<en>150</en> The disparity grows worse today. Legal education has
become more local as a result of the considerable domestic and regional
legislation passed. Textbooks and studies, to cope with the increased
material, have had to concentrate on taking a domestic and regional
approach with little space to spare for an international perspective,
or for comparative study.<en>151</en> This is regarded by many as
unfortunate, especially given the long experience with fruitful
international communication in the area of international trade
law.<en>152</en> Finding means to transcend national boundaries is also
to continue in the tradition of seeking the means to break down
barriers to legal communication and understanding. In 1966, a time when
there were greater differences in the legal systems of states
comprising the world economy Clive Schmitthoff was able to comment
that:
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="149">
		<number>149</number>
		<note>
			Schanze (1996) p. 62.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="150">
		<number>150</number>
		<note>
			Lalive, <i>International Arbitration - Teaching and Research</i> in
Julian Lew (ed.), <i>Contemporary Problems in International
Arbitration</i> (1987) at p. 18, quoting statement by Goode.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="151">
		<number>151</number>
		<note>
			Regionalisation may be a step towards internationalisation, but is
not the same thing, and the subsequent step does not necessarily
follow.
		</note>
	</endnote>
	<endnote notenumber="152">
		<number>152</number>
		<note>
			See Lalive, id. reference to Goode and the Institute of
International Law, Teaching of International Law, 1987 Committee
chaired by Zourek.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="129">
	<ocn>129</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		"22. The similarity of the law of international trade transcends the
division of the world between countries of free enterprise and
countries of centrally planned economy, and between the legal families
of the civil law of Roman inspiration and the common law of English
tradition. As a Polish scholar observed, "the law of external trade of
the countries of planned economy does not differ in its fundamental
principles from the law of external trade of other countries, such as
e.g., Austria or Switzerland. Consequently, international trade law
specialists of all countries have found without difficulty that they
speak a 'common language'
	</text>
</object>
<object id="130">
	<ocn>130</ocn>
	<text class="indent1">
		23. The reason for this universal similarity of the law of
international trade is that this branch of law is based on three
fundamental propositions: first, that the parties are free, subject to
limitations imposed by the national laws, to contract on whatever terms
they are able to agree (principle of the autonomy of the parties'
will); secondly, that once the parties have entered into a contract,
that contract must be faithfully fulfilled (<i>pacta sunt servanda</i>)
and only in very exceptional circumstances does the law excuse a party
from performing his obligations, viz., if <i>force majeure</i> or
frustration can be established; and, thirdly that arbitration is widely
used in international trade for the settlement of disputes, and the
awards of arbitration tribunals command far-reaching international
recognition and are often capable of enforcement abroad."<en>153</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="153">
		<number>153</number>
		<note>
			Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
<i>Progressive Development of the Law of International Trade</i>
(1966). Report prepared for the UN by C. Schmitthoff.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="131">
	<ocn>131</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		As suggested in the passage quoted earlier by Lalive and Goode and
underlined by the discussion throughout this paper, an increased
attention to international commercial law and arbitration is merited in
the law student's curriculum. Efforts by a number of institutions aimed
at enriching student awareness, education and experience in this
respect, through the arrangement of such international inter-collegiate
activities as arbitration moots and essay competitions are commendable.
Equally so are various international commercial law oriented Internet
efforts that are of value to researchers and practitioners
alike.<en>154</en>
	</text>
	<endnote notenumber="154">
		<number>154</number>
		<note>
			The Institute of International Commercial Law, Pace University
School of Law, is engaged in the various activities mentioned in this
paragraph with regard to the /CISG/.
		</note>
	</endnote>
</object>
<object id="132">
	<ocn>132</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Summary
	</text>
</object>
<object id="133">
	<ocn>133</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		This paper has discussed a number of interrelationships, themes,
problems and possible solutions that arise from its premises,
perspective, and framework, as set out in summary form in the
introduction. It highlights the need for lawyers world-wide to foster a
genuine international approach to their thinking, method, practice and
solutions with regard to international commercial contracting and law.
The conduct of business world-wide is increasingly transnational. It
demands that the legal community keep abreast of and cater for these
needs. Efforts to find solutions to should similarly focus on a
transnational and harmonising direction. The discussion in this paper
concentrates on various aspects that are raised in consequence of this
with regard to: the legal framework available for the international
business community; problems related to further transnationalisation;
and some possible solutions. It is not, however, a mere matter of
choice for the legal community to decide whether or not to take an
interest in this increasingly evident phenomena. The international
business community has the power to find ways to meet their needs
through the expression of their choice in the exercise of their
contractual freedom. In using this power they exert influence on the
conduct of the legal community in a manner which ensures that these
needs are eventually satisfied. The business community subscribes to
the legal framework and services provided by those sensitive to their
needs. Those less sensitive are marginalised and eventually persuaded
of the need to adapt. The results that would be achieved by absolute
freedom of contract, however, are not necessarily the most ideal for
the business community as a whole. As such it is necessary to be
mindful of the limitations of contractual freedom and legislators
should give recognition to this need as well.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="134">
	<ocn>134</ocn>
	<text class="h4">
		Endnote
	</text>
</object>
<object id="135">
	<ocn>135</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		* Lectures on private law aspects of international trade at the Faculty
of Law, University of Troms&#248;, Norway, and created <i>ITL -
International Trade Law Monitor</i> &lt;<link
xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/">http://itl.irv.uit.no/trade_law/</link>&gt;
or &lt;<link xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
xlink:type="simple"
xlink:href="http://tradelaw.net/">http://tradelaw.net/</link>&gt; off
which a large number of the (black letter) legal texts referred to in
this paper are available.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="136">
	<ocn>136</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Thanks are due to Albert Kritzer, the Executive Secretary, Institute of
International Commercial Law, Pace University School of Law and Petri
Keskitalo, Research Fellow, Faculty of Law, University of Troms&#248;,
for reading and commenting on this text in its preparatory stages. The
views expressed here and any remaining errors are my sole
responsibility.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="137">
	<ocn>137</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		URLs are occasionally provided as references. These are subject to
change without notice.
	</text>
</object>
<object id="138">
	<ocn>138</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Endnotes
	</text>
</object>
<object id="139">
	<ocn>139</ocn>
	<text class="norm">
		Endnotes
	</text>
</object>
</body>
</document>

